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Abstract 
Evidentiality is commonly concerned with two basic notions: evidence type and the speaker’s 
commitment towards the truth of the proposition expressed (Chafe and Nichols 1986).  
Throughout a detailed study of the morphosyntax and semantics of deverbal agentives (DAs), 
this dissertation investigates indirect evidentiality and its interaction with two other semantic 
categories, particularly epistemic modality and temporality in Jordanian Arabic (JA). The study 
shows that the semantics and morphosyntax of DAs is far more complex than what has been 
described in the previous literature which mainly focused on the temporal and non-verbal 
features of DAs.  
I propose an indirect evidential account to capture the semantics of DAs. The evidential 
proposal is grounded on a diverse body of evidence which shows that DAs are the hallmark of 
indirect evidentiality in JA. The evidential meaning of DAs is explored with regard to their 
interaction with temporality and epistemic modality. The proposed analysis provides a unified 
account of DAs where the evidential, modal and temporal components are incorporated. I argue 
that the indirect evidence is specified by anterior and posterior temporal relations. I also show 
that evidential DAs trigger a modal reading in their semantics. The modal reading is captured by 
a compositional analysis where DAs are analyzed as quantifiers over possible worlds, adopting 
Kratzer’s possible world theory (1981, 1991). Morphosyntactically, the study calls for a 
reconsideration of the previous categorization of DAs found in the literature (Kremers 2003, 
Mughazy 2004 among others). I defend an alternative evidential categorization of DAs in JA. 
The morphosyntactic analysis also challenges the ‘verbal vs non-verbal’ view of predication in 
Arabic in general and in JA in particular. Based on this fact, I propose an alternative view of 
predication in JA based on a modal vs non-modal rather than a verbal vs non-verbal distinction.   
iv 
 
The empirical findings of the current study have significant implications for the linguistic 
analysis of JA, Arabic dialects, Semitology and evidentiality cross-linguistically. The study 
provides an alternative evidential perspective of the temporal behavior of DAs and specifically 
the temporal problem of DAs which has long dominated the literature on DAs in all Arabic 
dialects. Typologically, the current evidential account suggests that any theory of evidentiality 
should not restrict the requirement of the evidence type to a lexical or morphological 
specification, but include a temporal specification as well. Also, the evidential-modal analysis 
suggests that the type of inferential reading not only includes consequent-state inferential 
readings as assumed in the literature but also result-state inferential readings as well. 
Additionally, the current study is the first attempt to account for evidentiality in Semitology. 
Contrary to the widely held belief in the Semitic literature, this study provides evidence that 
evidentiality does exist as a separate category in at least one Semitic language - JA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
There is much gratitude I owe for those who helped and inspired me throughout the path 
that led to the present dissertation. For all of them I say ‘Thank you’.  I would like to start by 
extending my greatest thanks and gratitude to my advisor Dr. Clifton Pye. My appreciation to 
him is beyond any linguist or language can ever express as he was indeed the greatest linguist 
and friend I have ever known. To him I say ‘I had honor and pleasure to work with you, I will 
never forget you and I will always love you as a friend, and as an inspiring linguist’.  I am also 
indebted to my committee members: Dr. Marc Greenbege, Dr. Utako Minai, Dr. Naima 
Boussofara, Dr. Andrew McKenzie and Dr. John Bricke for their great help, reviews and 
constructive input which enormously contributed to the success of my dissertation. They have 
each influenced the shape of this dissertation in their own way. I owe special thanks to Dr. 
McKenzie who showed interest in my work and guided me throughout writing this dissertation 
by his clever insights and extremely enjoyable discussion on evidentiality and modality. My 
thanks also go to my sponsor, Mutah University, for the financial support of the first four years 
of my study at Kansas University. 
I can never express my gratitude to my family who supported me throughout my doctoral 
study at the States. As a linguist who is supposed to have all the eloquent words, I can find none 
to say to my family to pay them the many thanks they deserve. My family means the world to me 
and the whole world can never pay them back the overwhelming love, support and devotion they 
gave me during my study. All that I am and hope to be, I owe to my father and mother who 
instilled the love of education in me since childhood. Their true love and prayer were my angels 
throughout the difficult times. I can never forget the love and support I had from my sister 
vi 
 
Hadeel, my brothers Ahmad, Ismael and Musab, my sister’s husband Hakim and his son Anas 
and his three daughters Sarah, Malak and Lina. 
To Dima, I say ‘Thank you; thank you for being the most gracious gift in my life. It is 
because of you I have reached a point in my life where I feel it is no longer necessary to impress 
anyone. I found you and that is all I want’.       
Throughout my stay at Lawrence I met the greatest people ever; those whom I will never 
forget and I will always be indebted to. I start with my dearest friends Feras Gosheh, Baha 
Safadi, Ali Muqadam, and Jawad Obaid. To them I say ‘Guys, I love you all, you were a family 
to me, I have never met people like you in my life (I guess I will not), and I could not have 
achieved my dissertation without your help, support and understanding. The memories of all the 
good times and laughs we had together will always be with me. You truly shaped part of my 
character and mentality; and for all of that I will always be there for you as you were always 
there for me.’  
I would like also to express my sincere appreciation to the Jayhawks at the department of 
linguistics at Kansas University who would make such great linguists one day. They all set the 
tone of daily life and discussion: Atef Al-Sarayreh, Rania Al-Agarbeh, Mujdey Abudalbuh, 
Turki Binturki, Hiba Gharib, Emad Alkulaib, Kelly Berkson, Mircea Sauciuc, Ibrahima Ba, 
Alonso Canales, Kristi Bond, Sok-Ju Kim, Khady Tamba, and Pedro Mateo. My warmest 
gratitudes also go to my friend Hesham Aldamen and his family who encouraged me a lot and 
offered help with my tests of language intuition. Special thanks are due to my informants who 
were so generous in offering help and time. 
 
 
vii 
 
A lot of people I met at Lawrence deserve many special thanks as well: Dr. Mahmoud 
Al-Kofahi and his wife, Khalid Al-Kofahi, Mjali Al-Kofahi, Ayman Batayneh, Shaalan Al-
Garni, Mukhtar Al-Twairi, Mahmoud Al-Bishti, Amer Safadi and his wife Haala, Rami Safadi, 
Sami Safadi, Ahmad Muqadam and Abdullah Al-Hmood. I thank them all for the good time and 
the true company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
List of Symbols and Abbreviations…………………………………………………………….. xii 
List of Phonetic Symbols……………..…………………………………………………………xiv 
List of Tables and Figures………………………………………………………………………. xv 
 
Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………………………...1 
 
1.1 Significance of the Study………………………….………………………………………….9 
1.2 Language of the Study……………………………………………………………………….11 
1.3 Methodology…………………………………………………………………………………11 
   1.3.1 Informants……………………………………………………………………………..…12 
   1.3.2 Techniques and Data Collection…………………………………………………………12 
1.4 A Remark on Terminology……………………………………………………………..……14 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation…………………………………………………………………...15 
 
Chapter Two: Review of Related Literature………………………………………………….19 
 
2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..19 
2.2 Approaches to the Temporal Problem of DAs in Arabic……………………………………20 
   2.2.1 The Lexical Aspect Approach…………………………………………………………...20 
   2.2.2 The Formal Aspect Approach……………………………………………………………29 
   2.2.3 The Sub-atomic Semantic Approach…………………………………….…………...….45 
2.3 Previous Studies on Evidentiality in Arabic……………………………………....................67 
2.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...…72 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: Deverbal Agentives in Jordanian Arabic: An Alternative  
                            Morphosyntactic View………………………………………………………73 
                             
3.1 Introduction………………………………………………….………………………………73 
3.2 Morphological Template of DAs……………………………………………………………73 
3.3 DAs as a Mixed Category…………………………………………………………………...74 
3.4 The Non-Verbal Analysis of  DAs ……………………………………………………….....75 
   3.4.1 Stativity vs Agentivity Diagnostics……………………………………………………...77 
   3.4.2 Individual vs Stage Level Predicates………………………………………………….....89 
   3.4.3 Morphsyntactic Diagnostics……………………………………………………………..96 
   3.4.4 The Nominal Classification……………………………………………………………...99 
      3.4.4.1 DAs as Non-Event Nominals……………………………………………………….100 
      3.4.4.2 DAs as Event Nominals…………………………………………………………….102 
   3.4.5 The Adjectival Classification…………………………………………………………...122 
      3.4.5.1 Previous Studies (Kremers 2003, Mughazy 2004, and Al-Agarbeh 2011)………...122 
      3.4.5.2 Against an Adjectival Classification of DAs……………………………………….128  
ix 
 
 
3.5 The Verbal Analysis of DAs ……………………………………………………………….139 
3.6  Predication in JA: An Alternative View…………………………………………………...152 
3.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….157 
 
 
Chapter Four: Semantics of Deverbal Agentives: An Alternative Evidential Account…….159 
 
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...159 
4.2 The Proposal………………………………………………………………………………….160 
4.3 Evidentiality…………………………………………………………………………………..161 
   4.3.1 Definition………………………………………………………………………………....161 
   4.3.2 Evidentiality Classification……………………………………………………………….165 
4.4 DAs as Indirect Evidentials…………………………………………………………………..167 
   4.4.1 Speaker-Dependency……………………………………………………………………..167 
       4.4.1.1 Habituality……………………………………………………………………………168 
       4.4.1.2 Speaker-Oriented Reading: Evidence from Habitual Operator……………………...169 
   4.4.2 Indirect Evidence…………………………………………………………………………176 
       4.4.2.1 Indirect Evidence: Event Not Perceived…………………………………………..…176 
       4.4.2.2 Indirect Evidence: Temporal Specification…………………………………….……179 
   4.4.3 DAs as an Inferential Indirect Evidential…………………………………………………184 
      4.4.3.1 Inferential Indirect Evidence……………………………………………………….…184 
      4.4.3.2 Actuality Entailment Effect…………………………………………………………..185 
      4.4.3.3 Propositional Attitude Predicates: A De-Dicto Reading……………………….…….191 
      4.4.3.4 Inferential Readings: Result-State (RSI) and Consequent-State (CSI) Readings…….198 
      4.4.3.5 More on the Consequent-State Inferential Reading (CSI)……………………………206 
      4.4.3.6 Inferential Contribution of Evidential DAs………………………………………..…210 
   4.4.4 Interim Summary…………………………………………………………………………212 
   4.4.5 Indirect Evidential Predicates in JA……………………………………………………....213 
      4.4.5.1 Indirect Evidence: Event Not Perceived…………………………………………..….214 
      4.4.5.2 Inferential Reading…………………………………………………………………....216 
   4.4.6 Evidential DAs and Mirativity……………………………………………………...…….222 
   4.4.7 Evidential DAs and First Person Effect……………………………………………….….226 
   4.4.8 DAs as Reported Indirect Evidentials…………………………………………………….233 
   4.4.9 The Futurate Interpretation of DAs……………………………………………………….237 
4.5 Passive Participles (PPs)……………………………………………………………………...241 
   4.5.1 Speaker-Dependency: Habitual Interpretation……………………………………………242 
   4.5.2 Indirect Evidence………………………………………………………………………....244 
      4.5.2.1 Event Not Perceived……………………………………………………………….…244 
      4.5.2.2 Temporal Specification……………………………………………………………….245 
   4.5.3 Passive Participles as an Inferential Indirect Evidential………………………………….248 
      4.5.3.1 Result-State vs Consequent-State Inferential Readings………………………………248 
   4.5.4 Mirative Interpretation and First Person Effect…………………………………………..251 
4.6 Evidentiality in Semitology………………………………………………………………..…253 
 
x 
 
4.7 Evidentiality and Temporal Relations………………………………………………………..254 
   4.7.1 Evidential Relative Tense………………………………………………………………...254 
      4.7.1.1 Temporal Framework of Evidential Relative Tense……………………………...…..260 
      4.7.1.2 Semantic Derivation………………………………………………………………..…262 
   4.7.2 Remarks on the Temporal Problem of DAs………………………………………………264 
4.8 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………268 
 
Chapter Five: Indirect Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality……………………………….272 
 
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...272 
5.2 Interaction of Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality…………………………………………273 
   5.2.1 Previous Approaches……………………………………………………………………..273 
5.3 Levels of Meaning: Truth-Conditional vs Non Truth-Conditional…………………………...277 
5.4 Evidential DAs: Propositional or Illocutionary Operators……………………………………279 
   5.4.1 Truth Value Diagnostics………………………………………………………………….281 
      5.4.1.1 Known Truth/Falsity………………………………………………………………….281 
      5.4.1.2 Assent/Dissent………………………………………………………………………...285 
      5.4.1.3 Cancellability of Evidence Requirement……………………………………………..292 
   5.4.2 Embeddability and Scopal Diagnostics…………………………………………………..294 
      5.4.2.1 Embeddability………………………………………………………………………...294 
      5.4.2.2 Scope with Respect to Interrogatives…………………………………………………300 
      5.4.2.3 Scope with Respect to Negation……………………………………………………...303 
   5.4.3 Interim Summary…………………………………………………………………………310 
   5.4.4 Modal Subordination……………………………………………………………………..311 
   5.4.5  The Counterfactual Effect………………………………………………………………..315 
5.5  Possible World Semantics: Kratzer (1981, 1991)……………………………………………319 
   5.5.1 The Modal Base…………………………………………………………………………..320 
   5.5.2  The Ordering Source……………………………………………………………………..322 
5.6  Modal Analysis of Evidential DAs…………………………………………………………..325 
   5.6.1  Possible World Semantics: Application……………………………………………….…325 
      5.6.1.1 The Modal Base………………………………………………………………………326 
      5.6.1.2 The Ordering Source……………………………………………………………….…331 
   5.6.2 Compositional Analysis…………………………………………………………………..336 
      5.6.2.1 Semantic Formalization………………………………………………………………336 
      5.6.2.2 Temporal Incorporation………………………………………………………………338 
      5.6.2.3 Semantic Derivation………………………………………………………………….344 
5.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………350 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion, Implications and Further Research……………………………352 
 
6.1 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………352 
6.2 Implications of the Study…………………………………………………………………..358 
6.3 Further Research…………………………………………………………………………...363 
 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………...…365 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
List of Symbols and Abbreviations: 
  
JA = Jordanian Arabic    t  =     Time  
MSA = Modern Standard Arabic                                ERs  =     Event Arguments 
CA = Classical Arabic                                             w  =     World 
RSI = Result-State Inferential                                  w'  =     Possible World 
CSI = Consequent-State Inferential                         w*  =     Real World  
DAs = Deverbal Agentives                                        f(w)  =     Modal Base 
DAPs = Deverbal Active Participles                           g(w)  =     Ordering Source 
APs = Active Participles                                           ST  =     Stereotypical 
PPs = Passive Participles                                          Dox  =     Doxatic 
EAT = Evidence Acquisition Time                            S  =     Speech Time                                              
R = Accessibility Relation                                     Epis  =     Epistemic                                                                                                                     
s = State                                                                MASC  =     Masculine                                                                                  
E/e = Event Variable                                                FEM  =     Feminine 
EV = Evidential Operator                                         NOM  =     Nominative       
R = Reference Time                                               ACC  =     Accusative 
TT = Topic Time                                                      PERF  =     Perfective 
SAO = Speaker’s Awareness Origio                           IMPERF =     Imperfective    
PS = Post-State                                                         SING         =     Singular 
P = Prejacent                                                          PL             =     Plural   
P = Proposition                                                      1                =     First Person   
T = Time of described eventuality                         2               =     Second Person  
TU = Time of Utterance                                            3               =    Third Person                                          
xiii 
 
 CENs  = Complex Event Nominals  
∩  = Intersection 
 ⊆  = Subset 
 |  |  = Cardinality 
 #  = Semantically Unacceptable 
 *  = Grammatically Unacceptable 
 p↔q  = Mutual Entailment 
 ¬p↔q = Lack of Mutual Entailment 
 ¬  = Negative Operator 
 X  = Speaker 
 i  = Index 
=  = Equal 
≠  = Not Equal 
∀  = Universal Quantifier 
∃  = Existential Quantifier 
◇  = Possibility Operator 
□  = Necessity Operator 
    
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
List of Phonetic Symbols: 
 
Symbol                             IPA           Description 
 
‘  Ɂ  Glottal stop 
Dh  ð  Voiced dental fricative 
 
th  ɵ   Voiceless dental fricative 
 
j ʤ  Voiced palato-alveolar affricate 
 
tsh ʧ  Voiceless palato-alveolar affricate 
 
3 ʕ  Voiced pharyngeal fricative 
 
H  ħ  Voiceless pharyngeal fricative 
 
gh γ  Voiced uvular fricative 
 
x  x  Voiceless uvular fricative 
 
sh  ʃ  Voiceless post-alveolar  fricative 
 
D ð
ʕ  
Voiced interdental fricative (emphatic) 
 
S s
ʕ
   Voiceless alveolar fricative (emphatic) 
 
T  t
ʕ
   Voiceless alveolar stop (emphatic) 
 
z  d
ʕ  
Voiced alveolar stop (emphatic)    
 
q q  Voiceless uvular stop 
 
y  j   Voiceless palatal approximant 
 
w w  Voiceless palatal velar 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
List of Tables and Figures 
1. Tables 
Chapter One: 
Table (1): Informants of the study: demographic information…………………………….. ……12 
 
Chapter Two: 
Table (1):  Brustad’s Classification of Lexical Aspect and the Participles………………... ……25 
 
Chapter Three: 
Table (1): Morphological Templates of DAs………………………………………………. ……74 
Table (2): Grimshaw’s Classification of Nominals…………………………………………….103 
Table (3): Grimshaw’s Diagnostics of Complex Event and Result Nominals…………………105 
Table (4): DAs and Result Nominals………………………………..………………………….106 
Table (5): DAs and Masader (CENs)…………………………………………………………...114 
Table (6): Three-way Classification of Predicates in JA (first version)………………………..152 
Table (7): Three-way Classification of Predicates in JA (final version)……………………….156 
 
Chapter Five: 
Table (1): Propositional vs Illocutionary Analyses based on the Level of Meaning Diagnostics..279 
Table (2) Diagnostics Results for St’át’imcets, Quechua and DAs evidentials………………….311 
Table (3) The Ordering of Possible Worlds According to the Propositions in g(w)……………..323 
 
 
xvi 
 
 2. Figures 
 
Chapter Two: 
Figure (1):  Prospective and Retrospective Present (Flieschman 1982)…………………………46 
 
Figure (2):  Prospective and Retrospective Present (Belazi1993)……………………………….47 
 
 
Chapter Three: 
Figure (1): Alternative View of Predication in JA (first version)………………………………153 
Figure (2): Alternative View of Predication in JA (final version)……………………………...156 
 
 
Chapter Four: 
Figure (1): Willett’s Classification of Evidentiality Types……………………………………….165 
Figure (2): Anterior vs Posterior Temporal Relations of DAs …………………………………..180 
Figure (3): Modified Version of the Anterior vs Posterior Temporal Relations of DAs ………...182 
Figure (4): Temporal and Inferential Indirect Evidence (Anterior Relation)…………………….208 
Figure (5): Temporal and Inferential Indirect Evidence (Posterior Relation)……………………209 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
  
Evidentiality is commonly concerned with two basic notions: evidence type and the 
speaker’s commitment towards the truth of the proposition expressed (Chafe and Nichols 1986). 
The former notion specifies the source of information the speaker uses to base his claim upon 
which includes direct, indirect (inference) and hearsay evidence (Aikhenvald 2004). The latter 
notion, on the other hand, subsumes evidentiality under the realm of epistemic modality where a 
proposition is possibly or necessarily true. That is, it views evidentiality as encoding the 
speaker’s attitude towards his knowledge of reality.  
Cross-linguistically, the notion of evidentiality has been investigated relatively recently. 
Most of the previous studies of evidentiality have shown that evidential interpretations arise from 
separate expressions i.e. either lexical or morphological expressions (Garrett 2001, Faller 2002, 
Aikhenvald 2004, Matthewson et al. 2007, Peterson 2010, and others). For example, in Turkish 
direct and indirect evidence are indicated morphologically (Şener 2011). In past events where the 
speaker has direct evidence (i.e. the speaker perceived the event), the morpheme [-DI] is used 
(1a). However, when indirect evidence is obtained (i.e. the speaker did not perceive the event), 
the morpheme [-mIs] is used (1b). 
(1)  
(a) Ev       kirmizi-ydi. 
house  red-COP-past-DIR.EV-3SG 
‘Speaker has direct evidence that the house is red.’   
                                                                         (Direct Evidence/ Şener 2011: 10) 
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(b) Adam anla-mis. 
man    understand-past-INDIR.EV-3SG 
‘It was reported to the speaker that / the speaker inferred that the man    
 understood/has understood.’                                                    
                                                                     (Indirect Evidence/ Şener 2011:11) 
      
In this dissertation, I investigate indirect evidentiality and its interaction with modality 
and temporality in Jordanian Arabic (JA). Indirect evidentiality in JA deviates from previous 
studies of evidentiality (in which the distinction between direct and indirect evidence is specified 
lexically or morphologically) in that the type of evidence is specified temporally. I argue that the 
indirect evidence requirement in JA is a result of two temporal relations: anterior and posterior 
temporal relations between the time of the event and the evidence acquisition time (EAT, 
following Lee 2011). An anterior temporal relation corresponds to a post-state reading (2a), and 
a posterior temporal relation corresponds to a futurate reading (2b); both readings are denoted by 
Deverbal Agentives (DAs) in JA. I propose that DAs are the exemplary structure of indirect 
evidentiality in JA. 
(2)  
(a) sarah   msawieh    el-‘akil. 
Sarah   make-DA  the-food 
‘Sarah has made the food.’         
                                                             (Post-state reading: anterior relation) 
 
(b) ‘anas  jaay           bukrah. 
Anas  travel-DA tomorrow 
‘Anas is coming/ is going to come tomorrow.’ 
     
                                                             (Futurate reading: posterior relation) 
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The proposed evidential analysis assumes that the anterior and posterior temporal 
relations of DAs trigger an inferential reading as well: the fact that the event is anterior or 
posterior to the EAT guarantees that the speaker does not perceive the event; rather s/he infers it. 
The inferential interpretation is accounted for by providing a compositional modal analysis of 
evidential DAs where DAs are analyzed as quantifiers over possible worlds, adopting Kratzer’s 
possible world theory (1981, 1991) and by incorporating the temporal component into the modal 
denotation of DAs. The proposed modal analysis captures that the proposition in the scope of the 
evidential implication of DAs is true in a set of possible (accessible) worlds which I call the 
speaker’s belief worlds rather than the actual world.  
Evidentiality is a new topic in Semitology as shown by the scarcity of studies on 
evidentiality in Semitic languages. The reason behind this fact is the long held belief that a 
category of evidentiality does not exist in Semitic languages (Isaksson 2000, Aikhenvald 2004 
among others). Until now there has not been a single study that provides a comprehensive and 
detailed semantic analysis of evidentiality in any Semitic language. The current work is the first 
attempt to account for evidentiality not only in Arabic but in Semitology in general. The 
contribution of the proposed evidential account is achieved by the fact that active and passive 
participle constructions in JA, a Semitic language, are argued to be the hallmark of indirect 
evidentiality. This provides compelling evidence for the first time that evidentiality exists as a 
separate category in Semitology.  
In order to investigate indirect evidentiality and its interaction with temporality and 
modality in JA, I discuss the semantics and morphosyntax of deverbal agentives (DAs) which I 
view as an exemplary structure of indirect evidentiality in JA. In the current work, I propose that 
DAs are indirect evidentials that express indirect evidence (which is specified temporally) and a 
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modal inferential reading. Most of the previous approaches to the semantics of DAs in Arabic 
(the lexical aspect approach of Holes 2004 and Brusad 2000 among others; the formal aspect 
approach of Mitchell and El-Hassan 1994, Boneh 2004 and others; and the sub-atomic approach 
of Kinberg 1992 and Mughazy 2004) were centrally concerned with accounting for the varied 
temporal and aspectual interpretations of DAs. For example, these approaches attempted to 
account for the temporal problem of verbless sentences with DAs in Arabic. Verbless sentences 
in Arabic have always been accounted for as encoding a present default reading that is licensed 
by a null copula. When verbless sentences encode past or future reading, an overt copular verbs 
kaan ‘was/were’ or ykoon ‘be’ are used to express these temporal readings respectively. 
However, unlike all other verbless sentences, those with DAs have varied temporal readings in 
that they license temporal adverbials that belong to different time specifications without the need 
of overt copular verbs (Mughazy 2004). For example, sentence (3) licenses the present temporal 
adverbial delwa’ti ‘now’, while those in (4) and (5) license the past adverbial embareH 
‘yesterday’ and the future adverbial bukra ‘tomorrow’ respectively without the need of an overt 
copular verb; (Examples taken from Egyptian Arabic, Mughazy 2004:5). 
(3) mona   nayma       delwa’ti. 
Mona  sleep-DA   now 
‘Mona is asleep now. 
 
(4) ‘ana  kaatib        eg-gawaab  embareH. 
I        write-DA  the-letter     yesterday 
‘I wrote the letter yesterday.’ 
 
(5) ‘ana misaafer     bukra. 
I       travel-DA  tomorrow 
‘I  am going to travel tomorrow.’ 
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Furthermore, the previous approaches have attempted to account for why sentences with 
DAs vary in terms of their aspectual readings. The problem that arises with these aspectual 
readings is that there is no verbal component in these sentences to license the different aspectual 
readings of DAs and that DAs maintain the same morphological template in all of these readings. 
Examples (6-8) are illustrative; (Egyptian Arabic, Mughazy 2004). 
(6) 3ali saakin     fe el-beet       da. 
Ali  live-DA  in the-house  this 
‘Ali lives in this house.’ 
 
(7) nadir     mashi        hinaak  ‘ahoh. 
Nader   walk-DA   there     now right 
‘Nader is walking over there right now.’ 
 
(8) mona   lissa  mixallaSa  el-wageb. 
Mona   just   finish-DA  the-homework 
‘Mona has just finished the homework.’ 
 
Sentence (6) has a present simple reading, sentence (7) a present progressive reading, while (8) 
has a present perfect reading. 
In the current study, I provide a theoretical and empirical criticism of these approaches as 
will be discussed in chapter 2. One of the prevailing shortcomings of these approaches, for 
instance, is that none of these approaches has explored or accounted for the evidential 
interpretation of DAs as exemplified by the sentences under (9 and 10).  
(9)  
(a) majdi     Saaf         es-sayarah, bs  (mumkin)  ‘aHmad (elli)   Safh-a. 
Majdi    park-DA  the-car,       but (maybe)    Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but Ahmad did/Ahmad might have done it.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’ 
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(b) majdi     Saf              es-sayarah,# bs  (mumkin) ‘aHmad (elli)    Safh-a. 
Majdi    park-PERF  the-car,#       but (maybe)   Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but Ahmad did/Ahmad might have done it. 
 
 
(10)  
(a) ‘ana sheft  sarah   msawieh   el-ma3mool, bs   ma sheftha lamma sawwat-uh. 
I      see     Sarah  make-DA  the-dessert,   but not  see       when   make-PERF-it 
‘I saw Sarah had already made the dessert, but I did not see her making it.’ 
 
(b) ‘ana sheft sarah   sawwat         el-ma3mool, # bs   ma sheftha lamma  sawwat-uh. 
I      see    Sarah  PERF-make  the-dessert, #   but not see        when    make-PERF-it 
‘I saw Sarah making the dessert, but I did not see her making it.’         
 
Contra to the perfective in (9b), the sentence with a DA (9a) survives the actuality entailment test 
which asserts that the proposition is true in an irrealis world (i.e. modal component) rather than 
the actual world. In (10a), a DA is allowed in a context where the speaker did not perceive the 
event contra to the perfective in (10b). These sentences pose a challenge to the previous semantic 
approaches of DAs in Arabic in that none of them has either explored or accounted for such 
problematic cases. Sentences (9 and 10) show that the semantic behavior of DAs is different 
from the semantics of the perfective verbal form. The contrast between the semantics of DAs and 
other verbal forms such as the perfective and imperfective has been undetected by most of these 
approaches. The current work provides an alternative evidential-modal account to capture the 
semantic behavior of DAs shown in (9a) and (10a). It also provides an explanation for the 
semantic contrast between DAs and other verbal predicates in JA such the perfective and 
imperfective verbal forms. Additionally, the proposed evidential analysis accounts for the 
temporal and aspectual behavior of the DAs from an alternative evidential perspective. DAs have 
other semantic features that are problematic for the previous approaches which will be further 
discussed in chapter 2.  
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Morphosyntactically, DA predicates are a mixed category that exhibits both verbal and 
non-verbal (i.e. nominal and adjectival) properties. The fact that DAs have mixed verbal and 
non-verbal properties has led to the assumption that DAs can be classified as either non-verbal 
predicates (i.e. nominal, adjectival and complex adjectival predicates) or verbal predicates.  
Under the non-verbal analysis, the major argument for categorizing DAs as nominals 
comes from the definiteness property.  Definiteness is a distinguishing feature of nominals in 
Arabic that sets them apart from other non-nominals (i.e. verbal predicates). In Arabic, all 
nominals can be either definite or non-definite as shown in (11a and b).  
(11)  
(a) sami shaarak                                      fee  es-sbaag. 
Sami participate-PERF.3SG.MASC  in   the race 
‘Sami has participated in the race.’  
 
(b) sami sharaak                                      fee sbaag   el-thaHieh. 
Sami participate-PERF.3SG.MASC  in   race    the-city 
‘Sami has participated in city race.’ 
 
However, DAs are only grammatical when they are indefinite as shown by the 
grammaticality of (12a) and the ungrammaticality of (12b) where the DA Saayim ‘fast (DA)’ is 
used with the definite article el ‘the’. 
(12)  
(a) ‘ana  Saayim    bukrah. 
I       fast-DA   tomorrow 
‘I am fasting/going to fast tomorrow.’ 
 
                 (b)* ‘ana  el-Saayim    bukrah. 
                         I       the-fast-DA tomorrow 
                         ‘I am the fasting/going to fast tomorrow.’ 
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I argue that the definiteness property is a sufficient argument against the nominal 
classification of DAs due to the fact that definiteness is a denominating feature of all nominals in 
Arabic including event and non-event nominals.  
DAs have been classified as verbal predicates as well. However, a closer look at DA’s 
morphosyntactic behavior, namely the property of person agreement, calls for a reconsideration 
of this claim. The property of person agreement is a denominating feature of the verbal category 
in Arabic which distinguishes them from non-verbal categories where only number and gender 
agreement is marked. The fact that DAs violate this typical feature of verbs in Arabic clearly 
suggests that DAs cannot be categorized as verbal predicates (Mughazy 2004 and Boneh 2004, 
2005 and 2010).  
The most recent approach to the morphosyntactic categorization of DAs is the (complex) 
adjectival approach which has been proposed under the non-verbal analysis (Kremers 2003 and 
Mughazy 2004). The same argument has also been extended to DAs in JA as proposed by Al-
Agarbeh (2011). For example, Mughazy (2004) claims that the major argument in support of the 
adjectival analysis comes from the fact that DAs can be used in comparative and superlative 
contexts in which only adjectival predicates are licensed as shown in (13); (Mughazy 2004: 53). 
(13) ‘Hna ‘a’dar                         min-ak     3ala Hal       el-mushkila   di. 
we     become able to-DA  from-you  on   solving  the-problem  this 
‘We are better able to solve this problem than you.’  
 
I argue that this argument is incomplete and based on a very limited set of data. In fact, 
the only permissible DA structure in comparative contexts is the dynamic modal gaadir ‘can/be 
able to’ as shown in sentence (13). No other DA forms are attested in these contexts; not only in 
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JA but in most dialects of Arabic as well. Consider sentences (14a and b) where the DA forms 
are used in comparative contexts, yet the utterances yield ungrammaticality. 
(14) 
     (a)* sami ‘aakal           li-tufaaHa     min-ak. 
            Sami eat-COMP   to-the-apple  than-you 
            ‘Sami is more eating to the apple than you.’ 
  
     (b)* sami  ‘aftaH            la-l-baab      min-ak. 
            Sami open-COMP  to-the-door  than-you 
            ‘Sami is more opening to the door than you.’ 
 
 
Based on these facts, I argue that DAs are problematic for all the previous verbal and 
non-verbal analyses. In this work, I defend an alternative categorization of DAs which has 
recently been categorized in the literature as adjectival predicates (Kremers 2003, Mughazy 
2004, Al-Agarbeh 2011 among others). I also attempt to present an alternative perspective of the 
conventional dichotomy of predication in Arabic in general and in JA in particular which is 
based on the ‘verbal vs non-verbal’ distinction. The motivation for this alternative view comes 
from the fact that this conventional view fails to account for the mixed and intermediate 
morphosyntactic behavior of DAs which exhibits both non-verbal vs verbal properties. 
 
1.1 Significance of the Study 
The current study has significant implications for the literature on JA, Arabic dialects, 
Semitology and the typology of evidentiality. First, this study is the first attempt to account for 
evidentiality not only in Arabic but in Semitology in general. In Semitology, evidentiality is a 
totally new topic as shown by the scarcity of studies on evidentiality in Semitic languages. 
Semiticists have long held that evidentiality as a separate category does not actually exist in 
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Semitic languages (Isaksson 2000). Contrary to this belief, I show that participle constructions 
are the hallmark of the evidential category in JA, which is a Semitic language.  
Second, this study provides an alternative evidential account for the semantics of DAs. 
This evidential analysis differs from all of the previous approaches cited in the literature on 
Arabic dialects where the central concern was only to account for the temporal and aspectual 
interpretations of DAs. It also accounts for the temporal problem of DAs from an alternative 
evidential viewpoint and provides new perspectives on the temporal relations in JA, especially 
the incorporation of evidence acquisition time (EAT, following Lee 2011) into the temporal 
relations in JA and the evidential relative tense analysis. 
Typologically, the current work contributes to the existing literature of evidentiality in 
many regards. I show that the type of evidence in JA is specified temporally not lexically or 
morphologically as always assumed in the typology of evidentiality. Moreover, this study is one 
of the few to provide a unified account of indirect evidentiality where not only the evidential and 
modal components are used but the temporal component is incorporated as well. While the 
proposed evidential-modal analysis provides further typological support for the close overlap 
between evidentiality and epistemic modality (Izvorski 1997, Matthewson et al. 2007, McCready 
and Ogata 2007, Peterson 2010, Lee 2011 and others), it also shows that the type of inferential 
reading is not only restricted to consequent-state inferential readings as previously proposed in 
the literature but also to result-state inferential readings as well.  
Fourth, the current study proposes an alternative morphosyntactic view of the categorical 
status of DAs in JA. It shows that DAs constitute a major challenge to the conventional ‘verbal 
vs non-verbal’ view of predication in Arabic in general and in JA in particular. Based on this 
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fact, I defend an alternative view of predication in JA based on a modal vs non-modal rather than 
a verbal vs non-verbal distinction.  
1.2 Language of the Study 
The current study investigates indirect evidentiality and its interaction with modality and 
temporality based on data taken from Jordanian Arabic (JA). Jordanian Arabic is a Levant dialect 
of Arabic spoken in the country of Jordan. JA belongs to the South-Central Semitic languages, 
most closely related to Aramaic, Amharic, Hebrew, Ugaritic and Phoenician (cf. Comrie 1987). 
JA is used as a spoken variety in all the regions of Jordan. JA, as a spoken variety in informal 
settings, coexists with another variety, Standard Arabic which is mainly used in formal settings 
such as the media, academic settings, etc… (Ferguson 1959, El-Hassan 1977, Mitchell 1978 
among others). 
 
1.3 Methodology  
The data presented in the current study are based on JA. The semantic field work 
methodology adopted in this study for data elicitation comprises natural conversation and formal 
elicitation techniques (Mathewson et al. 2004 and Peterson 2010). These two techniques were 
used to elicit data for the semantic and morphosyntactic analyses of this study.  It is worth 
mentioning that the current study is the first to account for the semantics of evidentiality in 
Semitology with no other previous studies, therefore I proceeded on virgin soil with regard to the 
techniques and methods used for elicitation of the meaning of evidentials in the current study. I 
followed some of the methodologies adopted by previous and seminal studies of evidentiality in 
other languages such as Mathewson et al. (2004) and Peterson (2010). 
 
12 
 
1.3.1 Informants 
Data were collected from 125 native speakers of JA representing all of the regions in 
Jordan. The motivation for including speakers from all parts of Jordan is to assure that the 
current semantic account is applicable to JA regardless of the region where it is used. All the 
informant information along with their regions, gender, age and number is given in Table (1). 
There were no discernible differences with regards to the intuition of these speakers in both the 
semantic and morphosyntactic elicitation tests.   
  
Table (1) Informants of the study: demographic information 
Age Range Gender 
  Region 
 
South                    Center                  North 
 [Karak, Ma’an]      [Amman, Salt]            [Irbid] 
Total 
20s Female 
Male 
       12                             8                                  5 
       12                             6                                  7 
25 
25 
30s Female 
Male 
       11                             7                                  5 
       12                             6                                  4 
23 
22 
40s Female 
Male 
        5                              4                                  4 
        6                              6                                  5 
13 
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1.3.2 Techniques and Data Collection 
There have been three major techniques used for semantic elicitation in this study. The 
primary technique was to provide JA native speakers with a variety of contexts that target the 
evidential and modal meanings and then ask them to choose the appropriate sentence that 
adequately describes the context at hand. The sentences that were introduced to the speakers 
include sentences with DAs, passive participles, perfective and imperfective verbal forms. The 
following is an illustrative example. 
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(15) Context: Majdi is smoking outside while Sami is working on his laptop inside. Suddenly,   
               Majdi sees two kids start to fight and Majdi is watching them. Sami hears the   
               noise from inside and then asks Majdi who is still watching them fighting: 
 
Sami: what is this noise outside? 
 
Majdi: (a) fii wlaad   thneen ga3deen                bethawashu. 
in  kid-PL two      IMPERF.PART    IMPERF-fight.3PL.MASC 
‘There are two kids fighting.’ 
(b) fii wlaad   thneen mithawashiin. 
in  kid-PL two      fight-DA 
‘There are two kids have fought.’ 
 
 
The speaker is presented with this context and then asked which sentence, sentence (a) with a 
DA or (b) with an imperfective form, s/he chooses to adequately describe the context given in 
(15).  
 Another technique that was used to collect data for the semantic analysis is the 
acceptability judgment task. This task is crucial for the semantic analysis since it includes the 
intuition of the native speakers of the evidential and modal meanings under examination. In this 
task, JA speakers were introduced with pairs of sentences describing the same context and then 
were asked which sentence is semantically felicitous. The sentences given under (16) are 
illustrative example. 
(16)  
(a) ‘ana sheft  3ali   raakib     el-baaaS,  bs   ma sheftu-h  lamma  rakbu-uh. 
I       see   Ali     ride-DA  the-bus,    but  not see-him  when    ride-it 
‘I saw Ali had already ridden the bus, but I did not see him ride it.’ 
 
(b) ‘ana sheft  3ali  rakib           el-baaaS,#   bs  ma  sheftu-h  lamma  rakbu-uh. 
I      see    Ali    ride-PERF  the-bus,  #   but not  see-him  when    ride-it 
‘I saw Ali (when he) rode the bus, but I did not see him ride it.’ 
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 The third method I implemented for the sake of the semantic analysis was to record 
natural telephone conversations for JA native speakers in informal settings. This method 
afforded me the chance to observe how JA speakers use DAs in a variety of contexts without the 
interference of the researcher. It also provided me with instances of the use of DAs in reported 
contexts especially hearsay reportive where the speaker is reporting incidents via a third party. 
This information was crucial to account for the reportive use of DAs as part of its indirect 
evidential interpretation. 
 In addition to testing the semantic acceptability of utterances that are essential for the 
evidential and modal accounts, the current study also implemented tasks to elicit data for the 
morphosyntactic analysis. To this end, I used a grammaticality judgment task where JA speakers 
were asked to evaluate the given sentences from grammatically acceptable, awkward and 
grammatically unacceptable. In this task I used a variety of contexts where I applied the nominal, 
adjectival and verbal properties to DAs in order to test the acceptability of the sentences with 
DAs with each of these features. The following is an illustrative example taken from this task. 
(17)  
(a) el-banaat     3aamlaat          keik. 
the-girl-PL  do-DA-SPL     cake 
‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
(b) *el-banaat     3ummal          keik. 
 the-girl-PL   do-DA-IPL    cake 
‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
 
 
1.4 A Remark on Terminology 
In this dissertation I discuss the semantics and morphosyntax of deverbal agentives 
(DAs) as an exemplary structure of indirect evidentiality in JA. DAs are the major domain of 
inquiry in this work. DAs are also known in the literature of Arabic as active participles (APs) or 
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deverbal active participles (DAPs). Throughout this dissertation, I equate deverbal agentives 
(DAs) and (deverbal) active participles (DAPs/APs) and use them interchangeably. The 
motivation for referring to DAPs/APs as DAs is to draw attention to the agentivity of DAs which 
was overlooked in the literature of Arabic. Based on the modal analysis of DAs advocated in this 
study, I show that the agentivity of DAs is only a matter of inference. 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two reviews the previous literature on 
the semantics of DAs and evidentiality in the dialects of Arabic and Semitology. This chapter is 
divided into two sections. In section one I survey the previous approaches to the semantics of 
DAs in the dialects of Arabic. These approaches include the lexical aspect approach, the formal 
aspect approach and the sub-atomic semantic approach. All these approaches were mainly 
concerned with accounting for the varied temporal and aspectual interpretations of DAs. I lay out 
the major arguments of these approaches and then provide a theoretical and empirical criticism 
of them. I also show that all these approaches fail to account for the evidential interpretations of 
DAs in JA. In section two, I discuss the most related studies of evidentiality in Arabic and 
Semitic languages. 
Chapter Three explores the morphosyntactic properties of DAs in JA. In this chapter I 
present the morphological template of DAs and show how DAs exhibit a mixed morphosyntactic 
behavior of verbal and non-verbal properties. The chapter also discusses verbal vs non-verbal 
predication in JA and then provides compelling evidence showing that this conventional view 
fails to account for the mixed and intermediate behavior of DAs which exhibit both non-verbal 
vs verbal properties. The last section in the chapter argues for an alternative view of predication 
in JA based on a modal vs non-modal rather than verbal vs non-verbal dichotomy. Under the 
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alternative view of predication, I argue that DAs belong to an evidential category. I provide 
evidence for this categorization based on the behavior of passive participles in JA as well. 
Chapter four proposes an alternative indirect evidential account to capture the semantics 
of DAs in JA contra to the previous literature. The evidential proposal is grounded on an ample 
and diverse body of evidence which shows that the interpretation of DAs reflects the semantics 
of indirect evidentiality. The chapter shows that DAs have the three basic features of indirect 
evidentiality: speaker-dependency, indirect evidence and speaker’s attitude towards the 
proposition expressed i.e. a modal component. I show that speaker dependency is evident from 
the contrast in meaning between DAs and the imperfective under habitual readings. The evidence 
comes from the fact that the habitual interpretation with DAs is anchored to the speaker rather 
than to the subject as evident from the entailment test. 
 I argue that DAs introduce an indirect evidence requirement similar to indirect evidentials 
i.e. the speaker did not directly perceive the event. The argument is based on the fact that DAs 
are acceptable under a cancelation test that negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker 
and that DAs are not acceptable in contexts where the speaker perceives the event itself. 
However, both imperfective and perfective are acceptable when the speaker perceived the event. 
Typologically, I show that DAs in JA introduce a temporal contribution to the indirect evidence 
requirement: the indirect evidence is specified temporally rather than morphologically or 
lexically. In this regard, JA differs from other evidential languages where direct and indirect 
evidence is specified by separate morphemes.  
The chapter discusses how DAs trigger result-state (RSI) and consequent-state (CSI) 
inferential readings. A RSI inferential reading indicates that there is an entailment between the 
state (i.e. evidence) and the event, and therefore a speaker can only target event arguments (ERs) 
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in his or her inference and the inference about the event itself is blocked. In the CSI inferential 
reading, the lack of entailment allows inference to target the event. By this meaning, DAs differ 
from other inferential evidential systems cross-linguistically where only a CSI reading is 
triggered; no RSI reading has been attested in these systems.  
 Chapter four also analyzes how DAs pattern with other inferential evidential predicates 
(evidential proper) such as shakluh ‘it looks like’ in JA. I probed the evidential meaning of DAs 
further by claiming that DAs express a mirative reading and show sensitivity to the first person; 
these are one of the notable semantic extensions of indirect evidentiality cross-linguistically 
(Aikhenvald 2004). Contrary to perfectives and imperfectives, only DAs are felicitous in 
contexts where a mirative interpretation is expressed; also only DAs show sensitivity to first 
person. In addition, DAs are used as reported evidentials where JA speakers employ DAs to 
communicate the lack of direct evidence contrary to perfectives and imperfectives.  
The chapter concludes by extending the indirect evidential proposal to account for the 
semantics of passive participles (PPs) in JA. Based on this extension, I conclude that active and 
passive participles are the hallmark of evidentiality in JA. This conclusion poses a challenge to 
the belief in the literature of Semitology where it is assumed that evidentiality as a separate 
category does not actually exist in Semitic languages.  
Chapter five examines the interaction of indirect evidentiality and epistemic modality. It 
provides a formal semantic account of the modal reading of DAs based on Kratzer’s possible 
worlds theory (1981, 1991). In this regard, the modal analysis of evidential DAs lends 
typological support for the close overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality. It also 
provides further support for the indirect evidential account of DAs advocated in chapter 4.  
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In this chapter I argue that the results of the diagnostics of the level of meaning show that 
DAs pattern with epistemic modals and modal evidentials and not with non-modal or 
illocutionary evidentials. Further support for the modal analysis is provided based on the 
interaction of DAs and modal subordination and the behavior of DAs in counterfactual copular 
contexts. Therefore, it is concluded that a modal analysis would account for the behavior of 
evidential DAs. On the basis of the empirical findings of these diagnostics, I analyze DAs as 
quantifiers over possible worlds where the modal base includes the indirect evidence and the 
ordering source ranks the accessible worlds and picks out the most ideal world depending on 
what the speaker knows at the evidence acquisition time. I also incorporate the temporal 
component in the modal analysis of DAs since anterior and posterior temporal relations are 
essential to the establishment of the indirect evidence requirement and consequently to the 
inferential reading of DAs. 
Chapter six concludes the dissertation. This chapter summarizes the main findings of the 
previous chapters. It also discusses the implications of these findings for the research of JA, 
Arabic dialects and typology of evidentiality. The last section provides directions for further 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Chapter Two 
 Review of Related Literature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The present chapter surveys the theoretical and descriptive approaches to the semantics of 
Dverbal Agentives (DAs) in Arabic. It also provides a comprehensive criticism of these analyses. 
Previous approaches to DAs are centrally concerned with two major issues. First, the literature 
on DAs in Arabic is mainly concerned with providing explanation of the temporal behavior of 
DAs which has long intrigued the previous studies on DAs. The temporal problem of DAs is 
concerned with the varied temporal interpretations licensed by DAs in the absence of an overt 
copula unlike other verbless sentences. The second issue addresses the different aspectual 
reading of DAs. These issues will be discussed under three main approaches: the lexical aspect 
approach, the formal aspect approach and the subatomic semantic approach. None of the 
approaches reviewed here accounts for the evidential semantics encoded by DAs as proposed in 
the current work. 
This chapter also includes a tentative survey of previous studies on evidentiality in 
Arabic. Evidentiality is a totally new topic in Semitology as shown by the scarcity of studies on 
evidentiality in Semitic languages. There is not a single study that provides a comprehensive and 
detailed semantic analysis of evidentiality in Semitic languages. The reason behind this fact is a 
long held belief that evidentiality as a category does not actually exist in Semitic languages. The 
current work is the first attempt to account for evidentiality not only in Arabic but in Semitology 
as well. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section two surveys the temporal approaches of 
DAs in Arabic. This section is divided as follows; in sub-section one I present the main 
arguments advocated by the lexical aspect approach to account for the semantics of DAs. Sub-
section two provides a review of some studies that address the semantics of DAs from the 
perspective of viewpoint aspect approach. In sub-section three, I review the most seminal works 
that have been done under subatomic approach (Kinberg 1992 and Mughazy 2004). Section three 
presents previous studies of evidentiality on Arabic and Semitic languages, mainly Hebrew. 
Section four concludes the chapter.  
 
 2.2 Approaches to the Temporal Problem of DAs in Arabic 
 
    2.2.1 The Lexical Aspect Approach 
 
In this section I review previous studies that discuss semantics of DAs from a lexical 
aspect viewpoint. Most of the studies within this approach base their arguments on the 
assumption that the lexical aspectual properties of the verbs from which DAs are derived play a 
central role in determining the temporal and varied aspectual interpretations of DAs (Al-Najjar 
1984, El-Bakry 1990, Brustad 2000, Holes 2004 among others). Below I discuss the most 
relevant studies in this approach. 
Holes (2004) argues that the temporal specifications of DAs are based on the lexical 
aspect properties of the verbal base of the derived DA. According to him, finite verbs and DAs in 
Arabic receive their temporal readings by the context.  He claims that DAs have no intrinsic 
temporal or finite features in their structure similar to finite verbs in Arabic. He argues that these 
findings are valid in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the dialects of Arabic as well. In MSA, 
the DA of dynamic verbs often indicate a futurate reading relative to the time of utterance as 
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shown in example (1) below. However, the DA of stative verbs often expresses a situation 
simultaneous to the time of utterance as shown in example (2). Examples are takes from Holes 
(2004: 220). 
(1)  ‘alHarbu  waqe3atuun   la   maHala. 
 the-war    happen-DA   no   avoid 
 ‘War will break out , inevitably.’ 
 
(2)  ‘nni muSaddequka. 
 I      believe-DA-you 
 ‘I believe you.’ 
 
 
Holes (2004) argues that the imperfective form of the verb (which he labels the p-stem) 
can be used interchangeably with the DAs in sentences (1) and (2) above. The same finding 
holds for the perfective form (which he labels the s-stem) when used as a substitute of DA in (2). 
In the absence of time adverbs, only the DA in sentence (1) allows, out of context, a present and 
futurate readings. 
He further claims that the dichotomist view of stative verbs (which include verbs of 
perceptions and cognition) and dynamic verbs (which include verbs of motion) is the 
determining factor of the temporal readings of  DAs in all Arabic dialects. While the DA derived 
from the stative verbs expresses state as in example (3) below, DAs derived from the a motion 
verb express a futurate reading rather than perfective meaning as in (4), (Holes 2004: 221): 
 
(3)  ana mish  3aarif          irragil   da.             (Cairene Arabic) 
 I     not     know-DA   the-man this  
 ‘I do not know this man.’ 
 
(4)  wein     raayeH? 
 Where  go-DA 
 ‘Where are you going?’                  (Most dialects of Arabic according to Holes 2004) 
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Holes (2004) observes instances where there is opposition between the s-stem (perfective 
form of verb) and DAs derived from dynamic verbs such that the perfective form expresses a 
completed action or (complete episode in Holes terms) and DAs produce a resultative 
interpretation. Examples (5-9) are illustrative (Holes 2004:221): 
 
(5) klit.                                            (Moroccan Arabic)                                             
Perf.eat-1.sg                              
‘I ate.’ 
   
(6) ‘akalit.                                        (Baghdadi Arabic) 
Perf.eat-1.sg 
‘I ate.’ 
 
(7) kalet.                                          (Bahraini Arabic)    
Perf.eat-1.sg 
‘I ate.’ 
 
(8) wakil.                                         (Moroccan Arabic) 
eat-DA 
‘I have eaten.’  
    
(9) makil.                                        (Baghdadi and Bahraini Arabic)   
eat-DA 
‘I have eaten.’  
                
                          
In sentences (5-7) the perfective forms of the verb klit, akalit and kalet ‘eat’ express a completed 
action or a neutral statement of fact according to Holes (2004). It can also be used in narrative 
contexts. The corresponding DAs in (8-9) are appropriately used in contexts where the speaker 
has already eaten and not hungry at the time of utterance.  
 Holes’ account of DAs has a number of conceptual and empirical weaknesses. The first 
problem is concerned with attributing the temporal specification of DAs to the aspectual classes 
of verbs. It has been argued that DAs derived from a motion verb express a futurate reading 
rather than perfective meaning. However, in sentence (10) below the DA meshtaghleen ‘work’ is 
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derived from a dynamic verb, yet the sentence is felicitous under a perfect interpretation and not 
a futurate reading. 
(10) ‘l3umaal             meshtaghleen ‘el-Tareeg. 
The-worker-PL  work-DA         the -road 
‘The workers have finished working in the road.’ 
 
 
 This  claim can be supported by the fact that only the deictic adverbial  hassa ‘now’ and 
the past adverbial imbareH ‘yesterday’ are acceptable with the DA meshtaghleen ‘work’ in (10) 
above. The presence of the future adverbial bukrah ‘tomorrow’ renders the sentence 
unacceptable as shown in (11) and (12) respectively. 
(11) ‘l-3umaal             meshtaghleen ‘el-Tareeg  hasa /imbareH. 
The-worker-PL  work-DA         the-road    now/yesterday 
‘The workers have/had finished working in the road now/yesterday.’ 
 
(12) ?/* ‘l-3umaal     meshtaghleen  ‘el-Tareeg   bukrah. 
The-worker-PL  work-DA         the -road     tomorrow 
‘The workers will finish working in the road tomorrow.’ 
 
 
Another empirical problem with Holes’ account is the assumption that both verbal forms 
 (the perfective form (s-stem) and the imperfective form (p-stem)) can be used interchangeably 
with DAs as indicated in examples (1) and (2) above. This assumption leads to many erroneous 
predictions. One problem is the licensing of habitual adverbials by the imperfective form of the 
verb and DAs as illustrated in sentences (13) and (14) respectively. Sentence (13) denotes a 
habitual or generic reading. This is expressed by the use of the imperfective form (p-stem in 
Holes terms) and the licensing of the habitual adverbial kulla marratin ‘every time’. However, in 
sentence (14) the DA is used instead of the imperfective form of the verb, yet the sentence is 
unacceptable. Holes’ account erroneously predicts that both sentences are acceptable in that both 
the imperfective form and the DA should license the habitual adverbial as shown in (13) and 
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(14). I will address this issue in more details in chapter 4 when I provide an evidential analysis of 
the interpretation of habituality in DAs and imperfective; (the examples below are taken from 
Fassi 1993: 183). 
(13) kaana   r-rajulu               yfthaHu                             faahu           kulla maratin. 
was      the-man-NOM    IMPERF-open.3sg.Masc  mouth-his   every time 
‘The man used to open his mouth every time.’  
 
(14) *kaana  r-rajulu               faatiHaan            faahu          kulla maratin. 
 was      the-man-NOM   open-DA.Masc   mouth-his   every time 
 ‘The man was in the state of opening his mouth every time.’ 
 
 
 
Brustad (2000) discussed the semantics of DAs in a comparative study of four Arabic 
dialects: Moroccan, Egyptian, Syrian and Kuwaiti. Her analysis of the semantics of DAs 
comprises three major notions: (a) the relation between the semantics of DAs to lexical aspect, 
(b) the major aspectual reading of DAs and (c) the temporal reference of DAs in these dialects. I 
will discuss each notion in turn. 
Brustad (2000) argues that the semantic analysis of verbs is better exemplified by 
providing arrays of meanings to each verb and that each meaning belongs to a different category. 
Therefore, she argues that Arabic verbs can have both telic and atelic meanings depending on the 
context. For example, the verb naam ‘to sleep’ can have a telic meaning ‘to fall asleep’ and an 
atelic reading ‘to sleep’. Following Ingham (1994), she proposes a classification of verbs in 
Arabic where verbs are classified as action verbs or state/motion verbs. Based on this 
classification she provides two emerging patterns of DAs as presented in Table (1) taken from 
Brustad (2000:171): 
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           Table (1) Brustad’s Classification of Lexical Aspect and the Participles 
 Telic Atelic 
State/Motion Resultant State Progressive 
Action Resultant State -------------- 
 
Table (1) provides the aspectual interpretations of participle predicates (DAs) in the four dialects 
under investigation. This table clearly shows that the aspectual interpretation of participle 
predicates are dependent on the lexical class of the verb each participle is derived from. 
 Brustad (2000) claims that DA predicates denote a ‘resultant state’ reading as its 
canonical reading. According to this claim, DA predicates are always subsumed under the  
perfect aspect paradigm where the DAs always project a state resulting from a prior event and 
relevant to the utterance time. In an attempt to provide a further investigation of the perfect 
aspectual interpretation of DAs in Arabic, she claims that the use of DAs in the given dialects 
conforms to the Li and Thompsons (1982) proposal for perfect aspect in Chinese. Li and 
Thompson (1982) analyzed the pragmatic properties of perfect meaning of Mandarin Chinese. 
They listed five pragmatic functions of perfect in Chinese, two of which Brustad (2000) believes 
to be relevant to the perfect interpretations in Arabic as shown below (Brustad 2000: 179): 
1- To indicate a change of state, or change of perception on the part of the speaker. 
        2- To correct a wrong assumption.  
According to Brustad (2000), the above features are meant to account for the behavior of 
DAs in contrast to imperfective form as shown in examples (15-17). 
(15) ba3ref                              keif  kull waHad  bifakir. 
IMPERF-know.1SING  how  each one       IMPERF-think-3.SING.MASC 
‘I know how each one thinks.’ 
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(16) maani 3aarif          allah   wein   HaaTni. 
Neg     know-DA  God   where  put-DA 
‘I do not know where God put me (what is going on with me).’ 
 
(17) ‘nna 3aarif        shuu  3am   baHki. 
I       know-DA what  Prog   IMPERF-say 
‘I know what I am saying.’ 
 
 
Brustad (2000) claims that the motivation for the use of the imperfective in example (15) is to 
indicate an ‘underlying process’ of acquiring knowledge. She further argues that examples (16) 
and (17) can be accounted for by the pragmatic functions in (1) and (2) above. Sentence (16) 
presents a loss of perception by the speaker, whereas sentence (17) implies a correction of 
assumption by the interlocutor about the speaker. 
Brustad (2000) has also investigated the temporal reference of DAs in the four Arabic 
dialects she discussed. She argues that DAs have no intrinsic temporal reference in their 
semantics. The temporal reference is thus indicated through the use of time adverbials or 
established by the context. Accordingly, she provides further evidence that verbal predicates in 
Arabic including DAs comprise relative tense rather than absolute tense (cf. Cowell 1964, 
Comrie 1976, 1985, Eisle 1988, 1990 and Mitchell and El-Hassan 1994). 
Brustad (2000) bases her analysis of the temporal reference of DAs on Eisle (1990) who 
proposes that DAs express a current relevant state and an implied event. The current state is 
bound to a present reading and the implied event is either bound to a past or a future 
interpretation which in turn licenses the past and future adverbials. For example, in sentence (18) 
the future adverbial bukrah ‘tomorrow’ is licensed by the future event of leaving. The same 
sentence could also denote a future perfect interpretation (Brustad 2000: 227). 
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(18) humma mashyeen  bukrah. 
They     leave-DA  tomorrow 
‘They are leaving tomorrow.’  
 
 
Brustad’s analysis of DAs presents some insightful observations about the semantics of 
DAs especially those related to the fact that DAs comprise a state and an event. However her 
analysis is inadequate and lacking on many grounds. Brustad (2000) proposes a classification of 
verbs in Arabic where verbs are classified as action verbs or state/motion verbs. Based on this 
classification, she provides two emerging patterns of DAs as presented in Table (1) above. I 
argue that such patterns do not provide adequate predictions. The DA shaghaal ‘work’  in (19) is 
derived from the action verb yshtaghel ‘work’ and according to Table (1) we would assume that 
the aspectual reading denoted by this verb should give a resultant state reading and not a 
progressive one. Yet, sentence (19) is only acceptable under a progressive and not a resultant 
state reading. 
(19) Adam shaghaal    fee el-maktabeh. 
Adam  work-DA  in   the-library 
‘Adam is working in the library.’ 
 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Brustad (2000) believes that some of the pragmatic 
features of perfect in Chinese can be relevant to the perfect interpretations in Arabic as presented 
in examples (16) and (17) above. However, it is still not clear how these features account for the 
semantics of the DA Haab ‘love(DA)’ in (20): 
    
(20) ‘adam  Haab        el-bent. 
Adam  love-DA  the-girl 
‘Adam loves/is in love with the girl.’ 
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Brustad (2000) draws a distinction in meaning between the imperfective and DA 
predicates in that the former is used to indicate an ‘underlying process’ and the latter expresses a 
completed event with resultant state as shown in examples (15-17) above. However such a 
distinction is still insufficient to account for the difference in meaning between the habitual 
interpretation denoted by the imperfective and the DAs predicates in sentences (21) and (22). 
 
(21) majdi  dayman  birkab                                      el-baaS  la  el-jaam3a. 
Majdi  always   IMPERF-ride.3SING.MASC  the-bus  to  the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the bus to the university.’ 
 
(22) majdi dayman  raakib      el-baaS  la  el-jaam3a. 
Majdi  always  ride-DA   the-bus  to  the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the bus to the university.’ 
 
  
Moreover, her account does not provide an adequate explanation of why sentence (22), 
repeated here as (24), is still acceptable when continued with a contradictory statement that 
negates the habitual readings with the DAs while such contradiction yields unacceptability with 
the imperfective form in (21) repeated here as (23). 
(23) majdi  dayman  birkab                                       el-baaS  lal-jaam3a,#          bs mush  
Majdi  always   IMPERF.ride .3.SING.MASC the-bus   to  the-university, #but not 
ma3naatuh ennu dayman birkab                                       el-baaS  lal-jaam3a. 
mean          that   always  IMPERF.ride .3.SING.MASC the-bus   to  the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the bus to the university but it does not mean he always rides 
the bus to university.’ 
 
(24) majdi  dayman  raakib      baaS  el-jaam3a,       bs mush   ma3naatuh  ennuh   
Majdi  always   ride-DA   bus    the-university, but not    mean            that    
dayman birkab                                       baaS  el-jaam3a. 
always  IMPERF.ride .3.SING.MASC  bus    the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the bus to the university but it does not mean he always rides  
the bus to university.’ 
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Brustad (2000) claims that sentences such as (18), repeated here as (25), could express a 
future perfect interpretation (Brustad 2000: 227). 
(25) humma mashyeen  bukrah. 
They     leave-DA  tomorrow 
‘They are leaving tomorrow.’  
 
 
This assumption erroneously predicts that (25) is similar in meaning to sentence (26) where the 
copular verb bykoon ‘to be’ is used to express a future perfect interpretation. 
(26) humma  bykoon-u     mashyeen       lamma  neji                      bukrah. 
they       to be-they    leave-DA-PL  when  come.INF.1st.PL  tomorrow 
‘By the time we come tomorrow, they would have left.’  
 
 
In sum, I argued in this section that lexical aspect studies have both empirical and 
theoretical shortcomings. I showed that the lexical aspect properties of the verbal base of the 
derived DAs are lacking in that it confines some temporal and aspectual readings of DAs to a 
specific verb classes to the exclusion of others. Furthermore, none of the studies presented above 
accounts for the evidential behavior of DAs which is a prevailing shortcoming of all the previous 
studies of DAs as shown in the next sections.  
 
2.2.2 The Formal Aspect Approach 
The formal aspect approach argues that DAs bear aspectual interpretations in their 
semantics. The proponents of this approach claim that DAs encode a perfect aspectual reading 
which mainly translates as a result-state reading. While their main argument in accounting for 
DAs semantics is based on a viewpoint aspect perspective, they also highlight the significance of 
the lexical aspect properties of the verbal stem of which DAs are derived from as one of the key 
factors of the varied temporal and aspectual readings of DAs. The current work draws on some 
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implications presented by the formal aspect approach as will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
especially those related to the result-state reading of DAs i.e. anterior temporal relation. 
However, it will be shown that a lot of the assumptions made by these accounts are inadequate 
and do not provide plausible explanations for the more complex semantics of DAs. For example, 
these accounts as they stand do not account for the evidential behavior of DAs and they do not 
provide adequate explanation of the contrast between DAs and the perfective form other than 
that based on resultant-state reading. 
Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994) attempted to account for the semantics of DAs by the use 
of lexical aspectual verb classes and viewpoint aspect. They argue that that the temporal 
interpretation of DAs stems from the class of the verb the DAs are derived from. In this regard, 
they classified the verb classes into three types: non-motive verbs, motive verbs (also known as 
motion verbs or translocatives since they denote a change of spatial location in Mitchell and El-
Hassan terms) and situative or locative verbs. The non-motive verbs express a perfect aspectual 
reading; the translocatives express a future interpretation, while the locatives indicate a 
progressive interpretation as shown in sentences (27), (28) and (29) respectively. 
(27) ‘ana maakil. 
I       eat-DA 
‘I have eaten.’ 
 
(28) ‘ana msaafer     bukrah. 
I       travel-DA tomorrow 
‘I am leaving tomorrow.’ 
 
(29) ‘ana baayet     3end  mHammad   eleileh. 
I       stay-DA  at      Mohammed  tonight 
‘I am staying at Mohammed’s house tonight.’ 
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Based on Mitchell and El-Hassan’s account, DAs also exhibit an aspectual interpretation 
namely a perfect aspect reading. They argue that DAs “refer to the inception of an act, activity, 
or a state and to a consequent state of affairs” (Mitchell and El-Hassan 1994: 18). They have 
distinguished two types of result states based on data from Egyptian and Jordanian Arabic: while 
the DAs refer to an unbroken relevant result state in Egyptian, no such implication arises in 
Jordanian Arabic as in (30); example taken from Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994:78). 
(30) laabis      el-badhleh.  
wear-DA the -suit 
‘He is wearing the suit.’ 
 
 
According to their analysis, this sentence means that he put on the suit at earlier time and that he 
has not taken it off since. They claim that this reading only arises in Egyptian but not in 
Jordanian Arabic. Moreover, they showed that the current relevant state is also available with the 
copular verb kaan ‘to be/was’ in Egyptian and not in Jordanian Arabic as in (31). 
(31) kaan laabis      el-badhleh (lamma shuftuh). 
was  wear-DA the-suit      (when I saw him) 
‘He was wearing the suit  (when I saw him).’ 
 
 
 
 Sentence (31) expresses a past perfect reading where the subject of the sentence had put on the 
suit and at no time after that he took it off not until the time of seeing him as indicated by the 
continuation (when I saw him). It is argued that this relevant state reading is only available in 
Egyptian Arabic and not in Jordanian where no current or ‘unbroken’ relevant sate reading is 
implied. To support their argument regarding the absence of current relevant state reading, 
Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994) argue that (32) is acceptable in Jordanian Arabic where the 
continuation w shaaleHha  ‘and took it off’ negates the relevant result state. 
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(32) kaan laabis      el-badhleh w    shaaleHha      (lamma shuft-uh). 
was  wear-DA the-suit     and take if off-DA (when I saw him) 
‘He had worn the suit and took it off (when I saw him).’ 
 
 
The same facts regarding the relevant state reading in Jordanian also obtain for passive 
participles, and therefore (33) according to their analysis is felicitous only under a reading where 
there is no current relevant state (i.e. the door is not open). This interpretation is supported by 
sentence (34) where the sentence is still acceptable under cancellation. 
(33) el-baab     maftooH. 
The-door  open-PP 
‘The door is open.’                                        (Mitchell and El-Hassan 1994:80) 
 
 
(34) el-xazaaneh maftooHa  wi  msakarah. 
The-safe      open-PP     and close-PP 
‘The safe is opened and is (now) closed.’     (Mitchell and El-Hassan 1994:80) 
 
 
 
Among the limitations of this analysis, there are the following four. First, Mitchell and 
El-Hassan (1994) argue that the presence of temporal phrases affects the interpretations of DAs 
in Jordanian Arabic. Those that specify the total duration, the beginning and end, give non-
durative readings while those that indicate an inceptive specification give durative readings as in 
(35) and (36) respectively. 
(35) ayman  mixtafii   fii  elmasjid      yoomeen.  
Ayman hide-DA in  the-mosque two days 
‘Ayman hid in the mosque for two days.’ 
 
(36) ayman  mixtafii    fii  elmasjid       min   youm elxamees. 
Ayman hide-DA  in   the-mosque  since day-Thursday 
‘Ayman hid in the mosque since Thursday.’ 
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I argue that such assumptions are inaccurate. In (37) below the DA kaatib ‘write’ is used 
with a temporal phrase that specifies an inceptive reading, yet the sentence yields a non-durative 
i.e. complete event with a result state obtained. The same observation holds for the DA 3aayesh  
‘live’ in sentence (38) which is used with the temporal adverbial min santeen la7ad elyoom 
‘since two years till today’ specifying the total duration (beginning and end of state of affairs) of 
the DA and yet the sentence yields a durative reading contra to Mitchell and El-Hassan’s 
prediction. 
(37) majdi kaatib       el-resaleh  min    yoom elxamees. 
Majdi write-DA the-letter   since  day     Thursday 
‘Majdi has written the letter since Thursday.’ 
 
(38) majdi 3aayesh  fe 3amman men santeen     la7ad elyoom. 
Majdi live-DA  in Amman since two years till      today 
‘Majdi has been living in Amman two years up until today.’ 
 
 
Second, according to Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994) only motion verbs (translocative 
verbs) give rise to future interpretations as in sentence (28) above. However, the futurate reading 
can also be obtained by other classes of verbs such achievements as in the DA meshtari ‘buy(DA)’ 
derived from the achievement verb ysthtari ‘buy’ as shown in (39). 
(39) bedi                              ajeeb             aay foon   ma daam ‘enni meshtari  meshtari. 
IMPERF.want.1SING  bring.Inf.1
st
   I    phone  as far as  I       buying     buying 
‘I want to bring an iphone as far as I am buying one.   
 
 
It has also been argued that DAs derived from motion verbs express futurity without the 
need of future adverbs. That is, they can express future interpretations in out of the blue contexts 
without the presence of future adverbs bukrah ‘tomorrow’ as in (40). 
(40) Hasan msaafer. 
Hasan travel-DA 
‘Hasan is leaving.’ 
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Again, this implication is inadequate due to the fact that sentence (40) can also be used to 
indicate a current relevant state and not futurate reading as in this dialogue: 
A:  wein   Hasan? 
 where Hasan 
 ‘Where is Hasan?’ 
 
B:  Hasan msaafer. 
 Hasan travel-DA 
 ‘Hasan has traveled.’ 
 
 
The above dialogue clearly shows that the DA masafer ‘travel’ is used to denote a current state 
of leaving in that the speaker (B) emphasizes the fact that Hasan is not here now and not that he 
is leaving in the future as expected by Mitchell and El-Hassan’s approach. 
Third, the lack of the relevant current state in Jordanian Arabic as indicated in sentences 
(30-32) above is not substantially supported. Contra to Mitchell and El-Hassan’s approach, JA 
speakers intuit that sentences (30) and (31) repeated here as (41) and (42) respectively are 
perfectly acceptable under a current relevant and unbroken result state reading. 
(41) laabis      el-badhleh.  
wear-DA the-suit 
‘He is wearing the suit.’ 
 
(42) kaan laabis      el-badhleh (lamma shuft-uh). 
was  wear-DA the-suit     (when I saw him) 
‘He was wearing the suit (when I saw him).’ 
 
 
I support my claim regarding the felicity of the result state reading in sentences (41) and 
(42) above by the cancellation test as shown in (43) and (44) respectively. The fact that (43) and 
(44) yield unacceptable utterances clearly indicates that the DA laabis ‘wear’ semantically 
asserts a result state reading; it also shows that the result reading is current and unbroken. In 
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other words, Mitchell and El-Hassan’s analysis erroneously predicts that (43) and (44) should be 
acceptable. However, this is not the case with (43) and (44). 
 
(43) laabis      el-badhleh# bs    shaaleHha. 
wear-DA the-suit  #   but   took it off-DA 
‘He is wearing the suit but had taken it off.’ 
 
(44) kaan laabis      el-badhleh# bs     shaaleHha        (lamma shuftuh). 
was  wear-DA the- suit  #  but    took it off-DA  (when I saw him) 
‘He was wearing the suit but had taken it off  (when I saw him).’ 
 
 
Sentence (42) above has been argued to express a broken result state at the time of 
seeing/witnessing. In other words, (42) indicates that he was not wearing the suit at the time I 
saw him. I would assume therefore, that sentences (45-47) indicate a broken result state at the 
time of seeing Majdi in accordance with Mitchell and El-Hassan’s assumption. Therefore, we 
predict the following result states of these sentences respectively: the book was not on the table, 
the TV was not on, and that Majdi was not walking.  
(45) majdi kaan HaaT     le-ktaab   3ala eTawleh (lamma shuftuh). 
Majdi was   put-DA the-book on    the-table  when   saw-him 
‘Majdi had put the book on the table when I saw him.’ 
 
(46) majdi kaan mshaghel   el-telfezion  (lama shuftuh). 
Majdi was  switch-DA the-T.V       (when saw-him) 
‘Majdi had switched the T.V on when I saw him.’ 
 
(47) majdi kaan maashi      (lamma shuftuh). 
Majdi was  walk-DA  (when   saw-him) 
‘Majdi was walking when I saw him.’ 
 
 
However, all JA speakers intuit that these sentences are only acceptable under an ‘unbroken 
result state’ interpretation at the time of seeing Majdi. In fact, most of JA speakers find it very 
awkward to assign an alternative interpretation to these sentences as assumed by Mitchell and El-
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Hassan’s proposal. I use the same arguments above to support my claim regarding the assertion 
of the result state of passive participles. I argue that passive participles pattern with active 
participles (DAs) in that they also assert a result state (unbroken state) in their semantics contra 
Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994). Sentences (48) and (49) are illustrative. 
(48) el-baab     maftooH#  bs    msaker. 
The-door open-PP  #  but  closed-PP 
‘The door is open but closed.’  
 
(49) el-bab     kaan  maftooH (lamma shuft-uh). 
The-door was  open-PP  (when    saw-it) 
‘The door was open when I saw it.’  
 
 
Sentence (48) shows that the passive participle maftooH  ‘opened’ asserts a result state 
and the state is unbroken as shown by the unacceptability of (48) under cancellation. Sentence 
(49) is only felicitous under the ‘unbroken result’ reading at the time of seeing the door. In other 
words, at the time of seeing the door it was still open (i.e. the unbroken result reading) and it is 
awkward to think of the sentence otherwise i.e. the broken result reading where the door is not 
open as assumed by Mitchell and El-Hassan’s account. 
Based on data from Syrian Arabic, Boneh (2004, 2005 and 2010) explored the temporal 
interpretations of DAs in non-embedded contexts. Her analysis of the DAs is based on two major 
premises: the lexical aspect of the VP determines the temporal reading of the DAs and viewpoint 
aspect of DAs encodes a perfect aspectual reading.  
According to Boneh’s data, she claims that the temporal reading of DAs is dependent on 
the type of the verb class the DAs are derived from. To this end, she argues that the variations of 
temporal readings of DAs depend on the VP type: telic verbs and activity verbs encode an 
anteriority reading as in sentence (50), stative verbs  denote a simultaneous reading as in (51) 
37 
 
and  directional motion verbs give imminent future interpretations as in (52). Examples are taken 
from Boneh (2005:4-5). 
(50) sami kaateb                er-risaale. 
Sami write- DA.sg.m the-letter 
‘Sami has written the letter. 
 
(51) sami Haabeb              mouna. 
Sami love- DA.sg.m Mouna 
‘Sami has fallen in love with Mouna (and now he is in love with her).’ 
 
(52) sami maašii. 
Sami leave- DA.sg.m 
‘Sami is about to leave.’ 
 
 
Boneh (2004, 2005 and 2010) argues that telic and activity verbs pattern together in that 
the subject is understood as being in consequent state of the event implied by the DA having 
taken place prior to the utterance time. In other words, the subject is in a current relevant sate 
that holds at TU and this state is bound by an anterior implied or (underlying eventuality in 
Boneh’s terms). Furthermore, she contends that the resultative reading of the subject is not at all 
dependent on the result state of the object. According to her analysis, there are examples in 
Syrian Arabic in which the state of the subject is clearly dissociated from that of the object even 
with verbs that allow the object to be in a resultative state such as the verb fateH ‘open’, as in 
(53); the example is taken from Boneh (2005: 6). 
 
       [Context: it is cold in the room. The window is closed] 
(53) Shuu faateH       esh-shubbaak? 
Q      open-DA   the-window 
‘Have you opened the window?’ 
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In (53), the question targets the status of the subject (i.e. the addressee) in that he is held 
responsible for the temperature in the room irrelevant of whether the window is open or closed. 
Speakers of Syrian Arabic have the choice of using the passive participle maftooH ‘opened’ if 
the focus is on the state of the window as assumed by Boneh’s analysis.  
In her analysis, stative verbs give rise to a simultaneous post-state reading in which the 
subject of the DA constructions undergoes this state after going into a change of state. Unlike the 
statives, the motion verbs give rise to an imminent future reading. Based on Boneh’s account, the 
subject DP of such verbs is in a preceding state of the underlying eventuality. Therefore, the 
subject Sami in (52) above is understood to be in a pre-state of going down to the market. Boneh 
argues that the imminent future reading is only attested with motion verbs and that such reading 
does not arise with any other verb class. 
The future reading in Boneh’s account depends on two conditions. The first is concerned 
with the speaker’s point of view as expressed in (54). The sentence invites two possible readings 
depending on the situational context:  (a) a futurate reading: if the speaker is at home with Sami,   
(b) an anteriority reading: if the speaker sees Sami at the market. 
(54) sami naazel                        3a  s-s-uu’. 
Sami go-down-DA-sg.m   to  the-market 
(a) ‘Sami is about to go down to the market.’ 
(b) ‘Sami has gone down to the market.’ 
 
The second condition is concerned with the animacy of the subject. Boneh (2004, 2005 
and 2010) argues that the futurate reading only occurs with animate subjects. The motivation for 
this assumption is that the intentions of carrying out the event can only be assessed with animate 
subjects. On the other hand, if an inanimate subject is used with motion verbs, then the sentence 
with DAs yields an anterior reading where the subject is understood to be in a post-state rather 
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than a pre-state. In this case the DAs receive the same temporal reading of dynamic verbs i.e. an 
anteriority reading as in (55) where the subject l-3arabaye ‘baby cart’ is in a post-state (i.e. 
anterior reading) rather than a pre-state (i.e. future reading); example is taken from Boneh 
(2005:8).       
(55) l-3arabaye            kaarje       l-zaawet   l-Tarii’. 
the-baby carriage roll- DA   to-corner  the street  
‘The baby’s carriage rolled to the corner of the street.’ 
 
 
The imminent future interpretations with inanimate subjects are expressed by the use of 
the canonical future form which comprises the future particle raH ‘will’ followed by the non-
finite form of the verb. In (56), the speaker uses the future form if he/she sees that the pot of 
flowers is going to fall down as indicated by Boneh (2005: 8). 
(56) Hood l-ward         raH   yuu’a3                        la  taHet. 
Pot     the-flower  will   INF. 3sg.m-fall down to down 
‘The flower pot is about to fall down.’ 
 
 
The other major premise of Boneh’s account is concerned with the view point aspect 
encoded in the semantics of DAs. She proposes that participial constructions encode a perfect 
viewpoint aspect. Following Klein (1994), Boneh (2004, 2005 and 2010) argues that this perfect 
viewpoint aspect is distinct from the other two in the verbal system of Syrian Arabic in terms of 
the type of temporal relation used which specifies the nature of the aspectual reading at play.  In 
the case of perfective and imperfective, the temporal relation holds between reference time 
(Topic-Time TT in Klein’s terminology) and eventuality time. However, in the case of DAs a 
perfect aspect is denoted; the relation holds between TT and the post-time state rather than the 
eventuality as is the case with the imperfective and the perfective.    
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Based on this proposal, Boneh (2004, 2005 and 2010) provides the following schematic 
representations for the aspectual system in Syrian Arabic (after Klein 1994); (Adapted from 
Boneh 2005 and 2010; she used AST-T for TT): 
     (TT: Topic Time, TU: Time of Utterance, Ev-T: Event Time, Post-T: Post time State) 
(57) a. Perfect Aspect (DAs):   TT ⊆ POST-T, TU ⊆ TT   
b. Perfective Aspect:         Ev-T ⊆ TT  
c. Imperfective Aspect:     TT ⊆ Ev-T 
 
As can be noted from this representation, the perfect aspect denoted by DAs is distinct from the 
imperfective and perfective in two regards. With the DAs, the inclusion relation is between TT 
and Post-time state instead of the core eventuality as it is the case with the imperfective and 
perfective. Also, the DAs are assigned a temporal reading in that they receive a default present 
temporal specification; this is shown by the inclusion relation between the TT and the TU (i.e. 
present tense reading). 
The current work draws on some implications of Boneh’s analysis especially those that 
are related to the post-state interpretation of DAs. However, her analysis is lacking in some 
regards. As mentioned earlier, Boneh bases part of her analysis regarding the variations of 
temporal readings of DAs on the aspectual properties of the verbal base which the DAs are 
derived from. For example, she argues that telic verbs and activity verbs encode an anteriority 
reading while motion verbs encode a future reading. I argue that such a proposal is insufficient 
because it is merely descriptive in nature. This is due to the fact that the question of why DAs 
that are derived from different verb classes give varied temporal interpretations remains 
unanswered.  
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Boneh’s analysis of the future reading yields inadequate observations. She argues that the 
future reading is only attested with motion verbs and not with other verb classes. Boneh sets two 
conditions for disambiguating the anteriority from future readings as mentioned earlier. The 
ambiguity between the anteriority and future reading only arises with motion verbs as seen in 
(54) above. However, in (58) the DAs jaayeb ‘bring’ is not derived from a motion verb, yet the 
sentence is ambiguous between an anteriority and futurate reading. In other words, the restriction 
laid out here that the ambiguity between anteriority and future reading only arises with motion 
verbs is not substantially supported. 
(58) (xalas),    ‘ana  jaayib       el-‘ayy foon.  
(enough), I       bring-DA  the iphone 
(a) ‘I have brought the iphone.’ 
(b) ‘I am buying the iphone.’ 
 
 
Furthermore, the restriction on the animacy of agents under the futurate reading is flawed 
as well. In (59), the DA is derived from a motion verb ejaa ‘come’ and the subject of the DA 
predicate is inanimate el-thawrah ‘revolution’; yet the DA denotes a futurate reading. Boneh’s 
analysis erroneously predicts that the reading denoted by the DA in (59) is felicitous only under 
an anteriority reading not a futurate reading.   
(59) el-thawrah        jaayieh. 
the-revolution  come-DA 
‘The revolution is coming.’   
 
 
Boneh (2004, 2005 and 2010) claims that the choice of using the canonical future form 
which comprises the future particle raH ‘will’ followed by the non-finite form of the verb versus 
the DA is dependent on the animacy status of the DP subject. The inanimate subject is used with 
the former while the animate is used with latter. However, this claim is refuted by sentence (59) 
above where the inanimate subject is felicitously used to denote a futurate reading with the DA. 
42 
 
 In my current proposed analysis of DAs, the semantic difference between the canonical 
form of future and futurate reading of DA is not based on an animacy hierarchy; rather it is 
captured by an evidential analysis. I argue that while the canonical future form expresses non-
evidential interpretation, DAs express an indirect evidential interpretation as an essential part of 
their semantics (See chapter 4 for detailed discussion). The contrast between the non-evidential 
interpretation vs the indirect evidential provides more plausible explanation of why the canonical 
future form is used in sentence (56) above, repeated here as (60), and not the DA. 
 
(60) Hood l-ward         raH   yuu’a3                        la  taHet. 
Pot     the-flower  will   INF. 3sg.m-fall down to down 
‘The flower pot is about to fall down.’ 
 
 
Contra to Boneh’s analysis, I argue that the acceptability of using the future form raH yuu’a3 
‘will fall’ instead of the DA is better captured by evidential perspective rather than animacy 
restrictions. In (60) the speaker witnesses/sees that the flower pot is falling or going to fall as 
indicated by Boneh (2005: 8). In other words, the speaker’s judgment was based on a witnessed 
event (i.e. direct evidence) which is not compatible with the semantics of DAs where only an 
indirect type of evidence is asserted (i.e. non-witnessed event); hence, the unacceptability of a 
DA in (60).       
The evidential account proposed in the current work provides a further explanation of 
why sentence (59) is felicitous despite the inanimacy of the agent. In Boneh’ analysis, sentence 
(59) is erroneously predicted to be unacceptable based on the fact that only animate subjects are 
allowed with DA predicates under futurate readings. The motivation for her claim as mentioned 
above is that only animates subjects’ intention can be assessed. However, (59) is perfectly 
acceptable. The acceptability of (59) is better accounted for by the proposed evidential analysis: 
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in Boneh’s analysis sentences with DA predicates are subject-oriented predicates (i.e. non-
evidential), therefore the contrast between animate vs inanimate subjects comes into play in 
determining the correct futurate reading with DAs. However, her explanation fails to account for 
the acceptability of (59). Under the current proposal, DAs are speaker-oriented predicates (i.e. 
evidential) therefore the contrast between animate vs inanimate subjects is irrelevant to the future 
reading of the DAs. Contra to Boneh, the intention of the subject of sentences with DAs is 
assessed on a speaker-oriented basis (i.e. from the perspective of the speaker) rather than subject-
oriented basis (from the perspective of the subject). 
Boneh has highlighted the contrast in meaning between the resultative reading of DAs 
and perfectives. In (61) the resultative reading is semantically asserted with DA but 
pragmatically given with the perfective as in (62). The perfect semantic representation proposed 
for the DAs under (57) earlier accounts for this contrast; examples taken from Boneh (2004:30). 
(61) sami   mlaa’ii    l-kenez #    bas Daya3o. 
Sami  find-DA  the-treasure but lose-3SG-it 
‘Sami has found the treasure but lost it.’ 
 
(62) sami  la’a            l-kenez         bas Daya3o. 
Sami  find-PFV  the-treasure  but lose-3SG-it 
‘Sami (has) found the treasure but lost it.’ 
 
 
 However, the same semantic representation fails to account for the contrast between the 
DA and perfective in the following pair of sentences. 
(63)  
(a) ‘ana sheft         majdi  gaa3id  bs  maa  sheftuh              lamma  ga3ad. 
I      see-PERF Majdi  sit-DA  but not   see-PERF-him  when    sit-PERF 
‘I saw Majdi sitting but I did not see him sitting down.’ 
 
(b) ‘ana  sheft      majdi    ga3ad#        bs  maa sheftuh             lamma  ga3ad. 
I   see-PERF  Majdi    sit-PERF #  but not   see-PERF-him when     sit-PERF 
‘I saw Majdi sitting but I did not see him sitting down.’ 
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In (63a) the sentence with the DA is acceptable despite the contradictory continuation which 
cancels witnessing the event. However, the perfective (63b) does not survive the cancellation. 
One might argue that the representation given under (57a) accounts for this contrast especially if 
we know that (57a) describes a relation with which the post-time state rather than eventuality is 
asserted. I argue that while this might look true superficially, a closer examination of the 
behavior of DAs reveals that eventuality is part of the meaning of the DAs as it can be part of the 
assertion sometimes. This proposal can be supported by the fact that DAs license adverbials that 
measure the length of the event such as the adverbial In X in a similar fashion to the perfective 
(where eventuality is part of the assertion). Examples (64a and b) are illustrative. 
 
(64)  
(a) majdi kaateb        er-resaleh  fii saa3a. 
Majdi write-DA   the-letter   in one hour 
‘Majdi  has written the letter in one hour.’ 
 
(b) majdi katab                                 er-resaleh fii saa3a. 
Majdi write-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-letter  in one hour 
‘Majdi  wrote the letter in one hour.’ 
 
 
It is clear therefore that eventuality is part of DA meaning as shown by the acceptability of (64 
a). It is still not clear, though, why a sentence such as (63a) is felicitous under cancellation i.e. 
the contradictory statement that targets the event. Therefore, any claim that the representation in 
(57a) accounts for the contrast under (63) is not semantically supported. 
 The same result holds for (65a) where the DA is felicitous despite the continuation which 
cancels the truth of the original sentence in which Majdi is the one who is supposed to have 
opened the door. The perfective (65b), on the other hand, does not allow a contradiction. The 
representation in (57a) does not suffice to explain this contrast. 
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(65)  
(a) majdi faateH      el-baab   bs    ‘aHmad  elli   fataHu-h. 
Majdi open-DA the-door but   Ahmad  who  PERF-open.3SG.MASC-it 
‘Majdi has opened the door but it was Ahmad who opened it.’ 
 
(b) majdi fataH             el-baab #   bs     ‘aHmad elli    fataHu-h. 
Majdi PERF-open  the-door  # but    Ahmad  who  PERF-open.3SG.MASC-it 
‘Majdi has opened the door but it was Ahmad who opened it.’ 
 
 
 These examples clearly show that the representation given under (57) is lacking. Any 
account for DAs should provide explanations for the contrasts between the DAs and perfectives 
as mentioned above and not only for the contrast in terms of the resultative reading between 
them as is the case with Boneh’s analysis. Most importantly, none of the studies presented in this 
section accounts for the evidential reading of DAs. The proposed evidential analysis of DAs in 
the current work is used to revisit the semantics of DAs in JA. The proposed evidential analysis 
accounts for why DAs encode perfect and futurate readings as its canonical readings. In other 
words, the current work attempts to answer the question of why DAs involve anterior and 
posterior relations i.e. perfect and futurate readings respectively and not an overlap relation as is 
the case with perfectives and imperfectives. None of the studies discussed so far provides an 
explanation for this question. The evidential account also provides an explanation of why DAs 
are distinct from the other two viewpoint aspects such as perfective as discussed in the contexts 
(63 and 65) above.  
 
 
2.2.3 The Sub-atomic Semantic Approach 
 The studies presented in this section are the first attempts to account for the semantics of 
DAs using the logical semantic approach. For example, Mughazy (2004) is the first study to use 
logical and formal semantic representations based on the Neodavidsonian approach to account 
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for the semantics of DAs. The major premise of the subatomic analyses presented in this section 
is based on the claim that DAs denote a present state that is bound by underlying retrospective 
and prospective events which in turn license past and future adverbials respectively. This notion 
has precedence in the literature. Fleischman (1982) points out that the moment of speech which 
is temporally anchored at present now could encompass a prospective and retrospective present. 
The prospective and retrospective present is viewed as indicating non-now events (i.e. 
prospective and retrospective events) that are linked in a retrospective or prospective sense to the 
present time (S) as shown in figure (1).  
 
Figure (1):  Prospective and Retrospective Present (Flieschman (1982)) 
                             (E: Event, S: Speech time/Present) 
             (Retrospective present) E…..…….S…….…. E (Prospective present) 
                  
 A similar observation has been made by Belazi (1993) who accounts for the semantics of 
time reference of DAs in Tunisian Arabic using the same logic presented by Flieschman (1982). 
She argues that DAs in Tunisian encode a resultant relevant state that is bound by retrospective 
or prospective events as presented by Figure (2) (adapted from Belazi 1993: 75). 
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          Figure (2)  Prospective and Retrospective Present (Belazi1993) 
                ………………… 
                               E                           S 
                     Kaatib ‘write(DA)’ 
 
                               ……………….. 
                               S                          E 
                    Xaarij ‘leave(DA)’ 
 
 According to this representation, the DA Kaatib ‘write(DA)’ expresses a result state 
reading where the event (E) is in an anterior relation to the present (S). On the other hand, the 
DA Xaarij ‘leave(DA)’expresses a futurate reading in which the event is in a prospective relation 
to present (S). In the remainder of this section, I discuss the most relevant and seminal works 
under the subatomic analysis, Kinberg (1992) and Mughazy (2004). 
 Kinberg (1992) proposed a theoretical framework for the multiple functions and varied 
temporal specifications of DA predicates in Quranic text. His analysis is also meant to capture 
the different readings of DA predicates in classical Arabic and the dialects of Arabic as well. He 
argues that DAs semantics can be captured in two ways. First, DAs denote an unbound 
imperfective state that is characterized by a relative simultaneous tense. The reference time for 
this tense can be at TU (present), prior to TU (past), or posterior to TU (future). Second, he 
argues that DAs denote a present state bounded by a past or future event. This present state is 
open in that it can be bound for its beginning or its end by a binding event. The event that binds 
the beginning of this state is referred to as retrospective event while the event that binds the end 
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of the state is referred to as prospective event in Kinberg’s terms. The former covers the 
resultative use of the DAs while the latter expresses its futurate reading. According to this 
analysis, the participial form expresses the present state while the context provides the 
retrospective and prospective actualization of the event. In order to capture the bounded-state 
meaning, Kinberg proposes the term semi-imperfective present for this type of DA predicates. 
The motivation for the name ‘semi-imperfective’ comes from the fact that DAs express a state 
bound only in one of its edges either the beginning or the end. The present refers to a state that 
holds at the TU. 
 With regards to the first type of DAs (i.e. unbound imperfective states), Kinberg argues 
that there are two anchoring reference points of the relative tense of these predicates: either at 
TU denoting a present unbound imperfective state, or outside the TU i.e. either prior or posterior 
expressing past and future unbound imperfective states respectively. Examples (66-68) are 
illustrative (Kinberg 1992: 308-310). 
 
(66) enna bekulin kaferoon. 
We   in each  disbelieve-DA 
‘We disbelieve both of them.’ 
                                               (Quran ch. 23: 48) 
 
(67) ‘enna        fer3awanna wa  hamaana wa    junudahuma     kaanu          xaTe’een. 
Certainly  Pharaoh        and  Haman   and  soldiers-their    were-they    sin-DA 
‘Certainly, Pharaoh and Haman and their soldiers were sinners.’   
                                                                                                     (Quran ch.28:8)  
 
(68) yawma     nabTeshu al-baTshata al-kubra           ‘enna              muntaqemuun. 
Upon-day assulut    the-assult   the-most mighty certainly-we  vengeance-take-DA 
‘Upon the day when we shall assault most mightily, then shall take vengeance.’  
                                                                                                       (Quran ch.44:16) 
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Example (66) expresses an unbound imperfective state holding at the TU. Examples (67 and 68) 
denote an unbound state in the past and in the future respectively. The second type of DAs 
denotes a bound state. These DA predicates refer to a present state that is bound at its beginning 
by a retrospective event or at its end by a prospective underlying event. The former corresponds 
to the resultative state reading of the DAs while the latter covers the future reading. In these 
cases, the occurrence of the event is not simultaneous to the reference point but rather prior or 
posterior to it. Kinberg (1992) proposes the term semi-imperfective to refer to this type of DA 
predicates along with their underlying binding events. Examples (69-70) are illustrative. 
  
(69) quli l-lahu  xaliqu       kulli shay’in  w    hwuaa al waHeduu al-qahhaar. 
say  Allah  create-DA everything     and he        the-one and the-omnipotent    
‘Say: Allah has created all things, He is the One and the Omnipotent.’                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                  (Quran ch.13:16) 
 
(70) ‘inn         s-sa3ata    la-‘atiyatun. 
certainly the-hour   assertive-come-DA 
‘Certainly, the Hour is coming.’                           
                                                  (Quran ch.40: 59) 
 
 
 
Example (69) asserts a present state holds at TU and bound by a retrospective event prior to TU. 
Kinberg (1992) argues that the actualization of this underlying anterior event is liable to 
cancellation and that the location of this event is not given grammatically but rather is indicated 
by extra-linguistic means such as contextual information and world-knowledge. He assumes that 
the same fact also holds for other dialects of Arabic. In (70), the state holds at present while 
bound by a prospective event posterior to TU. 
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 It has been argued that prospective semi-imperfective predicates and the finite form of 
the verb are interchangeable. For example, Kinberg (1992) argues that the DA muxreju  ‘bring 
forth’ which characterizes a prospective semi-imperfective reading (i.e. present state bound by 
future event)  and the finite form yuxreju ‘bring forth’ which indicates a future interpretation in 
(71) are interchangeable.  
(71) yuxreju     al-Hayya   mina l-mayyeti wa  muxreju             l-mayyeta mina l-Hayyi. 
bring-forth the-living from the dead   and bring-forth-DA the dead   from  the living  
‘He brings forth the living from the dead, He brings forth the dead from the living.’ 
 
                        
In (71), the DA predicate is coordinated to the finite form of the verb which indicates a future 
reading here. It is assumed that the interchangeability of the DA predicate with the finite from of 
the verb exhibits a neutralization of the distinction between the future tense and the futurate 
reading denoted by the DA predicate. 
 Kinberg’s account of DAs exploits some appealing remarks on the tense-aspect system in 
Arabic. It provides an alternative perspective of imperfective aspect in Arabic where the 
imperfective aspect is subcategorized into unbound imperfective and bound imperfective (i.e. 
semi-imperfective). However, the account of semi-imperfectivity is not firmly established.  
 Kinberg’s analysis is based on the notion that imperfective aspect is subcategorized into 
the unbound imperfective vs the semi-imperfective (bound). The DA predicates also fall under 
each subcategorization as noted earlier. As an unbound imperfective, DAs express an unbound 
imperfective state which is similar to the stative reading of the imperfective form of the verb. In 
other words, it is assumed under this analysis that both structures (DAs and imperfective) denote 
the same stative interpretation. I argue that this assumption is flawed. In (72) the stative reading 
of the imperfective form beHeb ‘like’ is distinct from the stative reading given by the DA Haab 
‘like’ in that the former expresses a loose reading of the state that stretches over a longer span of 
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time or a generic meaning, while the latter has a more specific reference time. Kinberg’s analysis 
erroneously predicts that both readings are analogous.  
(72)  
(a) majdi   beHeb                                  yrooH                        ytsawwag. 
Majdi   IMPERF-like.3SG.MASC  INF-go.3SG.MASC  INF-shop.3SG.MASC 
‘Majdi likes to go shopping ( in general).’ 
 
(b) majdi   Haab           yrooH                        ytsawwag. 
Majdi   like-DA      INF-go.3SG.MASC  INF-shop.3SG.MASC 
‘Majdi likes to go shopping (now/this time).’ 
 
 
 As far as the unbound state is concerned, Kinberg (1992) argues that sentence (67) above, 
repeated here as (73), expresses an unbound state in the past with no beginning or end specified. 
The sentence does not invite the inference that the state given is resultative or an outcome of a 
change-of-state transition period.  
(73) ‘enna         fer3awanna wa  hamaana wa    junudahuma    kaanu          xaTe’een. 
Certainly   Pharaoh        and  Haman   and  soldiers-their    were-they   sin-DA 
‘Certainly, Pharaoh and Haman and their soldiers were sinners.’ 
 
 
 However, I argue that such an implication is inaccurate. The argument that sentence (73) 
invites an unbound result state reading entails that the DA xaTe’een ‘sinners’ describes a 
permanent and enduring quality that is attributed to Pharaoh and Haman rather than a changing 
or contingent property. This assumption is challenged by the fact that DAs describe a changing 
state rather than a permanent state which is a quality always ascribed to pure adjectives not DAs 
in the traditional grammar of Arabic (Fassi 1993).  Hence, DAs denote a change of state or 
resultative reading rather than a permanent state reading. In other words, the unbound state 
reading assumes that the meaning of (73) can be captured by saying that ‘Pharaoh and Haman 
were sinners’ instead of ‘Pharaoh and Haman have become sinners (i.e. entered the state of 
committing sins)’. The former reading is captured by an unbound state reading while the latter is 
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captured by a change of state or resultative reading. Furthermore, the former reading (Pharaoh 
and Haman were sinners) contradicts their image and fate in the Quran where they were 
ultimately punished. The fact that they were sinners should rule out the punishment as one 
cannot be punished unless s/he has the choice of committing sins (i.e. have become sinner/ 
resultative reading) and not were intrinsically sinners from beginning till the end (i.e. unbound 
state). Only the resultative reading could correctly explain why they were punished at the end 
and not the unbound reading as Kinberg (1992) claims. 
 The assumption that DAs are ‘deictic tensed forms’ is not substantially supported. As 
mentioned earlier, DAs are assumed to indicate a present tensed reading as their main deictic 
center. Kinberg (1992: 311) argues that “It is inaccurate to conclude, however, that participle 
clauses are timeless. Thus, the reference point would generally be the present moment of 
utterance”. This assumption is challenged by the fact that DAs have varied relative points of 
reference: prior to the TU as in (74) and posterior to the TU as in (75) and not only a present 
tense reading (Kinberg 1992: 310).  
(74) w    hum  min  faza3en yawma’ethen        ‘amenuun. 
and they  from terror     upon-day-of-then  secure-DA 
‘and they shall be secure from terror that day.’ 
 
(75) ‘am             xalaqna      l-mala’ikata ‘enaathan wa hum       shahiduun. 
or-whether created-we  the-angles     females   while-they  witness-DA  
‘ Or did We create the angles as females, while they were witnessing.’ 
 
 
 If Kinberg’s assumption is correct regarding the deictic present reading of DAs, two 
predictions should be born out. First, DAs would exhibit different inflectional and morphological 
templates under each temporal reading. However, this prediction is not born out since DAs 
maintain the same inflectional template with all temporal readings. Second, if DAs are ‘deictic 
tensed forms’ they should necessarily undergo the restriction which states that the deictic time 
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adverbs or reference points indicated by relative tense should match the deictic time reference 
contained in the tensed form. In other words, since DAs are believed to involve a present deictic 
reading in their semantics, then sentences (74) and (75) above should be ungrammatical because 
the present deictic reading of DAs should conflict with the past and future reference points in 
(74) and (75) respectively. The fact that these sentences are perfectly acceptable suggests again 
that analyzing DAs as deictic present tensed forms is flawed. The current work assumes that DAs 
trigger an evidential relative tense reading not a deictic present tensed form as claimed by 
Kinberg (1992). 
 Another major challenge for Kinberg’s claim that DAs are deictic present-tensed forms 
comes from their interaction with the copular verb kaan ‘was/were’ in classical and Modern 
Standard Arabic. DA predicates do not bear deictic tense because they do not form complex 
tenses with the copular verb kaan ‘was/were’ (77) unlike present verb forms (76). This is 
confirmed by the fact that there is no temporal specification given by DAs that can be anchored 
in the temporal reading expressed by the copular verb (Fassi 1993). 
(76) kana     3aliyuun   yqefu                   3endama daxaltu                   el-bayata. 
was      Ali            3SG-stand.Masc  when       enter-PERF.1SG   the-house 
‘Ali was standing when I entered the room.’ 
 
(77) kana   3aliyuun  waqefan     3endama  daxaltu                  el-bayata. 
was    Ali            stand-DA   when       enter-PERF.1SG  the-house 
‘Ali was standing when I entered the room.’ 
 
Sentence (76) includes a present form of the verb and is ambiguous between two readings: result 
state reading in that Ali was in the state of standing when I entered the house; and a simultaneous 
reading in that he was in the process of standing when I came in (i.e. the temporal specification 
of the verb is anchored in the time specified by the copula verb kaan). However, the 
interpretation in (77) with the DA waqefan ‘standing’ bears only a result state reading. 
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 One last complication of Kinberg’s analysis lies in the assumption that prospective and 
retrospective semi-imperfective predicates and the finite form of the verb bear analogous 
interpretations therefore they are assumed to be interchangeable. One piece of evidence that has 
been provided to support this claim is coordinated contexts as in (71) above. In other words, 
Kinberg (1992) argues that the interchangeability of the DA with the finite form of the verb 
neutralizes the distinction between the future form and the prospective DAs (futurate reading) in 
one hand, and the imperfective form of the verb and retrospective DAs (perfect or anterior 
reading) on the other.  However, I have already argued that this assumption is inaccurate in that 
the futurate reading denoted by DA is distinct from the future reading given by the future tense 
form. I have also shown that the imperfective form of the verb bears a different meaning from 
that denoted by DAs (see the previous two sections for further discussion). 
 Mughazy (2004) also provides a subatomic analysis of DAs in Egyptian Arabic. His 
analysis attempts to account for the temporal problem of verbless sentences with DAs. These 
verbless sentences have always been accounted for as encoding a present default reading that is 
licensed by a null copula. When verbless sentences encode a past or future reading, an overt 
copular verbs kaan ‘was/were’ or ykoon ‘be’ are used to license these temporal readings 
respectively. However, unlike all other verbless sentences, those with DAs have varied temporal 
readings in that they license temporal adverbials that belong to different time specifications 
without the need of these overt copular verbs. For example, sentence (78) licenses the present 
temporal adverbial delwa’ti ‘now’, while those in (79) and (80) license the past adverbial 
embareH ‘yesterday’ and the future adverbial bukra ‘tomorrow’ respectively without the need of 
an overt copular verb (Mughazy 2004:5). 
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(78) mona  nayma       delwa’ti. 
Mona  sleep-DA   now 
‘Mona is asleep now.’ 
 
(79) ‘ana kaatib        eg-gawaab embareH. 
 I      write-DA  the-letter    yesterday 
‘I wrote the letter yesterday.’ 
 
(80) ‘ana misaafer     bukra. 
 I      travel-DA  tomorrow 
‘I  am going to travel tomorrow.’ 
 
Mughazy (2004) argues that licensing past and future adverbials by DAs without the need 
of an overt copular verb creates a problem for the assumption that the reference time of the 
tensed form should be similar to the deictic temporal reading of the adverbial. Furthermore, it 
has been argued in his analysis that sentences with DAs vary in terms of their aspectual readings. 
The problem that arises with these aspectual readings is that there is no verbal component in 
these sentences to license these different aspectual readings and the DAs maintain the same 
morphological template in all of these readings. Examples (81-83) are illustrative. 
(81) 3ali saakin     fe  el-beet       da. 
Ali  live-DA  in  the-house  this 
‘Ali lives in this house.’ 
 
(82) nadir   mashi         hinaak  ‘ahoh. 
Nader  walk-DA   there      now right 
‘Nader is walking over there right now.’ 
 
(83) mona   lissa  mixallaSa  el-wageb. 
Mona   just   finish-DA  the-homework 
‘Mona has just finished the homework.’ 
 
 
Sentence (81) has a present simple reading, while sentences (82) and (83) exhibit present 
progressive and present perfect readings respectively. 
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In order to account for this temporal problem, Mughazy (2004) proposed a subatomic 
analysis for DAs in Egyptian Arabic. He argues that all sentences with DAs should be analyzed 
as encoding a default present tense reading similar to all other verbless sentences in Arabic. All 
DAs license different temporal adverbials regardless of the lexical aspect of the verbal base from 
which DAs are derived. He claims that DAs are complex adjectival predicates that express a 
target state that is bound by an underlying event (onset event in Mughazy’s terms). These 
underlying events occur at the beginning or at the end of the target state which always holds 
indefinitely at speech time. When the state is bound at its beginning, the underlying event is 
viewed as retrospective onset event that binds the beginning of the target state which in turn 
licenses past temporal adverbials. On the other hand, if the target state is bound at its end, the 
underlying event is viewed as a prospective event that licenses the future adverbials. The nature 
of the target state is three fold: it holds indefinitely upon the completion of the onset event, it 
holds at speech time, and it functions as the landing site of the present temporal adverbials. 
Mughazy distinguishes between a target state and a resultant state in that the former holds 
indefinitely due to the fact that it is a natural consequence of the completion of the underlying 
event whereas the latter is only pragmatically implicated. 
Mughazy’s account is based on the sub-atomic analysis of event predicates, also known 
in the literature as the Neo-Davidsonian approach as in the works of Parsons (1990) and 
Higginbotham (2000).  According to this subatomic analysis, any predication is analyzed into a 
lexical decomposition that includes semantic components (i.e. the arguments). According to this 
approach, both events and states are introduced as arguments of the verb just like other thematic 
arguments. Both events (e) and states (s) are restricted variables in that they are existentially 
bound. Mughazy (2004) extends this analysis to DAs and argues that DAs are complex 
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predicates that involve an existential quantification over a state and an event unlike verbs that 
involve either quantification over states or events. According to Mughazy’s subatomic analysis, 
the following is a semantic representation of DAs in Egyptian Arabic where the DA baa3it 
‘send’ involves an existential quantification over state and event variables (Mughazy 2004: 18).          
(84)  
(a) 3ali  delwa’ti baa3it      eg-gawaab  min  ‘usboo3. 
Ali   now       send-DA  the-letter    from  week 
‘Ali is now in a state of having sent the letter a week ago.’ 
 
(b)  ∃s ∃e [sending (e) Agent (e, Ali) & Patient (e, the letter) & A week ago (e) &  
 Having sent the letter (s) & Theme (s, Ali) & Now (s) & ONSET (e,s)]. 
 
Despite its intuitive appeal, Mughazy’s account suffers from many complications.  One 
of the major premises of Mughazy’s analysis lies in the fact that DAs quantify over a target state 
that holds indefinitely in time. This is based on the view that, as Mughazy (2004) claims, a state 
terminates iff its subject undergoes a change of state (i.e. shifting from a state into another one), 
which is not applicable to the target state denoted by DAs. For example, in (85) the target state of 
having read the book by Mona holds indefinitely in time because such a state is irreversible i.e. it 
is not possible for Mona to enter a state of not having read the book after she had read it 
(Mughazy 2004: 165): 
(85) mona ‘aarya      ek-kitaab  da   min  3ashar seneen. 
Mona read-DA  the-book  this from ten      years 
‘Mona read that book ten years ago.’   
    
 
Mughazy (2004) argues that the target state of ‘Mona having read the book’ in (85) still 
applies to Mona even though the reading event is completed ten years ago. In other words, the 
target state of ‘Mona having read the book’ is still applicable to Mona from the beginning of the 
ten years interval and up to speech time. I argue that this account fails to distinguish between the 
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interpretation of DAs and perfectives as far as the target state is concerned. In other words, it is 
not clear how the target state denoted by the perfective in (86) below is different from that given 
by the DA ‘aarya ‘read(DA)’  in (85) above.  
(86) mona ‘arat                              ek-kitaab da   min 3ashar seneen. 
Mona read-PERF.3SG.FEM  the-book this from ten      years 
‘Mona read that book ten years ago.’  
   
  
Sentence (86) has the perfective form of the verb ‘arat ‘read’. The event of reading the 
book by Mona took place ten years ago, yet it is still true that at the right edge of the reading 
event which characterizes the interval at which the completion of the event is born out, Mona has 
entered a target state of ‘having read the book’ and this target state started to hold ten years ago 
up until now. Note here that such a state is still irreversible (i.e. holds indefinitely in time) as it is 
not possible for Mona to move from the target state of having read the book to another state that 
cancels it i.e. a state of ‘Mona not having read the book’. The fact that perfective form exhibits a  
target state similar to that of DAs undermines the assumption made by sub-atomic account of 
confining the target state to DAs and not to any other form.  
I further argue that the resemblance of the target state between DAs and perfectives as 
shown above leads to unwanted results especially those related to the truth conditions of DAs as 
given by the sub-atomic account. Remember that according to the sub-atomic account DAs are 
complex predicates that project both state and event variables into their logical form, as 
illustrated in (84a and b) repeated here as (87a and b). 
(87)  
(a) 3ali delwa’ti baa3it      eg-gawaab  min  ‘usboo3. 
Ali   now      send-DA  the-letter    from  week 
‘Ali is now in a state of having sent the letter a week ago.’ 
 
(b) ∃s ∃e [sending (e) Agent (e, Ali) & Patient(e, the letter) & A week ago (e) &  
Having sent the letter (s) & Theme (s, Ali) & Now (s) & ONSET (e,s)] 
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The logical form under (87a) clearly suggests that the ONSET, which is the underlying 
inceptive event, binds two variables: a target state (s) and an event (e). The above logical form 
reads as follows “there is an event of sending such that it is a sending of letter by Ali, and this 
sending took place during the interval representing the day preceding the speech time. Moreover, 
there is a state such that it is a state of Ali’s having sent the letter, and this state holds of Ali at 
speech time and it came about at the point in time when the event of Ali’s sending the letter was 
completed. More specifically, the event of Ali’s sending the letter occurs over an open interval 
t1-t2 and the target state of him having sent the letter begins to hold over an interval that is closed 
at its beginning (viz, t2) and it holds indefinitely.” (Mughazy 2004: 19). The reading of the 
logical form as shown here clearly shows that the target state is a natural result or consequence 
that comes about upon the completion of the onset event of sending the letter: upon completion 
of the onset event of sending the letter, Ali enters the target state of ‘having sent the letter’ which 
holds over a span of time stretching from the ending point of the event interval (i.e. t2) up to 
speech time and holds indefinitely ever after as well. I argue that the nature of the target state as 
given by Mughazy (2004) under (87a and b) for the DA can be extended to the target state of the 
perfective as discussed under (86). Therefore I assume that the logical form of the DA in (87b) 
can be extended to the perfective in (86), repeated here as (88a), as shown in (88a and b): 
(88)  
(a) mona ‘arat                              ek-kitaab da   min 3ashar seneen. 
Mona read-PERF.3SG.FEM  the-book this from ten      years 
‘Mona read that book ten years ago.’    
 
(b) ∃s ∃e [reading (e) Agent (e, mona) & Patient (e, the book) & ten years ago (e) &  
Having read the book (s) & Theme (s, M) & ONSET (e,s)]. 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
The logical form in (88b) reads as follows: upon completion of the onset event of reading 
the book which spans from t1-t2, Mona enters the target state of ‘having read the book’ which 
holds over a span of time stretching from the ending point of the event interval (i.e. t2 which also 
characterizes the beginning of the target state) up to speech time and holds indefinitely ever after. 
I argue here that the definition and the nature of the target state as it stands in the sub-atomic 
analysis poses a challenge for the distinct semantic representation of the logical form of DAs. 
This is because the nature of the target state as it stands fails to distinguish the logical form of 
DAs under (87b) from that given by the perfective under (88b).  
A further complication for the subatomic analysis comes from the assumption that the 
consequent resultant state of DAs is pragmatically implicated. Mughazy (2004) argues that DAs 
especially those derived from inchoative verbs involve quantification over two types of state: a 
target state and a resultant state. While the former is semantically asserted as each DA must 
entail a target state, the latter is pragmatically given in that it can be cancelled and does not 
necessarily assert the existence of the resultant state at speech time. One argument Mughazy 
(2004) provides in favor of this claim comes from contradictory conjunctions where any 
sentence with a DA can be followed by a conjoined continuation that cancels the resultant state 
of the DA without yielding ungrammaticality as shown in (89) and (90). Mughazy (2004) 
substantiated his claim based on data taken from Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994) who discussed 
DAs in Egyptian Arabic and contrasted them to those in JA (see section 2.2.2). Mughazy 
(2004:186-187) provides the following examples as taken from Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994). 
(89) 3ali metgawez          sarah we   mTala’-ha. 
Ali get married-DA  Sarah and divorce-DA-her 
‘Ali has married Sarah and divorced her.’ 
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(90) 3ali laabis         el-badla we  ‘ale3-ha. 
Ali put on-DA  the  suit and  take off-DA-it 
‘Ali has put on the suit and took it off.’ 
 
 
Mughazy (2004) claims that the examples provided by Mitchell and El-Hassan are ‘non-
contradictory’ conjunctions and therefore used them to support his claim regarding the pragmatic 
nature of the resultant state of DAs in Egyptian Arabic. Interestingly enough, the above examples 
(89) and (90) were provided by Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994) to show exactly the opposite 
claim: Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994:78) comment on sentence (90) “in both Egypt and JA the 
sentence labis elbadla ‘He is wearing the suit’ refers to him having put on the suit at an earlier 
time, but, in Egypt only, the sentence also implied that he has not taken it off since”. Mitchell 
and El-Hassan (1994: 78) further argue that the same sentence “is perfectly good Jordanian 
Arabic but to an Egypt is a non-sequitur”. The same problem also applies to sentence (89): 
Mitchell (1978: 245-246) comments that it “would be extensible in Jordan by … wi mTallegha 
‘and he has (since) divorced her’ which would be inadmissible in Egypt, where the 
corresponding sentence has it that Sameer is still married to his cousin”. The above observations 
made by Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994) and Mitchell (1978) are also confirmed by the intuition 
of Egyptian Arabic speakers. 
Mughazy (2004) claims that DAs that are derived from inchoative verbs entail sentences 
with corresponding perfective forms. The source of entailment comes from the assumption that 
both structures encode a resultant state that does not necessarily hold at speech time. Examples 
(91) and (92) are illustrative. 
(91) 3ali waa’e3 3ala el-‘arz. 
Ali  fall-DA on   the-floor 
‘Ali has fallen on the floor.’  
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(92) 3ali wi’i3         3ala  el-‘arz. 
Ali  fall-PERF on    the-floor 
‘Ali fell on the floor.’    
 
 
According to Mughazy (2004), sentence (91) with the DA waa’e3 ‘fall(DA)’ entails sentence (92) 
with the perfective form wi’i3 ‘fell’. The source of entailment comes from the fact that neither of 
which entails a current relevant state holding at speech time (i.e. Ali being on the floor at speech 
time). However, the assumption that DAs sentences entail those with the perfective form is 
inadequate. Sentence (93) has the DA dhaayib ‘melt(DA)’ which is derived from an inchoative 
verb. Sentence (94) has the perfective form dhaab ‘melted’; therefore we would assume that both 
forms invite entailment to each other. However, the two forms do not entail each other as can be 
shown by the unacceptability of (93) under cancellation test which targets the resultant state of 
the DA, and the acceptability of (94) which survives the contradiction. 
 
(93) eth-thalj    dhaayib #  bs      (radd)  jaamid/     jamad. 
the-snow  melt-DA # but     (later) freeze-DA/ freeze-PERF 
‘The snow has melted but froze.’  
 
(94) eth-thalj    dhaab         bs      jamad. 
the-snow  melt-PERF but    freeze-PERF 
‘The snow  melted but froze.’  
 
 
The same fact holds for the contrast between the DA and perfective forms of other telic 
verbs. For example, the DAs faatiH  ‘open(DA)’ asserts the resultant state that the shop is open as 
shown by the unacceptability of the utterance in (95) where the sentence with the DA is 
continued with a contradictory statement that negates the resultant state of the shop being open. 
However, in (96) no such contradiction is obtained with the perfective form of the verb which 
indicates that the resultant state reading is only pragmatically implicated. If we assume, as 
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Mughazy (2004) claims, that both forms entail each other, then we would erroneously predict 
that both sentences should yield either true or false truth values. The fact that (95) is not 
acceptable while (96) is acceptable undermines the entailment argument that Mughazy (2004) 
advocates. 
(95) sami faatiH      el-maHal #  bs  mssakru-h. 
Sami open-DA the-shop  #  but close-DA-it 
‘Sami has opened the shop but closed it (the shop is open but closed).’ 
 
(96) sami fataH                                  el-maHal bs    sakaru-h. 
Sami open-PERF.3.SG.MASC  the-shop  but  close-PERF 
‘Sami opened the shop but closed it.’ 
 
 
In addition, the subatomic analysis fails to explain why the alleged entailment relation 
between DAs and perfective fail in this context: 
        (97) 
(a)  majdi faateH      el-baab,    bs     mumkin ‘aHmad  elli   fataHuh. 
  Majdi open-DA the-door,   but   may        Ahmad  who  PERF-open.3SG.MASC-it 
  ‘Majdi has opened the door but probably Ahmad is the one who opened it.’ 
 
(b)  majdi fataH            el-baab,#    bs  mumkin  ‘aHmad  elli    fataHuh. 
  Majdi PERF-open  the-door, # but may        ahmad  who  PERF-open.3SG.MASC-it 
  ‘Majdi has opened the door but Ahmad is the one who opened it.’ 
 
(c)  majdi mumkin elli   fataH            el-baab. 
  Majdi may       who  open-PERF  the-door 
  ‘Probably, it is Majdi who opened the door.’  
 
 
The fact that sentence (97a) survives under cancellation which asserts that somebody else other 
than Majdi might have opened the door clearly indicates that the DA involves a modal 
component in its semantics that allows for this contradiction to hold (I provide a detailed analysis 
of the modal component argument of DAs in chapter 4, however for the sake of my argument 
here it is sufficient to claim that DA in the above context involves a modal reading). Therefore 
and based on this I argue that (97a) entails (97c) which expresses a modal reading due to the 
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presence of the modal mumkin ‘might’. However (97b) yields anomaly which indicates that the 
perfective involves a realis (non-modal) reading that cannot be challenged. Therefore no 
entailment relation can be established between (97b) and (97c). If (97a) entails (97c) and (97b) 
does not entail (97c), then by logical entailment, it is necessarily the case that (97a) does not 
entail (97b). Again, the subatomic analysis would erroneously predict that both sentences (97a 
and b) would entail each other, which is not the case here. 
One further challenge to the subatomic analysis proposed by Mughazy (2004) comes 
from the quantificational property of past temporal adverbials. It is argued that the past temporal 
adverbials are licensed as modifiers of the underlying onset event that binds the target state. 
Therefore, in a sentence like (84a and b), repeated here as (98a and b), the past adverbial 
men‘usboo3 ‘a week ago’ modifies the underlying onset event ‘sending the letter’ as can be 
shown in the logical form under (98b) where the argument ‘a week ago’ binds the event variable 
 (e). 
(98)  
(a) 3ali delwa’ti  baa3it       eg-gawaab  men ‘usboo3. 
Ali   now       send-DA   the-letter    from  week 
‘Ali is now in a state of having sent the letter a week ago.’ 
 
(b) ∃s ∃e [sending (e) Agent (e, Ali) & Patient(e, the letter) & A week ago (e) &  
Having sent the letter (s) & Theme (s, Ali) & Now (s) & ONSET (e,s)] 
 
However, I argue that this logical form as it stands is insufficient to account for sentences 
such as (99a) where the past adverbial embareH ‘yesterday’ does not modify the onset event 
variable as would be predicted by Mughazy’s analysis given in (98b); rather it modifies the state 
variable as can be shown by the acceptability of the continuation which asserts that the time at 
which the underlying onset event took place (i.e. parking the car) holds at the day earlier than 
yesterday and not at yesterday. 
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(99)  
(a) majdi   saaf         es-sayarah 3ala baab ed-daar   embareH,   bs   hwwa  
Majdi  park-DA  the-car       by the -house gate  yesterday   but  he       
safha                                  awal embareH.  
park-PERF.3SG.MASC    the day before                        
‘Majdi’s car was parked  at the house gate yesterday, but he parked it there the 
day before.’ 
 
(b) #  ∃s ∃e [Parking(e) Agent (e, Majdi) & Patient(e, the car) & Yesterday (e) &  
             Having parked the car (s) & Theme (s, Majdi) & Now (s) & ONSET (e,s)] 
 
 
The logical form in (99b), as it is predicted by the subatomic analysis, does not capture 
the semantics of (99a) where the past adverbial embareH ‘yesterday’ modifies the state of the car 
being parked prior to speech time rather than the event of car parking. The logical form in (99b) 
erroneously predicts that the past adverbial quantifies over the event variable and not the state 
variable which yields a misrepresentation of the semantic of (99a). Therefore, I propose a 
modification of the semantic representation of (99b): 
(100) ∃s ∃e [Parking(e) Agent (e, Majdi) & Patient(e, the car) & Yesterday (RS) & the 
car is parked (RS)& Having parked the car (TS) & Theme (TS, Majdi) & Now 
(TS) & ONSET (i(the day before, TS), e)]. 
 
There are three major modifications I propose in the logical form under (100): first, the 
quantificational force of the past adverbial shifts from an event variable to a state variable. 
Second, the incorporation of another variable that is the resultant state variable (RS) as 
contrasted to the target state variable (TS) which is maintained under (100). Third, the 
incorporation of the index variable (i) which functions as a coreference variable that binds the  
actual time interval of the onset event (i.e.‘awwal ‘embareH ‘the day before yesterday’) and at 
the same time marks the initial point of the target state (TS). I propose the following 
representation of this index variable:  
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(101) i = [ACTUAL TIME (ONSET EVENT)….[TS] ] 
The representation given in (101) indicates that the index variable includes the time at 
which the onset event took place and the initial point of the TS. The index variable (i) in 
sentence (99a) coreferences or binds the actual time interval at which the onset event took place. 
That is, it binds the past adverbial awal embareH ‘the day before yesterday’. It also marks the 
initial point of the TS (i.e. having parked the car) which holds true at speech time as Mughazy 
(2004) claims. Note that the TS argument with its present default reading as claimed by the 
subatomic account is maintained under the logical forms (100) and (101). 
Based on the above mentioned discussion, I argue that a sentence such as (102) below, 
where the DA is used with a past adverbial, is ambiguous between two readings contra to 
Mughazy’s analysis: (a) the past adverbial ‘embareH ‘yesterday’ modifies the onset event as 
predicted by the subatomic analysis under (102a); (b) another reading arises where the past 
adverbial quantifies over the RS variable as predicted by the modified logical form proposed as 
demonstrated in (102b).    
(102) Majdi saaf           es-sayarah 3ala baa bed-daar  embareH.  
Majdi  park-DA  the-car       by the house gate  yesterday 
‘Majdi had/has parked the car yesterday.’ 
 
(a)  ∃s ∃e [Parking (e) Agent (e, Majdi) & Patient (e, the car) & Yesterday (e) &     
 Having parked the car (s) & Theme (s, Majdi) & Now (s) & ONSET (e,s)] 
 
(b) ∃s ∃e [Parking(e) Agent (e, Majdi) & Patient(e, the car) & Yesterday (RS) & the   
 car is  parked (RS)& Having parked the car (TS) & Theme (TS, Majdi) & Now   
 (TS) & ONSET (i(actual time, TS), e)]. 
 
 
In sum, I have presented in this section the main claims of the subatomic approach. The 
studies discussed here provide useful insights about the nature of quantificational force encoded 
in DAs semantics especially those related to the existence of two variables: a state and event 
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variables. Moreover, the subatomic analysis is the most appealing in that it highlights the 
significance of the DAs to the temporal and aspectual system in Arabic, which is one of the 
aspects that will be pursued in the current work where the evidential proposal will be used to 
revisit temporal relations in JA. I have also argued against the subatomic analysis claim 
regarding the semi-imperfective nature of DAs, the nature of the resultant state, the validity of 
the logical form proposed for DAs and the quantificational properties of time adverbials. Similar 
to other previous works, the subatomic analysis does not account for the evidential nature of DAs 
discussed in the previous sections.  
  
2.3 Previous Studies on Evidentiality in Arabic 
I have already argued at the beginning of this chapter that studies on evidentiality in 
Arabic and Semitic languages are very scarce due to the belief that evidentiality does not exist as 
a category in Semitology. Here I present all the studies I am aware of that discussed evidentiality 
in Arabic and Semitic languages. Only two studies touch upon this phenomenon in Semitic 
languages, Al-haisoni et al. (2012) and Isaksson (2000).  
Al-haisoni et al. (2012) provided a purely descriptive study of evidentiality in standard 
Arabic (SA). The description of evidentiality markers in this study is based on Chaf’s (1986) 
classification of evidential markers in English: degree of reliability markers, belief markers, 
inference, hearsay and general expectation markers. The study provided lists of predications 
mainly verbal predicates that assign evidentiality in SA based on this classification. These 
predicates include: the perfect form of the verbs and another category of verbs called in SA 
Danna w ‘axawatuha ‘to suppose and its sisters’. It is claimed that this category of verbs marks 
evidentiality in SA and it is further divided into two sub-categorizations: af3aal elquluub ‘verbs 
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of hearts’ and ‘af3aal ‘atHaweel ‘verbs of conversion’. The first subcategory (af3aal elquluub 
‘verbs of hearts’) is further divided also into ‘af3aal alyaqeen ‘verbs of complete truthfulness’ 
and ‘af3aal al-rujHaan ‘ verbs of potential truthfulness’. It is argued by Al-haisoni et al. that the 
former verb group is used to mark a high-degree of certainty, while the latter is used to indicate a 
lesser degree of certainty.  
The study further argues that Arabic uses direct and indirect perception verbs as in 
English to indicate direct and indirect evidentiality. These verbs include yara ‘see’ and ysma3 
‘hear’ to express direct evidentiality and predicates such as yuqaal ‘it is said’ to mark indirect 
hearsay evidence. Finally, it is argued that the past tense or the perfect form is used to indicate 
evidentiality in Arabic where the speaker uses this form to assert a high degree of certainty. 
Al-haisoni’s study is a very concise albeit purely descriptive study of evidentiality in SA. 
The study does not provide any detailed semantic analysis of those evidential markers and how 
these markers contribute to the evidentiality-modality semantic interface in Arabic. The study 
provides no evidence that these markers encode evidentiality other than at the lexical level. 
Isaksson (2000) provided a tentative survey of evidentiality in Arabic and classical 
Hebrew. His study is mainly concerned with a description of reportive, inferential and direct 
evidentiality in these two Semitic languages. He argues that in these languages evidentiality is 
specified by auxiliary particles. For example, Isaksson (2000) reports that there are some 
particles in Hebrew that trigger different types of evidentiality including the particles ulay 
‘perhaps’ and hinne ‘behold’ both of which can be followed by perfect or nominal clauses. For 
example, the particle hinne ‘behold’ invites direct and inferential evidential reading in classical 
Hebrew as argued by Isaksson (2000). In (103), the particle hinne ‘behold’ is followed by a 
nominal clause and is argued to express an inferential evidential reading.  
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(103) way-y-iqas          Pharaoh    w-hinne      Xelom. 
and-he-woke up  Pharaoh   and-behold-dream 
‘Then Pharaoh woke up (and realized) it was a dream.’ 
 
 
Isaksson (2000) argues that the particle hinne  with the nominal complement Xelom 
‘dream’ triggers an inferential reading based on the interpretation that Pharaoh woke up and 
realized ( i.e. drew a conclusion or inference) that he had a dream based on observable evidence. 
The same particle when followed by nominal clause can also be used to express direct 
evidentiality as in (104). 
(104) wa-aqum          ba-b-boqer    l-heniq        et-b-ni             w-hinne        met. 
and-I-went up  in-morning   for-nursing  ACC-son-my   and-behold  he-was-dead 
‘I got up in the morning to nurse my son and behold: he was dead.’ 
 
 
In this sentence the particle hinne ‘behold’ triggers direct evidentiality where it directs the 
attention to the observable direct sensory fact: her son being dead. 
In addition, Isaksson (2000) discussed some evidentiality markers in some Arabic 
dialects, spoken and classical. Based on data taken from Ingham (1986 and 1994), Isaksson 
(2000) provided some examples of what he believed to be markers of evidentiality, these 
include:  active participles as markers of reportive readings, the particle ka’anna ‘as/like’ and the 
particle tigil ‘you say’ as markers of inferentiality. Furthermore, he argues that the perfective can 
be used to indicate inferential and reportive evidential interpretations in classical Arabic (CA) 
and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). For example in (105) below, the perfective form akalta 
‘ate’ is used to trigger an inferential reading where the student in this sentence makes an 
inference that his teacher has already eaten treacle based on an observable traces of dibsan 
‘treacle’ on the shirt of the teacher (Isaksson 2000: 394-395).  
70 
 
(105) qala          lahu       ba3zu talameethe-hi:   ya  sayyidi akalta        debsan. 
say-PERF to-him  some  student-PL-his   oh  sir         eat-PERF treacle 
‘One of his students said to him: Sir, you have been eating treacle.’ 
 
 
Isaksson (2000:397) concludes his study by claiming that in Arabic and Hebrew “there 
are no internal tendencies towards a grammaticalization of the evidential categories. Such 
readings are instead frequently determined by auxiliary particles”.  
Isaksson’s study is only descriptive in nature. It is mainly concerned with describing the 
evidential markers in Arabic and Hebrew without providing a semantic investigation or 
providing evidence for the evidential readings of these markers. Furthermore, the claim that 
these languages do not exhibit a grammatical category of evidentiality is inadequate. I argue in 
chapter 4 that the participle morphology is the hallmark of the evidential category in JA.  Contra 
to Isaksson (2000), the fact that there exists a separate morphological paradigm of participles that 
distinguishes it from other predicates and that this morphological structure exhibits evidential 
semantics supports my claim regarding the grammaticalization of the evidential category in JA. 
According to Isaksson (2000), the perfective has acquired a secondary meaning which is related 
to evidential readings (i.e. reportive and inferential indirect evidentiality). This does not mean 
however, that the perfective has become an evidential because the primary meaning of perfective 
is rather different from evidential DAs. In other words, the perfective form expresses 
evidentiality only as a semantic extension of the semantics of perfective and not as its core 
meaning. Forms such as the perfective, which expresses evidentiality only as an overtone 
meaning, is subsumed under ‘evidentiality strategies’ as claimed by Aikhenvald (2004).  
Evidentiality strategies are forms that denote evidential readings only as a semantic extension or 
overtone meaning not as their core meaning. These include categories and forms like perfective, 
perfect, passive and other forms. If we assume that the evidential readings in Arabic are only 
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semantically implicated as an overtone use of another structure such as the perfective as argued 
by Isaksson (2000), then one might argue by the same token that DAs express evidentiality only 
as a semantic extension or semantic overtone. I present three main counterarguments to this 
claim. First, If this claim is on the right track and evidentiality (especially inferential evidential 
reading) is implicated semantically as an overtone of the perfect aspectual reading of DAs, then 
we would assume that a perfect reading (mainly the resultant state reading) of the perfective 
form of the verb should also trigger a similar evidential reading. However, this assumption is 
incorrect due to the fact that perfective violates the two core requirements of indirect 
evidentiality as will be discussed later: the requirement of indirect evidence and the requirement 
of inference (i.e. a modal component). Second, DAs not only denote a perfect aspectual 
interpretation but also a futurate reading. Any claim that the evidential reading is only specified 
by perfect semantics should also explain how and why such a reading (i.e. futurate) is also 
asserted in DAs semantics, whether it is related to the DAs evidential readings or not. Third, 
although I discuss DAs as the main structure under investigation, I will refer also to another type 
of participle structure in Arabic, the ‘passive participle’. I will argue that passive participles bear 
resemblance to DAs in that it shows an evidential semantics as well. I take the argument that 
passive participles denote an evidential reading as evidence to support my claim regarding the 
grammaticalization of an evidential category in JA. In other words, I argue that the fact that 
evidentiality is expressed by two forms that exhibit participle morphology clearly shows that 
participles are the hallmark of evidentiality in JA and that evidentiality is expressed 
grammatically by these two forms and not as a semantic extension or overtone as it is the case 
with the perfective form as claimed by Isaksson (2000).   
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
Previous approaches to DAs are centrally concerned with providing explanation to the 
varied temporal and aspectual interpretations licensed by DAs. All these approaches prove 
problematic because none of these approaches accounts for the evidential interpretations encoded 
by DAs as proposed in the current work. 
Studies on evidentiality in Arabic and Semitology are very scarce. The reason behind this 
fact is a long held belief that evidentiality as a category does not actually exist in Semitic 
languages. The two studies on evidentiality in Arabic and Hebrew reviewed here do not provide 
a comprehensive and detailed semantic analysis of evidentiality in Semitic languages. The 
current work is the first attempt to account for evidentiality not only in Arabic but in Semitology 
in general as will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter Three 
Deverbal Agentives in Jordanian Arabic: An Alternative Morphosyntactic View 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the morphosyntactic properties of DAs in JA. I attempt to defend 
an alternative perspective of the conventional ‘verbal vs non-verbal’ view of predication in 
Arabic in general and in JA in particular. The motivation for this alternative view comes from 
the fact that the conventional view fails to account for the mixed and intermediate behavior of 
DAs which exhibit both non-verbal and verbal properties. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section two I present the morphological template 
of DAs. Section three shows how DAs exhibit a mixed morphosyntactic behavior of verbal and 
non-verbal properties. Section four discusses the non-verbal analysis of DAs and investigates the 
implications of the arguments against this analysis on previous classifications of DAs that have 
been proposed in the literature, specifically the nominal and adjectival classifications. In section 
five I discuss the verbal properties of DAs and present arguments against the verbal analysis of 
DAs. In section six, I propose an alternative view of predication in JA. Section seven concludes 
the chapter. 
 
3.2 Morphological Template of DAs 
DAs have a morphological form that distinguishes them from the rest of the verbal 
predicates in JA, the perfective and the imperfective forms. Table (1) below presents some 
morphological templates of DAs. The first row represents tri-consonantal verb stems. The rows 
that are below represent some templates of verbal roots that include more than three root 
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consonants, four consonants and more or a three consonantal root with a long vowel; (Adapted 
from Mughazy 2004: 24). 
 
Table (1) Morphological Templates of DAs 
Verb Form Example Gloss DA form Example  Gloss 
CaCaC katab write CaaCiC kaatib write (DA) 
CaCCaC darrab train mCCaCiC mddarib train (DA) 
CCaCCaC tkallam speak miCCaCCiC mitkallim speak (DA) 
CaaCaC sharak participate mCaaCiC mshaarik participate (DA) 
CiCCaCaC ‘intaqad criticize miCCaCiC mintaqid criticize (DA) 
 
As Table (1) shows, the morphological template of DAs derived from a tri-consonantal 
root, as shown in the first row, is established by inserting the long vowel aa after the first 
consonant and a short i before the final consonant. The morphological template of DA derived 
from a root that has more than three consonants (quadric and more) is established by inserting 
the prefix m or mi in initial position and the short vowel i before the last consonant. 
 
3.3 DAs as a Mixed Category 
Active participles (APs) in Arabic are a mixed category that exhibit both verbal and non-
verbal (i.e. nominal and adjectival) properties. Some APs function as nominal predicates as in 
(1), while some others function as adjectival predicates as in (2). 
(1) ‘axuuy           bishtaghel                              3aamil. 
brother-my   IMPERF-work.3SG.MASC  worker-AP  
‘My brother’s job is worker.’ 
 
(2) el-mawDuu3                  lessa ghaamiD                               benesbeh      eli. 
the-subject.SG.MASC   still   mysterious-AP.SG.MASC   with regard  to-me 
‘The subject is still mysterious to me.’ 
 
75 
 
Sentence (1) has the AP 3aamil ‘worker’ in an object position that denotes a nominal 
function. In (2) the AP ghaamiD ‘mysterious’ is used in a post-nominal position (i.e. as a 
predicate adjective) where it modifies the head noun of the clause el-mawDuu3 ’the subject’ and 
agrees with it in terms of gender and number. There is a third function of APs where they exhibit 
a verbal function. These APs are the focus of the current work and are referred to as deverbal 
agentives (DAs) since they exhibit verbal properties as in (3). 
(3) majdi kaasir         el-kaaseh. 
Majdi break-DA  the-glass 
‘Majdi has broken the glass.’ 
 
 
 The DA kaasir ‘break (DA)’ in (3) exhibits verbal properties in that it denotes an event and 
a resultative state. It also bears resemblance to verbs in terms of distributional properties in that it 
occupies a verbal position in (3) where the deletion of the DA makes the sentence 
ungrammatical. All three functions of APs (i.e. the nominal, the adjectival and the deverbal) have 
the same morphological template as shown in Table (1) in the previous section.   
The fact that APs have mixed verbal and non-verbal properties has led to the assumption 
that DAs can be classified as either non-verbal predicates (i.e. nominal, adjectival and complex 
adjectival predicates) or verbal predicates. In the following sections, I discuss these non-verbal 
and verbal analyses and provide counterarguments to each of them.  
 
3.4 The Non-Verbal Analysis of DAs 
There is a long held view in the literature of Arabic that DAs are non-verbal predicates 
and thus are subsumed under verbless sentences, also known in Arabic as nominal or copular 
sentences (Bakir 1980, Fehri 1993, Eisele 1999, Jelinek 1981, 2002 among others). Verbless 
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sentences are formed by a subject or a topic followed by a non-verbal predicate including a noun 
as in (1a), an adjective (1b), a prepositional phrase (1c) or a DA as in (1d). 
(1) 
    (a) majdi m3allem. 
           Majdi teacher                                    
           ‘Majdi is a teacher.’ 
 
    (b) majdi mabSoot.    
           Majdi happy      
           ‘Majdi is happy.’ 
 
    (c) majdi fii  el-maktabeh.     
           Majdi in  the-library                                     
           ‘Majdi is in the library.’ 
 
    (d) majdi naayim. 
            Majdi sleep-DA 
            ‘Majdi has fallen asleep.’ 
                                   
 
 Verbless sentences as those in (1) have been assumed to encode a default present stative 
reading. These non-verbal predicates allow present adverbials without the need of an overt 
copular verb such as kaan’was/were’. However, when used with past adverbials, the use of the 
overt copular verb kaan ‘was/were’ is necessary as in (2a) otherwise the sentence is 
ungrammatical as demonstrated in (2b). 
(2) 
   (a) majdi kaan  fii el-beit      embareH. 
          Majdi was   in the-house yesterday                                    
          ‘Majdi was in the house yesterday.’ 
 
   (b)* majdi   fii el-beit       embareH. 
           Majdi   in the-house  yesterday                                   
           ‘Majdi in the house yesterday.’ 
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 I argue that the claim that DAs are subsumed under non-verbal predicates is not 
empirically motivated. In the remainder of this section, I provide counterarguments to this non-
verbal analysis. The argument against the non-verbal analysis is structured as follows: in sub-
section one I discuss stativity vs agentivity diagnostics. In sub-section two, I examine the 
contrast between stage-level vs individual-level predicates. Sub-section three discusses some 
other morphosyntactic diagnostics against the non-verbal analysis of DAs including word order 
and interaction of DAs and verbless sentences with copular verbs. In sub-section four and five, I 
investigate the implications of the arguments established in the previous sub-sections on the 
nominal and adjectival classifications of DAs that have been proposed in the literature in Arabic 
in general and in JA in particular.  
 
3.4.1 Stativity vs Agentivity Diagnostics 
 One of the most fundamental features of verbless sentences in Arabic is that they are 
stative in nature.  Sentences (1a-d), repeated here as (3a-d) indicate a pure stative reading: the 
state of Majdi being a teacher (3a), the state of Majdi being happy (3b) and the state of Majdi 
being in the library (3c). 
(3) 
    (a) majdi m3allem. 
           Majdi teacher                                    
           ‘Majdi is a teacher.’ 
 
    (b) majdi mabSoot.    
           Majdi happy      
           ‘Majdi is happy.’ 
 
    (c) majdi fii  el-maktabeh.     
           Majdi in  the-library                                     
           ‘Majdi is in the library.’ 
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 DAs are also assumed to be verbless sentences and denote a state reading as well. In (1d), 
repeated as (4), the sentence with a DA expresses a state reading: the state of Majdi having fallen 
asleep. 
(4) majdi  naayim. 
         Majdi  sleep-DA 
         ‘Majdi has fallen asleep.’ 
                                   
  
 One piece of evidence that DAs denote a stative reading comes from their behavior in 
perception verb complements (Mughazy 2004). In (5a) with the perfective form of the verb 
waggaf ‘stood up’, the speaker saw the event of Majdi standing up as supported by the fact that 
the sentence licenses the event-denoting adverbial bsur3a ‘quickly’. Sentence (5b) with the DA 
waagif ‘stand up (DA)’, on the other hand, denotes a state reading where the speaker saw Majdi in 
the state of standing up. The stative reading is supported by the fact that the sentence becomes 
unacceptable if the event-denoting adverbial bsur3a ‘quickly’ is used. 
(5)  
    (a) ‘ana shefit                            majdi  waggaf                              bsur3a. 
           I       see-PERF.1SG.MASC Majdi stand-PERF.3SG.MASC  quickly  
           ‘I saw Majdi when he stood up quickly.’ 
 
    (b)* ‘ana shefit                            majdi waagif       bsur3a. 
            I      see-PERF.1SG.MASC Majdi stand-DA  quickly  
            ‘I saw Majdi  in the state of standing up quickly.’ 
 
 In addition, DAs express a result-state reading that is semantically asserted. In sentence 
(6) the DA faateH ‘open(DA)’denotes a resultative state reading where the result state is 
semantically asserted as evident by the fact that the sentence is unacceptable under the 
cancellation test. 
 
 
79 
 
(6) majdi  faatiH     el-maHal#  bs  msakr-uh. 
         Majdi open-DA the-store # but close-DA-it 
         ‘Majdi is in the state of having opened the store but he is in the state of  
         having closed it.’    
 
 However, while it is true that DAs express a state reading similar to non-verbal 
predicates, they are different from verbless sentences in that they also have an eventive reading. 
In other words, one stark difference between verbless sentences and DAs is that the former are 
pure statives in nature while the latter are stative and eventive. One major difference between the 
sate denoted in verbless sentences and that denoted by DAs is that the state is not a result of a 
preceding event in the former while it is in the latter. This contrast is clearly manifested by the 
difference between the state in sentences in (3) where copular sentences express a pure stative 
reading with no event entailed, and the result-state denoted by DAs in (6) where the result state 
‘the store being open’ is semantically entailed by the existence of a preceding event ‘opening the 
store’ i.e. the result-state ‘being open’ is true iff there is an entailing pre-existing event 
(opening). 
 Moreover, non-verbal predicates induce a homogenous or static state i.e. unchanging 
throughout their duration. However, DAs indicate a rather heterogonous and dynamic or change 
of a state reading which is a property of non-stative predicates. One piece of evidence comes 
from the different readings both structures denote under the sub-interval property which has 
always been taken as a defining feature of pure stative predicates (Partee 1984, Herweg 1991, 
Smith 1997 among others). The sub-interval property is defined in model-theoretic semantics as 
reflected in an entailment pattern as given formally under (7) (adapted from Smith 1997: 32). 
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       (7) Sub-interval property: When a state holds for an interval T, it holds for every  
                                                       sub-interval t of that interval T. 
 
The definition given under (7) comprises an entailment pattern given as: any sub-interval t  
(which is a sub-interval of the interval T) entails T. 
 
 In sentence (8a) below, the non-verbal predicate denotes a static and homogenous state 
reading: the state of Majdi being sick spans over the interval T (i.e. for three days) and that there 
is no moment throughout this interval T where Majdi is not sick. In other words, if we assume 
that Majdi was sick for three days spanning from Saturday till Monday, then it follows by logical 
entailment that any sub-interval t (say Sunday) entails the whole interval T as supported by the 
acceptability of (8b): If Majdi was sick for three days (from Saturday till Monday), then it is true 
that Majdi was sick on Sunday. However no such logical entailment arises in the case of the DA 
in (9a-b) as shown in (9c). If we assume that the event of writing the letter took three hours (from 
1 o’clock till 4), then it does not follow that Majdi wrote the letter at 2. In other words, if Majdi 
wrote the letter in three hours (from 1 till 4), it is not true that he wrote it at 2 or was writing it at 
2.  
(8) 
    (a) majdi mariiD  el-thalath teyaam elmaDyaat. 
           Majdi sick      the  three day-PL the-last 
           ‘Madi has been sick for the last three days.’ 
 
    (b) majdi  kaan  mariiD  el’aHad. 
             Majdi  was   sick       Sunday 
             ‘Madi was sick on Sunday.’ 
 
    (c) Sentence (a) → (entails) sentence (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
81 
 
(9) 
    (a) majdi kaatib       er-resaleh fii thalath sa3aat. 
              Majdi write-DA the-letter  in  three    hour-PL 
              ‘Majdi has written the letter in three hours.’  
    
                (b) majdi kaatib/kaan biktib                      (fi)  er-resaleh esaa3a  thentein. 
                          Majdi write-DA /was IMPERF-write (in) the-letter   o’clock two 
                          ‘Majdi has written/was writing the letter at two o’clock.’  
 
                (c) Sentence (a)  ¬ → (does not entail) sentence (b) 
       
 The distinction in state readings between DAs and verbless sentences as pointed out 
above is also present in the logical definition of time adverbials. The time adverbials with 
verbless sentences include a universal quantificational character as given in (10a and b). 
However, DAs, especially those derived from non-stative verbal stems, have an existential 
quantificational force as illustrated in (11a and b).  
(10) 
       (a) majdi kaan mariiD  el-‘sbuu3 elmaaDii. 
             Majdi was   sick      the-week the-past  
             ‘Madi was sick last week.’ 
 
       (b) ∃T (T˂now & LAST WEEK(T) & ∀t(IN (T,t)          Sick (m) at t) 
                    There is a past time T which is last week, such that for every time t which is      
                    in T, Majdi was sick at t. 
 
(11)   
       (a) majdi  jaai           3ala ed-daar    el-‘sbuu3 el-maaDii. 
             Majdi  come-DA to    the-home the-week the-last 
             ‘Madi had come home last week.’ 
 
       (b)  ∃T (LAST WEEK(T) & T˂now & ∃t(IN (T,t)          come (m) at t) 
                    There is a past time T which is last week, such that at some time t which is      
                    in T, Majdi came home at t. 
  
 The universal and existential quantificational contrast here corresponds to the 
homogeneity vs heterogeneity distinction discussed under (8) and (9) above. The universal 
quantifier implicates that the state denoted by verbless sentences in (10) is homogenous in that it 
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is true in every sub-interval t of the whole interval T (last week): The state of Majdi being sick is 
true at every day last week. This contrasts with the existential quantifier in (11), where DA is 
used, in which the interval T (last week) contains some time (t) at which Majdi came home. This 
interpretation does not necessarily assert that such a result-state (i.e. Majdi being home) was true 
at all sub-intervals of T because it might be the case that Majdi stayed home for some time at T  
 (last week) then left afterwards. 
 Another argument in support of the fact that DAs, contra verbless sentences, involve 
eventive reading comes from their temporal interpretations in (past) complement clauses.  When 
stative predicates are used in subordinate clauses, they usually denote an overlapping reading 
with the event in the main clause. However, non-stative predicates are not interpreted as such. 
Rather, they denote a past-shifted reading where the event in the subordinate clause occurred at 
an interval prior to the one in the main clause. The former reading (i.e. the overlapping reading) 
corresponds to the behavior of verbless sentences suggesting that they are stative as in (12a and 
b); whereas the latter (shifted-reading) corresponds to DAs (especially those derived from verbal 
root whose lexical aspect is accomplishment or achievement) suggesting that they are non-stative 
as in (13a and b). 
(12) 
       (a) sami gaal  ennuh majdi  fii ed-daar. 
             Sami said  that     Majdi in  the-house 
             ‘Sami said that Majdi was home.’ 
 
       (b) ------------/////said/////---------TU (Time of Utterance)--------- 
                             {at home} 
 
  
(13) 
       (a) sami gaal  ennuh majdi  kaatib      er-resaleh. 
             Sami said  that    Majdi  write-DA the-letter 
             ‘Sami said that Majdi had written the letter.’ 
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       (b) --------write (DA)----------////said////---------TU(Time of Utterance)--------- 
 
 
                        
In (12a), the verbless sentence indicates an overlapping reading where the state of Majdi being 
 home overlaps the event of saying in the main clause as demonstrated in (12b).  However, the 
DA in (13a) asserts a shifted reading where the occurrence of the writing is prior to the event of 
saying in the main clause as shown in (13b).  
 The contrast between the overlapping and shifted readings of verbless sentences and DAs 
respectively is also found in narrative contexts (Kamp and Rohrer 1983, Smith 1999, among 
others). The argument here is that statives do not advance the narrative context while non-
statives do. In (14) the non-verbal predicate kaayen z3laan ‘was angry’ has an overlapping 
reading with the other event (entering the library). This contrasts with the interpretation in (15) 
where the event of borrowing the book denoted by the DA mesta3eer ‘borrow(DA)’ preceded the 
event of entering the library i.e. a past shifted-reading. 
(14) 
       (a) sami faat                                  el-maktabeh.  kaayen za3laan 
             Sami enter-PERF.3SG.MASC the library.     Was    angry 
             ‘Sami entered the library. He was angry.’ 
 
       (b) ------------///entered///---------TU(Time of Utterance)--------- 
                               {angry}  
 
 
(15) 
       (a) sami faat              el-maktabeh. kaayen mesta3eer    min-ha ktaab 
             Sami enter-PERF the-library.    was      borrow-DA  from-it book  
             ‘Sami entered the library. He had already borrowed a book from there’ 
 
       (b) --------borrow(DA)----------////enter///---------TU(Time of Utterance)--------- 
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 Another major distinction between verbless sentences and DAs resides in their sensitivity 
to agentivity. As stative predicates, all verbless sentences yield non-agentive interpretations 
 [-Agentive]. This fact is supported by their failure to pass agentivity diagnostics as I will 
demonstrate shortly. DAs, on the other hand, exhibit a dual agentive nature i.e. they show 
agentive and non-agentive behavior [-/+ Agentive]. This dual nature follows naturally from their 
dual eventive vs stative nature [+stative / +eventive] as discussed above.  First I will show how 
DAs are characterized by the [-agentive] property and then proceed to discuss the behavior of 
DAs and verbless sentences under agentivity diagnostics. 
 Agentivity refers to the argument that is responsible for bringing about an event. There are 
at least three main features subsumed under agentivity: causation, control and volition (Dowty 
1975 among others). Causation has been argued as the most salient feature of agentive contexts, 
whereas volitionality and control are extra properties that are embraced by animate causers only 
(Arche 2006). DAs can sometimes be characterized as [-agentive]. Consider (16) where the DA 
waagif  ‘stand up(DA)’ is embedded under the perception verb shefit ‘saw’. Here the DA 
expresses a non-agentive reading as exemplified by two facts. First, in (16a) the DA does not 
license the agentive-oriented adverb shwai ‘slowly’. Second, in (16b) the DA survives the 
contradictory statement which states that it is possible that someone else caused him to fall, 
suggesting that Majdi in this sentence is [-agentive] otherwise the sentence should be 
unacceptable as is the case with the perfective form of the verb in (16c) where Majdi is 
[+agentive]. 
(16) 
       (a)*  shefit        majdi waagif      shwai  shwai. 
               see-PERF Majdi stand-DA slowly slowly  
               ‘I saw Majdi standing up very slowly.’ 
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       (b)   shefit        majdi  waagif     bs  mumkin waHad thani elli  waggaf-uh. 
               see-PERF Majdi stand-DA but may       one     other  who stand-PERF-him 
               ‘I saw Majdi standing up, but maybe someone else stood him up.’ 
 
       (c)   shefit         majdi  wagaf #          bs  mumkin waHad thani  elli  waggaf-uh. 
               see-PERF Majdi stand-PERF#  but may       one       other  who stand-PERF-him 
               ‘I saw Majdi stand up, but maybe someone else stood him up.’ 
 
 
 As pointed out earlier, causation and volition are one of the major properties of animate 
agents. However, not all animate agents are real causers. The argument el-baibii ‘the baby’ in the 
sentences under (17) is an animate, yet it is not agentive [-causer, -volition]. Only the DA 
ghaasil ‘wash(DA)’ is appropriate with this non-agentive subject as demonstrated in (17a) and not 
the perfective form of the verb ghasal ‘washed’ in (17c). This fact is supported by the 
acceptability of sentence (17b) where the DA ghaasil ‘wash(DA’ survives the contradictory 
statement which asserts that someone else washed the baby’s face for him unlike the perfective 
in (17d). 
(17)     
       (a) shefit        el-baibii  ghaasil      wejhuh. 
             see-PERF the-baby  wash-DA  face-his 
             ‘I saw the baby’s face washed.’ 
 
       (b) shefit        el-baibii   ghaasil     wejhuh   bs ummuh        elli   ghasalatlu 
             see-PERF the-baby  wash-DA  face-his  but mother-his who wash-PERF-for-him 
             ‘I saw the baby’s face washed, but his mother washed it for him.’ 
 
       (c)* shefit        el-baibii   ghasal           wejhuh. 
              see-PERF the-baby  wash-PERF  face-his 
              ‘I saw the baby wash his face.’ 
 
       (d)* shefit        el-baibii   ghasal         wejhuh    bs ummuh       elli    
              see-PERF the-baby  wash-PERF  face-his  but mother-his who  
              ghasalatlu. 
              wash-PERF-for- him 
              ‘I saw the baby wash his face, but his mother washed it for him.’ 
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 The aforementioned discussion asserts that DAs yield non-agentive interpretations 
 [-agentive]. However, unlike non-verbal predicates, DAs also show an agentive interpretation 
[+agentive]. This is supported by the fact that DAs, especially those derived from 
accomplishment and activity verbal base, survive agentivity diagnostics as contrasted to non-
verbal predicates which fail these tests. One piece of evidence comes from agent-oriented 
adverbials. In (18a) the DA Saaf ‘park(DA)’ licenses the agent-oriented adverb 3amadan 
‘deliberately’; whereas non-verbal predicates, which are canonically stative in nature, are 
unacceptable with this adverb as exemplified in (18b and c). 
(18)     
       (a)  majdi  Saaf        es-sayarah 3a baab ed-daar    3amadan. 
               Majdi park-DA the-car       on door the-house deliberately 
               ‘Majdi has parked the car at the house gate deliberately.’ 
 
       (b)* majdi mariiD 3amadan. 
               Majdi sick     deliberately 
               ‘Majdi is sick deliberately.’ 
 
       (c)* majdi  m3alem 3amadan. 
               Majdi teacher  deliberately 
               ‘Majdi is a teacher deliberately.’ 
 
 Furthermore, unlike non-verbal predicates (19a and b), DAs are allowed in pseudo-cleft 
contexts with elli Saar ‘what happened’ as shown in (19c). 
(19)     
       (a)* elli     Saar        enuh  majdi Taweel. 
                What happened that    Majdi tall 
                ‘What happened is that Majdi is tall.’ 
 
       (b)*  elli    Saar          enuh majdi  m3alem. 
                 What happened that   Majdi  teacher   
                 ‘What happened is that Majdi is a teacher.’ 
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                   (c)    elli    Saar         enuh majdi kaatib      er-resaleh. 
                            What happened that  Majdi write-DA the-letter 
                            ‘What happened is that Majdi has written the letter.’  
  
 Unlike non-verbal predicates, DAs survive imperative contexts. JA exhibits some 
particles with imperative nuance such as the particle huh! I call these particles ‘imperative 
particles’ since they switch the reading of the sentence into an imperative reading. These 
particles are also used in contexts where the speaker commands the addressee to do something 
with a warning tone. The imperfective verb bitratbi ‘clean’ denotes a typical imperfective 
reading that is habitual reading ‘Sarah cleans up her room everyday’ as exemplified by sentence 
(20). 
(20) ‘enti           betratbi                             ghurfetki   kul yoom, ‘ana ba3ref. 
             You-FEM  IMPERF-clean.2
nd
.FEM  room-your every day,  I      IMPERF-know  
             ‘You clean up your room every day, I know that.’ 
  
 When the imperative particle huh! is used with the imperfective verb in (20) above, the 
reading switches from an imperfective to an imperative reading with a warning nuance as 
illustrated in (21). 
(21)  betratbi                                     ghurfetki      huh! 
             IMPERF-clean.2SING
 
.FEM   room-your    IMPER 
             ‘Clean up your room, ok!’ 
 
 
 DAs are allowed in these imperative contexts, while verbless sentences are not as 
illustrated in (22 a) and (22b and c) respectively. 
(22)     
       (a)*  betkuun m3alem huh! 
                 Be         teacher  IMPER 
                 ‘Be a teacher.’ 
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       (b)*  betkuun mabSuut  huh! 
                 Be          happy      IMPER  
                 ‘Be happy.’ 
 
       (c)  betkuun mrratib      ghuruftak     huh! 
                Be          clean-DA  room-your   IMPER 
                Lit: your room must be clean 
                ‘You clean up your room, ok !’  
 
 Finally, DAs are allowed in infinitival complements that induce agentive readings (i.e. 
non-stative) such as ‘it was very kind of you/very bold of you/very cunning of you to INF’ as in 
(23c). This contrasts with verbless sentences which are not allowed in such contexts due to their 
stative nature as expected, as in sentences (23a and b). 
(23)     
       (a)*/?? kanat xuTwah jaree’a minak      enak       m3alem. 
                   was   step        bold     from-you that-you teacher          
                   ‘It was very brave of you that you are a teacher.’ 
 
       (b)*     kanat xuTwah jaree’a minak      enak       mariiD. 
                   was   step       bold     from-you that-you  sick          
                   ‘It was very brave of you that you are sick.’ 
 
       (c)       kanat xuTwah jaree’a minak      enak       maxeth  haDa  el-mawqef. 
                  was   step        bold     from-you that-you take-DA this    the-stand          
                  ‘It was very brave of you to take this stand.’ 
  
 In sum, the abovementioned discussion shows that DAs have a distinct behavior from 
verbless sentences in terms of stativity and agentivity diagnostics. Unlike verbless sentences 
which are typically characterized by [+stative, -agentive], DAs exhibit a dual nature in that they 
are [+stative/+eventive] and [+/-agentive].  
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3.4.2 Individual vs Stage Level Predicates 
 Individual level predicates (IL) are defined as those predicates that ascribe properties to 
individuals (Carlson 1977). They are always contrasted with stage-level predicates (SL) which 
characterize a spatial and temporal representations of individuals (i.e. stages) as argued by 
Carlson (1977). Sentence (24a) exemplifies an IL while (24b) a SL. 
 
(24)   
       (a) John is short. 
 
       (b) John is at home. 
 
  
 The opposition between IL and SL predicates is of interest here due to the fact that 
languages tend to make a distinction between these two types of predicates using verbless 
sentences. As pointed out earlier, DAs are assumed to belong to verbless sentences; it would be 
interesting therefore to see how DAs correspond to this dichotomist IL vs SL view of predication 
and whether they pattern with the verbless sentences in this regard or not. 
 The discussion in this section leads to the conclusion that DAs are better accounted for as 
SL since they exhibit all the features of SL. The other types of verbless sentences, on the other 
hand, show a split behavior in that each type of verbless sentence such as nominal predicates can 
be characterized as IL or SL.  This conclusion is based on an array of diagnostics of IL/SL that 
are attested in the literature (Carlson 1977, Chierchia 1995, Kratzer 1995, Raposa and 
Uriagareka 1995, Higginbotham and Ramchand 1996, Becker 2000, Arche 2006 among others). 
The conclusion drawn in this section adds more appealing evidence to support the claim that 
DAs are distinct from non-verbal predicates.   
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 Carlson (1977) argues that the distinction between IL and SL predicates resides in the 
fact that the former employ permanent property while the latter express temporary properties as 
exemplified in (24a) and (24b) respectively. A similar observation has been made by Chierchia 
(1995) who argues that IL predicates display inherent generic properties in that they denote 
tangentially stable properties; whereas SL predicates express transient properties. These facts can 
be extended to predicates in JA. Verbless sentences in JA namely those with nominal and 
adjectival predicates show a split nature in that they can denote a temporary property and 
therefore behave as SL (25a and b), or expressing a permanent property and hence characterized 
as IL (25c and d). Verbless sentences with prepositional phrases and DAs show only a SL 
reading as illustrated in (26a and b) respectively.        
 (25)     
        (a)  majdi mariiD.  
               Majdi sick      
               ‘Majdi is sick.’ 
 
        (b)  majdi m3alem.  
               Majdi teacher   
               ‘Majdi is a teacher.’ 
 
        (c)  majdi 3yuun-uh     zurug.  
               Majdi eye-PL-his  blue-PL   
               ‘Majdi’s ayes are blue’ 
 
        (d)  majdi Taweel.  
               Majdi tall   
               ‘Majdi is tall.’ 
 
(26)     
       (a)   majdi fii ed-daar. 
              Majdi in  the-house      
              ‘Majdi is at home.’ 
 
       (b)  majdi laabis       ‘awaa3eeh     ej-jdaad.  
              Majdi wear-DA cloth-PL-his  the-new   
              ‘Majdi has put on his new clothes.’ 
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 Chierchia (1995) provides more characteristics of the IL predicates as follows (I only use 
the most relevant ones here):  (a) they are not allowed in locative constructions, (b) they are not 
allowed as complements of perception verbs, (c) in some contexts, they denote universal or 
generic readings and (d) they denote an aspectually stative reading. Regarding feature (a), DAs 
especially those derived from non-stative verbal roots allow locative adverbials as in (27a), those 
derived from stative roots are not allowed as in (27b). Similarly, some verbless sentences do not 
allow locative adverbials as shown in (27c-e), while others do.
1
  
(27)    
       (a)  majdi metxabii    fii el-ghurfah.  
               Majdi hide-DA   in the-room   
               ‘Majdi has hid himself in the room.’ 
 
       (b)* majdi Haab       el-bent   fii el-ghurfah.  
               Majdi love-DA the-girl  in the-room   
               ‘Majdi has loved the girl in the room.’ 
 
       (c)* majdi m3alem  fii el-ghurfah.  
               Majdi teacher  in the-room   
               ‘Majdi is a teacher in the room.’ 
 
       (d)* majdi 3yuun-uh     zurug     fii ed-daar.  
               Majdi eye-PL-his  blue-PL in the-house  
               ‘Majdi’s ayes are blue in the house.’ 
 
 
 DAs, not derived from stative verbal roots, are allowed in perception verbs complements 
as in (28a) while those derived from stative roots are not (28b). Similarly, some verbless 
sentences are not allowed in these contexts as in (28c and d) while others are allowed as in (28e). 
 
 
                                                          
1 See Kratzer (1988), (1995) and Arche (2006) for further examples of copular clauses allowing locative    
  adverbials.  
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(28)    
       (a) ‘ana shefit        majdi metxabii   fii el-ghurfah.  
              I       see-PERF Majdi hide-DA  in the-room   
              ‘ I saw that Majdi has hidden himself in the room.’   
                    
                   (b)* ‘ana  shefit        majdi Haab       el-bent   fii el-ghurfah.  
                           I       see-PERF Majdi love-DA the-girl  in  the-room   
                           ‘I saw that Majdi has loved the girl in the room.’ 
 
                   (c)* ‘ana shefit        majdi  m3alem.   
                           I       see-PERF Majdi teacher      
                           ‘I saw that Majdi a teacher.’ 
 
                   (d)* ‘ana shefit        majdi  Taweel.  
                           I      see-PERF Majdi  tall     
                           ‘I saw Majdi tall.’  
                
                   (e)  ‘ana shefit        majdi   fii ed-daar.  
                          I      see-PERF Majdi   in the-house     
                          ‘I saw Majdi in the house.’ 
 
 
 Regarding feature (c), verbless sentences entertain the ability to denote generic or 
universal readings; this contrasts with DAs where no universal or generic reading can be 
expressed (Note here that the ability of verbless sentences to assign generic reading does not 
necessarily mean that it is the only reading available with these structures; rather it is one of the 
readings these structures allow). In (29a and b), the verbless sentence expresses a 
generic/universal reading; whereas the DA in (29c) expresses a result-state reading i.e. the snow 
being shoveled without any implication for a generic reading.  
(29)     
       (a)  el-Huut      min  eth-thaddiyaat. 
               The-whale from the-mammals      
               ‘Whales are mammals.’                                   (Generic/Universal) 
 
       (b)   el-‘awlaad     agwaa     min el-banaat.  
               The-boy-PL  stronger  than the-girl-PL 
               ‘Boys are stronger than girls.’                       (Generic/Universal) 
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       (c)   el-‘awlaad     jaarfiin      eth-thalj. 
               The-boy-PL shovel-DA the-snow 
               ‘The boys have shoveled the snow.’             (Result-state)                            
 
 
 DAs show a stark difference from verbless sentences in feature (d). The distinction lies in 
the fact that the former denotes a result state which comes about as a result of a preceding event, 
while the latter denotes a pure stative reading without any implication of an existing event of any 
form. This contrast is clearly manifested by the difference between the two states under (30) and 
(31). The verbless sentences in (30) express a pure stative reading with no event entailed: the 
state of Majdi being a teacher (30a), the state of Majdi being happy (30b), and the state of Majdi 
being at home (30c). The sentence with DA (31a), on the other hand, denotes a result state which 
comes about as a result of a preceding event: the result state of ‘the store being open’ is 
semantically entailed by the existence of a preceding event ‘opening the store’. In other words, 
the result-state ‘being open’ is true iff there is an entailing pre-existing event ‘opening’ as 
illustrated by the unacceptability of (31b) with the cancellation test negating the fact that there 
has been a preceding event i.e. opening the store of the current result state. 
(30)   
       (a) majdi  m3allem. 
              Majdi teacher                                    
              ‘Majdi is a teacher.’ 
 
                   (b)  majdi mabSoot.    
                          Majdi happy      
                          ‘Majdi is happy.’ 
 
                   (c)  majdi  fii  ed-daar.     
                          Majdi in  the-house                                     
                          ‘Majdi is in the house.’ 
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            (31) 
                   (a) majdi  faatiH     el-maHal.  
                           Majdi open-DA the-store  
                           ‘Majdi has opened the store.’  
 
                   (b)   majdi  faatiH     el-maHal#  bs  el-maHal maa enfataH 
                           Majdi open-DA the-store # but the-store  not  open-PERF-passive 
                           ‘Majdi has opened the store but he did not open it.’ 
 
 
 The fact that DAs deviate from being purely stative, which is one of the typical properties 
of IL predicates as pointed out by Chierchia (1995) above, clearly indicates that DAs pattern 
with SL predicates rather than IL. Further evidence in support of this conclusion comes from the 
syntactic treatment of IL/SL predicates proposed by Kratzer (1995). Under her analysis, Kratzer 
(1995) claims that IL and SL predicates differ in their way of predication: IL are predicated to 
individuals; while SL are predicated to an eventive variable as proposed by Davidson (1967). 
 The crucial distinction between the two predicates according to Kratzer (1995) then is 
that SL predicates project an eventive argument in their structure while IL predicates do not. In 
Kratzer’s analysis, this fact gives rise to a distinction in their argument structure which is the 
base of the difference between IL and SL.  
 I argue that the distinction between IL and SL as proposed by Kratzer (1995) is also 
extended to verbless sentences and DAs in JA. In other words, DAs pattern with SL predicates in 
that they show an eventive argument in their structure; whereas verbless sentences do not and 
therefore pattern with IL predicates. One piece of evidence comes from the ability of DAs to 
allow locative and temporal adverbials which is a characteristic of eventive structures as in 
sentences under (32). However, verbless sentences do not allow these adverbials due to the lack 
of an eventive argument in their structure as in (33). 
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(32)    
       (a) majdi naayem      fii elghurfah.  
             Majdi sleep-DA   in the-room   
             ‘Majdi has fallen asleep in the room.’  
                  
                   (b) majdi jaai            embareH.  
                          Majdi come-DA yesterday   
                          ‘Majdi had come yesterday.’ 
 
                   (c) majdi jaai            hasa.  
                          Majdi come-DA now  
                          ‘Majdi has come now.’ 
 
                   (d) majdi jaai            bukrah. 
                          Majdi come-DA tomorrow  
                          ‘Majdi is coming tomorrow.’ 
 
            
            (33) 
                   (a)*  majdi m3alem  fii el-ghurfah.  
                           Majdi teacher   in  the-room   
                           ‘Majdi is a teacher in the room.’   
 
                  (b)*  majdi m3alem  gabil   dageega.  
                           Majdi teacher   before minute   
                           ‘Majdi is a teacher a minute ago.’ 
 
 
 Another piece of evidence that DAs have eventive arguments is that DAs, as in (32b, c 
and d) above, license all temporal adverbials without the need of an overt copula i.e. the copula 
kaan ‘was/were’ or ykoon ‘be’. This observation contrasts with verbless sentences as in (34a and 
b) where the overt copular verb kaan ‘was/were’ is needed to license the past temporal adverbial 
embareH ‘yesterday’. 
           (34)  
                  (a)* ‘ana mariiD embareH. 
                          I      sick      yesterday 
                          ‘I am sick yesterday.’ 
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                  (b)  ‘ana kunt  mariiD embareH. 
                          I     was   sick      yesterday 
                          ‘I was sick yesterday.’  
 
             
 Additionally, DAs express varied aspectual and temporal readings: a perfect result state 
reading in (35a) and a futurate reading in (35b). I argue that these readings are licensed because 
of the presence of the eventive argument in their syntax following Kratzer (1995). However, 
verbless sentences only denote pure stative readings and not varied aspectual and temporal 
readings due to the absence of this eventive component as explained earlier. 
(35)    
       (a) majdi gaaTef    ez-zeitoon.  
             Majdi pick-DA the-olive-PL 
             ‘Majdi has picked the olives.’ 
 
                   (b) majdi  msaafer     bukrah.  
                          Majdi travel-DA  tomorrow   
                          ‘Majdi is going to travel tomorrow.’ 
 
 To conclude, DAs pattern with SL predicates. This finding contrasts with the other types 
of verbless sentences which exhibit a split nature in that they pattern with SL in some contexts 
and IL predicates in others. 
 
 3.4.3 Morphsyntactic Diagnostics 
 The previous two sections have already presented counterarguments against the claim 
that DAs are non-verbal predicates (verbless sentences). Further support also comes from their 
morphosyntactic properties with regards to word order and interaction with the copular verbs 
kaan ‘was/were’ and ykoon ‘be’ as discussed below. 
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 Arabic employs two basic types of word order: SVO and VSO. In general, verbal 
sentences, where the perfective and imperfective forms of the verb used, display the two types as 
evident in (36a and b).          
(36) 
       (a) sami  Hal                               el-wajib. 
             Sami do-PERF.3SG.MASC the-homework 
             ‘Sami did the homework.’ 
 
       (b) Hal                                sami  el-wajib. 
             do-PERF.3SG.MASC  Sami  the-homework 
             ‘Sami did the homework.’ 
 
 
 DAs bear resemblance to verbal predicates rather than verbless sentences in this regard. 
DAs allow the two word orders as evident by the acceptability of (37a and b) where SVO and 
VSO word orders are attested respectively. In contrast, verbless sentences only allow SVO (38a), 
as shown by the unacceptability of (38b) where the predicate m3alem ‘teacher’ precedes the 
subject (topic) ‘Sami’.               
 (37) 
        (a) ‘ana saam3-ak,        ‘eHk-i. 
              I      hear-DA-you,  talk-IMPER-you  
              ‘I hear you, talk!’ 
 
        (b)  saam3-ak        ‘ana,  ‘eHk-i. 
              hear-DA-you   I,        talk-IMPER-you  
              ‘I hear you, talk!’ 
      
             (38) 
                    (a)  majdi  m3alem.   
                           Majdi  teacher     
                           ‘Majdi is a teacher.’ 
 
                    (b)* m3alem  majdi.   
                            teacher   Majdi     
                            ‘Majdi is a teacher.’ 
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 A similar observation has been made by Boneh (2005) for Syrian Arabic. Consider (39) 
where the verbless sentence is ungrammatical with VSO word order. 
(39)*  mariiD  sami.  
          sick       Sami     
          ‘Sami is sick.’               (Boneh 2005: 12)                
 
 Additionally, subjects can be dropped with DAs while they cannot be dropped in verbless 
sentences (Boneh 2005). Consider (40a) where DA predicates tolerate a covert subject; this is not 
the case with verbless sentences as in (40b). 
(40) 
       (a) Taabix      mansaf. 
               cook-DA  mansaf 
               ‘(He/I/You) has/have cooked mansaf.’ 
  
       (b)* m3alem. 
               teacher 
               ‘(Sami is) teacher.’  
 
             
        The use of the copular verbs kaan ‘was/were’ and ykoon ‘be’ is another diagnostic where 
the DAs and verbless sentences contrast. I argue that the copular verbs kaan ‘was/were’ and 
ykoon ‘be’ show different functions in both structures.  This is evident from the fact that copula 
verbs only play a temporal function with verbless sentences: they locate Topic-Time (TT) (after 
Klein 1994) in relation to TU to denote temporal readings; therefore in (41a), kaan ‘was’ locates 
TT prior to TU to the indicate past tense reading. However, with DAs copular verbs play the 
same role (i.e. temporal role) while indicating another role that is a ‘disambiguating role’ where 
the use of the copular verb neutralizes the ambiguity that accompanies with DAs. Sometimes, 
DAs are ambiguous between the futurate and the perfect aspectual (i.e. result state) 
interpretations as evident in (42a). While it is true that the use of the copular verbs kaan ‘was’ 
and yakoon ‘be’ establish the tense reading of the sentence as ‘past’ (42b) and ‘future’ (42c), 
99 
 
they also neutralize the reading to a perfect aspectual (i.e. result state) reading to the exclusion of 
the futurate reading as illustrated by the unacceptability of (42b and c) under futurate reading. 
(41) 
       (a) majdi  m3alem. 
               Majdi  teacher 
               ‘Majdi is a teacher.’  
               
                   (b) majdi kaan m3alem 
                           Majdi was  teacher 
                           ‘Majdi was a teacher.’ 
 
  
            (42) 
                  (a) majdi   jaai. 
                           Majdi come-DA 
                           Result-state reading: Majdi has come (He is home now). 
                           Futurate Reading: Majdi is going to come.  
 
                  (b) majdi   kaan  jaai. 
                           Majdi  was   come-DA 
                           Result-state reading: Majdi had come. 
                           #Futurate Reading: Majdi is going to come. 
 
                  (c) majdi  biykoon  jaai. 
                           Majdi  be           come-DA 
                           Result-state reading: Majdi will have come. 
                           #Futurate Reading: Majdi is going to come. 
 
                                    
 In sum, DAs not only differ from verbless sentences in agentivity/stativity, IL vs SL 
predicates but also in terms of word order and their interaction with copular verbs.  
 
 3.4.4 The Nominal Classification 
 
  Under the non-verbal analysis, there have been two major classifications of DAs in 
Arabic, the nominal classification (Bolus 1965, Qafisheh 1968, Gadallah 2000, among others) 
and the adjectival classification (Kremers 2003, Mughazy 2004, Al-Agarbeh 2011 among 
others). In the next two sections I discuss the implications of the counterarguments for the non-
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verbal analysis established in sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 for these two classifications. I start 
with the nominal classification. I argue that DAs are not nominal predicates. For the sake of this 
argument, I differentiate between two types of nominals: non-event nominals and event nominals 
(Grimshaw 1990). Each type will be discussed separately below. 
 
3.4.4.1 DAs as Non-Event Nominals 
  I use the term non-event nominals to refer to non-derived and non-eventive nominals i.e. 
nominals that are not derived from verbal roots nor have arguments or event structures. These 
non-event nominals include:  basic and pure nominals such as door, window, book etc…and 
simplex-event nominals (Grimshaw 1990). According to Grimshaw (1990), simplex-event 
nominals are non-derived nouns that refer to events but lack the argument and event structure 
that are found with event-nominals (event nominal predicates are discussed in section 3.4.4.2). 
Simplex event nouns include nouns such as journey, event, action, race, fight etc…. These nouns 
bear a resemblance to basic and pure nouns in many regards: both noun types are non-derived 
forms and both lack event and argument structures. Hence, they are subsumed under the same 
category here, the non-event nominals. 
 One might argue that the morphosyntactic behavior of DAs is analogous to non-event 
nominals. However, I only present one counterargument which I take as sufficient enough to rule 
out the non-event nominal analysis. My argument comes from the definiteness property of 
nominal predicates in Arabic. Definiteness is a denominating feature of nominals including non-
event nominals that sets them apart from other non-nominals (i.e. verbal predicates).  In Arabic, 
all non-event nominals can be either definite or non-definite as shown in the pairs of sentences 
(43 and 44) and (45 and 46). 
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(43) majdi shaaf                               el-filim      elli     enta  jebt-uh. 
            Majdi  see-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-movie which you  bring-it 
            ‘Majdi saw the movie which you brought.’ 
 
(44) majdi shaaf                              filim     wathaa’eqii    3an      en-nabataat  embareH. 
            Majdi see.PERF.3SG.MASC  movie   documentary  about  the- plants    yesterday 
            ‘Majdi saw a documantry movie about plants yesterday.’ 
 
(45) sami shaarak                                       fee  es-sbaag. 
            Sami participate-PERF.3SG.MASC  in   the race 
            ‘Sami has participated in the race.’  
 
(46) sami sharaak                                       fee sbaag  el-thaHieh. 
            Sami participate-PERF.3SG.MASC  in   race    the-city 
            ‘Sami has participated in a city race.’ 
  
 Sentences (43 and 44) include the pure nominal  filim ‘movie’. In (43) the pure nominal 
el-filim ‘the movie’ is definite as it is used with the definite article el ‘the’; whereas the same 
noun can be indefinite as it is the case in (44). Sentences (45 and 46) include the simplex-event 
nominal sbaag ‘race’. In (45) the simplex-event noun is definite while it is indefinite in (46). 
However, DAs are only grammatical when they are indefinite as shown by the grammaticality of 
(47); and the ungrammaticality of (48) where the DA Saayim ‘fast (DA)’ is used with the definite 
article el ‘the’. 
(47) ‘ana  Saayim    bukrah. 
            I       fast-DA   tomorrow 
            ‘I am fasting/going to fast tomorrow.’ 
 
(48)* ‘ana  el-Saayim    bukrah. 
            I       the-fast-DA  tomorrow 
            ‘I am the fasting/going to fast tomorrow.’ 
  
 Since, definiteness is a denominating feature of all nominals in Arabic including non-
event nominals, I count the definiteness property as a sufficient argument against the non-event 
nominal classification of DAs. 
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3.4.4.2 DAs as Event Nominals 
 In this section I take a closer look at the properties of event-nominals as described by 
Grimshaw (1990) and investigate whether they apply to DAs. This investigation sheds more light 
on the striking distinction between verbal and nominal properties of DAs and how this 
distinction can be accounted for. It also shows that despite the fact that DAs show 
morphosyntactic behavior that is similar to event nominals especially complex-event nominals 
such as masader ‘verbal nouns’ in Arabic, they still exhibit a stark contrast to event nominals 
with regard to other properties including definiteness and distributional properties which in turn 
corroborate the morphosyntactic status of DAs as a distinct category. First, I briefly introduce 
Grimshaw’s notions of event-nominals then I apply the diagnostics on DAs. 
 Grimshaw (1990) observed a range of striking differences between two major types of 
nominals: the first type is the derived nominals i.e. nominals that are derived from verbal base 
such as ‘examination’ which is derived from the verb ‘examine’. These nominals are also called 
‘deverbal nominals’ since they are derived from verbs. The other type is the non-derived 
nominals i.e. nominals that are not derived from verbs such as the noun ‘car’. In order to capture 
the differences between these two types of nominals, Grimshaw (1990) introduces the notion of 
argument-taking vs non-argument taking nominals. Based on this criterion, Grimshaw 
distinguishes between two types of nominals. The first type is concerned with nominals with 
event reading and argument structure (also called ‘complex-event nominals’ in Grimshaw’s 
terminology). The second type is those nominals that lack argument structure; those include 
‘result nominals’ and ‘simplex-event nominals’. The distinction between result nominals and 
simplex-event nominals lies in the derivational nature of each one; while the former is a derived 
nominal, the latter is not. Table (2) below summarizes the three types of nominals under 
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Grimshaw’s notion of nominalization with regards to argument-taking property and derivational 
nature.  
Table (2) Grimshaw’s Classification of Nominals 
         Nominal Type       Derivational Nature   Argument-taking Property 
1- Complex-Event Nominals        Derived Nominals    Argument-taking nominals 
2- Result Nominals         Derived Nominals  Non-argument taking nominals 
3- Simplex-Event Nominals      Non-Derived Nominals  Non-argument taking nominals 
  
 I have already discussed the relation between DAs and the non-derived nominals 
including pure and simplex-event nominals in the previous sub-section. In the remainder of this 
sub-section I focus on the derived nominals (deverbal nominals) which include the complex-
event and result nominals.  
 The distinction between the two types of derived nominals (complex-event and result 
nominals) is often obscured by a consistent ambiguity in their interpretations.  For instance, the 
derived noun ‘examination’ is ambiguous between two different readings: a concrete object 
reading where the word examination refers to an ‘exam’ and an event-based reading where the 
same noun refers to the event of examining someone (i.e. examination event). The former 
reading is captured by a result nominal, while the latter by a complex-event nominal. 
 Grimshaw’s account of derived nominals hinges on the assumption that the event 
component of the complex-event nominals is correlated with the obligatoriness requirement for 
an object argument. Consider, for instance, the role of the of-phrase, which occurs post-
nominally, for the acceptability of the utterance in (49) below (Grimshaw 1990: 49). The 
significance of this of-phrase lies in its selectional property: it selects for an object argument 
104 
 
complement of the derived nominal, thus denoting an event reading since only events can select 
for object arguments as their themes or patients. When the deverbal nominal ‘assignment’ in 
(49a) combines with the of-phrase, it can only denote an event-based reading. The event-based 
reading is supported by the acceptability of the predicate ‘took a long time’ which diagnoses an 
event reading and the unacceptability of the predicate ‘was on the table’ which emphasizes a 
result reading. However, when the same noun is not followed by the post-nominal of-phrase, 
only the result reading is allowed as it is clear by the acceptability of the predicate ‘was on the 
table’ as contrasted to ‘took a long time’ which makes the utterance ungrammatical. 
     
       (49)  
             (a) The assignment of unsolvable problems (took a long time) / (*was on 
                        the table). 
 
             (b) The assignment (*took a long time) / (was on the table). 
 
 As the sentences in (49) show, the presence and the absence of the object argument 
structure is the property that distinguishes event from result nominals. If the argument structure 
is present, then the deverbal nominal receives a complex event reading where it denotes an event 
with structure argument. On the other hand, if the argument structure is absent, then the deverbal 
nominal has a result nominal reading where it denotes an object and lacks argument structure. In 
order to distinguish between complex event and result nominals, Grimshaw established some 
diagnostics listed in Table (3) below.  
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Table (3) Grimshaw’s Diagnostics of Complex Event and Result Nominals  
                   Diagnostic     Complex Event Nominal            Result Nominal 
1- Argument Obligatoriness                  Yes                  No 
2- Event Reading                  Yes                   No 
3- Agent-Oriented Modifiers                  Yes                  No 
4- Subject Status              Argument            Possessor 
5- Implicit Argument Control                   Yes                  No 
6- Aspectual Modifiers                   Yes                  No 
7- Modified by ‘a’, ‘one’, ‘that’                    No                 Yes 
8- Count/Mass Nouns and                  
     Pluralization 
Appear in Mass Nouns and may 
not be pluralized 
Appear in Count Nouns and 
may  be pluralized 
9- Predication May not appear as predicate Can appear as predicate 
 
 I use the diagnostics presented in Table (3) to test whether DAs can be classified as result 
nominals. The results of these diagnostics clearly suggest that DAs are not result nominals. I first 
summarize the findings of these diagnostics in Table (4) below then I proceed to discuss these 
diagnostics and their results with illustrative examples.  
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Table (4) DAs and Result Nominals 
                   Diagnostic                  DAs            Result Nominal 
1- Argument Obligatoriness                  Yes                  No 
2- Event Reading                  Yes                   No 
3- Agent-Oriented Modifiers                  Yes                  No 
4- Subject Status               Argument             Possessor 
5- Implicit Argument Control                   Yes                  No 
6- Aspectual Modifiers                   Yes                  No 
7- Modified by ‘a’,‘one’, ‘the’, ‘that’                    No                Yes 
8- Count/Mass Nouns and                  
     Pluralization 
Do not appear in Mass or Count 
Nouns and cannot be pluralized 
Appear in Count Nouns and 
may be pluralized 
9- Predication May not appear as predicate Can appear as predicate 
 
a- Diagnostics (1) Argument Obligatoriness and (2) Event Reading: 
          (50) 
                (a) sami memtaHen  el-Tullaab          lemudet saa3a. 
                        Sami exam-DA   the-student-PL   for         hour   
                        ‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
                (b) The assignment *(took a long time).          (Grimshaw 1990: 49) 
 
 
                (c) sami ‘emtaHen                           el-Tullaab          lemudet saa3a. 
                        Sami exam-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-student-PL   for         hour   
                        ‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
 
 Sentence (50a) has the DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ which licenses the object argument 
structure el-Tullab ‘the students’. The selection of the argument structure by the DA obtains due 
to the fact that the DA maintains the same underlying structure of the verbal base from which it 
is derived as shown in (50c) where the verbal form emtaHan ‘examined’ selects for object 
argument el-Tullab ‘the students’. Furthermore, sentence (50a) indicates an eventive reading as it 
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licenses the event temporal adverbial lemudet sa3a ‘for an hour’. However, the presence of 
argument structure in the case of the derived result nominal ‘assignment’ is not obligatory as 
shown in (50b). Also, the sentence is unacceptable when used with the event-denoting predicate 
‘took a long time’, hence the absence of the event reading. 
 
   b- Diagnostic (3) Agent-Oriented Modifiers 
 
            (51) 
                  (a)   sami memtaHen  el-Tullaab          3an gasd. 
                          Sami exam-DA   the-student-PL   on  purpose 
                          ‘Sami has examined the students on purpose.’ 
 
                  (b) * The instructor’s intentional examination took a long time. (Grimshaw 1990: 51) 
  
The DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ licenses the agent-oriented modifier 3an gasd ‘on purpose’ as 
shown by the acceptability of (51a). However, no such case arises with the derived result 
nominal ‘examination’ in (51b). 
 
  c- Diagnostic (4) Subject Status 
   
           (52) 
                 (a) sami   kaatib       er-resaleh  bsur3a. 
                        Sami  write-DA  the-letter   fast 
                        ‘Sami has written the letter fast.’ 
 
                 (b) * The instructor’s examination took a long time.   
  
                 (c) * The instructor’s intentional examination took a long time.  (Grimshaw 1990: 51) 
 
 
Sentence (52a) with the DA is felicitous only when ‘Sami’ is construed as a subject of the DA 
predicate not as a possessor. This is supported by the licensing of the event-denoting adverbial 
bsur3a ‘fast’ which invites an agent-like rather than a possessor-like interpretation. Sentence 
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(52b) on the other hand, is acceptable only when the ‘instructor’ is interpreted as ‘the owner’ of 
the examination. In other words, (52b) is only felicitous under a possessor-like rather than 
subject-like interpretation as shown by the unacceptability of the agent-oriented modifier 
‘intentional’ in (52c) which induces an agent-like rather than a possessor-like interpretation.  
  
     d- Diagnostic (5) Implicit Argument Control 
 
             (53)  
                   (a)    sami  kaatib       er-resaleh  mshaan      yb3athha. 
                           Sami write-DA  the-letter   in order to  send-INF-it 
                           ‘Sami has written the letter in order to send it.’ 
 
                   (b)   The examination of the patient in order to determine …. 
 
                   (c)*  The exam in order to determine …    
                                                              
                                                              (Examples (b) and (c) are taken from Grimshaw 1990: 58)                                             
 
 
 This diagnostic is concerned with control structure of infinitival purpose clause i.e. ‘in 
order to’ followed by the infinitive form of the verb. Grimshaw (1990) argues that the event 
structure of the nominal with a complex event reading is what licenses the purpose control 
clause. This is exemplified by sentences in (53) which assert that the purpose clause is only 
allowed when the derived nominal expresses a complex event reading as in (53b), but not when 
the same derived nominal denotes a result reading as in (53c). The DA kaatib ‘write (DA)’ in 
(53a) is analogous to the complex event nominal in (53b) in that it also licenses the control 
phrase suggesting that DAs comprise an event and argument structure unlike result nominals.  
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      e. Diagnostic (6) Aspectual Modifiers:  
                         
           
(54) 
(a) sami memtaHen  el-Tullaab          lemudet saa3a. 
Sami exam-DA   the-student-PL   for         hour 
‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
(b) Only observation (*for several weeks) determines…. 
 
 DAs show another distinct behavior from result nominals in terms of licensing aspectual 
modifiers. If a derived nominal allows modification by time-span or durative adverbials such as 
for X, it clearly indicates that it has an event structure since only events allow these adverbials. 
Sentence (54a) with the DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ grammatically licenses the durative and 
event-denoting adverbial lemudet sa3a ‘for an hour’ indicating that it has an event structure 
which is not the case with the derived result nominal ‘observation’ in (54b) where the durative 
adverbial is not allowed according to Grimshaw (1990).  
                              
     f. Diagnostic (7) Modified by ‘a’, ‘one’, ‘that’: 
             
                 (55) 
                       (a)* huwaa el-kaatib          er-resaleh. 
                                    he        the write-DA  the-letter 
                                    ‘He the has written the letter.’ 
 
                       (b) huwaa  kaatib      er-resaleh. 
                                    he        write-DA  the-letter 
                                    ‘He has written the letter.’ 
 
                      (c) They studied the/an/one/that assignment.            (Grimshaw 1990: 54)    
 
               
 DAs are grammatical only when they are used without definite markers as exemplified in 
(55b), hence the ungrammaticality of (55a) where the DA kaatib ‘write(DA)’ is marked for 
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definiteness. Result nominal ‘assignment’, on the other hand, is allowed with both definite and 
indefinite markers as shown in (55c). 
        
g. Diagnostic (8) Count/Mass Nouns and Pluralization: 
                   (56) 
                         (a) el-ban-aat    3aml-aat        keik. 
                                    the-girl-PL  do.DA-SPL   cake 
                                    ‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
                         (b)* el-ban-aat    3ummal   keik. 
                                    the-girl-PL   do.IPL    cake 
                                    ‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
                         (c) The assignments were long.         (Grimshaw 1990: 54) 
 
 Before discussing examples in (56), there is one remark that needs to be clarified 
regarding pluralization of DAs. As shown earlier the active participles can have three different 
functions: nominal, adjectival and deverbal. All these different functions have the same 
morphological template as shown in Table (1). As far as pluralization is concerned, I distinguish 
between two forms of plural. The first form is the internal plural form (IPL) which is the plural 
marker of active participles with nominal function; it is also known as the ‘broken plural’ form. 
The second form is the suffixal plural form (SPL) which marks plurality in the case of deverbal 
active participles (Boneh 2005). In JA this suffixal plural form can inflect for either masculine or 
feminine; the former is expressed by the plural suffix -iin while the latter by the suffix -aat. 
Examples (57-61) are illustrative. 
(57) el-bint   3aamleh   keik. 
            the-girl  do-DA     cake 
            ‘The girl has made cake.’ 
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(58) el-ban-aat   3aaml-aat        keik. 
            the-gir-PL  do-DA-SPL    cake 
            ‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
(59)* el-banaat    3ummal         keik. 
            the-gir-PL  do-DA-IPL   cake 
            ‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
(60) haDa  bisthaghel                              3aamel. 
            This   IMPERF-work.3SG.MASC  worker-SG 
            ‘This one works as a worker.’ 
 
(61) haDuul   bisthaghlu                                   3ummal. 
            These     IMPERF-work.3SG.MASC.PL  worker-IPL 
            ‘These (ones/people) work as workers.’ 
 
 
 Sentence (57) has the DA 3aamleh ‘do(DA)’ (with deverbal reading) and the 
singular/feminine subject el-bint ‘the girl’. The DA agrees with its subject ‘the girl’ in terms of 
gender and number by showing singular and feminine inflectional agreement markings. 
However, in (58) the same DA has a plural subject el-banaat ‘the girls’ and therefore agrees with 
its subject by showing feminine but this time a suffixal plural marking (SPL) –aat and not an 
internal plural form (IPL) which makes the sentence ungrammatical as shown in (59). In 
sentence (60), the active participle 3aamel ‘worker’ has a nominal function where it refers to the 
‘person who works’, therefore, when it is pluralized as in (61) an internal plural form (IPL) is 
used rather than SPL which is only used with deverbal reading (58). A similar observation has 
been made by Mughazy (2004) and Boneh (2005) about Egyptian and Syrian Arabic respectively 
as shown in examples (62a and b) and (63a and b). 
 
(62)  
       (a)     henne kutaab          hal-ktaab.   
                they   writer-IPL   this-books 
                            ‘They are the writers of this book.’ 
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                   (b)    henne kaatb-iin           hal-ktab. 
                            they   write-DA-SPL  this-book 
                ‘They have written this book.’                
                                                                    (Syrian Arabic, Boneh 2005: 13) 
 
 
(63) 
       (a)     el-wilaad 3amliin          el-waagib. 
                the-boys  do-DA-SPL  the-homework 
                ‘The boys have done the homework.’ 
 
                   (b)    humma 3ummal        fi  maSna3 el-Hadeed. 
                           they      worker-IPL  in factory   the-steel 
                           ‘They are workers in the steel factory.’    
                                                                                          (Egyptian Arabic, Mughazy 2004:27-28) 
 
                                                                
 Based on the aforementioned discussion, it is clear now why sentence (56b) is 
ungrammatical while (56a) is acceptable: the DA in (56a and b) is used with a deverbal reading 
where only the SPL is allowed to mark plurality and not IPL which is used to mark nominal 
pluralization (i.e. broken plural marker), hence the acceptability of (56a) with SPL and the 
unacceptability of (56b) with IPL. Contra to DAs, result derived nominal ‘assignment’ is allowed 
with nominal pluralization as shown by the acceptability of (56c). 
 
       h. Diagnostic (9) Predication 
(64)                           
        (a)*  kaan  haDa majdi kaatib         er-resaleh. 
                 was   that   Majdi write-DA   the-letter 
                 ‘That was Majdi has written the letter.’ 
 
        (b)    That was the/an assignment. 
  
 
 Another property of the derived result nominal, according to Grimshaw, is their ability to 
occur as predicate or with equational be as shown by the acceptability of sentence (64b). 
However, this is not the case with the DAs as it is clear by the unacceptability of (64a). 
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 In sum, the results of the diagnostics discussed above show that DAs contrast with result 
nominal and therefore cannot be classified as such. 
 The other type of the derived event nominal according to Grimshaw’s classification is the 
complex-event nominal (CEN). As shown earlier, CENs involve an event structure in their 
semantics and therefore they license argument structure such as object arguments. These derived 
nominals retain the event and argument structure of the underlying verb and therefore have some 
verb-like properties that distinguish them from other types of derived nominals. These facts also 
obtain for DAs since DAs project an event structure and retain verb-like properties that 
distinguish them from other types of active participles (i.e. nominal and adjectival active 
participles).  
 At first sight, one might claim that DAs seem to be a typical instance of CENs since both 
forms bear event structure and retain verb-like properties and the fact that they have analogous 
behavior with regards to Grimshaw’s diagnostics as illustrated in Table (5) below. I put this 
claim to the test by examining the properties of CENs as described by Grimshaw (1990) and 
testing whether they are applicable to DAs in JA. To this end, I contrast the behavior of DAs 
with deverbal nouns in Arabic, also known as masader which have been recently accounted for 
as CENs in the sense of Grimshaw (1990) as shown by Kremers (2003). I therefore view 
masader (i.e. deverbal nouns) as an exemplifying structure of CENs in Arabic and use them as a 
diagnostic probe to test whether DAs can be categorized as CENs or not.  
I first lay out the findings in Table (5) and then proceed to discuss these diagnostics with 
illustrative examples from MSA and JA. 
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Table (5) DAs and Masader (CENs) 
                   Diagnose                  DAs            Masader (CENs) 
1- Argument Obligatoriness                  Yes                  Yes 
2- Event Reading                  Yes                   Yes 
3- Subject Status               Argument             Argument 
4- Implicit Argument Control                   Yes                  Yes 
5- Aspectual Modifiers                   Yes                  Yes 
6- Modified by ‘a’, ‘one’, ‘that’                    No                  Yes 
7-  Pluralization                    No                  No 
8- Predication Cannot appear as predicate May or may not appear as 
predicate 
 
a- Diagnostics (1) Predication and (2) Event Reading 
          (65)  
                (a) sami  memtaHen el-Tullaab         (lemudet  saa3a). 
                        Sami exam-DA   the-student-PL  (for          hour)   
                        ‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
                (b) sami ‘emtaHen                           el-Tullaab          lemudet  saa3a. 
                        Sami exam-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-student-PL   for          hour   
                        ‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
                (c) tamma     ‘e3terafuhu        bi      l-dhanb-i. 
                        happened confessing-his  with  the-crime-GEN 
                        ‘He came to confess his crime.’                           (MSA, Fassi Fehri 1993: 236) 
               
                (d) ‘ana maa baHeb                          el-3etaab. 
                        I      not   IMPERF-like.1SING  the-complaining 
                        ‘I do not like complaining.’ 
 
                 (e) ‘ana maa baHeb                          ‘a3atib. 
                        I      not   IMPERF-like.1SING   complain-INF 
                        ‘I do not like to complain.’ 
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 Sentence (65a) has the DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ and licenses the object argument el-
Tullab ‘the students’. The selection of the object argument by the DA obtains due to the fact that 
the DA maintains the same underlying structure of the verbal base from which it is derived as 
shown in (65b) where the verbal form emtaHan ‘examined’ selects for object argument el-Tullab 
‘the students’. Furthermore, the DA occurs in the position of a verb and indicates an event 
reading as it licenses the event temporal adverbial lemudet sa3a ‘for an hour’. The same facts 
hold for the masdar e3teraaf ‘confessing’ in MSA (65c) and 3etaab ‘complaining’ in JA in 
(65d).  These two verbal nouns induce an event reading and retain the argument structure of their 
verbal base.  
 One supporting piece of evidence comes from the fact that these two verbal nouns occur 
in the position of a verb. In other words, in order for verbal nouns to be able to occur in a verbal 
position, they must retain the verb’s event and argument structure in their morphosyntactic 
configuration. For instance, the masdar e3teraaf ‘confessing’ in sentence (65c) occurs in the 
position of a verbal complement of the light verb tamma ‘to come to happen’ in MSA. This light 
verb is usually used to express non-true passives in that it takes a complex event nominal, in this 
case the masdar e3teraaf ‘confessing’, as subject (cf. Holes 1995, Kremers 2003). The masdar 
3etaab ‘complaining’ in (65d) occurs also in a verbal position i.e. as a sub-clause complement of 
the verb baHeb ‘like’. The masdar must comprise an event and argument structure in order for it 
to be licensed in this verbal position as shown by (65e) where the sub-clause complement is 
occupied by the infinitival verb ‘a3atib ‘complain’. The fact that (65d) is grammatical clearly 
shows that the masdar 3etaab ‘complaining’ comprises an event and argument structure 
otherwise the sentence should be unacceptable.  
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b- Diagnostic (3) Subject Status 
 
            (66) 
                  (a)   sami  memtaHen  el-Tullaab.          
                          Sami exam-DA    the-student-PL    
                          ‘Sami has examined the students.’ 
 
                  (b)  graayet        sami  lal-qur’aan     kuwaiseh. 
                         recite-CEN Sami  to-the-quran   good 
                        ‘Sami’s reciting/recitation of Quran is good.’  
 
 
 Sentence (66a) with the DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ and (66b) with the masdar grayyeh 
‘reciting/recitation’ are felicitous only when ‘Sami’ is construed as a subject and not as a 
possessor. This can be supported by the fact that both the DA kaatib ‘write(DA)’ in (67a) and the 
masdar el-grayyeh ‘studying/reading’ in (67b) license agent-oriented and event-denoting 
modifiers such as bsur3a’fast’, hence inviting subject-like rather than possessor-like reading.   
           (67) 
                 (a)   sami  kaatib       er-resaleh   bsur3a. 
                         Sami write-DA the-letter    fast 
                        ‘Sami has written the letter fast.’ 
 
                  (b)  le-grayyeh     bsur3a  mush kwaiseh. 
                         the-studying  fast       not    good 
                         ‘Studying fast is not good.’ 
 
 
 
 
c- Diagnostic (4) Implicit Argument Control 
 
(68) 
(a) sami  kaatib        er-resaleh  mshaan      yb3athha. 
Sami  write-DA  the-letter   in order to  send-INF-it 
‘Sami has written the letter in order to send it.’ 
 
(b) ed-deraseh        mshaan tet3allam aHasan men ed-deraseh      mshaan tHaSel waDeefeh. 
the-study-CEN to           learn        better    from the-studying  to          get        job 
‘Studying to learn is better that studying to get only a job.’ 
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(c) qera’at-u-ka                   el-jareeddata      li   fahmi                         es-sayasat-i 
read-CEN-NOM-your   the-paper-ACC  for understanding-GEN  the-politics-GEN                     
ed-dawliyat-i.  
the-international-GEN  
‘Your reading the paper in order to understand the international politics.’ 
                                                                                                        (Kremers 2003: 132) 
                         
       
 This diagnostic is concerned with control structure of infinitival purpose clause (i.e. ‘in 
order to’ followed by the infinitive form of the verb). According to Grimshaw, the purpose 
clause is only allowed when the derived nominal expresses a complex event reading (i.e. 
comprising event and argument structure). The DA kaatib ‘write (DA)’ in (68a) is analogous to the 
masdar deraseh ‘studying’ in (68b) and qera’a  ‘reading’ in (68c) in that they all license the 
control phrase  suggesting that DAs are similar to masader in this regard.  
 
             
     d. Diagnostic (5) Aspectual Modifiers  
 
            (69) 
                  (a) sami  memtaHen el-Tullaab          lemudet   saa3a. 
                        Sami exam-DA   the-student-PL   for           hour   
                        ‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
                  (b) wallah ‘ana baguul deraseh        lemudet sit   sa3aat kaafi. 
                        By God I     say       study-CEN for          six  hours  enough 
                        ‘Honestly, studying for six hours is enough.’ 
 
 
 DAs show another behavior that is similar to masader in terms of licensing aspectual 
modifiers. If a derived nominal allows modification by time-span or durative adverbials such as 
for X, it clearly indicates that it has an event structure since only events allow these adverbials. 
Sentence (69a) with the DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ grammatically licenses the durative and 
event-denoting adverbial lemudet sa3a ‘for an hour’ indicating that it has an event structure 
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which is similar to the case with the masdar deraseh ‘studying’ in (69b) where the durative 
adverbial is also allowed. 
                              
     e. Diagnostic (6) Modified by ‘a’, ‘one’, ‘that’ 
             
                (70)                      
                     (a)   Hawala                         zaydun  (*haDa)  l-i3teraaf. 
                            try-PERF.3SG.MASC Zayd      (*this)    the-confessing 
                            ‘Zayd tried to confess.’                                                    (MSA, Fassi 1993: 236) 
 
 
                    (b)   kaan (*haDa)  majdi  kaatib       er-resaleh. 
                           was    (that)     Majdi  write-DA  the-letter 
                           ‘It was Majdi that had written the letter.’ 
 
 In (70a and b) the DA and the masdar do not allow the demonstrative haDa ’that’. Note 
here the demonstrative is not acceptable as a complementizer for the clause with the DA kaatib 
‘write(DA)’ in (70b) while it is allowed if it specifies the subject ‘Majdi’.  
 
          f. Diagnostic (7) Pluralization 
 
                 (71) 
                       (a)*  el-banaat     3ummal           keik. 
                                the-gir-PL   do-DA-IPL    cake 
                                ‘The girls have made cake.’ 
 
                       (b)*  ‘ana baHeb                   rukuub-aat   el-xeil. 
                                I      IMPER-like.1SG  riding-SPL  the-horses 
                                ‘I like ridings horses.’ 
 
 
 One more property of CENs masader is that they do not allow nominal pluralization as 
exemplified by the unacceptability of sentence (71b) where the masdar rukuub ‘riding’ is 
pluralized as rukuubaat  ‘ridings’. This is a robust property of DAs in Arabic as well, as shown 
by the unacceptability of (71a).   
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    g. Diagnostic (8) Predication 
 
                (72) 
                      (a)  kaan  haDa  eftetaaH   el-‘ulumbiaad  er-rasmmi. 
                             was    that   opening    the-olympic     the-official 
                            ‘That was the official opening of Olympics.’ 
                           
                      (b)* kaan   haDa majdi  faateH     el-baab. 
                              was    that   Majdi  open-DA the-door 
                              ‘That was Majdi has opened the door.’       
 
 DAs differ from masader in that they, unlike masader, cannot occur as predicates or with 
equational be as shown by the unacceptability of (72b). However, masader can occur in such 
position as shown by the acceptability of (72a). While it is true that CENs usually do not occur in 
predicate positions as argued by Grimshaw (1990), masader seem to be able to license predicate 
positions as shown in (72a) above, (see Kremers 2003 for further discussion).  
 At first sight, the aforementioned discussion indicates that DAs and masader pattern 
together as CENs. However, I argue that DAs cannot be categorized as CENs despite these 
similarities. I base my argument on two distinguishing and denominating features of CENs in 
Arabic: definiteness and their distribution in the sentence. 
 Definiteness is a distinguishing property of non-verbal categories in Arabic which sets 
them apart from the verbal category. It is a denominating property of all nominal classifications 
in Arabic: non-event nominals (i.e. pure and simplex-event nominals) and event-nominals (i.e. 
result and complex-event nominals). In Arabic, as we have seen earlier, Masader  are argued to 
be  complex-event nominals and therefore undergo the condition of marking definiteness, which 
is a robust property of all masader in Arabic as in (73a and b) where the masader el-grayyeh ‘the 
studying’ and el-‘3teraaf  ‘the confessing’ are marked with the definite article el ‘the’. 
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(73)  
      (a)  sami beHeb                                  el-grayyeh          bakkeer. 
             Sami IMPERF-like.3SG.MASC  the-study-CEN  early 
             ‘Sami likes studying early.’ 
 
                  (b)  ‘el-‘3teraaf                 bi -thanb  faDeelih. 
                         the-confessing-CEN  in guilt     virtue 
                         ‘Confessing the crime is a virtue.’ 
 
 
 If DAs are categorized as CENs as masader, they should undergo the same condition of 
marking definitensess. However, this is not the case with DAs since they always need to be 
indefinite as shown by the ungrammaticality of (74a and b) where DAs are marked with the 
definite article el ‘the’. 
(74) 
       (a)* sami el-naayem. 
              Sami the-sleep-DA 
              ‘Sami the has fallen asleep.’ 
 
                   (b)* sami  el-jaay. 
                           Sami the-come-DA 
                          ‘Sami the is going to come.’ 
 
 
 Another argument against the claim that DAs are CENs comes from the distributional 
property of CEN masader. Masader in Arabic have the distribution of nouns in that they appear 
in all of the typical positions of nominals: subject, object, complement of prepositions and 
adjuncts. Examples (75a-d) are illustrative. 
       (75)                           
            (a)  el-taddrees   weddu  taHDeer         mutawaaSil. 
                   the-teaching  need    prepare-CEN  constant 
                   ‘Teaching needs constant preparation.’ 
 
            (b)  ‘ana benesbeh       elli       baHeb                                  et-taddrees. 
                    I      with regards to-me   IMPERF-like.3SG.MASC  the-teach-CEN 
                   ‘I myself like teaching.’ 
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            (c)  geddeesh   btuSruf                                    sa3a  3ala  et-taddrees        kull   yoom. 
                   how many IMPERF-spend.3SG.MASC  hour  on    the-teach-CEN  every day 
                   ‘How many hours do you spend on teaching every day?’ 
 
            (d)  eT-Tullab         wagafu                              ‘eHteraman     la-l-‘ustaadh. 
                   the-student-PL  stand-PERF.3PL.MASC  respect-CEN  to-the-teacher 
                   ‘The students stood up in respect to their teacher.’ 
 
 
 In (75a) the masadr et-taddrees ‘the teaching’ is used as the subject of the verb weddu 
‘need’ and in (75b) the same masdar is used in object position (the object of the verb 
baHeb’like’). In (75c) the masdar is used as a prepositional complement and in (75d) it is used as 
an adjunct. However, DAs do not distribute as nouns; rather they only occur in verbal positions 
as shown in (76a-c). 
              
               (76) 
                     (a)  ‘adam Haab      el-bent. 
                           ‘adam love-DA the-girl  
                           ‘Adam has fallen in love with the girl.’ 
 
                     (b) ‘adam biHaab                                  el-bent. 
                           ‘adam IMPERF-love.3SG.MASC  the-girl  
                           ‘Adam is in love with the girl.’ 
 
                     (c)  ‘adam Hab                                   el-bent. 
                           ‘adam love-PERF.3SG.MASC   the-girl  
                           ‘Adam fell in love with the girl.’ 
 
 In (76a), the DA Haab ‘love (DA)’ occurs in the verb position of the sentence. This can be 
supported by sentences (76b and c) where the DA Haab ‘love (DA)’ can be substituted by the 
imperfective and perfective forms of the verbs respectively. 
 In sum, despite the fact that DAs pattern with masader in almost all the diagnostics 
discussed in Grimshaw (1990), DAs still show a contrastive behavior to CEN masader with 
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regard to definiteness and nominal distributional properties which are denominating features of 
all nominals in Arabic. 
  
3.4.5 The Adjectival Classification 
 The second major classification under the non-verbal analysis is the claim that DAs are 
adjectival predicates. First, I review the major studies that advocate for the adjectival analysis. 
Then, I provide critique and counterargument for this analysis.  
3.4.5.1 Previous Studies (Kremers 2003, Mughazy 2004, and Al-Agarbeh 2011)  
 In an attempt to categorize DAs, Mughazy (2004) claims that DAs belong to the category 
of adjectives. He argues that DAs are complex adjectival predicates. The motivation for this 
analysis according to Mughazy (2204) comes from the fact that the state denoted by DAs is 
different from that denoted by simple adjectives in that the former expresses a state that comes 
about as a result of a preceding underlying event while the latter has no such restriction. 
 Mughazy (2004) provided some evidence to support his adjectival analysis. First, he 
argues that DAs bear morphosyntactic similarity to simple adjectives in that both forms must be 
indefinite when used as predicates as exemplified by sentences (77a and b). When both forms are 
definite as in (77c and d), the sentences become ungrammatical. (Examples are taken from 
Mughazy 2004: 51) 
 (77)  
        (a)   el-3araybiyya    gidiida. 
               the-car-FEM      new-FEM 
               ‘The car is new.’ 
 
                    (b)  mona  misafra. 
                           Mona  travel-DA-FEM 
                           ‘Mona is travelling.’ 
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                    (c)* el-3araybiyya   eg-gidiida. 
                           the-car-FEM     the-new-FEM 
                           ‘The car is the new.’ 
               
                    (d)* mona   el-misafra. 
                            Mona  the-travel-DA-FEM 
                            ‘Mona is the travelling.’                
 
 Second, Mughazy (2004) claims that DAs and simple adjectives are the only categories 
that can be used as predicates in circumstantial clauses in Arabic as in (78a and b). 
(78) 
       (a)   3ali rawwaH      za3laan. 
              Ali went home   unhappy 
              ‘Ali went home unhappy.’ 
 
                   (b)  3ali rawwaH       Haasis     b-el-weHdda. 
                         Ali  went home   feel.DA   with-the-loneliness  
                          ‘Ali went home feeling lonely.’                  
                                                                                           (Mughazy 2004: 52) 
 
 
 Mughazy (2004) claims that the major argument in support of the adjectival analysis 
comes from the fact that DAs can be used in comparative and superlative contexts in which only 
adjectival predicates are licensed. Examples (79a and b) are illustrative (Mughazy 2004: 53). 
(79)    
       (a)   al-kinaaya-t-u                      ‘astaru                       li-l-3ayb. 
              the-metaphore-FEM.NOM  conceal-DA-NOM   for-the-uncomely 
              ‘Metaphors are better at concealing what is uncomely.’ 
 
       (b)   ‘Hna ‘a’dar                         min-ak     3ala Hal        el-mushkila   di. 
               we     become able to-DA  from-you  on   solving  the-problem  this 
               ‘We are better able to solve this problem than you.’  
 
 
 In short, Mughazy (2004) takes the aforementioned discussion as sufficient evidence to 
claim that DAs belong to the adjectival category. 
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 Kremers (2003) proposed a syntactic analysis for the two types of participles in Arabic: 
verbal participles and non-verbal participles (i.e. nominal and adjectival participles). Following 
Fassi (1993), he postulates that participles (active and passive participles) start out as verbs but at 
some point in the derivation an adjectival head projects in replacement of the verbal one. The 
fact that participles start out as verbs account for their verbal use and the switch of the head 
projection from verb to adjective should account for their non-verbal function. For instance, the 
the active participle sami3uuna ‘hear(AP)’ in (80a) is used verbally due to the fact that it assigns 
accusative case to the complement object Suraaxana ‘our cry’. 
 
           (80) 
                (a)  hal ‘antum   sami3-uuna             Surax-a-na? 
                       Q   you-PL  hear-AP-PL.NOM  cry-ACC-our    
                      ‘Do you hear our cry?’                                                    (Kremers 2003:145) 
 
 
 
 According to Kremers’ analysis, what licenses the assignment of accusative case marking 
in (80a) is the verbal head as shown in the tree diagram under (80b) below. 
80(b): 
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 Kremers (2003) proposes the same syntactic configuration in (80b) to non-verbal 
participles as well. He argues that the structure of non-verbal participles phrases (i.e. nominal 
participles) can be derived by switching from the verbal head which projects at first stage of the 
derivation and licenses the verbal use of participles (i.e. assigning accusative case) to an 
adjectival head which licenses the non-verbal function of participles (i.e. assigning genitive case) 
as it is the case with the non-verbal participle alsabiqatu ‘the preceding’ which assigns a genitive 
case to the complement qur’an ‘the holy book of Quran’ as shown in (81a and b): 
       (81) 
            (a)  al-kutubu               l-muqadasat-u    l-sabiqat-u                  li-lqur’an-i. 
                   the-books-NOM   the-holy-NOM   the-preceding-NOM   to-the-Quran-GEN 
                  ‘The holy books that preceded the Quran.’ 
                                                                                                                         (Kremers 2003: 145) 
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 (b): 
 
  
 In the spirit of Abney (1987), Kremers (2003) argues that participle phrases project the 
functional head Deg which stands for degree head. According to Abney, Deg head is the 
equivalent for the adjectival head (i.e. A head). This functional head is also considered as the hub 
of the comparative and superlative constructions according to Kremers’ analysis. Therefore, he 
claims that participles constructions bear several similarities to adjectival phrases as exemplified 
in (80b and 81b). The motivation of his claim comes from the assumption that both participles 
and adjectives agree with their internal DegP-subject, which is assumed to be pro in the case of 
participles, in gender and number and with the head noun of the whole DP in case and 
definiteness. Consider (82). 
         (82)  ra’aytu     mra’-at-an                              jamil-an       
                 I-saw        woman-FEM-ACC.INDEF   beautiful-MASC-ACC.INDEF  
                 wajh-u-ha. 
                 face-MASC-NOM-her 
                 ‘I saw a women with a beautiful face.’                               (Kremers 2003:100) 
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 According to Kremers (2003), the participle phrase such as the one given in (81a) above 
is similar to the adjectival phrase in (82). Both the participle al-sabiqatu ‘the preceding’ in (81a) 
and the adjective jamilan ‘beautiful’ in (82) agree with its internal Deg-subject in gender and 
number: al-sabiqatu ‘the preceding’ agrees with pro which always takes masculine singular 
marking; and  jamilan ‘beautiful’  agrees with the subject of the DegP which is inflected for 
masculine singular marking. Both the participles and the adjective also agree with the head noun 
of the whole DP in case and definiteness: al-sabiqatu ‘the preceding’ is definite and assigned 
nominative case which is similar to the head noun al-kutubu ‘the books’ ; and the adjective 
jamilan ‘beautiful’  is indefinite and assigned accusative case agreeing with the head noun 
‘emra’atan ‘woman’.   
 The adjectival classification has also been extended to DAs in JA as proposed by Al-
Agarbeh (2011).  In her analysis of verbal vs non-verbal predication in JA, Al-Agarbeh (2011) 
argues that DAs pattern with adjectives. The motivation of her argument is based on three 
assumptions. First, she argues that DAs in JA pattern with adjectives in their agreement pattern 
rather than with nouns. More specifically, DAs and adjectives show a binary number agreement 
system: singular or plural unlike nouns which show a ternary system by the addition of the dual 
marking as shown in (83a and b). Second, according to her analysis DAs do not show person 
agreement with their subject similarly to non-verbal predicates including adjectives which only 
show number and gender agreement. Third, she argues that DAs, as is the case with all non-
verbal predicates, inflect for definiteness since they can take the prefix il- ‘the’ which marks 
definiteness in Arabic as exemplified in (83a and b) where the DA waqif  ‘stand(DA)’ is 
grammatically used with the definite article il- ‘the’. 
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           (83)                                             (Adjective)       (DAs) 
                (a)  il-muhandis-tein            il-mariiD-at/  il-waqif-at. 
                      the-engineer-DL.FEM   the-sick-plf/   the-standing-PL.FEM                                    
                      ‘The sick standing engineers.’ 
      
                                                                   (Adjective)       (DAs) 
                 (b)  il-muhandis-ein                il-mariiD-iin/  il-waqif-iin. 
                        the-engineer-DL.MASC  the-sick-plm/   the-standing-PL.MASC                                    
                       ‘The sick standing engineers.’                                               
                                                                                                                       (Al-Agarbeh 2011: 76) 
 
            
 
 Al-Agarbeh (2011) provides a basic classification of predicates in JA: verbal predicates 
including perfective, imperfective, non-finite and imperative and non-verbal predicates including 
nouns, adjectives, participles and nominalized structures. She also adds the modal particles 
including modals and the future particle raH ‘will/(be) going to’. The verbal vs non-verbal 
classification defended by Al-Agarbeh (2011) is analogous with the conventional dichotomist 
view of predication in Arabic where predicates are classified as either verbal or non-verbal. Her 
classification of predicates is based on the agreement features exhibited by each class: predicates 
showing full agreement (i.e. person, number and gender) are subsumed under verbal predicates; 
predicates exhibiting partial agreement (i.e. number and gender only) are classified as non-verbal 
predicates; modal particles, on the other hand, show no agreement at all. According to her 
analysis, DAs are subsumed under non-verbal predicates since they show partial agreement i.e. 
number and gender and not person. 
 
3.4.5.2 Against an Adjectival Classification of DAs 
 I argue that the analysis that DAs are adjectival predicates is based on a weak footing. 
One major argument in favor of categorizing DAs as adjectives is that DAs and predicate 
adjectives pattern alike. A similar observation has been made by Fassi (1993) who advocates an 
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adjectival categorization of APs in Arabic. Fassi (1993) argues that both APs and adjectival 
predicates have similar distributions in the sense that both can be used as predicates in verbless 
sentences (see Fassi 1993 for detailed discussion).  Perhaps the motivation for considering DAs 
as adjectives based on the predication argument comes from the view that predicative adjectives 
bear verb-like properties in that they denote a temporary rather than permanent state as it is the 
case with attributive adjectives (Bolinger 1967 and Bhat 1994). This makes predicative 
adjectives behave like DAs since DAs denote a temporary rather than permanent state. In fact, 
predicative adjectives do not retain  verb-like properties in all contexts since they sometimes can 
be ambiguous between a modifying function (i.e. permanent state modification) and a 
predication function (i.e. verbal-like property in that they denote temporary state similar to 
verbs) as can be seen in the sentence Majdi mas’uul ‘Majdi is responsible’ where the predicative 
adjective mas’uul ‘responsible’ is ambiguous between a permanent state reading ‘trustworthy’ 
corresponding to modifying function and a temporary state reading ‘to be blamed’ corresponding 
to predicative verb-like function. Therefore the argument that predicative adjectives and DAs 
pattern alike is not accurate in all contexts.  
 Furthermore and along the same lines, Mughazy (2004) claims that DAs bear a 
morphosyntactic similarity to simple adjectives because both forms must be indefinite when used 
as predicates as exemplified by sentences (77a and b) above. I argue that this claim is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for categorizing DAs as adjectival predicates since nominals 
must be indefinite when used as predicates as well (84a and b). The nominal m3allim ‘teacher’ is 
used indefinitely in (84a) similarly to the adjectival predicate gidiida ‘new’ in (77a) above. The 
sentence is ungrammatical with a definite nominal predicate (84b).  
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(84) 
       (a) sami  m3allim. 
                  Sami teacher 
                  ‘Sami is a teacher.’ 
 
       (b)* sami  el-m3allim. 
                  Sami the teacher 
                  ‘Sami is the teacher.’ 
 
                                 
 Second, Mughazy (2004) claims that DAs are adjectival predicates since both forms are 
the only categories that can be used as predicates in circumstantial clauses in Arabic as in (78a 
and b) above. Again, this observation has also been used by Fassi (1993) to support his adjectival 
analysis of DAs in Arabic (Fassi 1993: 187).  Contra to Fassi (1993) and Mughazy (2004), such 
an observation is not complete. This is shown by the fact that adjectival predicates are not the 
only forms that can be used as predicates in circumstantial sentences in Arabic. In fact many 
forms can be used in these contexts including imperfective as in (85), and passive participles 
(PPs) as in (86).  
                      
           (85) 3ali rawwaH      bebkii. 
                       Ali went home   IMPERF-cry.3SG.MASC 
                       ‘Ali went home crying.’ 
 
           (86) 3ali rawwaH      maktool. 
                       Ali  went home   beat-PP  
                       ‘Ali went home beaten.’          
                        
 
 Mughazy (2004) claims that the major argument in support of the adjectival analysis 
comes from the fact that DAs can be used in comparative and superlative contexts in which only 
adjectival predicates are licensed as shown in (79a and b) above. However, this argument is 
based on a very limited set of data. In fact, the only permissible DA structure in comparative 
contexts is the dynamic modal gaadir ‘can/be able to’ as shown in sentence (79b) earlier. No 
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other DA forms are attested in these contexts, not only in JA but in most dialect of Arabic as 
well. Consider sentences (87a-d) where the DA forms are used in comparative (COMP) and 
superlative (SUPR) contexts, yet the utterances yield ungrammaticality. 
          
         (87) 
               (a)* sami ‘aakal           li-tufaaHa     min-ak. 
                      Sami eat-COMP   to-the-apple  than-you 
                      ‘Sami is more eating to the apple than you.’  
 
               (b)* sami aftaH              la-l-baab      minak. 
                      Sami open-COMP  to-the-door  than-you 
                      ‘Sami is more opening to the door than you.’ 
 
               (c)* sami ‘aakal           waHad fii eS-Saf. 
                      Sami eat-SUPR    one       in  the-class  
                      ‘Sami is most eating one in the class.’  
                 
               (d)* sami  aftaH           waHad  la-l-baab. 
                      Sami open-SUPR  one       to-the-door  
                      ‘Sami is most opening one of the door.’ 
 
 
 If DA forms are used as adjectival predicates, sentences in (87) should be acceptable. 
However, in (87a and b) the DA forms maakil ‘eat (DA)’ and faatiH ‘open(DA)’are used in 
comparative contexts respectively, yet the sentences are ill-formed. The same fact obtains for 
sentences (87c and d) where the same DA forms are used in superlative contexts. It is these 
contexts, comparative and superlative, that have been presented as the strongest argument in 
favor of the adjectival analysis.       
 Similarly, I argue that Kremers’ adjectival analysis of APs in Arabic is lacking and 
cannot be extended to Arabic dialects including JA. As pointed out earlier, Kremers (2003) 
contends that APs project a Deg-head (equivalent to adjective head). If Kremers’ account is on 
the right track, then APs should obey one of the typical properties of adjectives, that is their 
ability to license degree modifiers indicating that adjectival predicates are gradable as shown in 
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(88a) where the adjective Taweel ‘tall’ licenses the degree modifier jiddan ‘very’. However, the 
AP naafi3un ‘help (AP)’ in (88b) does not license degree modifiers as shown by the 
unacceptability of the sentence; Example (88b) is taken from Fassi (1993:197). 
 
         (88) 
               (a) 3amr-un       Taweel-un   jidd-an. 
                        3amr-NOM  tall-NOM   very-ACC 
                        ‘3amr is very tall.’ 
 
              (b)* zayd-un        naafi3-un          ‘abaa-hu     jidd-an. 
                        Zayd-NOM  help-AP-NOM  father-his   very-ACC 
                        ‘Zayd is very helping his father.’ 
 
 
 I argue that the observation made by Al-Agarbeh (2011) regarding the adjectival status of 
DAs is not substantially motivated either. The claim that DAs are non-verbal predicates since 
they, similar to adjectives, license the definite article al- ‘the’ as shown in (83a and b) above is 
lacking. I argue that when DAs are used with the definite marker al- ‘the’, the definite marker is 
not used canonically to express a definite article the, rather it is used as a relative pronoun that 
exhibits the same form as that of the definite article (Mughazy 2004). This type of al- is referred 
to in Arabic grammar as al almawsuula ‘relative pronoun al-’. Therefore, unlike non-verbal 
predicates in Arabic as in (89c) where al is used as a definite article ‘the’ with the noun el-
3amarah ‘the building’ and the adjective el-Taweeleh ‘the tall’, sentences (83a and b), repeated 
here as (89a and b) on the other hand, are acceptable only under the reading where the prefix al- 
is used to express a relative pronoun elli ‘who’ rather than a definite article ‘the’. Therefore the 
claim that DAs are non-verbal predicates, mainly adjectival, because they allow the definite 
article as claimed by Al-Agarbeh (2011) is invalid.  
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(89) 
       (a) il-muhandis-tein            il-waqif-at. 
             the-engineer-DL.FEM   who-standing-PL.FEM 
             Lit: il-muhandis-tein elli waqif-at                                     
             ‘The engineers who are standing.’ 
 
       (b) il-muhandis-ein                il-waqif-iin. 
             the-engineer-DL.MASC   who-standing-PL.MASC                                    
             Lit: il-muhandis-ein elli waqif-iin                                     
             ‘The engineers who are standing.’ 
                  
       (c) el-3amarah    el-Taweeleh. 
             The-building  the-tall 
             ‘The tall building.’ 
 
 
 The strong correlation between DAs and adjectives arises as a result of several empirical 
observations including the view that adjectives and verbs (or verb-like predicates as DAs in this 
case) can be grouped together into one class of predicates (Kenaan 1979). Some of the findings 
supporting this claim might be related to the observation that adjectives are similar to verbs in 
denoting the features of objects and that they are relational in nature which enables them to 
function as predicates (Bhat 1994).  However, there exist several fundamental differences 
between the two categories that override these similarities. One major distinction between them 
is related to their dependency status. In other words, adjectives are dependent in that they are 
subordinated to their head nouns as their primary function is the modification of nouns. DAs, on 
the other hand, are independent and serve as the nuclei of the utterance. Their primary function, 
unlike adjectives, is to denote an event and a resultant state that comes about as a result of such 
an event. For example, the adjective mariiD ‘sick’ in (90) is bound to its head noun Sami: it 
modifies the reference of its head noun Sami, whereas the DA mssakir ‘close(DA)’ in (91)  does 
not modify the head noun Sami;  rather it denotes the event of closing the window with a 
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resultant state i.e. a window that is closed where Sami is viewed as a participant and not as a 
modified head noun as in (90). 
 
(90) sami mariiD. 
            Sami sick 
            ‘Sami is sick.’ 
 
 (91) sami mssakir      esh-shubaak. 
            Sami close-DA  the-window 
            ‘Sami has closed the widow.’ 
 
 
 In addition, one of the primary differentiating characteristics between DAs and adjectives 
is related to their temporal status. Adjectives denote a permanent state while DAs express a 
temporary transient state (Givon 1984, Thompson 1988, and Bhat 1994 among others). Since 
adjectives are part of noun phrases and noun phrases introduce participants that are characterized 
by being more time-stable in nature, adjectives then should comply with this requirement and 
consequently denote a prototypically permanent state. DAs, on the other hand, being more 
verbal-like predicates, denote temporary and transient situations: actions, processes and events 
that undergo a change of state and are characterized by being more time-limited in nature. 
Consider sentence (92a) where the adjective gaSeer ‘short’ denotes a permanent state of Majdi, 
while the DA in (92b) denotes a change of state (i.e. being closed to being opened) and a 
contingent state that holds true at some TT (Topic Time after Klein 1994) but may not hold at 
some others (i.e. the window is open at a specific TT but not necessarily open at some other 
TTs). 
             (92) 
                    (a) majdi  gaSeer. 
                            Majdi  short 
                            ‘Majdi is short.’ 
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                   (b) ‘esh-shubaak  faatiH. 
                            the-window    open.DA 
                            ‘The window is open.’  
 
 A similar observation has been made by Fassi (1993) who argues that adjectives are 
stative while DAs are dynamic in nature (i.e. non-stative in Fassi’s terms). He argues that pure 
stative roots only yield adjectives and not DAs. For example the stative root krm ‘be generous’ 
can only be used to derive an adjective kariim ‘generous’ and not an active participle kaariim. 
However, active participles can only be derived from dynamic roots such as ‘aakil  ‘eat(AP)’ but 
cannot be used to derive adjectives such as ‘akiil (Fassi 1993: 178). Therefore, Fassi (1993) 
proposes the following schematic presentation of the rule governing the derivation of active 
participles as presented in (93a) and adjectives (93b). 
(93) 
     (a) e            s 
 
     (b) s            s                         (Fassi 1993:179) 
 
 
 
 When adjectives are used in the function of predication (i.e. predicate adjectives), they 
tend to manifest some of the verbal features, which as noun modifiers they were unable to 
manifest. One of those verb-like characteristics is their ability to denote a temporary state rather 
than a permanent state which is the default reading of attributive adjectives in general (Bolinger 
1967 and Bhat 1994). The temporary-denoting feature of predicative adjectives is similar to DAs 
behavior as pointed out earlier. For example when the adjective mufeedeh ‘handy’ occurs 
predicatively, it denotes a temporary state as in (94a); whereas the same adjective denotes rather 
a permanent property if used attributively as in (94b). 
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(94) 
       (a)    el-‘adawaat  mufeedeh. 
               the-tool-PL  handy 
               ‘The tools are handy.’ 
 
       (b)   el-‘adawaat  el-mufeedeh Daruurieh. 
               the-tool-PL  the-handy     necessary 
               ‘The handy tools are necessary.’ 
 
 
 Despite the fact that adjectives, similar to DAs, exhibit some verb-like properties, they 
still stand in sharp contrast with DAs. For instance, unlike DAs, adjectives do not allow any 
complements and other increments such as particles or clitics. Consider the following examples: 
 
(95)  
       (a)   bent-ha          el-Taweeleh Helweh. 
              daughter-her  the-tall          beautiful 
              ‘Her tall daughter is beautiful.’ 
 
       (b)*  bent         el-Taweeleh-tha Helweh. 
               daughter   the-tall-her         beautiful 
               ‘Her tall daughter is beautiful.’ 
 
       (c)   el-kutub        le-ktheereh elli      fii el-xazaneh la-muna. 
              the-book-PL the-many     which in the-closet   to-Muna 
              ‘The group of books, which are in the closet, belong to Muna.’ 
 
            (96) 
                   (a)   majdi  maxetdh-ha. 
                           Majdi take-DA-it 
                           ‘Majdi took it.’ 
 
                   (b)   majdi  Haat        ez-zetuun-aat  fii    el-3aSayeh 3ala  el-‘arD. 
                           Majdi  pick-DA the-olive-PL  with the-stick      on    the-floor 
                           ‘Majdi has picked the olive with the stick dropping them on the floor.’ 
 
 
 Sentence (95b) is unacceptable since the adjective Tweeleh ‘tall’ is used with the 
possessive cliticized pronoun ha ‘her’; the only way for the sentence to be acceptable is to 
cliticize the pronoun with the head noun bent ‘daughter’ (95a). However, cliticized pronouns are 
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perfectly acceptable with DAs as shown by the grammaticality of (96a) where the object 
cliticized pronoun ha ‘it’ is allowed with the DA maxetdh ‘take(DA)’. Moreover, DAs allow 
complement arguments: in (96b) the DA Haat grammatically selects for the instrument 
complement ‘with the stick’ and the locative adverbial complement ‘on the floor’. However, 
sentence (95c) is felicitous only when the relative clause complement ‘which are in the closet’ is 
used as modifier to the head noun el-kutub ‘the books’ not the adjective el-ktheereh ‘the many’. 
 Another distinction between DAs and adjectives with respect to verb-like properties is the 
ability of the former to manifest aspectual readings and license temporal and manner adverbials 
which is not the case with the latter. Examples (97a-c) and (98a-c) are illustrative. 
        
        (97) 
             (a) majdi kaatib       er-resaleh (embareH). 
                    Majdi write-DA the-letter  (yesterday) 
                    ‘Majdi has written the letter.’ 
     
             (b)  majdi Saayim  bukrah. 
                    Majdi fast-DA tomorrow 
                    ‘Majdi is going to fast tomorrow.’ 
 
             (c)  majdi mraaji3        el-maadeh  bsur3a. 
                    Majdi review-DA the-course  fast 
                    ‘Majdi  has reviewed the course fast.’ 
 
 
        (98)  
             (a)   majdi mariiD. 
                    Majdi sick 
                    ‘Majdi is sick.’ 
 
             (b)* majdi  mariiD embareH. 
                     Majdi sick      yesterday 
                     ‘Majdi is sick yesterday.’ 
 
             (c)* majdi mariiD bsur3a. 
                    Majdi sick      fast 
                   ‘Majdi is sick fast.’ 
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 In (97a and b) the DAs kaatib ‘write(DA)’ and Saayem ‘fast(DA)’ denote  resultant state and  
futurate readings respectively. However, sentence (98a) with the adjective mariiD ‘sick’ is 
felicitous only under a stative reading. The same DAs kaatib ‘write(DA)’ and Saayem ‘fast(DA)’ in 
(97a and b) also grammatically allow different temporal adverbs ‘embareH  ‘yesterday’ and 
bukrah ‘tomorrow’ respectively; whereas the adjective mariiD ‘sick’ is not allowed with these 
adverbials as shown by the unacceptability of the utterance in (98b). Furthermore, DA mraaji3 
‘review(DA)’ in (97c) grammatically licenses the manner adverbial bsur3a ‘fast’; in contrast, the 
adjective in (98c) cannot take manner adverbials.   
 DAs and adjectives differ markedly in terms of case assignment in MSA. DAs have the 
ability to assign accusative case to their complements due to the presence of intrinsic verb 
component in their syntax as pointed out many times earlier (Fassi 1993 and Kremers 2003 
among others). Adjectives, on the other hand, lack this property and therefore fail again to 
comply with another differentiating characteristic of verbal and verb-like predicates such as DAs 
in this case. Thus, although the DA muqruu ‘feed generously(DA)’ in (99a)  grammatically assigns 
accusative case to its object al-zayfa ‘the guest’, the adjective Hasant ‘pretty’ fails to do so as 
shown by the unacceptability of (99b).  
            (99) 
                  (a)  ‘antum muqr-uu                                 az-zayf-a. 
                          you     feed generously-DA-NOM  the-guest-ACC 
                         ‘You generously feed the guests.’ 
 
                  (b)*  hend-un         Hasanat-u      al-wajh-a. 
                           Hend-NOM   pretty-NOM  the-face-ACC 
                          ‘Hend’s face is pretty.’ 
 
 
 Also, both forms show distinct behavior with respect to genitive case assignment. That is, 
DAs, when used deverbally, fail to assign genitive case unless the preposition li ‘of ’ is used 
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which licenses the genitive case assignment when DAs are used in the construct state. 
Adjectives, on the other hand, are genitive case assigners. The construction in (100a), in which 
the object of the DA maaniH ‘give(DA)’ is assigned a genitive case, is ill-formed. However, the 
complement of the adjective Hasanatu ‘pretty’ is grammatically assigned genitive case (100b); 
examples taken from Fassi (1993:199).                    
(100)  
         (a)* zayd-un         maaniH-u        l-maal-i. 
                Zayd-NOM   give-DA-nom  the-money-GEN 
                ‘Zayd is giving of the money.’                                  
 
         (b) hend-un         Hasanat-u      al-wajh-i. 
                Hend-NOM   pretty-NOM  the-face-GEN 
                ‘Hend’s face is pretty.’ 
 
 
 In summary, I have argued with evidence that DAs are not adjectival predicates. I have 
further argued that the previous analyses which support this claim are not robustly attested either.  
 
3.5 The Verbal Analysis of DAs 
 Active participles (APs) in Semitic languages are known for their ambiguity between 
verbal and non-verbal uses. Consider for instance the active participle (AP) kaatib ‘writer’ in JA 
in (101) where it has both nominal and verbal interpretations. The same facts hold for the APs in 
Hebrew (also known as Benoni) where, for example, the AP šomer ‘guard’ is ambiguous 
between nominal and verbal readings as in (102). 
(101) hwwa   kaatib       le-ktaab. 
            He        write-AP  the-book  
            Nominal: He is the writer of the book. 
            Verbal: He has written the book.                (JA) 
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(102) Dani šomer. 
            Dani guard-AP 
            Nominal: Dani is a guard. 
            Verbal: Dani guards/is guarding.                (Hebrew, Shlonsky 1997:27)                              
 
 One way of teasing apart the nominal and the verbal occurrence of APs in both languages 
is the marking of definiteness. For example, the addition of the definite article el ‘the’ in Arabic 
and ha ‘the’ in Hebrew to the AP forms forces a nominal reading as shown in (103) and (104) 
respectively. 
(103) huwwa   el-kaatib.        
            He          the-write-AP   
            Nominal: ‘He is the writer.’                         (JA)                                                                                                                     
 
(104) Dani haya      ha- šomer. 
            Dani be-past  the-guard-AP 
            Nominal: ‘Dani was a guard.’                      (Hebrew, Shlonsky 1997:27) 
 
                           
 Also, the presence of a complement that is preceded by the preposition la ‘of/to’ in 
Arabic and šel ‘of’ forces a nominal reading as well, as exemplified in (105) and (106). 
(105) huwwa   el-kaatib         lahaDa-liktaab mush sami.   
            He         the-write-AP  of this-book      not     Sami 
            Nominal: He is the writer of the book  not Sami.      (JA) 
                                                                                                                  
(106) Dani   šomer       šel ha-nasi. 
            Dani  guard-AP  of  the-president 
            Nominal: Dani is the president’s guard.                    (Hebrew, Shlonsky 1997:27) 
 
 
 Deverbal active participles (DAPs) behave similar to verbs in that they do not allow 
definite markings as in (107 and 108). 
 
(107)* sami  el-naayem. 
            Sami the-sleep-DA 
            ‘Sami the has fallen asleep.’ 
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(108)* sami el-jaay. 
            Sami the-come-DA 
            ‘Sami the is going to come.’ 
 
(109)* sami  el-binaam                                     bakkeer. 
            Sami  the-IMPERF-sleep.3SG.MASC  early 
            ‘Sami the sleeps early.   
 
(110)* sami  el-naam                                     bakkeer. 
            Sami  the-sleep-PERF.3SG.MASC   early 
            ‘Sami the slept early.   
 
 The DAs naayem ‘sleep(DA)’ in (107) and jay ‘come(DA)’ in (108) are ungrammatical 
when marked by the definite article el ‘the’. The same pattern applies to verbs in JA as shown in 
(109) and (110) where the imperfective and perfective form of the verb yield unacceptable 
utterances when marked with definiteness.  
 Another difference between the nominal and verbal uses of APs is strongly reminiscent 
of the event and argument structure of verbal use of APs. Deverbal APs invariably retain the 
argument structure of their underlying verbal roots. In (111), the deverbal AP Haaris ‘guard’ 
obligatorily selects for an object argument structure complement el-3amarah ‘the building’ 
which in turn induces an ambiguity between verbal and nominal interpretations. However, in the 
absence of the object complement, the same AP in (112) can only be taken as nominal. 
 
(111) majdi  Haaris       el-3amarah. 
            Majdi  guard-AP  the-building 
            ‘Majdi has guarded/is the guard of the building.’ 
 
(112) majdi  Haaris.       
            Majdi  guard-AP   
            ‘Majdi is a guard.’ 
  
 Another verb-like property of DAs is that, as mentioned earlier, they license control 
structure of infinitival purpose clause (i.e. ‘in order to’ followed by the infinitive form of the 
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verb). According to Grimshaw (1990), the purpose clause is only allowed when the structure at 
issue expresses an event reading (i.e. comprising event and argument structure). The DA kaatib 
‘write (DA)’ in (113) licenses the control phrase  mshaan + INF ‘ in order to + INF ‘ suggesting 
that DAs bear resemblance to verbs such as the perfective form of the verb in (114) where the 
perfective form katab ‘wrote’ licenses the control phrase as well.  
 
(113) sami  kaatib        er-resaleh  mshaan      yb3athha. 
            Sami  write-DA  the-letter   in order to  send-INF-it 
            ‘Sami has written the letter in order to send it.’ 
 
(114) sami  katab                                 er-resaleh  mshaan      yb3athha. 
            Sami  write-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-letter   in order to  send-INF-it 
            ‘Sami wrote the letter in order to send it.’ 
 
 
 DAs show another similar behavior to verbs in that they also license aspectual modifiers. 
If a DA allows modification by time-span or durative adverbials such as for X, it clearly indicates 
that it has an event structure since only events allow these adverbials. Sentence (115) with the 
DA memtaHen ‘exam(DA)’ grammatically licenses the durative and event-denoting adverbial 
lemudet sa3a ‘for an hour’ indicating that it has a verb-like properties which is similar to the case 
with the  imperfective verbal predicate bidrrus ‘study’ in (116) where the durative adverbial 
xames sa3aat ‘for five hours’ is also allowed. 
 
(115) sami memtaHen  el-Tullaab           lemudet   saa3a. 
            Sami exam-DA   the-student-PL   for            hour   
            ‘Sami has examined the students for an hour.’ 
 
(116) sami biddrus                                    xames   sa3aat     kull    yoom. 
            Sami IMPERF-study.3SG.MASC  five        hour-PL every day 
            ‘Sami studies for five hours every day.’ 
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 In addition, DAs have the distribution of verbs. They appear in the position where 
imperfective and perfective verbs appear. Examples (117-119) are illustrative. 
 
(117) ‘adam Haab      el-bent. 
            Adam love-DA the-girl  
            ‘Adam has fallen in love with the girl.’ 
 
(118) ‘adam biHaab                                 el-bent. 
            Adam IMPERF-love.3SG.MASC  the-girl  
            ‘Adam is in love with the girl.’ 
 
(119) ‘adam Hab                                   el-bent. 
            Adam love-PERF.3SG.MASC   the-girl  
            ‘Adam fell in love with the girl.’ 
 
In (117), the DA Haab ‘love (DA)’ occurs in the verb position of the sentence. This can be 
supported by sentences (118 and 119) where the DA Haab ‘love (DA)’ is replaced by the 
imperfective and perfective forms of the verbs respectively.  
 I have already shown that APs bear ambiguity between nominal and verbal uses as in 
example (101) above, where the AP kaatib ‘writer/has written’ is ambiguous between a nominal 
reading ‘writer of the book’ and a verbal reading ‘has written the book’. Note here that this 
ambiguity only occurs with masculine singular agreement. When the AP is inflected for feminine 
singular or for plural, it becomes easy to distinguish the verbal from the nominal use (Boneh 
2005). Examples (120-123) are illustrative. 
 
(120) hiyyeh  kaatbeh      hal-ktaab. 
            she       write-DA   the-book 
            ‘She has written the book.’ 
 
 (121) hiyyeh  kaatb-it                hal-ktaab. 
            she       write-DA-FEM   the-book  
            ‘She is the writer of the book.’                     (Boneh 2005:13 / Cowell 1964: 265) 
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(122) haDuul  el-shabaab  Hurras              el-benaayeh. 
            these      the-young  guard-DA-IPL  the-building 
            ‘These young men are the guards of the building.’ 
 
(123) haDuul el-shabaab  Hars-iin             el-benaayeh. 
            these     the-young  guard-DA-SPL  the-building 
            ‘These young men have guarded the building.’ 
 
 
 
 In (120 and 121), the AP form is inflected for the feminine singular marking, in (120) the 
AP functions as a verb whereas in (121) the AP expresses a nominal function. In other words the 
ambiguity is lifted with feminine inflection. The same fact obtains for pluralization. In (122) the 
AP Hurras ‘guards’ is inflected for internal plural marking (IPL) which is used to form a 
nominal broken plural, hence the AP expresses a nominal function. However, in (123), the AP 
Harsiin ‘have guarded’ is inflected for suffixal plural marking (SPL) -iin which marks plurality 
when APs are used verbally and therefore expresses a verbal usage. It is worth mentioning here 
that sometimes the suffixal plural marking (SPL) which marks plurality when APs are used 
verbally can also express pluralization when APs are used as nominals. However, when this 
happens, the morphological formation of the nominal APs and that of the verbal APs should 
markedely differ as exemplified with sentences (124) and (125). 
 
(124) haDuul lewlaad   mumathel-iin  fee el-masraHieyeh. 
            these     the-boys  act-AP-IPL      in   the-play 
            ‘These boys are actors in the play.’ 
 
(125) haDuul lewlaad   mathel-iin     fee el-masraHieyeh. 
            these     the-boys  act-AP-IPL   in   the-play 
            ‘These boys act in the play.’ 
 
 
 In (124 and 125) the APs are inflected for plurality using the same SPL marker iin, yet 
the AP in (124) is used nominally while the one in (125) is used verbally. The reason of this 
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contrast is that both forms exhibit a distinct AP morphological formation: in (124) the nominal 
AP is formed with the prefix mu- while the verbal AP in (125) by the prefix m-. 
 At first sight, the aforementioned discussion seems to support the claim that DAs are 
verbs. However, a closer look at the morphosyntactic behavior of DAs, namely the property of 
person agreement, calls for a reconsideration of this claim. The property of person agreement is a 
denominating feature of the verbal category in Arabic which distinguishes it from non-verbal 
categories where only number and gender agreement is marked to the exclusion of person. The 
fact that DAs violate this typical feature of verbs in Arabic clearly suggests that DAs cannot be 
categorized as a verbal category (Mughazy 2004 and Boneh 2004, 2005). The person agreement 
feature is manifested in the discussion below in two regards: subject-verb agreement vs negation. 
 Standard Arabic allows two basic word orders in declarative sentences with two types of 
subject-verb agreement. In the SVO word order, the verb obligatorily has full subject agreement 
i.e. the verb agrees with the subject in all the features of person, number and gender. In sentences 
with the VSO word order, the verb agrees with subject in terms of person and gender but not in 
terms of number. The same agreement facts extend to JA. Examples (126 and 127) are 
illustrative. 
(126)  
         (a)   el-banaat    shafaan                       el-filim. 
                 the-girl-PL see-PERF.3PL.FEM  the-movie  
                 ‘The girls saw the movie.’ 
 
         (b)* el-banaat    shafat                         el-filim. 
                 the-girl-PL see-PERF.3SG.FEM  the-movie  
                 ‘The girls saw the movie. 
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(127) 
                     (a)   shafaan                       el-banaat      el-filim. 
                            see-PERF.3PL.FEM   the-girl-PL   the-movie  
                            ‘The girls saw the movie.’   
              
                     (b)  shafat                          el-banaat      el-filim. 
                            see-PERF.3SG.FEM  the-girl-PL   the-movie  
                            ‘The girls saw the movie.’ 
 
 Sentences in (126) present the SVO word order. The verb in these examples exhibits full 
agreement with its subject in all of the features (i.e. person, gender, and number). The examples 
in (127), on the other hand, represent the VSO word order, and indicate that the verb shows 
partial agreement with its subject (i.e. in terms of person and gender) and not in terms of number. 
In other words, despite the type of agreement established between the subject and verb, verbs 
always agree with their subjects in terms of person. However, DAs agree with their subjects only 
in terms of number and gender but not in terms of person as exemplified by the sentences under 
(128). 
(128)   
       (a)   huwwa  Saayim. 
              He         fast.DA-SING.MASC 
              ‘He is fasting.’    
 
                   (b)  humma  Saayim-iin. 
                          They      fast.DA-PL.MASC  
                          ‘They are fasting.’ 
                        
                   (c)  hieyeh   Saayim-eh. 
                          She       fast.DA-SING.FEM  
                          ‘She is fasting.’    
 
                   (d)  henneh  Saayim-aat. 
                          They    fast.DA-PL.FEM  
                          ‘They are fasting.’    
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                   (e)  ‘ana  Saayim. 
                          I       fast.DA-SING.MASC 
                          ‘I am fasting.’        
 
                   (f)   ‘enta    Saayim. 
                          You    fast.DA-SING.MASC  
                          ‘You are fasting.’   
 
 
 Sentences (128a-d) exhibit masculine/feminine vs singular/plural inflections. Each one of 
these features is marked by a distinct inflectional morphology: ø for Singular masculine as in (a), 
-iin for plural masculine as in (b), -eh for singular feminine as in (c) and –aat for plural feminine 
as in (d). Sentences (128a, e and f), on the other hand, show different person pronouns: (a) has 
the third person pronoun, (e) has the first person pronoun and (f) has the second person pronoun, 
yet no person inflection is marked on the DA form.  
 The other argument against viewing DAs as verbs comes from sentential negation 
(Mughazy 2004, Boneh 2005, 2010 among others). This argument is also related to the person-
agreement feature. JA exhibits two ways of expressing sentential negation: verbal negation and 
predicate negation (Benmamoun 2000). The former is used with verbal sentences and expressed 
by the use of the proclitic ma. The latter is used in verbless sentences and is expressed by the use 
of pronouns of negation (mu, mi, mumma, etc…) Consider these examples: 
 
(129)  
         (a)   majdi  ma  Hal                                      el-wajib. 
                 Majdi  not  do-PERF.3SING.MASC   the-homework 
                 ‘Majdi did not do the homework.’ 
 
                     (b)   majdi 3adatan   ma   biHell                                     el-wajib. 
                             Majdi  often      not  IMPERF- do.3SING.MASC  the-homework 
                             ‘Majdi does not do the homework often.’ 
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(130)   
         (a)   majdi  mu        m3alem. 
                 Majdi  not-he  teacher.SING.MASC 
                 ‘Majdi is not a teacher.’ 
 
                     (b)   sarah   mi          m3almeh. 
                             Sarah  not-she  teacher.SING.FEM 
                             ‘Sarah is not a teacher.’ 
 
                     (c)   ‘ana  mana     m3alem. 
                             I       not-me  teacher.SG.MASC 
                             ‘I am not a teacher.’ 
 
 
  The sentences in (129a and b) show verbal sentential negation where the perfective and 
imperfective forms of the verb are negated by the negative operator ma respectively. Sentences 
(130a-c), on the other hand, show non-verbal negation where the pronoun negation particles mu, 
mi and mana are used to negate verbless sentences.  
 These forms of sentential negation are sensitive to the person agreement feature 
(Benmamoun 2000). In other words, when person agreement is present as with verbal sentences, 
the negative operator ma is used. When person agreement is absent, on the other hand, as with 
verbless sentences where only number and gender agreement is established, the pronouns of 
negation are used. The use of the negation pronouns compensates for the loss of the person 
agreement inflection on the topic and its predicate in non-verbal sentences (See Benmamoun 
2000 and Hoyt 2007 for further discussion). Unlike verbal forms where the negative operator ma 
is used, DAs are negated by negation pronouns similar to non-verbal predicates as exemplified 
by the following sentences:             
(131)   
                   (a)   huwwa mu       naayim. 
                           He       not-he  sleep-DA-SING.MASC  
                           ‘He has not fallen asleep.’ 
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                   (b)   ‘ana     mana     naayim. 
                           I          not-me   sleep-DA-SING.MASC  
                           ‘I have not fallen asleep.’ 
 
                   (c)   ‘ent  ment         naayim. 
                          You  not-you    sleep-DA-SING.MASC  
                          ‘You have not fallen asleep.’ 
 
The sentences in (131) show that DAs are negated using the non-verbal negation markers. The 
use of the verbal negative operator ma yields the sentences ungrammatical. 
 The verbal and non-verbal categories are not the only categories that do not 
accommodate DAs; other categories do not as well. For example, modals in JA do not show 
agreement with their subjects while DAs show agreement in terms of gender and number as 
discussed earlier. The modals laazim ‘must’ and mumkin ‘may’ which express deontic and 
epistemic interpretations respectively do not establish agreement with their subject as shown in 
(132a-f), whereas DA Saayim ‘fast(DA)’  as in (128a-d) above show agreement with its subject in 
terms of gender and number. 
(132)  
         (a)   sarah   laazim  t-rooH                    3ala  el-madraseh. 
                 Sarah  must    INF.3SG-FEM.go  to      the school 
                 ‘Sarah must go to school.’ 
 
         (b)   el- Tulaab           laazim   y-lbas-uu                      el-zai       el-muwaHaad. 
                 The- student-PL must     INF-3.wear.MASC.PL the form  the unified 
                 ‘The students must wear a uniform.’ 
 
         (c)   laazim  t- gaddem                      el-‘emtiHaan. 
                 Must    INF-2SG.MASC-take  the  exam 
                   ‘You must take the exam.’ 
 
               (d)   sami   laazim   y-rooH                    3ala   el-madraseh. 
                       Sami   must     INF.3SG-MAS.go   to      the school 
                       ‘Sami must go to school.’ 
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               (e)   sarah   mummkin  bi-t-Hib                            hadh-i       el-fawakeh. 
                      Sarah   may           IMPERF.3SG.FEM-like  this-FEM  the- fruit 
                      ‘Sarah may like this fruit.’ 
 
               (f)   mummkin sami   bi-sma3                                  musiqaa. 
                      May          Sami   IMPERF.3SG.MASC-listen  music 
                      ‘Sami might be listening to music.’ 
 
               (g)  mummkin  bi- drus -uu                             fii   el-maktabeh. 
                      May           IMPERF-study.3PL.MASC   in   the-library 
                      ‘They might be studying at the library.’ 
  
                
 DAs differ from adverbs as well. The primary function of adverbs is to modify verbs and 
adjectives as exemplified in (133a and b) where the adverb biguwwah ‘with force’ and ktheer 
‘very much/a lot’ modify the event of opening the door and the status of the taste of the ice 
cream respectively. However, this is not the case with DAs as shown repeatedly earlier. 
 
(133) 
         (a)  majdi fataH                                 el-baab   bi-guwwah. 
               Majdi open-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-door  with force 
               ‘Majdi opened the door forcefully.’ 
 
         (b)  el-‘ays kreem   zaaki  ktheer. 
                The-ice cream  tasty  very much 
                ‘The ice cream is very much tasty.’  
                     
 
 Furthermore, DAs differ from the category of pseudo-verbs. Pseudo-verbs can be 
“nominal or existential phrases that have a partial verbal syntactic nature. These constructions 
are used semantically to convey a verbal meaning, often possessive or existential in nature” 
(Brustad 2000:153). They pattern like verbs in that they mark person agreement and select the 
verbal predicate negative marker ma ‘not’. Examples (134a and b) are illustrative. 
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(134) 
       (a) ma  3end-i                         mushkeleh. 
                not  there-1SING.MASC  problem 
                ‘I have no problem.’ 
 
       (b) ma  3end-u                        mushkeleh. 
                not  there-3SING.MASC  problem 
                ‘He has no problem.’ 
                                       
 
 Sentences (134a and b) have a pseudo-verb construction 3end-I /3end-u ‘I have/he has’. 
This construction describes an existential meaning that corresponds to ‘there is no problem’. As 
can be seen in (134a and b), 3end-i /3end-u ‘I have/he has’, pattern like verbs in that they mark 
person agreement and they are negated with the verbal predicate negative operator ma ‘not’. 
Note here that the use of non-verbal negative markers makes the sentences ungrammatical. 
However, DAs in JA do not have the same features in the sense that no DA in JA expresses 
possessive or existential interpretations. Furthermore, DAs lack person agreement and do not use 
verbal negative markers for negation as discussed earlier. 
  In sum, I take the fact that DAs lack person agreement, which is an obligatory feature of 
the verbal category in Arabic, as a sufficient argument against classifying them as verbs. I also 
argued that DAs cannot be accommodated by other categories such as modals, adverbs or 
pseudo-verbs. In the next section I provide an alternative view of predication in JA to capture the 
intermediate morphosyntactic status of DAs predicates along with the verbal and non-verbal 
predicates.  
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3.6  Predication in JA: An Alternative View 
 I argued in the previous sections that DAs exhibit a mixed morphosyntactic status of 
verbal and non-verbal properties. There are many arguments to support the claim that DAs do 
not belong to the verbal predicates, especially the fact that DAs violate person agreement which 
is an obligatory feature of the verbal predicates in Arabic that distinguishes them from non-
verbal predicates. Moreover, DAs cannot be accounted for by the non-verbal analysis either. I 
have shown that DAs differ from the non-verbal predicates of nouns and adjectives especially 
with regards to the definiteness property. Definiteness is a distinguishing property of non-verbal 
predicates in Arabic which set them apart from verbal predicates. Table (6) below summarizes 
the distinguishing features of verbal vs non-verbal predicates in JA and show how DAs have a 
mixed behavior of both. 
 Table (6) Three-way Classification of Predicates in JA (first version) 
 
 Table (6) shows that the features of [-Person, -Definiteness] of DAs corroborate their 
morphosyntactic status as a distinct type of predication in JA that set them apart from verbal and 
non-verbal predicates which are characterized by [+Person, -Definiteness] and [-Person, 
+Definiteness] respectively. I take this fact as a major challenge to the conventional dichotomist 
‘verbal and non-verbal’ view of predication in Arabic in general and in JA in particular.  This 
view has long been observed as the basis of predicates classification in Arabic. Yet, the fact that 
this view fails to account for DAs as shown calls for a reconsideration of predication in JA. 
Feature Verbal Predicates Non-verbal Predicates DAs 
1. Person Agreement + - - 
  2. Definiteness - + - 
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Therefore and to this end, I propose an alternative view of predication in JA where predicates are 
not classified on verbal vs non-verbal basis, rather, they are classified on modal (irrealis) vs non-
modal (realis) basis. I present this alternative view in figure (1). 
 
Figure (1) Alternative View of Predication in JA (first version):
 
  
 As demonstrated in figure (1), predication in JA is alternatively classified based on modal 
vs non-modal rather than verbal vs non-verbal dichotomy. While the latter fails to discern the 
morphosyntactic nature of some predicates such as DAs, the former has the advantage point to 
account for all predicates in JA including DAs. I assume that the modal vs non-modal view has a 
predictive force in that any predicate in JA can be accounted for as such. Figure (1) includes all 
predicates in JA as discussed in Al-Agarbeh (2011). In her analysis, as shown earlier, she 
assumes that predicates in JA are classified into verbal and non-verbal based on their agreement 
(person and definiteness) specifications: verbal predicates have the features [+person, -definite], 
whereas non-verbal predicates have the features [-person, +definite].  In other words, she adopts 
verbal and non-verbal dichotomy to account for predication in JA. She further claims that DAs in 
JA belong to non-verbal predicates based on their agreement properties i.e. lack person 
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agreement and inflect for definiteness which are characteristics of non-verbal predicates. 
However, despite the intuitive appeal of Al-Agarbeh’s analysis, I argued that DAs do not belong 
to non-verbal predicates in that they lack the definiteness property as discussed in Table (6). The 
failure of non-verbal predicates along with verbal predicate to account for DAs undermines the 
claim for taking the verbal vs non-verbal distinction as the base of predicates classification in JA. 
Alternatively, I assume that the modal vs non-modal view is more appealing since it recaptures 
all predicates in JA discussed in Al-Agarbeh’s and accounts for DAs as well.  
 In this alternative view of predication I subsumed DAs under ‘Distinct Category’ (DC). 
However, I propose a new category for DAs in JA which I call the ‘evidential category’. My 
motivation for proposing this category comes from the analysis pursued in this work where DAs 
are accounted for as evidential predicates. I provide a body of evidence to support this proposal 
in chapter 4. I provide further evidence in support of the evidential category based on the 
behavior of another participle construction in JA, passive participles (PPs). I argue that PPs bear 
a similar morphosyntactic behavior to DAs: they lack person agreement and definiteness. 
Consider sentence (135). 
 
(135) biguul-u  enuh enteh masjuun. 
            say-they  that   you    prison-SG.MASC-PP 
            ‘They say that you have been imprisoned.’ 
 
 
 Sentence (135) has the PP masjuun ‘prisoned’ which agrees with its subject only in terms 
of gender and number but not in person. Furthermore, PPs resemble DAs in their sensitivity to 
definiteness. In other words, when PPs are used with the definite marker al- ‘the’, the definite 
marker is not used canonically to express a definite article the, rather it is used as a relative 
pronoun that has the same form as that of the definite article. This type of al- is referred to in 
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Arabic grammar as al almawsuula ‘relative pronoun al-’ as discussed earlier. Therefore, unlike 
non-verbal structures in Arabic where al- is used as a definite article, sentences (136a and b) are 
acceptable only under the reading where the prefix al- is used to express a relative pronoun elli 
‘who’ rather than a definite article ‘the’. 
(136) 
         (a)   biguul-u  enuh huwwa  el-masjuun. 
                 say-they  that  he          who-prison- SG.MASC-PP 
                 Lit: biguul-u  enuh huwwa  elli masjuun   
                 ‘They say that he is the one who has been imprisoned.’ 
 
                     (b)   biguul-u  enuh enteh  el-masjuun. 
                             say-they  that  you     who-prison- SG.MASC-PP 
                             Lit: biguul-u  enuh enteh elli masjuun  
                             ‘They say that you are the one who has been imprisoned.’ 
 
 
 The same facts also hold for PPs in MSA. In (137a and b), the PP al-maluumu ‘to be 
blamed’ agrees with its subject in terms of number and gender but not in person. Sentence 
(137c), for instance, has the PP al-mamlu’ata ‘filled’; the sentence is acceptable only under the 
reading where the prefix al- is used to express a relative pronoun allati ‘which’ rather than a 
definite article ‘the’. 
(137) 
         (a)   huwwa al-maluum-u                        3ala fe3l-i       dhalik-a. 
                 He       who-blame-SG.MASC-PP  on doing-GEN that-ACC      
                 ‘He is to blame for doing so.’ 
          
         (b)   ‘anta   al-maluum-u                        3ala fe3l-i          dhalik-a.  
                 You    who-blame-SG.MASC-PP  on  doing-GEN  that-ACC      
                 ‘You are to blame for doing so.’                 
 
                     (c)   ra’ayt-u       al-3arabat-a           al-mamlu’at-a          qashaan.     
                             see-PERF-I the-carriage-ACC which-fill-PP-ACC  hay 
                             Lit: ra’ayt-u al-3arabat-a allati mule’at qashaan.    
                             ‘I saw the carriage which was filled with hay.’   
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 These facts show that the morphosyntactic behavior of PPs resembles that of DAs. I 
argue in chapter 4 that passive participles (PPs) have an evidential reading similar to DAs as 
well. The evidential and the similar morphosyntactic behavior of DAs and PPs provide further 
support for the existence of a separate evidential category that contrasts with the verbal and non-
verbal categories in JA. Given this fact, I revise Table (6), repeated here as Table (7), where I 
subsume DAs and PPs under evidential predicates. 
Table (7) Three-way Classification of Predicates in JA (final version) 
 
 The alternative view of predication proposed in Figure (1), repeated here as Figure (2), is 
thus revised where the evidential category is now incorporated with DAs and PPs subsumed 
under it. 
Figure (2) Alternative View of Predication in JA (final version):
 
 
 
Feature Verbal Predicates Non-verbal Predicates Evidential Predicates 
       [DAs and PPs] 
1. Person Agreement + - - 
 2. Definiteness - + - 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I investigated the mixed morphosyntactic behavior of DAs in JA. The 
intermediate behavior of DAs has been discussed under verbal and non-verbal analyses.  I have 
shown that none of these analyses can account for the mixed morphosyntacic status of DAs in JA 
which exhibits verbal and non-verbal features. 
First, I have provided arguments against the non-verbal analysis based on 
agentivity/stativity tests, IL vs SL predicates and morphosyntactic diagnostics including word 
order and interaction with copular verbs. I have discussed the implications of these 
counterarguments on the two major classifications of DAs which have been proposed in the 
literature under non-verbal analysis, specifically the nominal and adjectival classifications. I 
showed that DAs cannot be classified as nominal or adjectival. 
I have also argued that DAs cannot be accounted for by verbal analysis either.  The 
discussion concludes that DAs have the features [-Person, -Definiteness] which corroborate their 
morphosyntactic status as a distinct type of predication in JA that sets them apart from verbal and 
non-verbal predicates which are characterized by [+Person, -Definiteness] and [-Person, 
+Definiteness] respectively.  Based on this fact, I showed that DAs constitute a major challenge 
to the ‘verbal vs non-verbal’ view of predication in Arabic in general and in JA in particular.  In 
this regard, I proposed an alternative view of predication in JA based on the modal vs non-modal 
distinction. I subsumed DAs under the category of ‘evidential predicates’ and supported this 
claim by the behavior of PPs in JA which exhibits a similar evidential and morphosyntactic 
behavior. 
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I conclude that predicates in JA allow for three-way classifications (non-verbal, verbal 
and evidential predicates) instead of the two-way view (verbal and non-verbal predicates). The 
three-way classification is better accounted for by modal vs non-modal distinction instead of the 
conventional verbal and non-verbal distinction which only accounts for verbal and non-verbal 
predicates and leaves the evidential predicates (DAs and PPs) unaccounted for. 
The evidential nature of DAs and how such category differs semantically from other type 
of predications discussed in this chapter such as perfective and imperfective verbal predicates 
will be the topic of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
Semantics of Deverbal Agentives: An Alternative Evidential Account 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an alternative evidential account for the semantics of DAs in JA. 
The current evidential proposal is grounded on an ample and diverse body of evidence which 
shows that the interpretation of DAs reflects the semantics of indirect evidentiality. This 
evidential analysis differs from all of the previous approaches cited in the literature on Arabic 
dialects where the central concern was only to account for the temporal interpretations of DAs as 
discussed in chapter two. The evidential account has its own contribution to Semitology as well 
since it brings into light the category of evidentiality which has been largely overlooked in the 
literature of Semitic languages. This is achieved by the fact that active and passive participle 
constructions in JA, a Semitic language, are argued to be the hallmark of indirect evidentiality. 
This provides compelling evidence that evidentiality exists as a separate category in Semitology 
contra to previous claims in the literature (Isaksson 2000, Aikhenvald 2004 and others). 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide my evidential 
proposal for the semantics of DAs. Section 3 provides an overview of the notion of evidentiality. 
In section 4 I discuss my indirect evidential proposal in details. This section provides a body of 
evidence for this proposal and is organized in the following sub-sections: sub-section 4.4.1 
discusses the speaker oriented reading of DAs and their interaction with the habitual operator. 
Sub-section 4.4.2 addresses the indirect evidence requirement and the temporal specification of 
the indirect evidence essential for the establishment of the indirect evidential reading of DAs. 
Sub-section 4.4.3 and its subsequent sections provide extensive analysis of the inferential 
readings of DAs. Sub-section 4.4.4 summarizes the above sub-sections. In sub-section 4.4.5 and 
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its subsequent sections, I discuss the interaction of DAs and indirect evidential predicates in JA. 
Sub-section 4.4.6 investigates the mirative interpretations of DAs. In sub-section 4.4.7, I provide 
evidence for the indirect evidential reading of DAs based on the sensitivity of DAs to first 
person, ‘first person effect’. Sub-sections 4.4.8 and 4.4.9 discuss the reported and futurate 
reading of DAs respectively. In section 4.5 I extend my indirect evidential proposal to passive 
participles (PPs) in JA. Section 4.6 remarks on evidentiality in Semitology. Finally, in section 
4.7, I discuss one of the least studied areas of evidentiality, the interaction of evidentiality and 
temporal interpretation; where I propose that DAs assert an evidential relative tens; I use this 
proposal to remark on the temporal problem of DAs as discussed in chapter 2.  
 
4.2 The Proposal 
I propose that DAs are indirect evidentials. I base my proposal on a body of attested 
evidence that divides into two major arguments. First, DAs appear in contexts that satisfy the 
three core features of indirect evidentiality: speaker-dependency, indirect evidence and 
inferential reading. Second, DAs show most of the notable semantic features of indirect 
evidentiality which include the following: DAs pattern with indirect evidential predicates in JA; 
they show mirative interpretation; sensitivity to first person; they are appropriately used in 
hearsay reported contexts (reported evidentiality) and they have futurate evidential reading.   
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4.3 Evidentiality 
4.3.1 Definition 
The definition of evidentiality involves two important notions: the type of evidence and 
speaker’s commitment towards the proposition expressed. Chafe and Nichole (1986:262) provide 
two types of definitions for evidential semantics corresponding to these two notions respectively: 
a narrow and a broad definition. The narrow definition of evidentiality is primarily concerned 
with the source of information or knowledge i.e. the evidence that information or knowledge is 
based upon. The broad sense, on the other hand, views evidentiality as encoding the speaker’s 
attitude towards his or her knowledge of reality i.e. speaker’s commitment towards the truth of 
the proposition s/he has made. 
The source-based view of evidentiality (i.e. narrow definition) is based on the source of 
information upon which a speaker knows P (proposition). Jakobson (1971:135) for instance 
adopts this view of evidential meaning; he defines evidentiality as coding “the alleged source of 
information about narrated events”. Along the same lines, Bybee (1985:185) views evidentiality 
as “markers that indicate something about source of information in the proposition”. The same 
view has been advocated by Aikhenvald (2004:3) who describes evidentiality as “a linguistic 
category whose primary meaning is source of information”. The following set of examples from 
Quechua (1a-c) illustrates the source-based view of evidentiality. 
P = proposition and EV= evidential meaning 
(1)  
(a) pilar-qa      t’anta-ta-n         mikhu-rqa-n. 
Pilar-TOP  bread-ACC-mi  eat-PAST1-3 
P= ‘Pilar ate bread.’  
EV= Speaker saw that                                         (Faller 2002:18) 
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(b) Lima-ta-n         viaja-n. 
Lima-ACC-mi  travel-3 
P= ‘She travelled to Lima.’ 
EV= Speaker was told that P                               (Faller 2002:19) 
 
(c) Mana-n muchila-y-pi-chu  ka-sha-n. 
not-mi  backpack-1-LOC-NEG  be-PROG-3 
P= ‘It is not in my backpack.’  
EV= Speaker infers P                                           (Faller 2002:19) 
 
   
 
 Examples (1a-c) mark the source of information the speaker bases his/her proposition 
upon. In (1a), the speaker saw Pilar eating the bread suggesting a sensory visual type of evidence 
or source of information. In (1b), on the other hand, speaker was told that she travelled to Lima; 
therefore indicating a reported or hearsay type of evidence. In (1c) the source of information is 
inferential in that the speaker infers P i.e. the source of information is based on inference made 
by the speaker (speaker has searched the backpack and infers that it is not there).  
 The broad sense of evidentiality encompasses a speaker’s attitude towards P. In this 
regard, the broader sense of evidentiality falls under the domain of ‘epistemic modality’ since it 
subsumes notions related to probability, possibility, validity of  propositions and speaker’s 
commitment towards the truth of the proposition s/he has expressed; all these notions capture the 
meaning of epistemic modality. Under this definition, there have been some approaches in the 
literature that extend the notion of evidentiality to cover all aspects related to epistemological 
assessment (Givon 1982, Bybee 1985, Chafe and Nichole 1986, Friedman 1986, Palmer 1986, 
Traugott 1989, Hopper and Traugott 1993, Bybee and Fleischman 1995 among others). For 
instance, Palmer (1986) views evidentiality as a major type of epistemic modality. He describes 
the meaning of epistemic as “should apply not simply to modal systems that basically involve the 
notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of 
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commitment by the speaker to what he says” (Palmer 1986:51). Palmer’s definition differs from 
the source-based view since it subsumes evidentiality under the rubric of epistemic modality. 
This epistemic-based view thus clearly acknowledges that encoding the source of information 
(i.e. narrow sense of evidentiality) can also describe the degree of the speaker’s commitment 
towards what he says depending on the manner the speaker acquired this knowledge (Mushin 
2001). A similar observation has been made by Givon (1982:24) who clearly describes 
evidentiality as “propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, are open to challenge by 
the hearer and thus acquire-or admit- evidentiality justification”. Again, this definition subsumes 
evidentiality under the notion of epistemic modality.  
 Under the broad definition of evidentiality, the degree of speaker’s commitment towards 
his proposition depends on the type of evidentiality used. In other words, if speaker witnessed 
the event or clearly experienced it by participating in it, then speaker most likely shows a high 
degree of certainty towards his propositions (i.e. he vouches for it); this is the case with direct 
evidentials i.e. speaker witnesses the event. However, if speaker did not witness the event or  
experience it by participating in it, then speakers most likely show a low degree of certainty 
towards their propositions (i.e. they do not vouch for it); this is the case with indirect evidentials 
i.e. speaker does not witness the event; rather s/he infers it or hears about it (Friedman 1986 and 
Mushin 2001). This contrast is illustrated in the following examples from Macedonian and 
Bulgarian (Mushin 2001: 20-21). 
 
(2) Taa mesi           leb. 
3SG  bake:SP   bread 
‘She baked bread.’          (I saw her do that /I vouch for it) 
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(3) Taa mesila      leb. 
3SG  bake:L   bread 
‘She baked bread.’           (I did not see her do that, I was told about it /I am not  
                                           prepared to vouch for it)   
 
 
 
 Sentence (2) exemplifies a direct evidentiality where the speaker saw her baking the 
bread. The fact that speaker saw the baking event induces a high degree of certainty on the side 
of the speaker i.e. speaker vouches for the event. Sentence (3), on the other hand, describes an 
indirect evidentiality where the speaker did not see the baking event but rather was told about it. 
This evokes a lesser degree of the speaker’s commitment towards the truth of his proposition in 
(3) i.e. speaker is not prepared to vouch for it.    
 While the definition of evidentiality varies between a narrow and a broad sense, there is 
nonetheless, a fundamental feature that needs to be present in the definition of evidentiality in 
either the broad or narrow sense, that is evidentials are always speaker-oriented. This feature of 
speaker dependency is reminiscent of the definition of evidentiality in general and to my 
proposal of DAs as indirect evidentials. To make this proposal more concrete, consider examples 
(4a-c). In (4a) the evidential implication is that the speaker saw a cat run (i.e. speaker has a direct 
sensory/visual evidence), and that this evidence belongs to the speaker and no one else (no one 
else saw the cat run). In (4b and c), the difference in evidential implication in these two 
sentences stems from the shift of speaker-anchoring: in (4b) it is the speaker who saw Sarah 
coming, whereas it is Majdi , not the speaker, who saw her coming in (4c). 
 
(4)  
(a) wesa    u-tlis-A’i. 
cat        it-run-FIRSTH.PAST 
‘A cat ran.’ (I saw it running)                       (Cherokee/Aikhenvald 2004: 26)  
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(b) ‘ana sheft          sarah   jaaieh. 
I      see-PERF  Sarah  coming 
‘I saw Sarah coming.’ 
 
(c) majdi  shaaf          sarah    jaaieh. 
Majdi  see-PERF  Sarah   coming 
‘Majdi saw Sarah coming.’ 
 
 
 To sum up, evidentiality involves three main notions: the type of evidence (source of 
information), speaker’s attitude towards the propositions (i.e. epistemic modal reading) and 
speaker-oriented reading. Next, I provide an overview of evidentiality classifications. 
 
 4.3.2 Evidentiality Classification 
 Perhaps the most well-known hierarchy of evidentiality types is proposed in Willett 
(1988), who provided a typological taxonomy of evidentiality based on 38 languages. Figure (1) 
presents Willett’s classification of evidentiality types. 
 
Figure (1) Willett’s Classification of Evidentiality Types   
  
 As demonstrated in Figure (1), the major distinction of evidentiality depends on the type 
of evidence induced: direct versus indirect evidence. As shown in Figure (1), direct evidentiality 
refers to information acquired through direct evidence i.e. sensory evidence which might be 
visual, auditory or any other form of sensory evidence. Indirect evidentiality, on the other hand, 
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refers to information acquired through indirect evidence i.e. inference or hearsay/report 
evidence. Under indirect evidentiality the speaker did not perceive the event, rather s/he knows 
about the event through a hearsay/report or inference i.e. speaker infers the event or heard about 
it based on observable result or through hearsay. Willett (1988) distinguishes between the two 
types of evidence under inference as follows (Willett 1988:96): 
(a) Inference from Result: the speaker infers the situation described from the observable  
      evidence (that is from perception of the results of the causing event). 
(b) Inference from reasoning: the speaker infers the situation described on the basis of                        
      intuition, logic, a dream, previous experience, or some other mental construct.    
 We can recapture and summarize the distinction between direct and indirect evidentials 
as discussed above, by applying the three major features of evidentiality as follows: 
 
A. Direct Evidentiality  
(a) Speaker-Dependency: it shows a speaker-oriented meaning. 
(b) Type of Evidence: direct evidence i.e. speaker witnesses/perceives the event. 
(c) Speaker’s attitude towards proposition:  information is attested by the speaker since s/he   
      witnessed the event.  
 
B. Indirect Evidentiality  
(a) Speaker-Dependency: it shows a speaker-oriented meaning. 
(b) Type of Evidence: indirect evidence i.e. speaker did not witness/perceive the event; rather  
     s/he was told about it or inferred it. 
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(c) Speaker’s attitude towards proposition: Information is not attested by the speaker since s/he   
     did not witness the event.  
 The three major characteristics of indirect evidentiality as shown above will be the focus 
of the proposed evidential analysis of DAs as discussed in the next sections.  
 
4.4 DAs as Indirect Evidentials 
 I propose an indirect evidential account for the semantics of DAs in JA. In the following 
sections I provide a body of evidence to support my proposal. I start with providing supportive 
evidence that DAs correspond to the three basic features of indirect evidentiality discussed 
earlier, repeated here for convenience: 
(a) Speaker-Dependency: it shows a speaker-oriented meaning.  
(b) Type of Evidence: indirect evidence i.e. speaker did not witness the event; rather s/he was    
      told about it or inferred it. 
(c) Speaker’s attitude towards proposition: Information is not attested to speaker since s/he did  
      not witness the event. I will discuss each one of these characteristics separately below. 
 
4.4.1 Speaker-Dependency 
 I argue that DAs induce a speaker-oriented reading similar to evidentials. One piece of 
evidence to support this claim comes from their interpretation with habitual adverbs and their 
contrast to the habitual reading given by imperfectives. First I lay out the definition of habituality 
I adopt for the sake of my argument here; then I proceed to discuss the contrast in habitual 
reading between DAs and imperfective. 
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4.4.1.1 Habituality 
  Habituality is defined as an iteration of incidents of an event over a span of time (Verkuyl 
1999). I adopt the definition of Arche (2006) who defines Habituality in terms of three notions: 
iteration, proportion and systematicity. Arche (2006) views habituality as a quantifier over 
multiple occasions (OCCs) of an eventuality. According to her analysis, habituality induces 
repeated and systematic incidents of an event. The meaning of habitual also involves the notion 
of proportion which she describes as “a certain proportion with respect to the number of times 
the action at stake is usually performed. In particular, it seems that when judging whether a 
habitual form is appropriate, some notion of ‘average’ regarding the number of occasions that an 
action is performed is taken into account” (Arche 2006:164). Based on this definition, a habitual 
quantifier involves a number of occasions that are considered as ‘average’. This average ratio is 
determined by extra linguistic factors which are referred to as ‘contextual norm parameter’ (C). 
This contextual norm parameter’ (C) can be the norms substantiated in a given society or a given 
norm. In other words, a given sentence denotes a habitual reading if the number of occasions in 
which the event is included is equal or approximately equal to the average ratio set by the 
contextual norm parameter’ (C). For example, a sentence like (5) denotes a habitual reading iff 
we compare the number of occasions people usually smoke to the number of occasions Majdi 
does.  
(5) majdi bedaxen. 
Majdi IMPERF-smoke.3SG.MASC 
‘Majdi smokes.’ 
 
 The semantic representation of the habitual reading of this sentence is given in (6); 
(Adapted from Arche 2006:166). 
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(6) Hab AB= Hab B  A∩B   _  C. B  
where Hab {habitual}, A {Majdi} and B {smoke}      _ 
 
 
 The notation in (6) reads as: a certain event (i.e. smoke) can be considered as habitual iff 
the cardinality of occasions that someone (i.e. Majdi) performs it A∩B is equal or 
approximately equal to the cardinality of occasions the event of smoking takes place as 
determined by the C. parameter: C. B . This notion of proportion is essential to my argument 
regarding the difference in habitual reading between imperfectives and DAs in JA. 
 
4.4.1.2 Speaker-Oriented Reading: Evidence from Habitual Operator 
 One of the attested features of imperfectives cross-linguistically is that they are usually 
used to express an habitual reading. The habitual reading is usually accompanied with an overt 
habitual adverb such as always, often or every day. The same fact extends to JA as in (7) below. 
 
(7) majdi daayman bi-rkab                                 baaS el-jaam3ah. 
Majdi always    IMPERF-ride.3SG.MASC  bus   the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the university bus.’ 
 
 
DAs can also be used to express an habitual reading in the presence of an habitual adverb as in 
(8).  
(8) majdi daayman raakib    baaS el-jaam3ah. 
Majdi always    ride-DA bus   the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the university bus.’ 
 
 
At a first glance, sentences (7) and (8) have the same habitual reading expressed in (9). 
 
  
(9) Hab(always) [RIDE(e) & MAJDI(m,e) & UNIVERSITY BUS(e,m,)] 
       {It is the habit of Majdi to take the university bus} 
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However, I argue that sentence (8) with the DA shows a distinct behavior under an 
habitual reading in that DAs show an evidential reading i.e. an habitual reading from a speaker 
oriented perspective. One piece of evidence comes from the fact that an habitual reading 
involves a strong connection between the subject and the main predicate. In other words, the 
interpretation of habituals usually implicates that there is a close connection (i.e. non-accidental 
connection) between the subject and its predicate i.e. a subject-oriented reading (Greenberg 2002 
and Hacquard 2006). Example (10) is illustrative: 
(10) ‘eHnaa  bi-nuTboox               mansaf    daayaman. 
We        IMPERF.cook.1.PL  mansaf   always 
‘We always cook Mansaaf.’ 
 
 
 Sentence (10) asserts that we always cook Mansaaf (a traditional dish in Jordan), but it 
also indicates that such a generalization is not accidental: we cook Mansaaf all the time in virtue 
of being Jordanians (it is part of our daily life routine or norm). In other words the habitual 
reading triggers a subject-oriented reading since it clearly establishes a strong connection 
between the subject and its predicate. This subject-oriented reading is evident under the 
contradictory entailment test as well (Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 2006). The logic of this test is as 
follows: if the habitual reading of a sentence is true in the real world then any continuation that 
asserts otherwise should yield unacceptability. By the same token, if the habitual reading of the 
sentence is not necessarily true in the real world, then the utterance should survive the 
contradiction. I apply this test on sentence (7) and (8) repeated here as (11) and (12) respectively. 
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(11) majdi daayman bi-rkab                                 baaS el-jaam3a      # bs mush ma3naatuh 
Majdi always    IMPERF-ride.3SG.MASC  bus   the-university # but not  mean 
ennu dayman  bi-rkab                               baaS  el-jaam3ah. 
that   always  IMPERF-ride.3SG.MASC  bus    the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the university bus # but it does not mean he always rides the 
university bus.’ 
  
(12) majdi daayman   raakib      baaS el-jaam3ah      bs   mush ma3naatuh  
Majdi always      ride-DA  bus   the-university  but  not    mean 
ennu dayman  bi-rkab                               baaS  el-jaam3ah. 
that   always  IMPERF-ride.3SG.MASC  bus    the-university 
‘(I always see) Majdi riding the university bus  but it does not mean that he always 
rides the university bus (as a habit).’ 
 
 
 Sentences (11 and 12) are continued with a contradictory statement negating the habitual 
reading in the original sentence i.e. it is not the habit of Majdi to take the university bus. 
Sentence (11) with the imperfective yields unacceptability under contradiction suggesting that 
the habitual reading asserted by the imperfective is true in the real world: imperfective asserts 
that ‘it is the habit of Majdi to take the university bus’ therefore we cannot assert the otherwise. 
Furthermore, the fact that (11) is anomalous clearly suggests that there is a strong relation 
between the subject and its predicate i.e. subject-oriented reading otherwise the sentence should 
be acceptable. However, sentence (12) with the DA is totally acceptable under this test. The fact 
that DA is acceptable clearly suggests that the habitual reading (i.e. it is the habit of Majdi to 
take the university bus) in (12) is not necessarily true in the real world. The question that might 
arise here is that if the habitual reading is not true in the real world then how can we account for 
the acceptability of (12)? In order to answer this question I propose that DAs denote an 
evidential semantics where the meaning is always anchored to the speaker i.e. expressing a 
speaker oriented meaning. Therefore I argue that (12) is true in a world different from the real 
world which I propose to call the speaker’s belief world (SBW). We can now account for the 
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 acceptability in (12) by proposing that the habitual reading of ‘Majdi taking the bus’ is 
perceived from the perspective of the speaker i.e. speaker-oriented reading rather than the 
perspective of Majdi i.e. Subject-oriented reading.  In other words, the sentence is true only in 
the speaker’s belief world and not necessarily in the real world as evident by its acceptability 
under the entailment test. 
The intuition of JA speakers supports the evidential (i.e. speaker oriented) reading 
proposed for sentence (12). JA speakers intuit that sentence (12) can be restated as in (13) and 
(14): 
(13) Among all/most of the times I see Majdi, he is on the university bus. 
 
(14) I always see him riding the university bus. 
 
The readings in (13) and (14) explain why (12) is acceptable under the entailment test: The fact 
that the speaker always sees Majdi riding the bus, does not necessarily mean that riding the bus 
is his iterated habit. Based on the above discussion, I propose the following semantic 
representation for sentences (11) and (12) as follows where I propose an Evidential Operator 
(EV) i.e. speaker’s belief world (SBW) to account for (12).  
 
(15) Always [RIDE(e) & MAJDI(m) & THE UNIVERSITY BUS(e,m)] 
 
(16) Always [EV (RIDE(e) & MAJDI(m) & THE UNIVERSITY BUS(e,m))] 
 
 The semantic representation given in (15) corresponds to sentence (11) with the 
imperfective and reads as: it is always the case that Majdi rides the university bus. The one given 
in (16) corresponds to (12) with the DA and reads as: It is always the case that I see Majdi riding 
the university bus; whenever I see Majdi, I see him riding the university bus. In other words, (16) 
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states that: according to speaker’s belief world (SBW) it is true that Majdi always rides the 
school bus. The speaker believes that riding the university bus is Majdi’s habit: the fact that 
Majdi has this habit is true only in the SBW and might not necessarily be a true habit of Majdi in 
the real world as shown in the entailment test.  
The contrast between the imperfective and the DA is also evident by the difference in 
sensitivity each form shows with regards to verifying instances (Krifke et al. 1995). The 
imperfective usually does not require a verifying instance as in (17a) where the imperfective is 
acceptable even when the ‘event of grinding’ has not taken place. However, sentence (17b) with 
the DA is acceptable only when the ‘event of grinding’ is verified.  
(17)  
(a) haDee  el- meTHaneh   bi-teTHan                           gameH. 
This     the- grinder        IMPERF.3SG.FEM .grind wheat  
‘This machine grinds wheat.’ 
 
(b) haDee  el- meTHaneh   TaaHnih    gameH. 
This    the- grinder        grind-DA   wheat  
‘This machine  has ground wheat.’  
 
  
 The same fact obtains under the habitual reading. In (18a), the imperfective indicates a 
habitual reading; however, the habitual reading is true even when the event has never been 
accomplished. DAs, on the other hand, require the event to be accomplished under an habitual 
reading as evidenced by the unacceptability of (18b) where the continuation negates the fact that 
the event has not been accomplished. 
(18)  
(a) dayman binuTbux                mjadara,   bs   3umurna maa kamalna Tabix    waHdeh. 
Always IMPERF-cook.1PL mjadarah, but  our life   not  finish      cooking one   
‘We always cook Mjadarah, but we have never finished cooking one.’ 
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(b) ‘eHna dayman Taabxiin     mjadara,  # bs   3umurna maa kamalna Tabix    waHdeh. 
We    always   cook-DA   mjadarah,#   but  our life   not  finish      cooking  one   
‘We have always cooked Mjadarah, but we have never finished cooking one.’ 
 
 
 Another major argument in support of the evidential speaker-oriented reading of DAs 
comes from the distinction between subjective and objective evidence. Nuyts (2001) asserts that 
subjective evidence is speaker-dependent i.e. only the speaker knows the evidence; whereas 
objective evidence is accessible to a group of people. In other words, if DAs trigger a speaker-
oriented reading, they should be felicitous only in the environment where subjective evidence is 
at issue. By the same token, non-evidential structures such as imperfectives should only allow 
objective evidence. Our assumption is born out in (19a and b). When objective evidence (that is 
known to a group of people) is asserted such as describing a universal fact as in (19a), only the 
imperfective is allowed, whereas the DA is not (19b). The only situation in which a sentence 
with a DA like (19b) is allowed is when subjective evidence is at issue: when the speaker himself 
has found or discovered that the sun rises in the east at the moment of speaking. In other words, 
(19a) with imperfective is only allowed under objective evidence reading while (19b) with a DA 
is acceptable only under the subjective evidence reading. 
(19)  
(a) esh-shams biTeTla3                           min esh-sharg. 
The-sun    IMPERF-rise.3SG.FEM  from the east 
‘The sun rises in the east.’ 
 
(b) esh-shams Taal3ih    min esh-sharg. 
The-sun    rise-DA   from the east 
‘[I have found/saw/noticed that] the sun rises in the east.’ 
 
 
 Based on this discussion, let us now try to apply the semantic representation of the 
habitual reading I provided under (6) above on the habitual reading of imperfective and DAs in 
sentences (7) and (8), repeated here as (20) and (22) respectively: 
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 A. Imperfective: 
(20) majdi daayman bi-rkab                                 baaS el-jaam3ah. 
Majdi always     IMPERF-ride.3SG.MASC  bus   the-university 
‘Majdi always rides the university bus.’ 
 
(21) Hab AB= Hab B  A∩B   _  C. B  
where Hab {habitual}, A {Majdi} and B {ride the bus} 
 
 
 
B. DAs 
 
(22) majdi daayman raakib   baaS el-jaam3ah. 
Majdi always   ride-DA bus   the-university 
‘[I always see]Majdi riding the university bus.’ 
 
(23) Hab EV: All/Most  SP∩A  ⊆ A∩B  
where EV {Evidential} Hab {habitual}, SP {Speaker}, A {Majdi} and B {ride the  
bus} 
 
 In the spirit of Arche (2006), I account for the habitual reading denoted by the 
imperfective using the notation in (21). The notation in (21) reads as: a certain event (i.e. riding 
the bus) can be considered as habitual iff the cardinality of occasions that someone (i.e. Majdi) 
performs it  A∩B is equal or approximately equal to the cardinality of occasions the event of 
riding the bus takes place as determined by the C. parameter: C. B . However, the same 
notation does not suffice to account for (22) as I discussed earlier, therefore I propose the 
notation in (23) to account for the evidential behavior asserted by the DA under habitual reading 
in (22). Hence, (23) reads as:  for all or most of the cardinality of occasions at which the speaker 
sees Majdi  SP∩A , he sees him riding the university bus  A∩B .  
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4.4.2 Indirect Evidence 
In this sub-section I discuss the second feature of indirect evidential that is the indirect 
evidence requirement i.e. the speaker did not perceive the event. I also show that the requirement 
of indirect evidence of DAs is specified temporally. 
 
4.4.2.1 Indirect Evidence: Event Not Perceived 
I have already shown in section 4.3.2 that the major distinction of evidentiality depends 
on the type of evidence induced: direct and indirect evidence. Willett (1988: 96) defines direct 
evidence as “the speaker claims to have perceived the situation described” and indirect evidence 
as “the speaker claims to know of the situation described only through inference”. In other 
words, with direct evidence, the speaker perceives the event at hand; whereas with indirect 
evidence the speaker does not perceive the event itself, rather s/he knows of the event based on 
an inference (i.e. observable result or reasoning) or a hearsay report (i.e. speaker was told about 
the event).  
I argue that DAs assert an indirect evidence requirement similar to indirect evidentials i.e. 
the speaker did not perceive the event. One piece of evidence comes from the fact that DAs are 
acceptable under a cancelation test that negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker. 
However, perfectives are infelicitous in this context as shown in (24) and (25). 
 
(24)    ‘ana sheft  sami naagil        el-’aghraaD bs  maa  sheftuh lama  nagal-hen. 
           I      saw    Sami move-DA the-stuff       but not   see       when  move-them 
           ‘I saw Sami has moved the stuff but I did not see him when he moved them.’ 
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(25)    ‘ana sheft  sami nagal             el-’aghraaD # bs   maa sheftuh lama  nagal-hen. 
            I      saw   Sami PERF-move the-stuff   #    but  not  see        when  move-them 
            ‘I saw Sami move the stuff but I did not see him when he moved them.’ 
 
 In (24) the DA naagil ‘move(DA)’ is used. The DA survives the cancelation test that 
negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker. In other words, in (24), what the speaker saw 
is the state of Sami having moved the stuff or the state of the stuff after being moved and not the 
event of moving itself. This contrasts with the perfective in (25) where the sentence is 
unacceptable when seeing the event is negated; this asserts that with the perfective the speaker 
saw the event of moving itself and not only the state that comes about as a result of this event.  
Another piece of evidence comes from the fact that DAs are not acceptable in the 
contexts where the speaker perceives the event itself. However, both imperfective and perfective 
are acceptable when the speaker perceived the event. Let us examine the following situation: 
 
(26) Context: Majdi is smoking outside while Sami is working on his laptop inside. 
               Suddenly, Majdi sees two kids start to fight and Majdi is watching them.  
               Sami hears the noise from inside and then asks Majdi who is still              
               watching them fighting: 
 
Sami: what is this noise outside? 
 
Majdi: (a)   fii wlaad thneen ga3deen               bethawashu. 
                   In  kid-PL two  IMPERF.PART    IMPERF-fight.3PL.MASC 
                   ‘There are two kids fighting.’ 
 
            (b)?? # fii wlaad thneen mithawashiin. 
                        In  kid-PL two    fight-DA 
                        ‘There are two kids that have fought.’ 
 
 
 In this context Majdi has direct visual access to the event of fighting in front of him. 
When he was asked by Sami about this event which he witnesses and is still taking place only 
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sentence (a) with the imperfective is acceptable and not (b) with the DA. This fact obtains for 
perfective as well. Consider the following context. 
(27) Context: Majdi and Sami want to swim in the pool. Majdi goes outside to smoke a   
               cigarette; while he is smoking outside, he sees the workers filling the  
               pool with water. Majdi continues seeing them till they have finished. The  
               moment they finished, Majdi tells Sami:  
   
Majdi: 
 (a)  hayumma  3abbu                            el-burkeh mai,    bnegdar nesbaH. 
        Here-they  fill-PERF.3PL.MASC  the-pool   water, can        swim 
        ‘Here they filled the pool with water, we can swim.’ 
 
(b)??/# hayumma  m3abbyiin  el-burkeh mai,   bnegdar nesbaH. 
            Here-they  fill-DA       the-pool   water, can        swim 
            ‘Here they have filled the pool with water, we can swim.’ 
 
 
In this context, Majdi witnesses the entire event of filling the pool with water. In order to 
describe this event for Sami, Majdi uses the perfective (a) rather than the DA (b). The only way 
for sentence (b) with the DA to be acceptable is in the context where Majdi goes outside to 
smoke and then found that the pool had already been filled with water i.e. he did not see the 
workers filling it, rather he sees the pool already filled with water. 
In sum, the above discussion shows very clearly that contra to imperfectives and 
perfectives, DAs induce indirect evidence where the speaker did not perceive the event itself but 
only perceives a result of the event. Next I provide further support in favor of this argument 
where I show that the indirect evidence requirement with DA is specified temporally.  
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 4.4.2.2 Indirect Evidence: Temporal Specification 
 
  Similar to Korean (Lee 2011) and Bulgarian (Smirnova 2012), I argue that evidential 
DAs in JA introduce a temporal contribution to the indirect evidence requirement: the indirect 
evidence is specified temporally rather than morphologically. In this regard, JA differs from 
other evidential languages where direct and indirect evidence is specified by separate 
morphemes. For example, in Turkish the direct and indirect evidence are specified 
morphologically (Şener 2011). In past events where the speaker has direct evidence the 
morpheme [-DI] is used; when indirect evidence obtains, the morpheme [-mIs] is used. Examples 
(28a and b) are illustrative. 
(28)  
(a) Ev    kirmizi-ydi. 
house  red-COP-past-DIR.EV-3SG 
‘Speaker has direct evidence that the house is red.’    
                                                                             (Direct Evidence/ Şener 2011: 10) 
(b) Adam anla-mis. 
man    understand-past-INDIR.EV-3SG 
‘It was reported to the speaker that / speaker inferred that the man understood/has 
understood.’            
                                                                            (Indirect Evidence/ Şener 2011:11)      
             
 
Similar examples are found in some other languages such as Tibetan (Garrett 2001), Quechua 
(Faller 2002), St’at’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007) and others.  
I argue that the indirect evidence induced by DAs is a result of two temporal relations: 
anterior and posterior relations. The former corresponds to a post state reading and the latter 
corresponds to a futurate reading as in (29a and b) respectively. 
(29)  
(a) dima   msawyieh  el-ma3mool. 
Dima  make-DA  the-ma3mool 
‘Dima has made ma3mool (type of dessert).’        (Post-state reading) 
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(b) dima  jaayieh      bukrah. 
Dima travel-DA tomorrow 
‘Dima is coming/ is going to come tomorrow.’    (Futurate reading)     
 
 In (29a) the DA expresses a perfect aspectual reading namely a post-state interpretation: 
the state of Dima having made the ma3mool (type of dessert)/the state of ma3mool having been 
made. In (29b), the DA denotes a futurate reading where the speaker expects that Dima will 
come based on some evidence at hand. Using a simple Riechenbach temporal system (1947), the 
two readings can be presented by the temporal semantic representation in (30a and b) below. 
                  S= Speech time, E= Event time and R= Reference time 
(30)  
(a) perfect reading: E__ R,S / E__R__S 
 
(b) futurate reading: S__R, E 
 
The above semantic representations can be captured by using anterior and posterior 
temporal relations. The anterior and posterior analysis has been proposed to account for the 
temporal behavior of DAs (Kinberg1992, Belazi 1993, Mughazy 2004 among others). All of 
these formal analyses agree on one point (see chapter 2 section 2.2.3 for further details): DAs 
encode a resultant present state that is bound by retrospective or prospective events as presented 
by Figure (2).          
  Figure (2) Anterior vs Posterior Temporal Relations of DAs 
                        E= Event and S= Speech time (Now/present) 
                     DAs:     E______________S_______________E 
                             (Anterior)           (Now/Present)            (Posterior) 
  
As figure (2) demonstrates, all previous analyses (Kinberg1992, Belazi 1993, Mughazy 
2004 among others) argue that the event is in an anterior and posterior relation with respect to 
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speech time i.e. present which holds the state.  I adopt the semantic presentation of these studies. 
However, I differ from the previous analyses with one crucial point: I argue that the event is in 
an anterior and posterior relation with respect to evidence acquisition time (Lee 2011) and not 
with respect to speech time (present). The concept of evidence acquisition time (EAT 
henceforth) was first introduced by Lee (2011) to account for evidentials in Korean. I adopt Lee 
(2011)’s EAT to account for the temporal relations of DAs. I define EAT as follows: it is the 
time at which the speaker acquires accessible evidence that is related to the anterior and posterior 
event. I argue that this accessible evidence corresponds to the state or any other form of 
accessible evidence related to the anterior or posterior event. In the spirit of Faller (2002), I refer 
to the EAT as ‘speaker’s awareness origio’ (SAO); what I mean by this is that at EAT the 
speaker is aware only of the accessible evidence inside the domain of EAT and not aware of 
anything outside the domain of EAT. In other words, what is inside EAT is the accessible 
evidence, therefore the speaker is aware of this evidence; however, what is outside the domain of 
EAT is the event, therefore the speaker is not aware of it. Based on this, I posit the following 
notions that capture the definition of EAT: 
(a)  EAT is the time at which the speaker acquires accessible evidence that is related to the  
      anterior and posterior event. 
(b)  The accessible evidence is inside the domain of EAT and can be a state or any form of  
      evidence the speaker believes to be related to the anterior or posterior event which is outside   
       the domain of EAT. 
(c)  The speaker is aware only of what is inside rather than what is outside EAT. This means that  
      the speaker is aware of the accessible evidence and not the event.  
 Now, I modify the semantic presentation given in figure (2) as follows: 
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        Figure (3) Modified Version of the Anterior vs Posterior Temporal Relations of DAs 
 
          E= Event and EAT= Evidence Acquisition Time/Speaker’s Awareness Origio,  
          the x mark presents the ‘speaker’.  
  
 
             DAs:         E_________[__EAT__]__________E 
                         (Anterior)              (SAO)                (Posterior) 
                                                    [.......x…..]     
 
 
 Figure (3) asserts that the event is in an anterior and posterior relation to the EAT rather 
than the present time. The incorporation of the EAT in the temporal presentation of DAs is 
crucial since it contributes to the evidential meaning DAs have i.e. EAT includes the indirect 
evidence which is necessary to establish the indirect evidential meaning of DAs. As shown in 
figure (3), the x mark, which represents the speaker, is included in the domain of EAT i.e. the 
speaker is only aware of what is inside EAT. The anterior relation captures the perfect reading of 
DA as in (29a), while the posterior relation captures the futurate reading (29b). I argue that the 
anterior and posterior relations are what trigger the indirect evidence induced by DAs: The fact 
that the event is either in anterior or posterior relation to EAT (which already includes the 
speaker and the accessible evidence or the state) guarantees that the speaker does not perceive 
the event; in other words, the event is outside the domain of the speaker (EAT/SAO). 
To make our discussion more concrete, let us now apply our semantic representation in 
figure (3) to example (29a). Sentence (29a) denotes a perfect reading (i.e. post-state) as discussed 
above. The perfect reading of this sentence can be semantically recaptured using figure (3) as 
shown in (31): 
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                      E=Event, EAT=Evidence Acquisition Time and PS=Post-State 
   
(31) DA (msawieh ‘make(DA)’)      
 
               E____________[__________EAT___________] 
              (Anterior)             (PS:ma3mool is already made)                
                                          [………........…x……………..] 
  
 As (31) shows, the post-state i.e. anterior relation denoted by the DA in (29a) triggers 
indirect evidence: the speaker, represented by (x) mark, does not perceive the event which is in 
an anterior relation to EAT; rather, the speaker only perceives the PS of this event which is 
included in the EAT. This analysis explains why DAs are felicitous in the contexts where seeing 
the event is negated as in (32a) as compared to the perfective (32b) where seeing the event 
cannot be negated.   
(32)  
(a) ‘ana sheft dima  msawieh    el-ma3mool,   bs   ma sheftha lama  sawwat-uh. 
I      see    Dima  make-DA  the-ma3mool, but not see       when  make-it 
‘I saw Dima have already made the ma3mool, but I did not see her making it.’ 
 
(b) ‘ana sheft dima  sawwat          el-ma3mool,   #bs   ma sheftha lama  sawwat-uh. 
I       see   Dima PERF-make   the-ma3mool, #but not see       when  make-it 
‘I saw Dima making the ma3mool, but I did not see her making it.’    
 
      
The same fact holds also for the futurate reading i.e. posterior relation. The speaker only 
perceives the accessible evidence available at EAT which s/he uses as its base for his inference 
about the posterior event i.e. futurate reading. The only difference is that with the futurate 
reading, the speaker does not perceive the event since the event is in a posterior rather than 
anterior relation to the EAT.     
To recap, the aforementioned discussion provides support to the argument that DAs 
trigger indirect evidence similar to indirect evidentials. The indirect evidence requirement is 
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specified temporally with DAs: the event is in an anterior or posterior relation to EAT. Next, I 
discuss the third feature of the indirect evidentials, the inferential reading. 
 
4.4.3 DAs as an Inferential Indirect Evidential 
In this section I discuss the third feature of indirect evidentials that is the speaker’s 
attitude towards the proposition s/he expresses i.e. an inferential reading. I propose that DAs 
have an inferential evidential reading in their semantics. The fact that DAs exhibit an inferential 
reading gives further support to the current indirect evidential proposal since inferential reading 
is a core feature of indirect evidentiality. I further argue that the inferential reading of DAs is 
licensed by an epistemic modal component. For the sake of this section, I only provide some 
arguments in favor of the epistemic modal reading and leave the rest to chapter 5. Before 
discussing the types of inferential readings in details, I will start by discussing the contribution of 
the indirect evidence requirement and the epistemic modal reading in triggering the inferential 
readings of DAs. The modal reading is discussed under two notions: actuality entailment test and 
propositional attitude predicates. 
 
4.4.3.1 Inferential Indirect Evidence 
I argue that the indirect evidence, which is specified by anterior and posterior temporal 
relations, is what triggers the inferential reading with DAs. The reasoning of this claim is as 
follows: The fact that the event is either in anterior or posterior relation to EAT guarantees that 
the speaker does not perceive the event; rather, the speaker uses the indirect evidence (i.e. the 
accessible evidence available at EAT) as his/her basis to make inference about the event. In other 
words, because the speaker does not perceive the event, the speaker infers the event/ about the 
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event. I apply this reasoning to derive an explanation of why DAs trigger an inferential reading 
in section 4.4.3.4.  
4.4.3.2 Actuality Entailment Effect 
The first evidence I provide to support the inferential/modal reading of DAs comes from 
their behavior under the actuality entailment effect (Bhatt 1999, Hacquard 2006). The actuality 
entailment effect was first introduced by Bhatt (1999) to examine the behavior of ability modals 
and their interaction with imperfective and perfective aspect. The main purpose of using this test 
was to detect whether or not a modal complement holds in the real world when inflected with 
imperfective and perfective aspect markings: whether the complement denotes a realis reading 
i.e. non-modal and therefore holds in the real world; or an irrealis reading i.e. modal and 
therefore holds in a world other than the real world (a possible world in Kratzer’s 1981, 1991 
terms). According to Bhatt (1999), the reasoning of this effect is as follows:  if the proposition 
denoted by the modal complement holds in the real world, it cannot be cancelled by a 
contradictory statement that contradicts the meaning of the original sentence. However, if the 
proposition does not hold in the real world, it can be cancelled by a contradictory statement
2
. 
Consider examples (33a and b) adapted from (Bhatt 1999 and Hacquard 2006).  
(33)  
(a) sami gader          yrfa3 es-sandoog, # bs  ma   rafa3uh. 
Sami can-PERF lift     the-box,   #     but not   lift-it 
‘Sami was able to lift the box, # but he did not lift it.’ 
 
                                                          
2
 See Hacquard (2006:16) for discussion on why such a test (actuality entailment) is an ‘entailment’   
  rather than an implicature. Similar facts discussed in Hacquard (2006) apply to DAs in JA:  
  under this test, DAs do not show irrealis reading across the board as will be seen in chapter 5.  
  The fact that DAs show contrastive irrealis vs realis reading under this test clearly suggests that  
  something in the semantics of DAs, rather than some pragmatic factor, is related to the irrealis  
  reading of DAs. In other words, if the irrealis reading is pragmatically driven, we should get  
  either an irrealis or realis reading under this test across the board; the fact that we do not rules out the  
  pragmatic factor.   
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(b) sami kaan bigdar            yrfa3 es-sandoog,  bs  ma   rafa3uh. 
Sami was can-IMPERF lift     the-box,        but not   lift-it 
‘Sami had the ability to lift the box, but he did not lift it.’  
 
 In (33a), the modal gader ‘could/was able to’ is inflected with perfective marking. The 
meaning of the sentence entails that Sami lifted the box i.e. lifting the box was actualized in the 
real world. This is supported by the fact that any continuation asserting that he did not comes out 
as a contradiction as shown by the unacceptability of (33a). The fact that (33a) is unacceptable 
under the actuality entailment test asserts that the proposition in this sentence (i.e. lifting the box) 
holds in the actual world according to the reasoning given in the above paragraph. However, 
things are different with (33b). In this sentence, the modal bigadar ‘can/is able to’ is inflected 
with imperfective marking. The meaning of this sentence does not imply whether or not Sami 
lifted the box i.e. lifting the box may or may not have been actualized in the real world. This 
reading is supported by the fact that any continuation asserting that he did not  does not come out 
as a contradiction as shown by the acceptability of (33b). The fact that (33b) is acceptable under 
actuality entailment test asserts that the proposition in this sentence (i.e. lifting the box) does not 
necessarily hold in the actual world (i.e. it holds in a world other than the real world, a modal or 
irrealis world).  
I explain the logic of this test as follows. The logic of the actuality entailment test is 
comparable to the fact that a proposition (P) cannot have two truth values in the same world. In 
other words, if we assume that a proposition (P) is true (T) in the real world, it cannot be False 
(F) at the same time:  in a real world, if P is T, P can only be T and not T and F. This can be 
semantically captured as in (34) below. 
(34) P (w*) = 1           ¬  [ ¬ P(w)] 
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(34) reads as: P is T in the real world iff it entails that it is not F in the real world.  
The logic in (34) explains why (33a) is unacceptable under contradiction.  Sentence (33a) has T 
value in the real world; therefore it cannot be contradicted: it cannot be T and F at the same time.   
However, the only way for P to have two truth values i.e. T and F is when P is true in an 
irrealis world (possible world) not the real world. In other words, if P is T in a possible world 
(w), P might be T or F in the real world: the real world conforms (assigning T) or denies 
(assigning F) to P. This can be semantically represented as in (35).  
 
(35) If P (w) = 1, P (w) =/≠ 1(w*) 
(35) reads as: if P is T at a possible world, then P can or cannot be T at the real world. 
The logic in (35) explains why (33b) is acceptable under contradiction:  Sentence (33b) has the T 
value in a possible world; therefore it can be contradicted: it can be F in the real world.       
As is well known, modals in general introduce propositions that are true in irrealis worlds 
or possible worlds rather than the real world (in Kratzer’s 1981 1991 terms). If an expression x is 
said to have a modal component, it means that we still judge the proposition denoted by this 
expression to be true even if it is not true in the real world. This fact is supported by the behavior 
of modals under the actuality entailment test. Consider (36a-c), the target of the contradictory 
statement is bold-faced.  
 
(36)  
(a) majdi kaan mumkin ySuf          es-sayarah, bs   majdi  ma  Safha. 
Majdi was  may       park-INF  the-car,      but Majdi  not  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi may have parked the car, but he did not.’ 
 
(b) majdi    kaan mumkin  ySuf         es-sayarah, bs   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi   was   may        park-INF  the-car,       but  Ahmad  (who) PERF-park-it 
‘It is Majdi who may have parked the car, but Ahmad did.’ 
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(c) majdi kaan mumkin ySuf       es-sayarah, bs  huwwa  Saf                  et-treela. 
Majdi was  may     park-INF  the-car,      but he          PERF-park-it  the-truck 
‘Majdi may have parked the car, but he parked the truck.’ 
 
 
 In (36a), the epistemic modal mumkin ‘may’ is used. The sentence is continued with a 
contradictory statement that negates that Majdi parked the car i.e. Majdi did not park the car in 
the real world (the target of the contradictory statement is the event of parking); yet the sentence 
is acceptable. The fact that the sentence is acceptable clearly suggests that the proposition 
denoted by the modal mumkin ‘may’ holds true in an irrealis world and not in the real world. The 
same facts hold also for sentences (36b and c) where the target of the contradictory statement is 
Majdi and the car respectively. Sentences (36b and c) are acceptable under contradiction which 
asserts that in the real world it is not Majdi who parked the car but Ahmad (36b) and what Majdi 
parked is not a car but a truck (36c). This clearly means that the sentences in (36) express a 
proposition that is true in an irrealis world and that we still judge these sentences to be true even 
when the proposition they express is negated in the real world. The sentences in (36) have a 
modal reading even when the contradiction includes a modal i.e. the contradiction asserts a 
modal reading rather than a real world reading as in (36a-c) above. In these sentences, the 
contradictory statement includes the modal mumkin ‘might’, and still the sentences give a modal 
reading as evident by their acceptability under the actuality entailment test. 
(37)  
(a) majdi  mumkin ySuf           es-sayarah, bs   mumkin ma  ySafha. 
Majdi  might     INF-park  the-car,       but  might     not  INF-park-it 
‘Majdi might park the car, but he might not.’ 
 
(b) majdi     mumkin  ySuf          es-sayarah, bs   mumkin  ‘aHmad  ySufha. 
Majdi     might      INF-park  the-car,       but might       Ahmad  INF-park-it 
‘It is Majdi who might park the car, but Ahmad might park it.’ 
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(c) majdi  mumkin ySuf         es-sayarah, bs   huwwa mumkin ySuf         et-treela. 
Majdi  might     park-INF  the-car,       but he         might     INF-park the-truck 
‘Majdi might park the car, but he might park the truck.’ 
 
 
I argue that DAs have a modal reading. I support my argument by the fact that DAs 
pattern with modals with regard to their behavior under the actuality entailment test: DAs, 
similar to modals, express a proposition that is true in an irrealis world and not necessarily in the 
real world. This is evident by the fact that DAs are acceptable under actuality entailment test. 
Consider (38a and b), the target of the contradictory statement is bold-faced. 
(38)  
(a) majdi     Saaf        es-sayarah, bs   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi    park-DA  the-car,       but  Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’ 
 
(b) majdi  Saaf         es-sayarah,  bs  huwwa  Saf               et-treela. 
Majdi park-DA  the-car,        but he          PERF-park  the-truck 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but he parked the truck.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car.’ 
 
 
 In (38a), the DA Saaf  ‘park(DA)’ is used. The sentence is continued with a contradictory 
statement that negates that it is Majdi who parked the car i.e. in the real world, it is not Majdi 
who parked the car, rather it is Ahmad (the target of the contradictory statement is Majdi). Even 
though the sentence is continued with this contradiction, the sentence is acceptable. The fact that 
the sentence is acceptable clearly suggests that the proposition (i.e. it is Majdi who parked the 
car) denoted by the DA Saaf  ‘park(DA)’ is true in an irrealis world and not in the real world. The 
same fact extends to sentences (38b) where the target of the contradictory statement is the car. 
Sentence (38b) is acceptable under contradiction which asserts that in the real world what Majdi 
parked is not a car but a truck. The fact that the sentence is acceptable clearly means that the 
proposition expressed in this sentence (i.e. what Majdi parked is the car) is true in an irrealis 
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world and not in the real world. This is exactly what a modal component means: we still judge 
(38a and b) to be true even when they are negated in the real world. 
The sentences in (38) still give a modal reading even when the contradiction includes a 
modal i.e. the contradiction asserts a modal reading rather than a real world reading as in (38a 
and b) above. In (39a and b), the contradictory statement includes the modal mumkin ‘might’, 
and still the sentences give a modal reading as evident by their acceptability under the actuality 
entailment test. 
(39)  
(a) majdi   Saaf         es-sayarah,  bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi   park-DA  the-car,       but  might       Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’   
     
(b) majdi  Saaf         es-sayarah,  bs  huwwa mumkin elli   Safuh               et-treela. 
Majdi  park-DA  the-car,        but he         maybe   what PERF-park-it  the-truck 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe he parked the truck.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car.’ 
 
The modal reading of DAs is further supported when DAs are contrasted with the 
perfective form of the verb. Contra to DAs, the perfective form of the verb does not survive the 
contradictory statement as it is evident by the unacceptability of (40a and b) where the perfective 
form Saf ‘parked’ is used. The fact that perfective is unacceptable under the actuality entailment 
test clearly suggests that the proposition denoted by the perfective form is true in the real world 
rather than an irrealis world i.e. no modal reading is asserted. The target of the contradiction test 
is bold-faced. 
(40)  
(a) majdi   Saf               es-sayarah,# bs   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi   park-PERF  the-car,     # but  Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but Ahmad did.’                            
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(b) majdi  Saf               es-sayarah, #  bs  huwwa  Saf              et-treela. 
Majdi  park-PERF  the-car,       #  but he        PERF-park  the-truck 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but he parked the truck.’   
 
The sentences in (40) with the perfective form above still give non-modal reading even 
when the contradiction includes a modal as evident by their unacceptability under the actuality 
entailment test in (41a and b).  
(41)  
(a) majdi     Saf             es-sayarah,#  bs   mumkin ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi   park-PERF  the-car,     #   but maybe    Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’  
 
(b) majdi  Saf              es-sayarah, #  bs  huwwa mumkin  Saf              et-treela. 
Majdi park-PERF  the-car,       #  but he        maybe    PERF-park  the-truck 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe he parked the truck.’ 
   
 
In sum, the aforementioned discussion asserts that DAs pattern with modals in that they 
denote a modal i.e. irrealis reading since they survive the actuality entailment test. It also shows 
that DAs contrast with perfectives in that the former have a modal reading while the latter do not.  
 
4.4.3.3 Propositional Attitude Predicates: A De-Dicto Reading 
Another piece of evidence for the inferential/modal reading of DAs comes from their 
parallel behavior to propositional attitude predicates such as bafaker/batDun ‘think’ and 
ba3taqed ‘believe’. Propositional attitude verbs are known to trigger a modal reading where the 
proposition is true only in an irrealis world rather than the real world. In propositional attitude 
verbs the proposition is true in the speaker’s belief world (SBW): these meanings are referred to 
as the de-dicto belief reading. As exemplified in (42), a de-dicto reading is a reading where a 
proposition (P) is true according to the believer’s thought and not necessarily the real world 
(Kearns 2000). 
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 X= index (refers to someone), P= Proposition  
(42) De-Dicto Belief : BELIEVE(X)[ P=1] 
 
(42) reads as: X (someone) believes that P (i.e. P is true iff it is in X’s thoughts). The modal 
reading of propositional attitude verbs is supported by the fact that they shift a realis reading to 
an irrealis (modal) reading. Consider the sentences in (43-45); (the target of the contradictory 
statement is bold-faced).  
(43)  
(a) majdi     ba3ath         er-resaleh,# bs  (mumkin) majdi  ma   ba3athha. 
Majdi   send-PERF  the-letter, #  but (maybe)   Majdi  not   PERF-send-it 
‘Majdi sent the letter, but (maybe) he did not.’   
 
(b) majdi     ba3ath         er-resaleh,# bs  (mumkin) ‘aHmad (elli)   ba3athha. 
Majdi   send-PERF  the-letter, #  but (maybe)    Ahmad (who)  PERF-send-it 
‘Majdi sent the letter, but (maybe) Ahmad did.’   
 
(c) majdi     ba3ath         er-resaleh,# bs majdi (mumkin) ba3ath         eT-Tard    mush  
Majdi   send-PERF  the-letter, #  but Majdi (maybe)  send- PERF the-parcel not  
er-resaleh. 
the-letter  
‘Majdi sent the letter, but (maybe) Majdi sent the parcel (not the letter).’ 
 
   
 Sentences in (43) have the perfective form of the verb ba3ath ‘send’. The sentences are 
continued with a contradictory statement that negates the original proposition in the sentence i.e. 
that the letter was not sent (43a), it is not Majdi who sent the letter (43b) and that what Majdi 
sent was not the letter (43c). All these sentences yield a non-modal reading as evident by their 
unacceptability under the actuality entailment test; this strongly suggests that the propositions 
they express is true in the real world and not in an irrealis world. The non-modal reading of the 
sentences (43a, b and c) can be captured by the following lexical entry in (44a, b and c) 
respectively. 
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                               w*= real world,   t= time 
(44)  
(a) [[ Majdi sent the letter]] w*,t    =  [[ SEND is true at t in the real world]] 
(b) [[ Majdi sent the letter]] w*,t   =  [[ MAJDI is true at t in the real world]]   
(c) [[ Majdi sent the letter]] w*,t   =  [[ THE LETTER is true at t in the real world]] 
 
 
 However, when theses propositions in (43) are embedded under a propositional attitude 
predicate such as the verb befaker ‘think’ as in (45a, b and c) respectively, the non-modal 
reading shifts into a modal interpretation as shown by their acceptability under the actuality 
entailment test. 
(45)  
(a) 3ali befaker  majdi    ba3ath          er-resaleh, bs  (mumkin) majdi ma   ba3athha. 
Ali think       Majdi   send-PERF  the-letter,   but (maybe)  Majdi  not  PERF-send-it 
‘Ali thinks that Majdi sent the letter, but (maybe) he did not.’   
 
(b) 3ali befaker  majdi   ba3ath         er-resaleh,  bs  (mumkin) ‘aHmad (elli)   ba3athha. 
Ali think      Majdi   send-PERF  the-letter,   but (maybe)    Ahmad  (who) PERF-send-it 
‘Ali thinks that Majdi sent the letter, but (maybe) Ahmad did.’  
 
(c) 3ali befaker  majdi   ba3ath          er-resaleh, bs   majdi (mumkin) ba3ath         eT-Tard  
Ali think       Majdi  send-PERF  the-letter,   but Majdi (maybe)   send- PERF the-parcel           
mush er-resaleh. 
not    the-letter  
‘Ali thinks that Majdi sent the letter, but (maybe) Majdi sent the parcel (not the letter).’  
 
  
The shift into a modal reading is due to a scopal effect where the propositions in (45a, b 
and c) respectively are in the scope of the propositional attitude verb befaker ‘think’. The modal 
reading of these sentences can be semantically accounted for by the following lexical entry (46). 
                SBW= Speaker’s Belief World,  t=time,  S= Speaker (Ali) 
 
(46)  
(a) THINK [[ Majdi sent the letter]] sbw,s,t   = [[ SEND is true at t in SBW]] 
(b) THINK [[ Majdi sent the letter]] sbw,s,t   = [[ MAJDI is true at t in SBW]]   
(c) THINK [[ Majdi sent the letter]] sbw,s,t  = [[ THE LETTER is true at t in SBW]] 
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The semantic representation in (46) exemplifies the de-dicto belief reading indicated by 
the propositional attitude predicate ‘think’ in sentences under (45): the real world reading of 
sentences in (43) as denoted in (44) shifts into a modal reading where the propositions are now 
true in speaker’s belief world rather than a real world as it is evident by their acceptability under 
the actuality entailment test. This shift into modal reading is due to the scopal effect of the 
propositional attitude verb ‘think’ as shown in (45) where the predicate ‘think’ has a wide scope 
over the propositions.
3
 The propositional attitude verb ‘think’ forces the proposition to hold in 
SBW by introducing a ‘judge parameter’ (Stephenson 2005) into the semantics of sentences in 
(43). The judge parameter corresponds to the ‘speaker’s perspective’ where the proposition is no 
longer judged based on real world readings, rather it is judged from the perspective of the 
speaker (i.e. the judge). In other words, the sentences in (43) are true in the real world as they are 
judged based on real world facts. This contrasts with sentences in (45); these sentences are true 
in SBW since they are judged by the speaker (Ali) i.e. they are judged from the perspective of 
Ali rather than perspective of real world. In the spirit of Stephenson (2005), I use the following 
lexical notation (47) to account for the modal reading of the propositional attitude predicate 
befaker ‘think’(adapted from Stephenson 2005:9). 
 
            SBW= Speaker’s Belief World (SBW), t=time, S= Speaker 
(47) [[think]]SBW,S,t  = [for all worlds w’ compatible with SBW at t, P(SBW,S,t)=1]                                            
 
The notation in (47) reads as: a proposition (P) is true iff it is true in SBW (rather than the 
real world) at a given time (t). We can now use the lexical entry in (47) to generate semantic 
representation of sentences in (45) as demonstrated in (48a, b and c) respectively: 
                                                          
3
 See Simons (2006) for an evidential account of propositional attitude predicates such as think and  
  believe.  
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(48)  
(a) [[think]]SBW,S,t  = [for all worlds w’ compatible with SBW at t, SEND(SBW,S,t)=1] 
(b) [[think]]SBW,S,t  = [for all worlds w’ compatible with SBW at t, MAJDI(SBW,S,t)=1] 
(c) [[think]]SBW,S,t  = [for all worlds w’ compatible with SBW at t,THE 
LETTER(SBW,S,t)=1]                                                                                                        
 
For example, the notation in (a) reads as: the proposition (SEND) is true in the SBW, Ali’s 
belief, at a given time (t). The same applies to (b) and (c) where the speaker (Ali) believes that it 
is Majdi (b) and it is the letter what Majdi sent (c).    
I argue that DAs pattern with propositional attitude predicates. This claim is supported by 
the fact that DAs, similar to propositional attitude predicates, shift a realis reading into an irrealis 
(modal) reading. Consider sentences (49a and b); (the target of the contradictory statement is 
bold-faced). 
(49)  
(a) majdi    walla3                 eDaw,      # bs    ‘aHmad (elli)   walla3-uh. 
Majdi   switch on-PERF  the-light,  #but   Ahmad  (who)  PERF-switch on-it 
‘Majdi has switched on the light, but Ahmad did.’  
 
(b) majdi    walla3                 eDaw,      bs #  huwaa walla3                   el-telfezyoon.                
Majdi   switch on-PERF  the-light,  but  # he       switch on-PERF  the-T.V.                   
‘Majdi has switched on the light, but he switched on the T.V.’   
 
Sentences in (49) have the perfective form of the verb walla3 ‘switch on’. The sentences 
are tested under the actuality entailment test: they are continued with a contradictory statement 
that asserts a real world contradictory reading:  that it is not Majdi who switched on the light 
(49a) and that what Majdi switched on is not the light (49b). All these sentences yield a non-
modal reading as evident by their unacceptability under the actuality entailment test; this 
strongly suggests that the propositions they express are true in the real world (i.e. actualized in 
the real world) and not in an irrealis world. The non-modal reading of the sentences (49a and b) 
can be captured by the following lexical entry in (50a and b) respectively. 
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                               w*= real world,   t= time 
 
(50)  
(a) [[ Majdi switched on the light]] w*,t    = [[ MAJDI is true at t in the real world]]   
(b) [[ Majdi switched on the light]] w*,t    = [[ THE LIGHT is true at t in the real   
              world]] 
 
 
However, when these propositions are used with DAs and not perfectives, the non-modal 
reading shifts to a modal interpretation as shown by their acceptability under the actuality 
entailment test as shown in (51a and b) respectively. 
(51)  
(a) majdi    mwalli3           eDaw,      bs    ‘aHmad (elli)   walla3-uh. 
Majdi   switch on-DA  the-light,  but   Ahmad  (who)  PERF-switch on-it 
‘Majdi has switched on the light, but Ahmad did.’     
        
(b) majdi   mwalli3            eDaw,     bs    huwaa walla3                el-telfezyoon.                
Majdi   switch on-DA  the-light, but  he        switch on-PERF the-T.V.                   
‘Majdi has switched on the light, but he switched on the T.V.’   
 
 
Contra to the perfective, the DA in (51a and b) forces a modal reading: the proposition is 
no longer true in the real world as is the case with the perfective, rather it is true in an irrealis 
world as evident by the acceptability of these sentences under the actuality entailment test. I 
argue that DAs are analogous to propositional attitude predicates in that they force the 
proposition to be true in a speaker’s belief world (SBW) rather than the real world. The 
motivation for introducing the SBW comes from the evidential interpretation proposed for the 
DAs:  DAs introduce an evidential operator (EV) which expresses a speaker-oriented reading i.e. 
the proposition is viewed from the speaker’s perspective as discussed in the previous sections. 
Based on this, I argue that the modal reading of sentences in (51) with DA triggers a de-dicto 
reading and can be semantically recaptured by the same lexical entry I used to account for the 
modal reading of propositional attitude predicate befaker ‘think’ in (46) above. 
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                EV= Evidential Operator, SBW= Speaker’s Belief World,  t=time, S= Speaker  
 
(52)  
 
(a) DA(EV)[THINK [[ Majdi switched on the light]]
 sbw,s,t 
 
  
= [[ MAJDI is true at t in SBW]]] 
 
(b) DA(EV)[THINK [[ Majdi switched on the light]]
 sbw,s,t 
 
 
= [[ THE LIGHT is true at t in   
             SBW]] 
 
Similar to propositional attitude verbs in (46), the semantic representation in (52) 
exemplifies a de-dicto belief reading indicated by the DA mawale3 ‘switch on (DA)’: the semantic 
representation in (52a) corresponds to sentence (51a) and can be read as: speaker believes/ thinks  
that it is Majdi (where ‘Majdi’ is target of the inference) who switched on the light. The semantic 
representation in (52b) corresponds to sentence (51b) and is read as: speaker believes/ thinks that 
what Majdi switched on is the light (where ‘light’ is target of the inference). The de-dicto 
reading is supported by the acceptability of sentences with DAs under the actuality entailment 
test (i.e. they indicate an irrealis reading rather than realis reading). In other words, I argue that 
DAs, similar to propositional attitude predicate, force the proposition to hold in SBW by 
introducing an evidential operator corresponding to a speaker parameter. The speaker parameter 
corresponds to the ‘judge parameter’ discussed earlier where the proposition is no longer judged 
based on real world readings as is the case with the perfective in (49); rather, with DAs it is 
judged from the perspective of the speaker (i.e. the judge) as shown in (51). The lexical entry in 
(52) captures the two core meanings of DAs, the evidential operator (EV) which introduces the 
speaker parameter (SBW); and the modal reading which is presented by the propositional 
attitude verb [THINK] as evident by the acceptability under the actuality entailment test.  
To recap, DAs pattern with propositional attitude predicates in that both force an irrealis 
reading by shifting a non-modal into a modal reading. The propositions in both structures hold 
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true in a SBW rather than a real world. The notion of SBW is compatible with the evidential 
account proposed for DAs since the evidential reading is speaker-dependent. The fact that DAs 
exhibit similar interpretations with propositional attitude verbs lends further support to the modal 
reading of DAs.  
 
4.4.3.4 Inferential Readings: Result-State (RSI) and Consequent-State (CSI) Readings 
I have argued that DAs have an indirect evidential reading: they induce a speaker-
dependent reading, they indicate indirect evidence and they have a modal interpretation. These 
three notions can be captured by introducing an evidential operator (EV) proposed in the 
semantics of DAs. In this section I show how these notions come into play in triggering the 
inferential reading of DAs. 
I argue that the indirect evidence of DAs, which is specified by anterior and posterior 
temporal relations, is what triggers the inferential reading with DAs (see section 4.4.2.2 for 
further details). The reasoning of this is as follows: The fact that the event is either in an anterior 
or posterior relation to the EAT (which already includes the accessible evidence) guarantees that 
the speaker does not perceive the event; rather, the speaker uses the indirect evidence at the EAT 
as his/her basis to make inference about the non-perceived event. In other words, the indirect 
evidence at EAT constitutes the grounding for the speaker’s inference about the event (speaker 
infers the event from seeing its results). This reasoning strongly indicates that the type of 
inferential reading is dependent on the type of the accessible indirect evidence available for 
speaker at EAT. 
Given this fact, I argue that there are two types of indirect evidence that can be available 
at EAT: a result-state (RS) and a consequent-state (CS). Since the inferential reading is 
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dependent on the type of indirect evidence, it follows that DAs exhibit two types of inferential 
readings: a RS-based Inferential Reading (RSI henceforth) and a CS-based Inferential Reading 
(CSI henceforth). In other words, the event implied in the semantics of DAs can have two types 
of states: a RS and a CS; these states are the only accessible evidence for the speaker at EAT and 
each state triggers a different inferential reading: the RS triggers an RSI reading and the CS 
triggers a CSI reading.  
Before I work out the semantics of inference in each reading, let me first explain the 
distinction between the two states.  In the spirit of Nikolaeva (2000), I differentiate between the 
two readings as follows. First, the RSI includes states that can be viewed as an integral part of 
the lexical description of the verb i.e. it is unambiguously predictable from the meaning of the 
verb itself. This means that each verb has a unique RS (i.e. only one RS) that is directly 
predictable from it (Nikolaeva 2000). However, the CS is not part of the lexical description of 
the verb i.e. it is not directly predictable from the meaning of the verbal stem. This clearly means 
that each CS depends on a subjective basis because each verb (or event) could have more than 
one CS. For example, the event of ‘parking’ in sentence (53) has two states as follows: 
 
(53) majdi    Saf                                   es-sayarah fee el-karaaj. 
Majdi   park-PERF.3SG.MASC  the-car       in   the-garage    
‘Majdi (has) parked the car in the garage.’ 
  
(A) RS (part of the lexical description of the verb park): the car is parked. 
 
(B) CS (not part of the lexical description of the verb park): Majdi is home.   
 
 In other words, the fact that Majdi parked the car has a RS (the car is parked) and there 
may be a CS (Majdi is home). The RS (the car is parked) is directly predictable from the verb or 
the event of parking itself: if there has been a parking event, consequently there is a car parked. 
200 
 
However, the CS (Majdi is home) is not directly predictable from the verbal semantics of the 
verb ‘park’, that is: if Majdi has parked the car, this does not necessarily mean that he is home. 
Note here that while there is only one RS (car is parked) of the verb or the event ‘park’, there 
could be many CSs. For example, the fact that Majdi has parked the car could have multiple, in 
fact infinite number of CSs: Majdi is tired from a long drive, Majdi has wrecked the car, Majdi is 
home, etc. 
Second, I argue that the RS is semantically asserted or entailed by the event. That is, 
there is a logical entailment relation between the RS and the event. The CS, on the other hand, is 
contextualized and lacks this entailment relation. I propose the following composite truth tables 
(54 and 55) to account for the distinction in terms of entailment relation for RS and CS 
respectively. 
(54) Composite Truth Table of Entailment (RS) 
 
                p = Event,  q= RS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(55) Composite Truth Table of Entailment (CS) 
 
                  p = Event,  q= CS 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
p  q 
T  T 
F  F 
T  T 
F  F 
p  q 
T  T or F 
F  T or F 
T or F  T 
T or F  F 
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As Table (54) demonstrates, both the event and the RS have a mutual entailment relation: 
if Majdi has parked the car, there is a car parked and vice versa. The same entailment logic 
applies when the sentence is F: if Majdi has not parked the car, consequently there is no car 
parked and vice versa. This contrasts with Table (55) where there is no entailment relation 
between the CS and the event: If Majdi has parked the car, he might be home or might not. Also, 
if Majdi is home, it could be that he parked the car or not. In other words, with RS, the event of 
parking is an entailing event; however, with CS the event of parking is non-entailing.  
The above entailment relations are further supported by the cancelation test. In (56a) the 
RS (the car is parked) is semantically asserted as evident by the unacceptability of the sentence 
under cancellation. However, the CS (Majdi is home) is not entailed by the event of parking, 
therefore the acceptability of sentence (56b).  
(56)  
(a) majdi Saaf        es-sayarah,  # leish es-sayarah mish maSfoofah? 
Majdi park-DA the-car,       # why  the-car       not   parked-PP 
‘Majdi has parked the car (the car has been parked), why the car is not parked?’ 
 
(b) majdi Saaf         es-sayarah,   leish majdi mush fii el-beit? 
Majdi park-DA the-car,         why  Majdi not    in  the-home 
‘Majdi has parked the car, why is not he home?’ 
 
 
 The unacceptability of (56a) shows that the RS (the car is parked) is part of the entailed 
meaning of the event ‘parking’. This contrasts with (56b) where the CS is allowed under 
cancellation. Clearly, if ‘Majdi is at home’ is interpreted as a consequent result of ‘Majdi’s 
having parked the car’, then the fact that ‘Majdi has parked the car’ does not necessarily entail 
that he is home as shown in Table (55) above. This explains why sentence (56b) is acceptable 
when the CS is negated. 
202 
 
Having established the distinction between the RS and CS, I will now work out the 
semantics of inference in each reading (RSI and CSI). To do this, I propose the following logic 
in (57) which accounts for the inference in each inferential reading (RSI and CSI).    
                                
          p = Event, q=State at EAT(Evidence Acquisition Time), E= Event,  
          ERs= Event arguments, (p↔q)=Mutual Entailment, ¬(p↔q)= Lack of Mutual Entailment 
 
 
(57)  
(a) RSI Reading:  If (p↔q), INFER [ ERs ] 
 
(b) CSI Reading: If ¬(p↔q), INFER [ E & ERs] 
 
 
The logic of inference presented in (57) is as follows: If the speaker wants to use the state 
(i.e. the accessible evidence at EAT) to make inference about the entailing event of this state 
(p↔q), then this state is regarded as a RS and therefore the speaker’s inference can only target 
the event arguments (ERs) i.e. the doer of the event (subject), the patient of the event (object), 
the manner the event is done (adverb), etc… and not the entailing event itself. This logic captures 
the inference in the RSI reading in (57a) above. However, if the speaker wants to use the state to 
make inference about the non-entailing event of this state (¬p↔q), then this state is regarded as 
a CS and therefore, the speaker’s inference can in this case target the non-entailing event and the 
event arguments. This logic captures the inference in the CSI reading presented in (57b). 
Let me demonstrate by an example. Let us assume that the speaker at the EAT perceives 
‘a car that is parked.’ Let us call this accessible evidence S which stands for ‘state’. This S can 
be a RS or CS depending on whether the speaker’s inference is made about the entailing or the 
non-entailing event: the entailing event of this S at EAT is ‘parking the car’ and the non-entailing 
event could be any event other than the entailing event such as Majdi has come home. If the 
speaker wants to use this S (car is parked) to make an inference about the entailing event 
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‘parking the car’ (i.e. there is mutual entailment between the event and state (p↔q)), then the 
speaker can only target the event arguments (ERs) by his inference and not the entailing event 
itself. Consider sentence (58). 
(58) majdi     Saaf          es-sayarah. 
Majdi      park-DA  the-car       
‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
 
(a) Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’  
(b) Intended: ‘[I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car. 
 
 
 Sentence (58) is uttered by the speaker when s/he perceived the S (car is parked) at the 
EAT. The fact that the inference in this sentence targets only the ERs: doer of the action (the 
subject: Majdi) and the patient (the object: the car), clearly suggests that the speaker wants to 
make an inference about the entailing event of S that is the event of ‘parking the car’. Since the 
speaker in (58) wants to make an inference about the entailing parking event of S (there is 
mutual entailment between event ‘parking the car’ and S ‘car is parked: p↔q), then according to 
the lexical entry in (57a), the speaker can only target the ERs: Majdi (subject of the event) and 
the car (object of the event) in his inference and not the entailing event (parking the car). This 
logic is supported by the fact that only when the inference targets ERs:  Majdi (subject of the 
event) as in (59a) and the car (object of the event) as in (59b), the sentence in (58) can be 
acceptable under actuality entailment test (Note here that the actuality entailment test detects the 
realis and irrealis readings: if the target of the actuality entailment test is acceptable, then it 
shows an irrealis reading i.e. it can be target of inference/it is inferred. However, if the target of 
the actuality entailment test is not acceptable, then it shows a realis reading i.e. it cannot be target 
of inference/ it is not inferred). On the other hand, when the speaker’s inference targets the 
entailing event ‘parking the car’ the sentence becomes anomalous (59c): the mutual entailment 
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between the S (car is parked) and the entailing event ‘parking the car’ blocks inference from 
targeting the entailing event ‘parking the car; this is evident by the unacceptability of (59c) under 
the actuality entailment test where the entailing event of parking is targeted by the inference. The 
target of the inference is bold-faced in each sentence. 
(59)  
(a) majdi    Saaf         es-sayarah, bs   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi   park-DA  the-car,       but  Ahmad (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’   
 
(b) majdi  Saaf         es-sayarah,  bs  huwwa  Saf               et-treela. 
Majdi park-DA  the-car,        but he         park-PERF   the-truck 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but he parked the truck.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car.’ 
 
(c) majdi    Saaf         es-sayarah,# bs   es-sayarah mish maSfoofah (ma enSafat). 
Majdi   park-DA  the-car,     # but  the-car       not    parked-PP (not park-PERF-Passive) 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but he did not park the car.’ 
# Intended: ‘[I infer that] Majdi has parked the car/ the car has been parked.’  
       
The aforementioned discussion demonstrates the logic under the RSI reading. I will now 
consider the other inferential reading that is the CSI reading. Similar to the RSI reading, let us 
assume that the speaker at the EAT perceives ‘a car that is parked’, let us call this accessible 
evidence S stands for ‘state’. As discussed above, this S can be a RS or CS depending on 
whether the speaker’s inference is made about the entailing or the non-entailing event. If the 
speaker wants to use this S to make an inference about a non-entailing event (i.e. there is no 
mutual entailment between the event and state (i.e.¬p↔q), then in this case the S (car is parked) 
is regarded as a CS according to the lexical entry in (57b). The speaker can in this case target the 
non-entailing event by his inference. Consider sentences in (60). 
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(60)  
(a) majdi jaai. 
Majdi come-DA 
‘Evidently, Majdi has come.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] Majdi has come.’ 
 
(b) es-seyarah maSfoofah, bs   majdi  muu  jaai. 
The-car      parked,        but  Majdi not   come-DA 
‘The car is parked, but evidently Majdi has not come.’ 
 
 Sentence (60a) is uttered by the speaker when he perceived the S (car is parked) at the 
EAT. When the speaker perceives this evidence (i.e. the state of the car being parked at EAT), 
s/he uses this evidence as a grounding for the inference i.e. majdi jaai ‘Majdi has come’. In 
(60a), the speaker believes or infers that  ‘Majdi has come’ based on the fact that there is a car 
parked i.e. maybe the speaker knows it is Majdi’s car, or s/he expects Majdi to come anytime 
today after a long trip in Europe, etc…. In other words, in the speaker’s belief world (SBW), if 
there is a car parked, this necessarily means that someone has come: this is only true in the SBW 
and not necessarily in the real world; this is because in the real world there might be ‘a car 
parked’ but Majdi has not come. This contradictory interpretation (60b) (there is a car parked, 
but Majdi has not come) is predicted by the lexical entry in (57b): there is a lack of entailment 
between the S (car parked) and the event (Majdi’s coming); the fact that there is no entailment 
between the S and the event explains why the contradiction in (60b) is acceptable. In other 
words, sentence (60a) indicates an inferential reading that is true only in the SBW and not 
necessarily in the real world; this is supported by the fact that when this inferential reading 
‘Majdi has come’ is challenged by a real world reading as given by the actuality entailment test 
in (60b), the inferential reading survives the test. The legitimacy of (60b) clearly indicates that 
the event ‘Majdi’s coming’ is an inferential or irrealis (i.e. it can be target of inference); this 
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logic is predicted by the lexical entry in (57b) which states that a non-entailing event (in this case 
Majdi’s coming) can be a target of inference. 
 
4.4.3.5 More on the Consequent-State Inferential Reading (CSI) 
 In this section I provide further evidence for the inferential interpretations discussed in 
the previous section, mainly the CSI reading. I also discuss how this inferential reading is 
derived through a temporal specification of indirect evidence. 
 JA speakers intuit that DAs are more acceptable than the perfective form of the verb in 
the context where the speaker makes an inference based on a consequent state. In the following 
contexts (61-64), the speaker makes an inference based on the available evidence at the EAT; 
this evidence is regarded as the CS since the speaker uses this evidence to make an inference 
about a non-entailing event. It is crucial to the current inferential analysis that under these 
inferential contexts DAs are more acceptable than perfective. 
 
(61) Context: Adam and Sami see Sarah coming towards them and her eyes are red and   
              swollen. Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) ‘eTala3! sarah mSayHeh. 
Look!    Sarah cry-DA 
‘Look!  [Evidently/ I infer that] Sarah has cried.’  
 
(b) ??/# ‘eTala3! sarah SayHat. 
         Look!            Sarah cry-PERF.3SG.FEM 
        ‘Look!  [Evidently/ I infer that] Sarah has cried.’  
 
 
(62) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see   
                that the light is on and there appears to be some luggage in the door  
               step. Then, Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) majdi  jaai. 
Majdi come-DA 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has come.’  
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(b) ??/#  majdi  ejaa. 
        Majdi   come-PERF.3SG.MASC 
       ‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has come.’  
 
 
 
(63) Context: Adam and Sami enter Majdi’s room. They see the T.V is still on and the   
                           video games are hooked to the T.V. Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) majdi  laa3eb     ‘ataari. 
Majdi play-DA  video games 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has played video games.’  
 
(b) ??/#  majdi  la3ib                                ‘ataari. 
         Majdi play-PERF.3SG.MASC  video games 
         ‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has played video games.’ 
 
 
 
(64)    Context: Adam and Sami enter Majdi’s house. They see remains of cooked rice  
                           and on the table; the room smells Mansaf too. Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) majdi  Taabix     mansaf. 
Majdi cook-DA Mansaf (traditional dish) 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has cooked Mansaf.’  
 
(b) ??/#  majdi  Tabax                               mansaf. 
        Majdi  cook-PERF.3SG.MASC  Mansaf (traditional dish) 
        ‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has cooked Mansaf.’  
 
  In the above contexts, the speaker makes an inference based on available evidence: the 
speaker perceives evidence (i.e. a CS) at EAT and makes an inference about a non-entailing 
event. For example, in (61), the speaker infers that Sarah has cried based on the evidence that her 
eyes are red and swollen (CS). Note here that the fact that Sarah’s eyes are red and swollen (CS) 
is not necessarily entailed by a crying event. To be more specific, it is possible that before Adam 
and Sami saw Sarah, she might have rubbed her eyes with red pepper and this caused the redness 
and swelling in her eyes. That is, there is a lack of entailment between the event (crying), which 
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is the target of inference here, and the state (her eyes are red and swollen) at EAT. The same 
logic applies to all other contexts in (62-64).  It is crucial to our analysis here that under the 
inferential reading as is the case in the above contexts, JA speakers intuit that DAs in sentences 
under (a) above are more acceptable than perfectives in sentences under (b)
4
.   
  Furthermore, in the above contexts, the type of indirect evidence at EAT (the indirect 
evidence in this case is the CS) is specified temporally as discussed earlier (See section 4.4.2.2. 
for further discussion). In other words, the temporal relation between the reference time of the 
eventuality and the EAT determines the indirect evidence the speaker acquires at EAT: in all the 
contexts (61- 64), DAs show a post-state interpretation where the event is in an anterior relation 
to EAT which includes the speaker and the post-state (which is in this case a CS). In the context 
in (63) for instance, the speaker (Adam) perceives accessible evidence at EAT i.e. a post-state 
(which is in this case a CS) where the T.V is on and the video games are hooked to T.V. The 
speaker uses this evidence to make an inference about an anterior event as shown in figure (4). 
 
             Figure (4) Temporal and Inferential Indirect Evidence (Anterior Relation) 
             E=Event, EAT=Evidence Acquisition Time and CS=Consequent-State 
   
 
               E_____________________[__________________EAT_________________] 
              (Anterior)                             (CS: T.V is on and video games are hooked to T.V)  
        (DA: laa3ib ‘play’) 
                                                             [………........…Adam and Sami………………..]    
  
 
 
  As figure (4) shows, the anterior temporal relation denoted by the DA in (63a) triggers 
indirect evidence: the speaker (Adam) does not perceive the event which is in an anterior relation 
                                                          
4
 Most JA speakers intuit that the use of the perfective in these inferential contexts is not acceptable and   
  they would rather use DAs. However, some feel that the perfective is not totally unacceptable but  
  awkward. 
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to EAT; rather, he perceives only the CS of this event i.e. the T.V is on and the video games are 
hooked to the T.V. Adam uses this evidence at EAT to infer the anterior event as indicated by the 
DA laa3ib ‘play(DA)’. In this context, the speaker believes that the CS (the T.V is on and the 
video games hooked to the T.V) is a post-state of an anterior event which the speaker believes to 
be an event of ‘playing video games’. 
 The same logic applies to futurate readings of DAs i.e. where the event is in a posterior 
relation to EAT. In the following context, the speaker (Adam) infers that Majdi is coming 
tomorrow based on available evidence at EAT. Consider sentence (65). 
 
(65) majdi  jaai           bukrah. 
Majdi come-DA tomorrow 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi is coming tomorrow.’ 
 
In sentence (65), the speaker (Adam) perceives an accessible evidence at EAT. The speaker uses 
this evidence to make inference about a posterior event as shown in figure (5). 
 
               Figure (5) Temporal and Inferential Indirect Evidence (Posterior Relation) 
               E=Event, EAT=Evidence Acquisition Time and CS=Consequent-State 
   
 
               [_____________EAT_______________]____________________E 
               (CS: Majdi has booked the ticket already)                                (Posterior) 
                                                                                                              DA: jaai  ‘come’  
               [………........…Adam…………………..]     
 
   
  As figure (5) shows, the futurate reading (i.e. posterior relation) denoted by the DA in 
(65) triggers indirect evidence: the speaker (Adam) does not perceive the event which is in a 
posterior relation to EAT; rather, he perceives only the CS of this event i.e. Majdi booked his 
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ticket for instance. Adam uses this evidence at EAT to infer the posterior event as indicated by 
the DA jaai ‘come’. In this context, the speaker believes that the CS (Majdi booked his ticket) 
necessarily means that he will come tomorrow. In other words, the fact that Majdi is coming is 
true only in the speaker’s belief world and not in the real world because it might turn out that 
Majdi has booked the ticket but he would not come or will not ever come.  
 
  4.4.3.6 Inferential Contribution of Evidential DAs 
 In section 4.4.3.4, I have demonstrated that DAs trigger two types of inferential readings: 
RSI and CSI readings. Evidential DAs, in this regards, differ from other indirect inferential 
evidentials discussed in the literature, e.g. Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002), Sti’at’imcets 
(Mtthewson et al. 2007), Gitsken (Peterson 2010), Turkish (Sener 2011) and (Korean (Lee 2011) 
among others. These languages trigger a CSI reading where the inferential evidential is used to 
trigger inference about the non-entailing event; no RSI reading has been attested in these 
languages. Evidential DAs in JA, on the other hand, trigger both types of inferential readings.  
 For example, in (67a), Korean uses the inferential evidential -te and –ass to trigger an 
inferential reading where the speaker sees wet ground and based on this evidence s/he infers that 
‘it rained yesterday’. 
(67) Context: Chelswu saw a wet ground this morning. Now he says: 
 
(a) Ecey          pam-ey   pi-ka          o-ass-te-la. 
yesterday   night-at  rain-NOM  fall-PAST-TE-DECL 
‘[I infer that] it rained yesterday.’                                (Korean/ Lee 2011: 55) 
 
 In this context (67), the speaker (Chelswu) sees wet ground and he takes this evidence as 
the grounding for this inference that it rained yesterday. The evidence available at EAT i.e. wet 
ground is not necessarily entailed by a raining event because it might be the case that the ground 
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is wet because of a sprinkler or because there was a leak of water of one of the underground 
pipes etc…. in other words, this means that the inferential reading in (67) is based on a CS rather 
than a RS. 
 Unlike languages such as Korean, evidential DAs not only trigger a CSI reading but also 
a RSI reading. As already discussed in section 4.4.3.4, when the speaker at the EAT perceives 
accessible evidence or S stands for ‘state’, this S can be a RS or CS depending on whether the 
speaker’s inference is made about the entailing or the non-entailing event. For example in 
sentence (58) repeated here as (68), and (60) repeated here as (69), the speaker perceives a state 
(S) ‘a car parked’ at EAT. When the speaker makes an inference about the entailing event 
(parking the car), this S is regarded as a RS and therefore the speaker can only make an inference 
about ERs as in (68). On the other hand, when speaker makes an inference about a non-entailing 
event (any event other than parking the car), this S is regarded as a CS and therefore the speaker 
makes an inference about a non-entailing event such as ‘Majdi has come’ as in (69).   
(68) majdi   Saaf         es-sayarah. 
Majdi   park-DA  the-car,        
‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
(a) Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’  
(b) Intended: ‘[I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car. 
 
 
(69) majdi jaai. 
Majdi come-DA 
‘Evidently, Majdi has come.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] Majdi has come.’ 
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4.4.4 Interim Summary 
 I have proposed an indirect evidential account for the semantics of DAs in JA. The 
discussion so far has established that DAs have the three basic features of indirect evidentiality. 
Section 4.4.1 provided evidence for the speaker-oriented meaning under an habitual 
interpretation. In section 4.4.2 I showed that DAs assert indirect evidence similar to indirect 
evidentials i.e. the speaker did not perceive the event. One piece of evidence comes from the fact 
that DAs are acceptable in the contexts that negate seeing the event on the part of the speaker. 
Perfectives, on the other hand, are infelicitous in these contexts.  
 In section 4.4.3, I discussed the third feature of indirect evidentials that is the speaker’s 
attitude towards the proposition s/he expresses i.e. an inferential reading. I proposed that DAs 
have an inferential evidential reading in their semantics. DAs express two inferential readings, 
RSI and CSI readings. The two readings contrast with regard to the entailment established 
between the result of the event and the event itself. The former (RSI) has a mutual entailment 
while the latter (CSI) does not. I further argued that these inferential readings of DAs are 
licensed by the temporal specification of the indirect evidence and an epistemic modal 
component as evidenced by the actuality entailment test and the de-dicto reading.  
 In the remainder of this chapter I provide further evidence in support of my indirect 
evidential analysis of DAs. I discuss the interaction of DAs with indirect evidential predicates in 
JA, mirative readings, the first person effect, reportive evidence and the futurate interpretation. I 
also extend my proposal to passive participles (PPs) in JA. Then I conclude by discussing the 
implications of the current evidential account on the temporal readings in JA and the temporal 
problem of DAs discussed in chapter 2.   
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4.4.5 Indirect Evidential Predicates in JA 
 Languages tend to use lexical predicates or ‘evidential propers’ (after Aikhenvald 2004) 
to express different types of evidentiality.  English, for instance, uses some evidential proper 
predicates to encode indirect evidential interpretations as in (70a and b). 
(70)  
(a) It looks like John has arrived.  
(b) Apparently/Evidently, She has failed the test. 
 
 In these sentences the use of ‘it looks like’ (70a) and ‘apparently/evidently’ (70b) encode 
an indirect evidential reading: the speaker makes inference about the ‘arriving’ and ‘failing’ 
events based on indirect evidence. In (70a), for instance, it might be the case that the speaker 
makes his/her inference based on some observable evidence at EAT such as s/he saw john’s 
luggage at doorstep. The same fact holds for (70b) where the speaker infers that she failed the 
test based on some observable evidence which might be the fact that she looks upset. In all these 
contexts, the speaker infers the event based on indirect evidence i.e. the speaker did not perceive 
the event of arriving or failing, rather s/she infers them based on some evidence. 
 Similar to other languages such as English, JA has some other predicates that encode an 
indirect evidential meaning. These predicates include: shakluh ‘apparently/evidently/it looks 
like’, ‘eDaahir ‘apparently’ mbayen ‘it appears to be’, etc. I argue that DAs pattern with these 
‘indirect evidential proper’ predicates. I take this analogous behavior as further supportive 
evidence for the proposed indirect evidential analysis of DAs. 
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4.4.5.1 Indirect Evidence: Event Not Perceived 
 Evidential proper predicates such as shakluh ‘it looks like’ encode indirect evidence 
where the speaker does not perceive the event. One piece of evidence comes from their 
unacceptability in the contexts where the speaker perceived the event.  The only way for these 
predicates to be felicitous is when they are used in contexts where the event is not perceived by 
the speaker. Consider the following contexts (71-72).  
 
(71) Context: Adam enters the room and sees Majdi watching T.V. Adam joins Majdi  
                in watching T.V. Suddenly, the phone rings (as Sami is calling) and  
               Adam answers the phone.  
 
Sami: 
(a) majdi shuu  besawi? 
Majdi what IMPERF-do.3SG.MASC 
‘What is Majdi doing?’ 
 
Adam: 
(b) gaa3id betfaraj              3ala et-telfeziyoon. 
PROG IMPERF-watch on    the-T.V   
‘He is watching T.V.’ 
 
(c) # shakluh      gaa3id betfaraj              3ala et-telfeziyoon. 
It looks like  PROG IMPERF-watch on    the-T.V   
‘It looks like he is watching T.V.’ 
 
 
 
(72) Context: Adam enters the house (he knows Majdi is home) and he hears noise   
                upstairs (loud music, somebody is yelling and cheering). Suddenly, the  
                phone rings Sami is calling) and Adam answers the phone. 
 
Sami: 
(a) majdi shuu besawi? 
Majdi what IMPERF-do.3SG.MASC 
‘What is Majdi doing?’ 
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Adam: 
(b) # gaa3id betfaraj              3ala et-telfeziyoon. 
PROG    IMPERF-watch on    the-T.V   
‘He is watching T.V.’ 
 
(c)  shakluh        gaa3id betfaraj              3ala et-telfeziyoon. 
It looks like  PROG IMPERF-watch on    the-T.V   
‘It looks like he is watching T.V.’ 
 
 
  
(73) Context: Adam and Sami are watching a boxing match. They are both fan of the  
                player in red trunk (Mike Tyson). Sami goes outside to smoke a  
               cigarette while Adam is still watching the match very carefully.  
               Suddenly, he hears Adam cheering loudly; then Sami asks Adam: 
 
Sami: 
(a) shuu Saar? 
what happen-PERF 
‘What happened?’ 
 
Adam: 
(b) tyson   Darabu                  buks   w    wage3. 
Tyson  punch-PERF-him  blow  and fall-PERF 
‘Tyson punched him then he fell.’ 
 
(c) # shakluh     tyson  Darabu                  buks  w    wage3. 
it looks like Tyson punch-PERF-him  blow  and fall-PERF 
‘It looks like he punched him then he fell.’ 
 
 
 
(74) Context: Adam and Sami are watching a boxing match. They are both fan of the  
               player in red trunk (Mike Tyson). They both go outside to smoke. While  
                they are outside, suddenly they hear the crowd cheering; then Sami asks  
               Adam (while they are both outside):  
 
Sami: 
(a) hah!    shuu Saar                ya tara? 
listen! what happen-PERF think 
‘listen! What do you think happened?’  
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Adam: 
(b) ?/#  tyson   Darabu                   buks  w    wage3. 
Tyson         punch-PERF-him  blow  and fall-PERF 
‘Tyson punched the other player then he fell.’ 
 
(c) shakluh       tyson    Darabu                  buks  w    wage3. 
it looks like Tyson  punch-PERF-him  blow  and fall-PERF 
‘It looks like Tyson punched the other player then he fell.’ 
 
      
 In contexts (71) and (73), the speaker (Adam) has direct visual evidence of the event: in 
(71) he sees Majdi watching T.V and in (73) he is watching the match. Under these contexts, 
only the imperfective (71b) and the perfective (73b) are acceptable. The evidential predicate 
shakluh ‘it looks like’ is infelicitous in these contexts. The only way for sentences with shakluh 
‘it looks like’ to be acceptable is in contexts (72) and (74) where the speaker (Adam) does not 
perceive the event: in (72), Adam does not see Majdi watching T.V., rather he hears a noise and 
cheering. He uses this indirect evidence as a base for his inference that Majdi is watching T.V.  
Similarly, in (74), Adam was not watching the match; rather he used the crowd cheers as 
evidence of his inference that Tyson knocked the other player out. The fact that DAs (c.f. 27 
above) pattern with the indirect evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’ in asserting an indirect 
evidence reading gives further evidence for the indirect evidential analysis of DAs.  
 
4.4.5.2 Inferential Reading 
 I argue that indirect evidential predicates such as shakluh ‘it looks like’ encode an 
inferential reading in their semantics. In this regard, indirect evidential predicates show a parallel 
behavior to modals and propositional attitude predicates: indirect evidential predicates express a 
proposition that is true in an irrealis world (in this case SBW) and not necessarily in the real 
world. This is evident by the fact that indirect evidential predicates such as shakluh ‘it looks 
217 
 
like’, like propositional attitude predicates and modals, shift a realis reading into an irrealis 
(modal) reading. Consider sentences (76a-c); (the target of the contradictory statement is bold-
faced). 
(76)  
(a) sami     fataH           es-shubaak,#   bs   (mumkin) sami ma  fataH-uh. 
Sami    open-PERF the-window, # but (may be)   Sami not  open-PERF-it 
‘Sami opened the window, but (maybe) he did not.’ 
 
(b) sami     fataH           es-shubaak,#   bs  (mumkin) ‘adam elli   fataH-uh. 
Sami    open-PERF the-window, # but (may be)  Adam who  open-PERF-it 
‘Sami opened the window, but (maybe) Adam opened it.’ 
 
(c) sami     fataH          es-shubaak,#   bs  (mumkin) huwwa  fataH            el-baab. 
Sami    open-PERF the-window, # but (may be)  he          open-PERF  the-door 
‘Sami opened the window, but (maybe) he opened the door.’   
 
 
 The sentences in (76) have the perfective form of the verb fataH ‘opened’. The sentences 
are continued with a contradictory statement that negates the original proposition in the sentence. 
All these sentences yield a non-modal reading as evident by their unacceptability under  the 
actuality entailment test as shown in (76a-c); this strongly suggests that the propositions they 
express are true in the real world (i.e. actualized in the real world) and not in an irrealis world. 
 However, when these sentences are embedded under an indirect evidential predicate such 
as shakluh ‘it looks like’ as in (77a-c), the non-modal reading shifts into a modal interpretation 
as shown by their acceptability under the actuality entailment test. The shift into a modal reading 
is due to the scopal effect where the propositions in (77a, b and c) respectively are in the scope of 
the inferential evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’. The modal reading of these sentences 
can be semantically accounted for by the lexical entries in (77d, e and f) respectively. 
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(77)  
(a) shakluh        sami     fataH          es-shubaak,   bs   mumkin sami ma  fataH-uh. 
It looks like Sami    open-PERF the-window, but may be   Sami not  open-PERF-it 
‘It looks like Sami opened the window, but maybe he did not.’ 
 
(b) shakluh        sami     fataH         es-shubaak,    bs   mumkin ‘adam elli   fataH-uh. 
It looks like Sami    open-PERF the-window, but  may be  Adam  who  open-PERF-it 
‘It looks like Sami opened the window, but  maybe Adam opened it.’ 
 
(c) shakluh       sami     fataH          es-shubaak,   bs  mumkin huwwa  fataH           el-baab. 
It looks like Sami    open-PERF the-window, but maybe   he          open-PERF the-door 
‘Sami opened the window, but maybe he opened the door.’ 
 
 
(d) THINK [[ Sami opened the window]] sbw,s,t    = [[ OPEN is true at t in SBW]] 
 
(e) THINK [[ Sami opened the window]] sbw,s,t    = [[ SAMI is true at t in SBW]]  
 
(f) THINK [[ Sami opened the window]] sbw,s,t   = [[ THE WINDOW is true at t in SBW]] 
 
 
 
 Similarly, DAs shift the realis reading into an irrelais reading. In sentences (78a-c) the 
DA faateH ‘open(DA)’ is used. The realis reading of these sentences (as indicated in 76a-c) shift 
into an irrealis reading when a DA is used: the proposition is true in the SBW and not necessarily 
in the real world as shown by the acceptability of (78a-c) under the actuality entailment effect. 
(78)  
(a) sami     faatiH         es-shubaak,   bs  (mumkin) ‘adam elli    fataH-uh. 
Sami    open-DA    the-window,  but (may be)   Adam who  open-PERF-it 
‘Sami opened the window, but (maybe) Adam opened it.’ 
 
(b) sami     faatiH          es-shubaak,  bs  (mumkin) huwwa  fataH           el-baab. 
Sami    open-PERF the-window,  but (may be)  he         open-PERF  the-door 
‘Sami opened the window, but (maybe) he opened the door.’ 
 
 
 Furthermore, inferential evidential predicates such as shakluh ‘looks like’ trigger a RSI 
and CSI reading. Let us assume that the speaker at the EAT perceives ‘an opened window’, let us 
call this accessible evidence S which stands for ‘state’. This S can be a RS or CS depending on 
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whether the speaker’s inference is made about the entailing or the non-entailing event: the 
entailing event of this S at EAT is ‘opening the window’ and the non-entailing event could be 
any event other than the entailing event such as Majdi has arrived home. If the speaker wants to 
use this S to make inference about the entailing event ‘opening the window’, then the speaker 
can only target the event arguments (ERs) by his inference and not the event of opening itself. 
Consider sentences (79a-c). 
(79)  
(a)   shakluh        sami     fataH          es-shubaak,#    bs   mumkin sami ma  fataH-uh. 
It looks like Sami    open-PERF the-window,#  but  may be  Sami not  open-PERF-it 
‘It looks like Sami opened the window, but maybe he did not.’ 
Intended:[ Evidently/I infer that] Sami has opened the window.’ 
 
(b)   shakluh        sami    fataH           es-shubaak,  bs    mumkin ‘adam elli    fataH-uh. 
It looks like Sami   open-PERF the-window, but  may be   Adam  who  open-PERF-it 
‘It looks like Sami opened the window, but  maybe Adam opened it.’ 
Intended:[ Evidently/I infer that] Sami has opened the window.’ 
 
(c)   shakluh       sami     fataH           es-shubaak,  bs  mumkin huwwa  fataH          el-baab. 
It looks like Sami    open-PERF the-window, but maybe   he          open-PERF the-door 
‘Sami opened the window, but maybe he opened the door.’                   
Intended:[ Evidently/I infer that] Sami has opened the window.’ 
 
         The sentences in (79) are uttered by the speaker when s/he perceives the S (an opened 
window) at the EAT. The inference of the speaker in this case can only target the ERs: the doer 
of the action (the subject: Sami) and the patient (the object: the window) as shown by the 
acceptability of (79b and c) respectively. However, sentence (79a), where the event of opening is 
targeted by the inference, is anomalous. This is because the speaker cannot make inference about 
an asserted real world knowledge at EAT: the fact that the speaker perceives ‘an opened 
window’ at EAT necessarily asserts an entailing ‘opening’ event. In other words, if the speaker 
perceives an opened window at EAT, this becomes part of his real world knowledge (speaker 
knows that there is an opened window) and therefore cannot make an inference about it: if I see 
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an opened window, I cannot say ‘it looks like’ it is opened. The only way for sentence (79a) to 
be acceptable is where the speaker does not perceive a RS ‘an opened window’ at EAT, rather 
s/he perceives a CS such as the speaker ‘feels cold’ and therefore s/he infers that someone has 
opened the window as in this context (80). 
 
(80) Context: Adam and Sami came to visit Majdi. Suddenly, they felt cold. Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) shakluh        majdi     fataH          es-shubaak. 
It looks like Majdi    open-PERF the-window 
‘It looks like Majdi opened the window.’ 
 
(b) shakluh        majdi     fataH          es-shubaak,   bs   mumkin majdi ma  fataH-uh. 
It looks like Majdi    open-PERF the-window,  but may be  Majdi not  open-PERF-it 
‘It looks like Sami opened the window, but maybe he did not.’ 
 
 Sentence (79a), repeated here as (80b), is now acceptable: the speaker makes inference 
about the opening event based on the CS ‘Adam felt cold’ and not based on a RS ‘an opened 
window’: when Adam felt cold, he inferred that ‘Majdi has opened the window’. That is, the fact 
that the speaker does not perceive an ‘opened window’ at EAT means that ‘opening the window’ 
is not part of his/her world knowledge and therefore the speaker can target the event of ‘opening 
the window’ with his inference: if I do not see an opened window at EAT and I felt cold, then I 
might say a sentence like (79a) using the indirect evidential predicate ‘looks like’ to target the 
event of opening. Note here that there is no mutual entailment between the CS ‘feeling cold’ and 
the inferred event ‘opening the window’. That is, Adam might have felt cold because he was sick 
or because Majdi is turning the air conditioning on by mistake etc… and not necessarily because 
the window was open. This explains why the event of opening the window is targeted by the 
inference in (80). 
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 The aforementioned discussion demonstrates the logic under the RSI reading. I will now 
consider the other inferential reading of shakluh ‘it looks like’,  that is the CSI reading. Similar 
to the RSI reading, let us assume that the speaker at the EAT perceives ‘an opened window, let 
us call this accessible evidence S stands for ‘state’. As discussed above, this S can be a RS or CS 
depending on whether the speaker’s inference is made about the entailing or the non-entailing 
event. If the speaker wants to use this S to make inference about a non-entailing event (i.e. there 
is no mutual entailment between the event and state), then in this case the S is regarded as a CS 
and hence the speaker can in this case target the non-entailing event by his inference. Consider 
the sentences in (81). 
(81)  
(a) shakluh       majdi   shawwab. 
It looks like Majdi  felt hot-PERF 
‘It looks like Majdi has felt hot.’ 
Intended: ‘[Evidently/I infer that] Majdi has felt hot.’ 
 
(b) es-shubaak     maftooH, bs   majdi  muu  mshaweb. 
The-window    opened,  but  Majdi not    felt-hot 
‘The window is opened, but evidently Majdi does not feel hot.’ 
 
 Sentence (81a) is uttered by the speaker when he perceived the S (an opened window) at 
the EAT. When the speaker perceives this evidence, s/he uses this evidence as grounding for his 
inference. In (81a), the speaker believes or infers that ‘Majdi has felt hot’ based on the fact that 
there is an opened window. In other words, in the speaker’s belief world (SBW) if there is an 
opened window, this necessarily means that someone has felt hot: this is only true in the SBW 
(that is what the speaker believes) and not necessarily in the real world. This is because in the 
real world there might be ‘an opened window’ but no one feels hot at all. This explains why the 
contradictory interpretation in (81b) is acceptable. Also the acceptability of (81b) is born out if 
we know that there is no mutual entailment between the CS (opened window) and the event 
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under inference (Majdi felt hot); the lack of this entailment allows the inference to target the 
event ‘Majdi felt hot’ as shown in (81a and b). The RSI and CSI readings of the indirect 
evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’ as discussed here is analogues to the inferential 
readings of DAs as discussed earlier (see section 4.4.3.4). 
 In conclusion, DAs pattern with inferential evidential predicates (evidential propers) such 
as shakluh ‘it looks like’ in asserting indirect evidence and inferential readings. I take this 
analogous behavior as further supportive evidence of the current indirect evidential analysis of 
DAs. 
 
4.4.6 Evidential DAs and Mirativity 
 Mirativity covers unexpected, surprising, non-volitional, unintentional, and unusual 
information on the part of the speaker (Aikhenvald 2004:195). It has been argued that a mirative 
reading is often connected to non-firsthand i.e. indirect evidentiality (DeLancey 2001, Lazard 
1999). In fact, indirect evidential systems often express a mirative meaning as one of their 
evidential overtones as reported in Aikhenvald (2004:195): “In small systems with two 
evidentials, the non-firsthand evidential may extend to cover new, unusual, and surprising 
information-that is, develop mirative overtones. In larger systems, the inferred evidential may 
acquire a similar range of meanings”. Aikhenvald (2004) also reports cross-linguistic evidence 
where mirative nuances are expressed by reported evidentials, which are part of the indirect 
evidentiality. 
 Indirect evidentiality asserts that the speaker does not perceive the event, but rather s/he 
infers it (inferential indirect evidential) or is told about it (reported indirect evidential). 
Consequently, the speaker may not take any form of responsibility for this event. To be more 
specific, the fact that the speaker is not aware of the event might indicate that these events have 
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occurred beyond his/her control or that these events are unexpected to the speaker and 
consequently are ‘surprising’ to him/her. That is how the mirative interpretation of indirect 
evidentiality arises (Aikhenvald 2004). All of these complex mirative meanings have been 
referred to in the literature of evidentiality as ‘unprepared mind’ (Delancey 2001) or 
‘psychological distance’ (Aksu and Slobin 1982). For example, in Turkish, if the speaker 
realized something that he did not expect, or something to his surprise, an indirect evidential is 
used as shown in sentence (82). 
 
(82) buyu-mus-sun. 
grow-INDIRECT EV-2SG 
‘You have grown!’                      (Johanson 2003:285, cited in Aikhenvald 2004) 
 
 
 The same fact obtains for many evidential systems cross-linguistically. In Abkhaz, 
Northern Khanty and Jarawara the indirect evidentials are used to encode a mirative overtone 
where the speaker has realized something to his surprise as evident in sentences (83a-c); 
examples are cited in Aikhenvald (2004: 196-197). 
(83)  
(a) sara  je-s-ajha-be-w    a-wa-j-dew-cqa          abra  de-q’a    zap. 
I       it-me-elder          ART-man-big-really  here  (s)he-be-INDIRECT EV  
‘It turns out (unexpectedly) that there is really a great person here who is more 
important than me!’                               
                                                                             (Abkhaz/Chirikba 2003: 248-249) 
 
 
(b) si xut-en          wer-le-nen            pa     xoti     ul-len 
so house-3du   make-PRES-3du   and  so         pole-3du  
kurte-t   ul-m-el. 
iron-PL  be-INDIRECT EV.PAST-3SG 
‘So they are making the house, and the poles turned out to be iron.’ 
 
                                                                    (Northern Khanty/Nikolaeva 1999:148) 
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(c) Okombi faha     hi-fa-hani                                          ama-ke. 
Okombi water   Oc-drink-IMM.P.INDIRECT EV   EXT-DECL.f 
‘Okombi (to his surprise) drank water.’ 
                                                                             (Jarawara/Aikhenvald  2004: 197) 
 
 
 I argue that the mirative interpretation also extends to DAs in JA. In the following 
contexts, the speaker discovers something unexpected or surprising; only indirect evidential DAs 
are appropriate in these contexts (84a, 85a and 86a) and not perfective or imperfective (84b, 85b 
and 86b). 
(84)  
(a) w      ‘ana Taali3 3ala el-masjid,    Talliet          3a Haali   wella          ana laabis  
While I     going   to    the-mosque, look-PERF on myself surprisingly I    wear-DA 
el-banTaloon  fii eshagluub! 
the-pants        inside out 
‘While I am going to the mosque, I looked at myself and surprisingly I found that I have 
worn the pants inside out!’ 
 
(b) ??/#  w      ana Taali3 3ala el-masjid,    Talliet         3a  Haali    wella            ‘ana  
While        I     going   to    the-mosque, look-PERF on myself  surprisingly  I    
labist/balbas                          el-banTaloon  fii eshagluub! 
wear-PERF/wear-IMPERF   the-pants         inside out 
‘While I am going to the mosque, I looked at myself and surprisingly I found that I 
worn/wears the pants inside out!’ 
 
 
(85)  
(a) SaHeit         eS-SubeH,     lageet         Haali   waagi3   min 3ala et-taxt! 
wake-PERF the-morning, find-PERF myself  fall-DA from off  the-bed 
‘I woke up in the morning and (surprisingly) have found myself  fallen off the bed!’ 
 
(b) ?/#  SaHeit         eS-SubeH,     lageet         Haali   wage3t       min  3ala et-taxt! 
Wake up-PERF the-morning,  find-PERF myself  fall-PERF from off  the-bed 
‘I woke up in the morning and (surprisingly) have found myself  fallen off the bed!’ 
 
 
(86)  
(a) ‘eih! mana Haamil     maSaari! 
Oh! not     carry-DA  money 
‘Oh! I do not have money with me!’ 
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(b) ?/#  ‘eih! ma  Hamalt/baHamel                 maSaari! 
        Oh! not  carry-PERF/IMPER-carry  money 
       ‘Oh! I do not have money with me!’ 
 
  The mirative interpretation can also be strengthened by using some particles in the 
context; I refer to these particles as ‘mirative particles’. JA employs the particle ‘atharii 
‘surprisingly’ to serve this purpose. This particle triggers a ‘deferred realization’ reading: the 
information of a certain situation is obtained and realized by speaker post-factum i.e. after-the-
fact realization (Floyd 1996 and Aikhenvald 2004). In other words, the speaker’s surprise comes 
about as a result of this deferred realization of information. Indirect evidential DAs are 
appropriate in these contexts (87a and 88a) unlike perfective or imperfective (87b and 88b). 
(87)  
(a) fii el-maktabeh, ‘athariitni      naayim     3ala el-laabtob! 
in the-library,     surprisingly  sleep-DA on    the-laptop 
‘Surprisingly, I slept on the laptop in the library!’  
 
(b) ?/#  fii el-maktabeh, ‘athariitni       nemit           3ala  el-laabtob! 
in the-library,            surprisingly  sleep-PERF  on    the-laptop 
‘Surprisingly, I slept on the laptop in the library!’ 
 
 
(88)  
(a) ruHet      3ala kanzas siti, ‘athariitni     naasi         a3abi     banzeen! 
go-PERF to    Kansas city, surprisingly forget-DA  fill-INF gasoline  
‘I went to Kansas city and discovered (to my surprise) that I forgot to fill up my 
car with gas!’  
 
(b) ?/# ruHet  3ala kanzas siti, ‘athariitni      naseet             a3abi     banzeen! 
go-PERF   to    Kansas city, surprisingly forget-PERF  fill-INF gasoline  
‘I went to Kansas city and discovered (to my surprise) that I forgot to fill up my 
car with gas!’  
 
 
   The indirect evidence of anterior and posterior relations of DAs explains why DAs are 
appropriate with mirative interpretations in the above contexts. DAs induce indirect evidence 
where the event is in an anterior or posterior relation with respect to EAT i.e. the speaker only 
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perceives the evidence at EAT and not the event. The lack of event awareness on the part of the 
speaker at EAT triggers a deferred realization reading where the speaker realizes the event (from 
its results at EAT) long after it occurred. In sentence (87), for instance, the speaker is only aware 
of the result state at EAT (i.e. him being on the laptop) and he has no personal awareness of the 
event of falling asleep until after it occurred: given his state at EAT (him on the laptop), he 
realized he fell asleep.  
   In sum, the mirative reading is one of the notable semantic extensions of indirect 
evidentiality cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald 2004). Contra to perfective and imperfective, only 
DAs are felicitous in the contexts where a mirative interpretation is expressed. The licensing of 
DAs in such contexts adds further support to the current indirect evidential analysis of DAs. 
 
4.4.7 Evidential DAs and First Person Effect 
One of the notable semantic features of indirect evidentiality is its sensitivity to first 
person ‘I’ (cf. Curnow 2002, 2003, Aikhenvald 2004 among many others). If a language has 
some restriction on the use of evidentials, these are likely to involve first person (Aikhenvald 
2004:219). Indirect evidentials’ sensitivity to first person has two forms. First, some indirect 
evidentials are restricted in the contexts of first person. It has been argued that indirect 
evidentials, more specifically inferential evidentials, is more appropriately used in the contexts of 
third person rather than first person (Schlichter 1986). Aikhenvald (2004) reports many 
languages where the evidentials are never used in the context of first person such as Hunzib, 
Kmoi languages, Tuyuca and many others.
5
 
                                                          
5
 Aikhenvald (2004: Ch.7) provides comprehensive review and discussion of languages with evidential  
  systems that are restricted in the context of first person.  
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Second, when indirect evidentials are used with first person, they develop a mirative 
overtone i.e. non-volitional, unintentional, lack of awareness, surprised meanings, known as 
‘first person effect’. In other words, if the speaker is talking about himself, then the use of 
indirect evidential, more specifically inferential evidential, seems to be counterintuitive: if the 
speaker performed an action himself, then it follows logically that the speaker does not need to 
infer that this action took place since the speaker himself performed the action at issue. 
Therefore, when an indirect evidential is used with first person, the canonical inferential reading 
of the indirect evidential is interpreted with a mirative overtone i.e. unintentional, uncontrollable, 
non-volitional, surprise. All these meanings comprise what is known as ‘first person effect’.
6
  
 For example, in Jarawara, when the indirect evidential is used in the contexts of first 
person, the indirect evidential implies a lack of control on the part of the speaker as shown in 
example (89) where the use of the indirect evidential with first person implies that the speaker 
had woken up drunk with no memory of what happened last night, (Dixon 2003:170 reported in 
Aikhenvald 2004). 
(89) o-hano-hani                                         o-ke. 
1SG.S-be.drunk-INDIRECT EV.f   1SG-DECL.f 
‘I got drunk (and don’t recall it).’ 
 
 Similar examples are also found in many languages such as Turkish (Aksu-Koc and 
Slobin 1986:160 reported in Aikhenvald 2004). In (90), the use of indirect evidential mush with 
first person does not indicate an inferential reading; rather it indicates an inadvertent action and 
therefore causes surprise on the part of the speaker. The speaker in this sentence suddenly wakes 
up over a pile of books, and then to his surprise he utters (90). 
 
                                                          
6
 See Curnow (2003 and 2004) for further discussion and cross-linguistic examples. 
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(90) uyu-mus-um. 
sleep-INDIRECT EV-1SG 
‘I must have fallen asleep!’  
 
 The indirect evidential sensitivity to first person is also clear in JA as it is evident by the 
sensitivity of the indirect evidential predicate shakluh ‘apparently/evidently/it looks like’ to first 
person. I have argued in section 4.4.5 that the indirect evidential predicate shakluh encodes an 
inferential reading. However, I argue that this inferential reading is dependent on the type of 
person used in the utterance. To be more specific, if indirect evidential predicate shakluh is used 
with third person, they denote a canonical inferential reading as shown in (91a); however, when 
it is used with first person, it indicates a ‘first person effect’ where the inferential reading is 
interpreted with a mirative overtone i.e. non-volitional, surprise and unprepared mind as shown 
in (91b). 
(91)  
(a) shakl-uh                 sami naam.                                    (Inferential Reading) 
it looks like-3SG   Sami sleep-PERF 
‘It looks like Sami is asleep.’ 
Intended:’[I infer that] Sami is asleep.’  
 
(b) shakil-ni                nemet! 
it looks like-1SG   sleep-PERF 
‘Apparently I have slept!’ 
Intended: (Surprisingly), I must have slept!               (Mirative Reading) 
 
 
 
In (91a), the indirect evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’ is used with third person. 
In this context, the speaker is making inference about Sami being asleep or not. This is evident 
by the acceptability of (91a) in a context where the speaker is looking at Sami lying down on the 
sofa and closing his eyes and then he uses this state as a base for his inference in (91a). However, 
in (91b), the same indirect evidential predicate is used but with first person. In this context, the 
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speaker is not trying to make inference about himself, rather the sentence indicates a ‘deferred 
realization’ meaning where the speaker realized after he woke up that he was sleeping i.e. the use 
of the indirect evidential predicate shakilni here indicates an unintentional or accidental action on 
the part of the speaker which triggers speaker’s surprise. Therefore sentence (91b) is appropriate 
in the context where the speaker woke up suddenly upon sleeping over his books in the library 
and then to his surprise he realized he was sleeping. 
I argue that DAs show sensitivity to first person as discussed above. First, in the context 
of first person i.e. when the speaker himself has performed an action, JA speakers usually do not 
use DAs; rather the perfective form of the verb is used. On the other hand, in the context of third 
person, DAs are allowed. For example, JA speakers intuit that (92a) with DA is unacceptable if 
the speaker is talking about himself i.e. first person is at issue as in (92b); the use of perfective 
(93) is more acceptable in this regard. However, they all agree that sentence (92a) with a DA is 
acceptable when the speaker is not talking about himself; rather he is talking about someone else 
i.e. third person is at issue as in (92c).  
(92)  
(a) lama naazil             ed-daraj,  meda3thir. 
when go down-DA the-stairs, stumble-DA 
‘When going down the stairs, (he/I) stumbled.’  
 
(b) ?/#  lama naazil                       ed-daraj,   meda3thir.                     (First Person) 
when go down-DA. 1SG  the-stairs, stumble-DA.1SG 
‘When I was going down the stairs, I stumbled.’ 
 
(c) lama naazil                      ed-daraj,    meda3thir.                           (Third Person) 
when go down-DA.3SG  the-stairs,  stumble-DA.3SG              
‘When he was going down the stairs, he stumbled.’ 
 
(93) lama naazalt                         ed-daraj, ‘eda3thart. 
when go down-PERF.1SG  the-stairs, stumble-PERF.1SG 
‘When I was going down the stairs, I stumbled.’   
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 The only way for sentence (92b) with the DA to be acceptable under first person 
interpretation is when used in reportive and mirative contexts. In a reportive context, the speaker 
is reporting what someone else said he has done (94a) and not when he (speaker) is describing 
what he himself has done (92b). In other words, the speaker is reporting the same statement 
(92b) through hearsay as in (94a). Another repair reading of sentence (92b) can also arise under a 
mirative interpretation (94b). In (94b), the first person pronoun is used and the sentence is 
acceptable only when the speaker is mocking his interlocutor by showing his disagreement. It 
also shows irony on the part of the speaker in the sense that he is surprised to hear such a 
statement about himself.   
(94)  
(a) bugulu   enni    lama  naazil                       ed-daraj,   meda3thir. 
say-they that-I  when go down-DA. 1SG  the-stairs,  stumble-DA.1SG 
‘The say that when I was going down the stairs, I stumbled.’ 
      
(b) lama naazil                       ed-daraj,   meda3thir! 
when go down-DA. 1SG  the-stairs, stumble-DA.1SG 
‘When I was going down the stairs, I stumbled!’ 
 
 
  It is worth mentioning that the reason why (92b) is acceptable under a hearsay 
interpretation as in (94a) is that in a hearsay report the speaker is only reporting what someone 
else said about him. In other words, in (94a) the evidential implication of DA is under the scope 
of a third party (they) and not under the scope of the speaker as in (92b); hence the acceptability 
of DA with first person (94a).      
Second, similar to indirect evidential predicate shakluh, the inferential reading of DAs is 
neutralized in the contexts of first person, as contrasted with third person, and it is only 
acceptable under mirative reading. This sensitivity is evident in the behavior of DAs under 
actuality entailment test. In (39), repeated here as (95a), the DA Saaf ‘park(DA)’ is used in the 
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context of third person where the speaker is making inference about ‘Majdi’; the inference made 
in this sentence is valid since the sentence is acceptable under actuality entailment test. However, 
when the same DA is used with first person, the inference is blocked as shown by the 
unacceptability of (95b) under the actuality entailment effect. 
(95)  
(a) majdi    Saaf        es-sayarah, bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi   park-DA  the-car,       but might       Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’ 
 
(b) ‘ana     Saaf         es-sayarah, # bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
I           park-DA  the-car,      #  but might       Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
#‘I have parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
#Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is me who parked the car.’  
   
 
The fact that the inferential reading with DA is acceptable in the context of third person 
(95a) while it is not acceptable in the context of first person (95b) clearly suggests that the 
inferential reading of DAs, similar to indirect evidentials, is sensitive to first person. Furthermore 
and similar to the indirect evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’ (91b), the only way for 
sentence (95b) to be acceptable is under a mirative interpretation: the sentence is acceptable only 
when a ‘deferred realization’ is induced where the speaker was not conscious or aware when he 
parked the car (i.e. he was drunk or drugged when he parked the car etc…) and then he realized 
that he parked it not until later (he woke up the next morning and saw that the car is parked) as 
shown in (96). 
(96) ‘ana     Saaf         es-sayarah,  bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad  (elli)   Safha. 
I           park-DA  the-car,       but  might        Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
I have parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[Surprisingly, I found that] I have parked the car (the car is parked), but 
maybe Ahmad parked it.’  
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It is worth mentioning here that while the inferential reading of DAs is sensitive to the 
choice of person used (with third person, inference is allowed; while it is not with first person), 
the inferential reading of perfective is always blocked no matter whether third person or first 
person is used as shown by the unacceptability of (97a and b) respectively where the perfective 
form of the verb Saf  ‘parked’ is used under the actuality entailment test.  
(97)  
(a) majdi     Saf                       es-sayarah, # bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
Majdi    park-PERF.3SG  the-car,      #  but might       Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
#‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
#Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’ 
  
(b) ‘ana   Safiet                  es-sayarah, # bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha. 
I        park-PERF.1SG  the-car,      #  but might       Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it 
#‘I have parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
#Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is me who parked the car.’     
      
I further argue that DAs show another form of sensitivity with first person in that the 
post-state and futurate readings of DAs are sometimes dependent on the type of person used 
(Mitchell and El-Hassan 1994).  In this regard, indirect evidential DAs differ from other indirect 
evidential systems. In these systems, the only restriction in the use of evidentials is in first person 
contexts and first person effects as shown earlier. In (98a and b) the use of DA with the first 
person triggers a futurate reading where the speaker has a negative intention to live in the 
apartment and eat with them respectively. However, when sentence (98a) is used with a third 
person, the futurate reading shifts into a post-state reading as exemplified in (99). Examples are 
adapted from Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994: 86). 
(98)  
(a) ‘ana mish maaxidh ‘ishaga,  el-Hai                     mish 3aajibni. 
I       not   take-DA  the-flat, the-neighborhood  not     I-like-it 
‘I am not going to take the flat, I do not like the neighborhood.’ 
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(b) ‘ana mish maakil ma3kuuh. 
I      not     eat-DA   with-you 
‘I am not going to eat with you.’ 
 
 
(99) huwwa mish maaxidh ‘ishaga,  el-Hai                    mish  3aajbuh. 
He        not   take-DA  the-flat, the-neighborhood  not     he-like-it 
‘He has not taken the flat, he did not like the neighborhood.’   
 
In conclusion, DAs are sensitive to first person effects similar to indirect evidentials such 
as the indirect evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’. The sensitivity of DAs is manifested in 
the sense that DAs are sometimes restricted in the contexts of first person; also the use of first 
person blocks its inferential reading unless a mirative overtone is intended. The choice of person 
could also affect the type of temporal/aspectual reading of DAs as well. I take DAs’ sensitivity to 
the first person as further evidence in favor of my indirect evidential proposal. 
 
4.4.8 DAs as Reported Indirect Evidentials 
 The reported evidential is one of the major types of indirect evidentiality (see Willett 
1988’s classification in section 4.3.2). Reported evidentials cover the type of information 
acquired through hearsay or someone else’s report. That is, the speaker acquires the knowledge 
through indirect evidence i.e. hearsay or report and not through direct evidence. This type of 
reported evidence is usually accompanied with the lack of speaker’s commitment to the truth of 
the reported information i.e. epistemic modal reading. In other words, the fact that the speaker 
acquires the information through second-hand or third-hand sources triggers a low degree of 
reliability and certainty of the reported statements on the part of the speaker; and therefore the 
speaker does not vouch for what s/he is reporting. In Estonian, for instance, the speaker uses a 
reported evidential to quote someone else’s report and implies that the speaker distances himself 
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from responsibility for the statement’s veracity as shown in (100), cited in Aikhenvald 
(2004:180). 
(100) Ta olevat                               arstiteaduskonna   lopeta-nud. 
He be-PRES.REPORTED    doctor.faculty       finish-PAST-PART  
‘He is said to have completed his studies of medicine (but I would not vouch for it)’ 
 
 
 In the contexts where the speaker acquires his knowledge through hearsay or someone 
else’s report, JA usually employs DAs to serve this purpose. In sentences (101a and b) the case is 
of reporting/narration.  In these contexts, DAs (101a) are used to report incidents that the speaker 
did not witness, rather was told about by someone else: the speaker is not the immediate source 
of information) rather he/she is just reporting someone else’s. This is contrasted with the 
perfective form of the verb (101b) where the speaker states incidents that s/he witnessed i.e. the 
speaker him/herself is the source of information.  
(101)  
(a) sami jaai            min   es-safar embareH w      jaayib      hadaya  lal kul  ma3uh. 
Sami come-DA from  travel     yesterday and bring-DA gift-PL  to all   with-him 
‘[It is said/I was told] that Sami came back and brought gifts to everyone with him.’ 
 
(b) sami eja                 min   es-safar embareH w      jaab            hadaya   lal kul  ma3uh. 
Sami come-PERF from travel     yesterday and bring-PERF gift-PL   to all    with-him 
‘[I saw] Sami came back and brought gifts to everyone with him .’ 
 
 
 This observation is supported by the following narrative context in (102). I have obtained 
this context while I was talking to a JA speaker over the phone who was reporting an incident 
that happened with her brother in the last few days. At the time of the incident, the speaker was 
studying abroad and she was told about the incident through hearsay which is in this case her 
mother. DAs are used in most parts of the context which I only cite a part of here. 
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(102) jaai          xalid     faayit       3aleehum w   mkaserhum takseer;  ba3dein jaretna 
come-DA Khalid enter-DA  to-them   and hit-DA       hitting , then      our-neighbor-FEM      
sam3eh    eS-soot    w   faayteh     tHajez    benaat-hum…… 
hear-DA  the-noise and enter-DA  separate between-them….. 
 
‘[I was told] that Khalid entered their room and hit them hard; then our neighbor heard 
the noise and she tried to stop the fight.’  
          
         
 JA speakers use the perfective sometimes to encode hearsay reports similar to DAs. 
When this happens, JA makes explicit reference to the speaker’s attitude towards the information 
s/he obtains through hearsay. In (103a and b), the DAs and perfective are used respectively; in 
both contexts the speaker acquires the knowledge through a hearsay. However, there is an 
important contrast between the two forms: with DAs (103a), the speaker does not vouch for the 
information he was told about; the speaker distances himself from being responsible of the truth 
of the reported assertion. This modal reading is expected in the case of DAs since DAs induce 
indirect evidence where the speaker does not witness the event at issue. In (103b), on the other 
hand, the speaker vouches for the truth of his assertion as he might have hard evidence based on 
which he is certain that the event at issue took place.  
(103)  
(a) sami  kaasir       rejluh w   raayiH 3a daktoor      embareH. 
Sami break-DA leg     and go-DA to the-doctor  yesterday 
‘[It is said/I was told] that Sami broke his leg and went to the doctor yesterday ( I do not  
vouch for it).’ 
 
(b) sami  kasar            rejluh w    raaH        3a  daktoor      embareH. 
Sami break-PERF leg      and go-PERF to  the-doctor  yesterday 
‘[It is said/I was told] that Sami broke his leg and went to the doctor yesterday (I vouch 
for it).’ 
  
A similar observation has been made by Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994). They have cited 
reportive examples where they asked 48 JA speakers to indicate which of the two sentences 
below (104a and b) suggests that the speaker was reporting the event and he was an eye-witness 
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of the event at issue ‘hitting’; in (104a) a DA is used, while in (104b) perfective is used. 
According to their study, 46 JA speakers chose sentence (104b) with the perfective and only 2 
chose (104a) with the DA. Examples are adapted from Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994:18): 
(104)  
(a) samiir  Daarib   muniir. 
Samiir  hit-DA  Muniir 
‘Samiir has hit Muniir.’ 
 
(b) samiir  Darab        muniir. 
Samiir  hit-PERF  Muniir 
‘Samiir  hit Muniir.’  
 
Based on this finding, I argue that the DA in (104a) indicates a hearsay report based on 
the fact that DA in (104a) is not accepted when speaker is reporting event which he was an eye-
witness of. This interpretation is captured in (105a) where the intended reading of DA is [I was 
told]. However, the perfective (104b) indicates immediate visual evidence [I saw] rather than 
hearsay as shown in (105b).  
(105)  
(a) samiir  Daarib  muniir. 
Samiir hit-DA  Muniir 
‘Samiir has hit Muniir.’ 
Intended: [I was told] that Samiir hit Muniir. 
 
(b) samiir  Darab       muniir. 
Samiir hit-PERF  Muniir 
‘Samiir  hit Muniir.’ 
Intended: [I saw] Samiir hit Muniir. 
 
 
 In sum, the aforementioned discussion suggests that DAs express an indirect evidential 
interpretation in the sense that they are used to encode hearsay or reported evidential reading. 
This contrasts with the perfective which is used to express direct evidence rather than hearsay 
evidence. Also contra to DAs, when the perfective is used to express hearsay evidence, it denotes 
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a high degree of certainty towards the truth of the reported statements. This contrast is expected 
since the former indicates indirect evidence, while the latter does not. 
 
4.4.9 The Futurate Interpretation of DAs 
      DAs express a futurate reading as one of its core meanings as in (106). 
 
(106) sami msaafir      bukrah. 
Sami travel-DA tomorrow 
‘Sami is travelling tomorrow.’ 
 
 
In (106), the speaker uses DA to express a futurate interpretation in which he infers that Sami 
will travel tomorrow. I argue that the futurate reading of DAs can be taken as further evidence 
for the indirect evidential semantics of DAs.         
The first argument pertains to the fact that DAs express a futurate rather than a future 
reading. A futurate reading is defined as “a sentence with no obvious means of future reference, 
that nonetheless conveys that a future-oriented eventuality is planned, scheduled, or otherwise 
determined.” (Copley 2009:15)
7
. In sentences (107 and 108), the speaker is emphasizing events 
that are planned or scheduled. 
(107) ‘ana raaji3          3ala 3amaan bukrah. 
I      go back-DA to   Amman tomorrow 
‘Evidently, I am going back to Amman tomorrow.’ 
 
(108) ‘apel    mnazleh       aay foon jadeed esh-shahr  eljaai. 
Apple  provide-DA iPhone     new    the-month  next 
‘Evidently, Apple (the company) is releasing a new iPhone next month.’ 
 
 
                                                          
7
 See Copley (2009) for further discussion on the semantics of futurates.  
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Also, DAs express futurate situations where the speaker believes that the occurrence of 
the future event is certain i.e. speaker has high degree of confidence that the event will occur 
(Mughazy 2004) as in (109) and (110). 
(109) ed-denya  shattayyih el-leileh. 
the-sky     rain-DA    tonight 
‘Evidently, it is raining tonight.’                  (JA) 
 
(110) en-nawwa  gayya       fe-m3ad-ha. 
the-storm   come-DA in-time-its 
‘The storm is coming on time.’                    (Egyptian Arabic/Mughazy 2004:209) 
 
 
 
 The certainty of speaker is supported by the fact that sometimes DAs are reduplicated to 
emphasize the meaning that the event will certainly take place according to speaker’s belief 
(Mughazy 2004) as exemplified in (111a and b)
8
. 
(111)  
(a) ed-denya  shattayyih  shattayyih. 
the-sky     rain-DA     rain-DA 
‘Evidently, it is  surely going to rain.’ 
 
(b) ‘ana baa3eth    el-maSaari baa3eth-hin      bukrah. 
I      send-DA  the-money send-DA-them  tomorrow 
‘Evidently, I am surely sending the money tomorrow.’   
                                      
          
The futurate (i.e. planned or scheduled) and future situations with high degree of 
certainty can be interpreted evidentially. The plan or schedule functions as the evidence available 
to speaker at EAT. The speaker then uses this evidence as grounding for his inference. Therefore, 
in (107) above, the speaker uses the plan he has at EAT as a basis for his inference about the 
future event ‘going back to Amman’. The same fact also obtains for the situations where the 
                                                          
8
 Interestingly, unlike Bulgarian and Turkish, reduplication of DAs in JA expresses a high degree of certainty on the   
  part of the speaker that the event will take place. In these languages reduplicated evidential structures express that   
  the speaker is doubtful about the truth of the proposition. I refer the reader to Ghomeshi (2004), Inkelas and Zoll  
  (2005) and Şener (2011) for further understanding of the semantics of reduplication.   
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speaker is confident about as in (109) and (111) above. The evidential interpretation of (111a) for 
example explains why the speaker is certain that the event will take place: the speaker is 
confident that the event will take place because he grounds his inference about the event of ‘rain’ 
based on the available evidence at EAT such as the sky is grey, it is cold etc… . All these 
meanings correspond to the evidential interpretation of DAs discussed earlier i.e. inference based 
on available evidence.  
Another argument for the evidential reading of the futurate interpretation comes from the 
indirect evidence specification which is an essential requirement for the indirect evidential 
semantics of DAs. I have already argued in section 4.4.2.2 that the indirect evidence requirement 
of DAs is specified temporally. One of the temporal specifications that establishes the indirect 
evidence of DAs is the futurate reading of DAs i.e. posterior temporal relation (see section 
4.4.2.2 for detailed discussion).  
Furthermore, the indirect evidence can be manifested in the contexts of futurate DAs 
rather than the canonical future form which comprises the particle raH ‘will’ followed by the 
non-finite form of the verb. In my analysis of DAs, the difference between the canonical form of 
future and futurate reading of DAs is not accounted for based on animacy hierarchy as discussed 
in Boneh (2005); rather it is captured by direct and indirect evidential analysis (See chapter 2 for 
further details on Boneh’s analysis). One argument I provide in favor of this claim is that unlike 
canonical future form, futurate DAs are not felicitous in the contexts where direct evidence is 
induced as exemplified in sentence (112), taken from Boneh (2005:8). 
(112) Hood l-ward        raH   yuu’a3                      la taHet. 
pot     the-flower  will  inf. 3sg.m-fall down to down 
‘The flower pot is about to fall down.’ 
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Contra to Boneh (2005), I argue that the acceptability of using the future form raH 
yuu’a3 ‘will fall’ instead of the DA is accounted for by the indirect evidential analysis rather 
than animacy restrictions. In (112), the speaker witnesses that the flower pot is falling or going to 
fall (Boneh 2005: 8). In other words, the context supplies direct evidence which is not 
compatible with the semantics of DAs where only indirect type of evidence is asserted. Hence, 
under this context only the canonical future form is used as shown by the acceptability of (112) 
and the unacceptability of DA as evident in (113) below.      
  
         Context: The speaker sees the flower pot shaking and is about to fall; then he says: 
 
(113) #  Hood l-ward       waa’i3              la taHet. 
    pot    the-flower  fall down-DA  to down 
    ‘The flower pot is about to fall down.’ 
 
In addition, futurate DAs encode an inferential or modal interpretation. This is evident by 
their behavior under the ‘known falsity’ diagnostic (Faller 2002). Epistemic modals are usually 
used to express a proposition that is not known to the speaker; in fact that is the major function 
of modals: they express propositions that are possibly or necessarily true as in (114 and 115) 
respectively. 
(114) It may be raining. 
◇P: It is possible that it is raining. 
 
(115) It must be raining. 
□P: It is necessarily possible that it is raining. 
 
 
The propositions in (114) and (115) are true iff the speaker does not know whether the 
proposition (i.e. it is raining) is true or not. In other words, epistemic modals cannot be 
felicitously used if the speaker already knows the falsity or truth of the proposition, as evident by 
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the unacceptability of (116) where the speaker already knows that the proposition (i.e. raining) is 
false (Faller 2002). 
(116) # It may/must be raining, but it is not (raining). 
 
The same fact extends to futurate DAs. Similar to epistemic modals such as may and must 
in (114 and 115) futurate DAs cannot be felicitously used if the speaker already knows the falsity 
or truth of the proposition as evident by the unacceptability of (117a) where the speaker already 
knows that the proposition (coming) is false. Therefore, futurate DAs express an inferential 
meaning similar to modals as exemplified in (117b). 
(117)  
(a) majdi  jaai           bukrah,     # bs huwwa muu jaai. 
Majdi come-DA tomorrow, # but he        not   come-DA 
‘Majdi is coming tomorrow, but he is not coming.’ 
 
(b) majdi  jaai           bukrah. 
Majdi come-DA tomorrow 
‘[I infer that] Majdi is coming tomorrow.’ 
 
 
In sum, it suffices to say that the futurate reading of DAs is another extension of the 
evidential interpretation of DAs. I will pursue this discussion with further details when I account 
for the modal and inferential readings of the futurate DAs in chapter 5 where I analyze the modal 
component of DAs using Kratzer’s possible world semantics (1981, 1991). 
 
4.5 Passive Participles 
In this section, I extend my indirect evidential proposal to account for the semantics of 
passive participles (PPs) in JA. I will show that PPs are indirect evidentials since they pattern 
with DAs in expressing indirect evidential interpretations. Based on this fact, I argue that 
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participle constructions ‘active and passive participles’ are the hallmark of evidentiality in JA. In 
the remainder of this section, I briefly apply the same arguments I used to account for the 
indirect evidential semantics of DAs to PPs. 
 
4.5.1 Speaker-Dependency: Habitual Interpretation 
Similar to DAs, I argue that PPs encode an evidential i.e. speaker-oriented reading as 
evident by their behavior under habitual interpretation. In (118), the PP mashghuul ‘busy’ is used 
with the habitual adverb dayman ‘always’; and in (119), the same habitual adverb is used with 
passive imperfective form of the verb binshaghel ‘gets/becomes busy’.  
 
(118) bs     a’Hki ma3 majdi,  talafuunuh      dayman mashghuul, bs mush ma3natuh ennu               
when talk    to     Majdi  telephone-his  always  busy-PP,    but not   mean       that       
talafuunuh        dayma  benshaghel. 
telephone-his     always get-busy-IMPERF-PASSIVE 
‘When I call Majdi, his phone is always busy, but this does not mean that his phone 
always gets busy.’ 
 
(119) bs     a’Hki ma3 majdi,  talafuunuh      dayman binshaghel, #                       bs mush               
when talk    to     Majdi  telephone-his  always  busy-IMPERF-PASSIVE,#  but not                
ma3naatuh ennuh  talafuunuh       dayma benshaghel. 
mean         that      telephone-his  always busy-IMPERF-PASSIVE 
‘When I call Majdi, his phone  always gets busy, but this does not mean that his phone 
always gets busy.’ 
 
 
Sentences (118 and 119) are continued with a contradictory statement negating the 
habitual reading in the original sentence i.e. it is not the habit of Majdi’s phone to be busy. 
Sentence (119) with the passive imperfective yields unacceptability under a contradiction 
suggesting that the habitual reading asserted by the imperfective is true in the real world i.e. 
imperfective asserts that ‘it is the habit of Majdi’s phone to be busy’ therefore we cannot assert 
the otherwise. However, sentence (118) with the PP is totally acceptable under this test. The fact 
243 
 
that the PP is acceptable clearly suggests that the habitual reading (118) is not necessarily true in 
the real world. Therefore I argue that (118), similar to DAs, is true in a world different from the 
real world which I proposed to call the speaker’s belief world (SBW). We can now account for 
the acceptability of (118) by proposing that the habitual reading of ‘Majdi’s phone is always 
busy’ is perceived from the perspective of the speaker i.e. speaker-oriented reading.  
The intuition of JA speakers supports the evidential i.e. speaker oriented reading 
proposed for sentence (118). JA speakers intuit that sentence (118) can be semantically restated 
as in (120 and 121): 
(120) Among all/most of the times I call Majdi I find his phone busy. 
(121) I always find his phone busy.  
 
The readings in (120) and (121) explains why (118) is acceptable under the entailment test: The 
fact that the speaker always finds Majdi’s phone busy does not necessarily mean that it is the 
habit of Majdi’s phone to be busy all the time. Based on the above discussion, I propose the 
following semantic representation for sentence (118) and (119) as follows where an Evidential 
operator i.e. speaker’s belief (SBW) is used to account for (118).  
(122) always [GET BUSY(e) & MAJDI(m)& PHONE(e,m)] 
 
(123) always EV [BUSY(e) & MAJDI(m)& PHONE(e,m)] 
  
 The semantic representation given in (122) corresponds to sentence (119) with the 
passive imperfective and it reads as: it is always the case that Majdi’s phon gets busy. The one 
given in (123) corresponds to (118) with the PP and reads as: it is always the case that the 
speaker finds Majdi’s phone busy i.e. according to speaker’s belief (SBW) it is true that Majdi’s 
phone is always busy. 
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 4.5.2 Indirect Evidence 
4.5.2.1 Event Not Perceived 
 I argue that PPs assert an indirect evidence requirement similar to indirect evidential DAs 
i.e. speaker did not perceive the event. The indirect evidence reading is essential to establish the 
indirect evidential reading of PPs similar to DAs as discussed earlier. 
 One piece of evidence comes from the fact that PPs are acceptable under a cancelation 
test that negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker. However, passive perfective is 
infelicitous in this context as shown in (124) and (125) respectively. 
 
(124) ‘ana sheft  el’aghraaD manguuleh, bs    maa  shefthin  lama   ntagalan 
I      saw    the-stuff     move-PP,     but  not   see-them when  move-them 
‘I saw the stuff moved but I did not see when they were moved.’ 
 
(125) ‘ana sheft   el’aghraaD ‘ntagalan,#                          bs   maa shefthin  lama   ntagalan 
I      saw    the-stuff       move-PERF-PASSIVE, # but  not  see-them when  move-them 
‘I saw the stuff had been moved but I did not see when they had been moved.’ 
 
 
 In (124) the PP manguuleh ‘move(pp)’ is used. The PP survives the cancelation test that 
negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker. In other words, in (124) the speaker saw the 
state of the stuff having been moved and not the event of moving itself. This contrasts with the 
passive perfective in (125) where the sentence is unacceptable when seeing the event is negated; 
this asserts that with passive perfective the speaker saw the vent of moving itself and not only the 
state that comes about as a result of this event.  
 Another piece of evidence comes from the fact that PPs are not acceptable in the contexts 
where the speaker perceives the event itself. However, only the passive imperfective is 
acceptable when the speaker perceived the event. Consider this situation: 
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(126) Context: Majdi is smoking outside while Sami is working on his laptop inside.  
               Suddenly, Majdi sees a car being parked in front of him.  
 
Sami: 
(a)  shuu eSuut haDa? 
       what  noise  this? 
       ‘What is this noise outside?’ 
               
Majdi: 
 (a) fii seyarah btenSaf. 
       In  car        IMPERF-PASSIVE.park 
       ‘There is a car being parked.’ 
 
(b)# fii seyarah maSfuufah. 
        In  car        park-PP 
        ‘There is a car parked.’ 
 
                            
In this context Majdi has a direct visual access to the event of parking the car. When he was 
asked by Sami about this event which he witnesses and is still taking place, only sentence (a) 
with the imperfective is acceptable and not (b) with the PP. 
 
4.5.2.2 Temporal Specification 
 Similar to evidential DAs, I argue that the indirect evidence induced by PPs is a result of 
two temporal relations: anterior and posterior relations. The former corresponds to a post-state 
reading, and the latter corresponds to a futurate reading as in (127a and b) respectively. 
(127)  
(a) er-resaleh maktuubeh. 
the-letter   write-PP 
‘The latter has been written.’     (Post-state reading)   
 
(b) shuuf ! el-maTa3am maftuuH maftuuH    bukrah,     fa laa txaaf. 
listen! the-resturant  open-PP open-PP     tomorrow, so not worry 
‘listen! The restaurant is surely going to be opened tomorrow, so do not worry/  
Surely, I am going to open the restaurant tomorrow, so do not worry.’                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                       (Futurate reading) 
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 I use the same semantic representations in figure (3), repeated here as (128), to account 
for the post-state (anterior) and futurate (posterior) temporal relations of the indirect evidence of 
PPs in JA.  
 (128)   Anterior vs Posterior Temporal Relations of PPs 
 
E= Event and EAT= Evidence Acquisition Time/Speaker’s awareness Origio, the x mark 
presents the ‘speaker’  
  
 
             PPs:         E_________[__EAT__]__________E 
                         (Anterior)              (SAO)                (Posterior) 
                                                    [.... X….]     
 
 
  In (128), the event is in anterior and posterior relation to EAT. The x mark, which 
represents the speaker, is included in the domain of EAT i.e. speaker is aware only of what is 
inside EAT. The anterior relation captures the post-state reading of PP as in (127a), while the 
posterior relation captures the futurate reading (127b). The anterior and posterior relations is 
what trigger the indirect evidence induced by PPs: The fact that the event is either in an anterior 
or posterior relation to the EAT (which already includes the speaker and the accessible evidence) 
guarantees that the speaker does not perceive the event; in other words, the event is outside the 
domain of the speaker (EAT).  
 To make our discussion more concrete, let us now apply our semantic representation in 
(128) to example (127a). Sentence (127a) denotes a post-state reading as discussed above. This 
reading can be semantically recaptured using (128) as shown in (129): 
 
 
 
247 
 
 E=Event, EAT=Evidence Acquisition Time and PS=Post-State 
   
(129) PP (maktubeh ‘write(pp)’)      
 
               E____________[__________EAT___________] 
              (Anterior)                    (PS: Letter is written)                
                                          [………........…x……………..]     
 
 
 As (129) shows, the post-state reading i.e. anterior relation denoted by the PP triggers 
indirect evidence: the speaker represented by (x) mark does not perceive the event which is in an 
anterior relation to EAT; rather, the speaker perceives only the PS of this event which is included 
in the EAT. This analysis explains why PPs are felicitous in contexts where seeing the event is 
negated as in (130).  
(130) ‘ana sheft  er-resaleh maktuubeh, bs   maa  sheftha lama  enkatabat. 
I       saw   the-letter  write-PP,     but  not   see-it    when  written 
‘I saw the letter written, but I did not see it when it was written.’ 
 
        
 The same fact also holds for the futurate reading i.e. posterior relation. The speaker only 
perceives the accessible evidence available at EAT which s/he uses as its base for his inference 
about the posterior event i.e. futurate reading. The only difference is that with the futurate 
reading, the speaker does not perceive the event since the event is in a posterior rather than 
anterior relation to the EAT.     
 To recap, the aforementioned discussion provides support to the argument that similar to 
DAs, PPs also trigger indirect evidence: PPs are felicitous only in the contexts where the event is 
not perceived by the speaker; also the indirect evidence is specified temporally i.e. the event is in 
an anterior or posterior relation to EAT.  
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4.5.3 Passive Participles as an Inferential Indirect Evidential 
 I argue that PPs denote a speaker’s attitude towards the proposition s/he expresses i.e. an 
inferential or epistemic modal reading. The fact that PPs exhibit an inferential reading gives 
further support to the argument that they are indirect evidential since inferential reading is a core 
feature of indirect evidentiality as shown earlier. I briefly apply the same arguments for DAs to 
account for the PPs’ inferential reading. 
 
4.5.3.1 Result-State vs Consequent-State Inferential Readings 
 PPs in JA encode result-state (RSI) and consequent-state (CSI) inferential readings 
similar to DAs. In the following context the speaker at the EAT perceives ‘a car that is parked’, 
let us call this accessible evidence S stands for ‘state’. This S can be a RS or CS depending on 
whether the speaker’s inference is made about the entailing or the non-entailing event: the 
entailing event of this S at EAT is ‘parking the car’ and the non-entailing event could be any 
event other than the entailing event such as Majdi is home (See section 4.4.3.4). If the speaker 
wants to use this S (car is parked) to make inference about the entailing event ‘parking the car’ 
(i.e. there is mutual entailment between the event and state) then the speaker can only target the 
event arguments (ERs: the doer of the action (subject), the patient or theme (object), the manner 
of the action (adverb) etc..) by his inference and not the entailing event itself. Consider sentence 
(131). 
(131) es-sayarah  maSfufah 3uuja. 
The-car       park-PP   crooked        
‘Evidently, the car is parked car crooked.’ 
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 Sentence (131) is uttered by the speaker when he perceived the S (car is parked) at the 
EAT. The fact that the inference in this sentence targets only the ERs: the manner in which the 
car is parked (adverb 3uuja ‘crooked’) clearly suggests that the speaker wants to make inference 
about the entailing event of S that is the event of ‘parking the car’; then according to lexical entry 
in (57a) (See section 4.4.3.4), the speaker can only target the ERs: the manner in which the car is 
parked (adverb 3uuja ‘crooked’) in his inference and not the entailing event (parking the 
car).This logic is supported by the fact that only when the inference targets ERs (the manner in 
which the car is parked, 3uuja ‘crooked’), the sentence in (131) can be acceptable under the 
actuality entailment test as in (132a). The acceptability of (132a) contrasts with the passive 
perfective sentence (132b) where the sentence is anomalous under the actuality entailment test 
suggesting that the proposition holds in real world. When the speaker’s inference targets the 
entailing event ‘parking the car’ the sentence becomes anomalous (132c): the mutual entailment 
between the S (car is parked) and the entailing event ‘parking the car’ blocks inference from 
targeting the entailing event ‘parking the car; this is evident by the unacceptability of (132c) 
under the actuality entailment test where the entailing event of parking is targeted by the 
inference. The target of the inference is bold-faced in each sentence. 
(132)  
(a) es-sayarah  maSfufah 3uuja,     bs   hee mumkin enSafat        
The-car       park-PP   crooked ,but it     maybe    park-PERF-PASSIVE   
mustaqeemeh (lama  enSafat). 
straight           (when park-PERF-PASSIVE)   
‘Evidently, the car is parked crooked, but it might have been parked straight.’ 
Intended: [I infer that] the car has been parked crooked. 
 
(b) es-sayarah  ‘nSafat                           3uuja,#     bs  hee mumkin       
The-car       park-PERF-PASSIVE  crooked,# but it     maybe     
enSafat                           mustaqeemeh. 
 park-PERF-PASSIVE  straight            
‘The car has been parked crooked, but it might have been parked straight.’ 
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(c) es-sayarah maSfuufah ,# bs   es-sayarah mish maSfoofah (ma enSafat). 
the-car      park-PP, #      but  the-car     not    parked-PP (not park-PERF-PASSIVE) 
‘Evidently, the car is parked, but the car has not been parked.’ 
 
 
 Furthermore, JA speakers intuit that PPs are more acceptable than the passive perfective 
form of the verb in the context where the speaker makes inference based on a consequent state 
i.e. CSI reading. In the following context (133), the speaker makes an inference based on the 
available evidence at EAT; this evidence is regarded as a CS since the speaker uses this evidence 
to make an inference about a non-entailing event. Consider the following context. 
 
(133) Context: Adam and Sami go to visit Majdi. When they reach the house, they  
                found that the door is open and all the stuff inside the house had been  
               scattered  everywhere and the place looks messy; then Adam says: 
 
(a) ‘edaar          masruuga! 
The-house  rob-PP 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] the house has been robbed.’  
 
(b) ??  ‘edaar     ‘ensaragat! 
The-house    rob-PERF-PASSIVE 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] the house has been robbed.’  
 
   
In the above context, the speaker makes an inference based on the available evidence: the 
speaker perceives the evidence (i.e. a CS) at EAT and makes an inference about a non-entailing 
event. The speaker infers that Majdi’s house has been robbed based on the evidence that his stuff 
is scattered everywhere and the door was open. Note here that the fact that Majdi’s stuff is 
scattered everywhere and the door was open is not necessarily entailed by a robbing event. To be 
more specific, it is possible that before Adam and Sami came to visit Majdi, he might have 
scattered his stuff because he was cleaning the house and he forgot the door was open when he 
left home. That is, there is a lack of entailment between the event (robbing), which is the target 
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of inference here, and the state (scattered stuff and open door) at EAT. This interpretation 
captures the CSI inferential reading of PPs. In sum, the aforementioned discussion suggests that 
PPs pattern with DAs in giving inferential readings, RSI and CSI readings.  
 
4.5.4 Mirative Interpretation and First Person Effect 
 PPs show indirect evidential semantics since they encode mirative interpretations; they 
are also sensitive to first person as discussed below. 
 In the following contexts, the speaker discovers something unexpected or surprising (i.e. 
mirative reading); only PPs are appropriate in these contexts (134a and135a) and not passive 
perfective (134b and 135b). 
 
(134)  
(a) Talliet         3a  Haali   wella            zraar     el-gameeS mafkookah. 
look-PERF on myself surprisingly  buttons the-shirt     unbutton-PP 
‘I looked at myself and surprisingly I found that my shirt is unbuttoned!’ 
 
(b) #/?? Talliet  3a  Haali  wella            zraar     el-gameeS ‘enfakat. 
look-PERF on myself surprisingly buttons  the-shirt     unbutton-PERF-PASSIVE 
‘I looked at myself and surprisingly I found that my shirt is unbuttoned!’ 
 
(135)  
(a) SaHeit         eS-SubeH,     lageet         el-ghaTa     marmi      ba3eed 3ann-i! 
wake-PERF the-morning, find-PERF the-blanket  throw-PP far       from-me 
‘I woke up in the morning and (surprisingly) had found that the blanket had been 
thrown away from me!’ 
 
(b) #/??  SaHeit   eS-SubeH,   lageet         el-ghaTa     ‘ertama                  ba3eed  
wake-PERF the-morning, find-PERF the-blanket  throw-PERF-PASSIVE far 
3an-ni ! 
from-me 
‘I woke up in the morning and (surprisingly) had found that the blanket had been 
thrown away from me!’     
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The mirative interpretation of PPs can also be found in the contexts where ‘mirative 
particles’ are used. JA employs the particle ‘atharii ‘surprisingly’ to serve this purpose. This 
particle triggers a ‘deferred realization’ reading: the information of a certain situation is obtained 
and realized by speaker post-factum i.e. after the event had occurred as discussed earlier. PPs are 
appropriate in these contexts (136a) unlike passive perfective (136b). 
          (136) 
                (a)  Taleet           3ala es-shubaak ‘athareetuh        maksuur! 
                       Look-PERF  to    the-window surprisingly-it  break-PP 
                      ‘I looked at the window and surprisingly found that it was broken!’  
 
               (b)#/? Taleet           3ala es-shubaak ‘athareetuh        ‘enkasarr! 
                          Look-PERF  to    the-window surprisingly-it  break-PERF-PASSIVE 
                         ‘I looked at the window and surprisingly found that it was broken!’  
 
 
  Similar to indirect evidentials, PPs are also sensitive to the first person. In first person 
contexts i.e. when the speaker himself has experienced the action, JA speakers usually do not use 
PPs; rather the passive perfective form of the verb is used. On the other hand, in third person 
contexts, PPs are allowed. For example, JA speakers intuit that (137a) with a PP is unacceptable 
if the speaker is talking about himself i.e. the first person is at issue as in (137b); the use of 
passive perfective (138) is more acceptable in this regard. However, JA speakers agree that 
sentence (137a) with a PP is acceptable when the speaker is not talking about himself; rather he 
is talking about someone else i.e. a third person is at issue as in (137c).  
(137)  
(a) lama   maDroob w     maHTooT fee es-sijin, Haka/Hakeit ma3 el-muHaami. 
When hit-PP      and   put-PP       in  jail        call-PERF.1SG  with the-lawyer  
‘When(I/he) was hit and jailed, I/he called the lawyer.’  
 
(b) #?? lama  maDroob     w     maHTooT    fee es-sijin, Hakeit                ma3  el-muHaami. 
When       hit-PP.1SG  and  put-PP.1SG  in  jail,        call-PERF.1SG  with the-lawyer 
‘When I was hit and jailed, I called the lawyer.’ 
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(c) lama maDroob       w      maHTooT    fee es-sijin, Haka                  ma3  el-muHaami. 
When hit-PP.3SG  and  put-PP.3SG  in  jail,        call-PERF.3SG  with  the-lawyer 
‘When he was hit and jailed, he called the lawyer.’  
 
 
(138) lama   nDarabit      w     nHaTeit        fee es-sijin,  Hakeit                ma3  el-muHaami. 
When hit-PP.1SG  and  put-PP.1SG  in   jail,        call-PERF.1SG  with  the-lawyer 
‘When I was hit and jailed, I called the lawyer.’ 
 
  To recap, PPs express mirative readings and are sensitive to the first person. This gives 
further support to their indirect evidential interpretation similar to DAs.  
 
 4.6 Evidentiality in Semitology 
As I discussed in chapter 2, evidentiality is a new topic in Semitology. The reason behind 
this fact is a long held belief that a separate category of evidentiality does not exist in Semitic 
languages. The current work is the first attempt to account for evidentiality not only in Arabic 
but in the entire family of Semitic languages. 
For example, Isaksson (2000) claims that Semitic languages, especially Hebrew and 
Arabic, do not exhibit a grammatical category of evidentiality. Contra to Isaksson (2000), I have 
shown that participle morphology, exemplified by active and passive participles, is the hallmark 
of the evidential category in JA, a Semitic language. The fact that there exists a separate 
morphological paradigm for participles that distinguishes it from other predicates such perfective 
and imperfective predicates and that this morphological structure exhibits evidential semantics in 
both participle constructions (DAs and PPs) supports my claim regarding the existence of the 
evidential category in at least one Semitic language, JA (See chapter 2 section for further 
details). 
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4.7 Evidentiality and Temporal Relations 
In this section, I explore one of the least studied areas of the semantics of evidentiality 
that is the interaction of evidentiality and tense. While the study of temporality per se is outside 
the scope of this dissertation, the motivation for a temporal analysis of the evidential DAs stems 
from the fact that the type of evidence induced by DAs is specified temporally. As discussed 
earlier, the indirect evidence of DAs is specified by two types of temporal relations: anterior and 
posterior temporal relations (see section 4.4.2.2 for further details). In this section, I briefly 
discuss the application of the evidential account to temporal relations in JA. I also use the 
implications of the interaction of the temporal relation and evidentiality to address the temporal 
problem of DAs discussed in chapter 2. 
 
4.7.1 Evidential Relative Tense 
In the spirit of Lee (2011) and Smirnova (2012), I argue that evidential DAs encode a 
relative tense in their semantics. The motivation for this claim comes from the fact that the 
temporal interpretation of evidential DAs exhibits a pattern that is similar to embedded 
constructions. Relative tense (also known as anaphoric tense Partee 1984) covers the notion that 
the reference time is located with respect to some other relevant time contextually given and not 
with respect to the time of utterance (henceforth TU) as in absolute tenses (Comrie 1985, Partee 
1984, Klein 1994 and others). In English, for instance, non-finite verbs bear a relative tense as 
exemplified in the use of participles in this sentence (Comrie 1985:57). 
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(139) Passengers awaiting flight 26 proceeded to departure gate 5. 
 
In (139), the time interval of the participle construction (awaiting) includes the time 
reference of the finite verb (proceeded). The tense of the matrix clause verb is past i.e. as a finite 
verb it receives an absolute tense marking. The time reference of the non-finite participle 
therefore receives a relative tense i.e. it receives a past tense interpretation depending on the time 
reference of the main verb ‘proceeded’. Similarly, in JA, the tense of the embedded constructions 
such as the complements of attitude or reporting verbs are relative in nature in that their temporal 
interpretation is dependent on the tense of the main verb and not on the TU (Ogihara 1996 and 
Abusch 1997) as shown in (140).  
(140) [majdi  gaal ennuh][ sami raH yjii    embareH/bukrah]. 
[Majdi said  that]    [Sami will arrive yesterday/tomorrow] 
‘[Majdi said that] [Sami would arrive yesterday/tomorrow.]’ 
 
The embedded future form raH yjii ‘would come’ in (140) is interpreted with respect to 
the time of the reporting verb gaal ‘said’ which is located prior to the TU (i.e. past tense). Hence, 
the reference time of the embedded future form can follow or precede the TU: if it follows the 
TU, then it is deictically specified; however, if it precedes the TU, then it is relatively specified 
i.e. relative to the past tense of the main verb gaal ‘said’. That is to say, if we assume that the 
embedded future form is absolute (interpreted with respect to the TU), then we would incorrectly 
predict that the reference time of the future form should only be located in the future (posterior to 
the TU) and that the relative tense reading where the reference time of the future form is located 
posterior to the reference time of the main verb is false. Yet, this is not the case in (140), because 
both readings are acceptable, the absolute and the relative posterior readings. 
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I propose that evidential DAs exhibit the same pattern of temporal reference as the 
embedded verb in (140) above. My contention is that evidential DAs locate the reference time of 
an event (henceforth T) not with respect to the TU but with respect to the time at which the 
speaker acquires the relevant evidence of the evidential assertion i.e. the evidence acquisition 
time (EAT, Lee 2011). The reference time of the described eventuality (T) is located anterior or 
posterior to the EAT (as discussed in section 4.4.2.2). The temporal location of the EAT is then 
specified contextually or by the use of temporal adverbials. The relative tense analysis is 
motivated by data such as sentence (58), repeated here as (141).    
(141) majdi     Saaf         es-sayarah. 
Majdi     park-DA  the-car        
‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
Intended: [I infer that] Majdi is the one who parked the car. 
Intended: [I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car. 
 
In (141), the speaker acquires the evidence (in this case car parked) at the EAT. Let us 
assume that the EAT is temporally specified at the TU (now). The speaker uses the evidence at 
the EAT, which coincides with the TU, to make an inference about an anterior event as evident 
by the post-state interpretation of the DAs in (141) as shown in (142) below.  
 
      T= reference time of the described eventuality, EAT=Evidence Acquisition Time and   
       PS=Post-State (evidence), x = Speaker  
   
(142) DA (Saaf ‘park(DA)’)      
 
               T____________[__________EAT(now)___________] 
         (Anterior)                            (PS: car is parked (now))                
                                          [………........……x…………..……..]     
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As (142) demonstrates, the speaker uses the evidence (the parked car) at the EAT, which 
coincides with TU (now), to make inferences about the subject (Majdi) and the theme of the 
event ‘parking the car’ which is located anterior to the EAT. It is crucial to our analysis here that 
the anterior temporal relation locates T with respect to the EAT and not to the TU. The evidential 
relative tense of sentence (141) is exemplified in (143). 
(143)  
(a) Intended: ‘[I infer that]  [it is Majdi who parked the car] 
                  [….EAT…]  [……………T………………] 
                  […..TU…..]  [………….Anterior………...] 
 
(b) Intended: ‘[I infer that]  [what Majdi parked is the car]                                                   
                  [….EAT…]  [……………T………………] 
                  […..TU….]  [………….Anterior…………] 
 
 
In (143), the speaker makes his inference based on the evidence at the EAT which 
coincides with TU (now). The inference targets the subject (Majdi) and the object (the car) of the 
anterior event which is represented by T which is in turn located with respect to the EAT and not 
the TU. This relative tense schematic representation patterns with the relative tense interpretation 
of sentence (140) above: T in (143) corresponds to the embedded future form raH yjii ‘would 
come’ in (140); the EAT (the time at which the speaker makes his inference based on the 
available evidence) in (143) corresponds to the reference time of the main verb gaal ‘said’ in 
(140). The future form raH yjii ‘would come’ is located posterior to the reference time of the 
main verb gaal ‘said’ not the TU as shown above. Similarly, T is located anterior to the EAT and 
not the TU. This relative temporal relation is recaptured in (144) below. 
(144) EAT ⊆ TU, T ˂ EAT 
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The same fact also holds when the same sentence (141) is used with a past adverbial such as 
embareH ‘yesterday’ as in (145). 
(145) embareH,  lageet                   majdi   Saaf         es-sayarah. 
Yesterday, find-PERF.1SG   Majdi  park-DA  the-car             
‘Yesterday, it was evident that Majdi had parked the car.’ 
 
(a) Intended: ‘[I inferred that]   it was Majdi who had parked the car.’ 
                       [….EAT……]    […………………T………….……] 
                       [..Prior to TU..]  [……………Anterior.……..……...] 
 
(b) Intended: ‘[I inferred that] what Majdi had parked was the car.  
                       [….EAT……]    […………………T………….……] 
                       [..Prior to TU..]  [……………Anterior.……..……...] 
 
  
 The only difference here is that the EAT is prior to the TU and T is anterior to the EAT as 
shown in (146). 
(146) EAT ˂ TU, T ˂ EAT 
 
The relative tense analysis also applies to DAs with a CSI (consequent-state inferential reading) 
in sentence (60a), repeated here as (147). 
(147) majdi jaai. 
Majdi come-DA 
‘Evidently, Majdi has come.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] Majdi has come.’ 
 
 
In (147), the speaker acquires the evidence (in this case car parked) at EAT. Let us 
assume that the EAT is temporally specified at the TU (Note here that the EAT could also be 
temporally located prior to the TU, that is, if we assume the speaker made the inference in (147) 
yesterday when he wanted to visit Majdi and saw his car parked in front of the house). The 
speaker uses the evidence at the EAT, which coincides with the TU, to make inference about an 
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anterior event as evident by the post-state interpretation of DAs in (147) as shown in (148) 
below.  
          
       T= reference time of the described eventuality, EAT=Evidence Acquisition Time,   
       PS=Post-State (evidence), X = Speaker  
   
(148) DA (jaai ‘come(DA)’)      
 
               T____________[__________EAT(now)___________] 
           (Anterior)                        (PS: car is parked (now))                
                                          [………........……X…………..……..]      
 
 
As (148) demonstrates, the speaker uses the evidence (car parked) at the EAT, which coincides 
with the TU (now), to make inference about an event (in this case ‘coming’) located anterior to 
the EAT. The evidential relative tense of this sentence is illustrated in (149). 
(149) Intended: ‘[I infer that]  [Majdi has come] 
                             [….EAT…]  [………T………] 
                             […..TU…..]  [….Anterior…...]                      
            
 
This relative temporal relation is recaptured in (150) below. 
 
(150) EAT ⊆ TU, T ˂ EAT 
 
The above discussion so far clearly shows that the temporal interpretation of evidential 
DAs is relatively asserted: T is located with respect with the EAT and not the TU. The use of the 
EAT in this regard, corresponds to the attitude holder’s now (cf. Von Stechow 1995, Ogihara 
1996, Giannakidou 1998 Smirnova 2012 and others).
9
 In the spirit of Smirnova (2012), I assume, 
therefore, that evidential sentences with DAs have two evaluation times or anchoring points, the 
                                                          
9 See Ogihara (1996) for an analysis of propositional attitude predicates and the attitude holder’s now.    
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first evaluation time covers the proposition in the scope of the evidential operator, the EAT, and 
the second one concerns the time of the entire predicate, the TU. 
 
 4.7.1.1 The Temporal Framework of Evidential Relative Tense 
I assume an intentional temporal framework in which tense maps properties of 
eventualities and time to propositions and then establishes these properties in time as proposed 
by Condoravdi (2002). In her temporal analysis of modals, Condoravdi (2002) argues that the 
temporal reading of modals can be best captured by the AT-relation. The AT-relation comprises 
four sentence radicals P the property of eventuality, t an interval or reference time of eventuality 
and w the world at which the eventuality holds and e the event
10
. In other words, according to the 
AT-relation in (151) the property of eventuality P of e is established in a reference time t at a 
certain world w. According to Condoravdi (2002:70) “the temporal relation for locating the 
eventualities with respect to the reference time is dependent on the eventualities properties in 
question (cf. Dowty 1986, Kamp and Rohrer 1983, Partee 1984, Klein 1994, and others)”. The 
AT-relation I adopt is specified in the lexical entry (151). 
 
(151) AT(t,w,P):   
(a) Eventive = ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ t]                 
(b) Stative = ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w)° t]          (Condoravdi 2002:70) 
                                                          
10
 A sentence radical is the denotation of a sentence before applying the temporal, aspectual or any other   
  operator specification to it (Stump 1985, Kaufmann 2005 and others). Therefore, the sentence radicals  
  for a sentence like ‘Sarah write letter’ are of the type <w,<e, <t>: 
 
  - Sarah write letter: λw λt λe [write.letter (w) (e) (t) (s)]. 
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I use this notation to derive semantic presentations of evidential relative tense with three 
other variables EAT, TU and T; therefore I propose the following semantic representations to 
account for the relative temporal readings of DAs: 
 
(152) Anterior Temporal Relation: 
(a) EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
(b) EAT ˂ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
(c) TU ˂ EAT & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
 
 
(153) Posterior Temporal Relation: 
(a) EAT ⊆ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
(b) EAT ˂ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
(c) TU ˂ EAT & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
 
The semantic entries in (152 and 153) present the relative tense with the anterior and 
posterior temporal relations specified by DAs. These two temporal relations specify the indirect 
evidence requirement that is essential to the indirect evidential reading of DAs.  I also argue that 
the above notations have the predicative force to account for the two inferential readings of 
evidential DAs: result-state inferential RSI and consequent-state inferential CSI as will be shown 
in the next sub-section. The semantic entry in (152) represents the relative tense with the anterior 
temporal relation (post-state reading) of DAs where T is anterior to EAT (T ˂ EAT). The AT-
relation indicates that the event is instantiated in w and in T (the reference time of the described 
eventuality) as shown in: AT [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T]. The last component of this semantic entry 
comprises the relation between the EAT and the TU. The relation in (a) constitutes the present 
tense EAT ⊆ TU, (b) past tense EAT ˂ TU, and (c) future tense TU ˂ EAT. The same fact holds 
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for (153); the only difference is that the relation between the EAT and T is of a posterior nature 
which characterizes the second temporal reading given by DAs, the futurate reading. 
 
4.7.1.2 Semantic Derivation 
The above semantic presentations can recapture the relative temporal interpretation of 
sentences such as (141), (145) and (147) above. The meanings of these sentences are derived by 
the following semantic representations given in (154 and 155) respectively. 
(154) ∃e [EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT [Park (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T] 
 
(155) ∃e [EAT ˂ TU & T ˂ EAT &  AT [Park (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T] 
 
Sentences (141), (145) and (147) characterize an anterior temporal relation where the 
speaker makes an inference about an anterior event. However, sentences (141) and (145) express 
result-based inferential readings RSI, while (147) expresses a consequent-state inferential 
reading CSI. The semantic representation (154) can derive a semantic representation for the 
relative temporal readings of sentences (141) and (147) as follows: the EAT (where the speaker 
uses the evidence for his inference) coincides with the TU; the speaker uses the evidence at the 
EAT to make inference about an event i.e. ‘park in (141) and ‘come’ in (147) which are located 
anterior to the EAT and these events (e) are instantiated at w and T. The same logic extends to 
sentence (145) as shown in (155). The only difference is that in (155) the EAT is located prior to 
the TU; therefore sentence (145) indicates past (T<EAT) of past (EAT<TU). 
Likewise, sentences with DAs that express a posterior temporal relation as in (156a) can 
be semantically derived by the semantic representation given in (153) above as shown in (156b). 
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(156)  
(a) majdi  jaai           bukrah.  
Majdi come-DA tomorrow 
‘[I infer that] Majdi is coming tomorrow.’ 
 
(b) ∃e [ EAT ⊆ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT [Come(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T] 
 
Sentence (156a) expresses a posterior relation under CSI inferential reading. The 
semantic presentation in (156b) reads as: the speaker acquires the evidence at EAT which 
coincides with TU; the speaker uses the evidence at EAT to make inference about an event (i.e. 
come) located as posterior to EAT.   
As discussed so far, the semantic representations given under (152 1nd 153) can account 
for the relative temporal interpretations of evidential DAs sentences with both anterior and 
posterior relations and under RSI and CSI readings as shown above. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that the semantic representations of relative tense of evidential DAs is only 
semantically felicitous when the EAT is either at the TU as shown in (152a and153a) or prior to 
the EAT (152b and 153b), but not when the EAT is posterior to the TU (152c and 153c). In other 
words, the posterior temporal relation between the EAT and the TU (TU<EAT) pertains to 
contexts where the speaker makes inference about an anterior or posterior event based on the 
assumption that he will acquire the relevant evidence in the future. That is to say, evidential DAs 
are not allowed in the context where the speaker makes the evidential implication first then 
acquires the evidence as shown in (157). This temporal configuration is semantically possible but 
pragmatically inapplicable. 
(157) ??/#  ‘ana bukrah       raH aguul ennuh majdi   jaai. 
         I      tomorrow  will say     that     Majdi  come-DA 
         ‘[Tomorrow, I will infer that] Majdi is coming.’ 
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This sentence shows that in order to express an indirect evidential reading using DAs in JA, the 
speaker is supposed to have acquired the evidence first in order for him to express the evidential 
reading and not otherwise. 
To conclude, DAs assert a relative temporal reading where the reference time of  the 
described eventuality is located with respect to another relevant time i.e. the EAT and not the 
TU. It is assumed, therefore, that evidential sentences with DAs have two evaluation times or 
anchoring points, the first evaluation time covers the proposition in the scope of the evidential 
operator i.e. the EAT, the second one concerns the time of the entire predicate, the TU. 
Furthermore, and based on this, evidential sentences with DAs have two reference times, the 
EAT and T. This notion contributes to the discussion in the next section. 
 
4.7.2 Remarks on the Temporal Problem of DAs 
Most of the previous approaches that discussed DAs have focused on the temporal 
interpretation of DAs and more specifically the temporal problem of DAs (See chapter 2 for 
further details). The temporal problem of DAs is concerned with the fact that unlike all other 
verbless sentences, those with DAs have varied temporal readings in that they license temporal 
adverbials that belong to different time specifications without the need of an overt copular verbs 
(Kinberg 1992, Mughazy 2004 among others). For example, sentence (158) licenses the present 
temporal adverbial hassa ‘now’, while those in (159) and (160) license the past adverbial 
embareH ‘yesterday’ and the future adverbial bukra ‘tomorrow’ respectively without the need of 
an overt copular verb to license past and future adverbials, kaan ‘was/were’ and ykoon ‘to be’ 
respectively as it is always the case with verbless sentences. 
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(158) sami hassa mraweH. 
Sami now come-home-DA 
‘Sami has come back home now.’ 
 
(159) majdi kaatib       er-resaleh embareH. 
Majdi write-DA the-letter  yesterday 
‘Majdi had written the letter yesterday.’ 
 
(160) sarah  msaafrih   bukrah. 
Sarah travel-DA tomorrow 
‘Sarah is travelling tomorrow.’  
 
 
The most appealing approach to account for this temporal problem is the sub-atomic 
account (Kinberg 1992, Belazi 1993 and Mughazy 2004). In the sub-atomic analysis, DAs 
encode a present state (target state) that is bound by underlying retrospective or prospective 
events. These underlying events occur at the beginning or at the end of the target state which 
always holds indefinitely at speech time. When the state is bound at its beginning, the underlying 
event is viewed as retrospective and consequently license past temporal adverbials. On the other 
hand, if the target state is bound at its end, the underlying event is viewed as a prospective event 
and in turn licenses the future adverbials. The present adverbials are licensed by the state which 
always holds at present according to this analysis.  
In my temporal analysis of DAs I retained the use of anterior and posterior temporal 
relations similar to the sub-atomic analysis. However, my analysis differs in many regards. First, 
the sub-atomic analysis only addresses the issue of how DAs license these temporal adverbials. 
My analysis, on the other hands, discusses why DAs license the anterior and posterior temporal 
relations: DAs license these readings to establish the indirect evidence requirement that is 
essential to the indirect evidential meaning of DAs as discussed earlier. Second, the sub-atomic 
analysis assumes that the state receives a default present reading and that temporal adverbials 
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describe the underlying events i.e. past adverbs describe the retrospective event while the future 
adverbs describe the prospective event as shown in (161). 
                     
                          (E: Event, S: Speech time/Present) 
           
 
(161)    E…..………………..S………….....….…. E 
          (Retrospective)          (State)                  (Prospective)  
 
 
    
However, this analysis does not provide an explanation for sentences like (162) where the 
past adverbial embareH ‘yesterday’ describes a state ‘the state of the parked car’ rather than the 
event of parking which is described by another past adverbial, awal embareH  ‘the day before’ as 
evident under the cancellation test which negates the fact that the event took place at embareH 
‘yesterday’. 
(162) Majdi   Saaf         es-sayarah 3ala baab ed-daar  embareH,      bs   hwwa    
Majdi   park-DA  the-car         by the -house gate  yesterday   but  he   
Safha                                 awal embareH. 
park- PERF.3SG.MASC   the day before               
‘Majdi’s car was parked  at the house gate yesterday, but he parked it there the 
day before.’ 
 
In my temporal analysis, on the other hand, sentences with evidential DAs have two 
reference times: the EAT and T. Therefore, temporal adverbials could quantify over any one of 
them. This explains why in (162) the past adverbial embareH ‘yesterday’ quantifies over the 
state in EAT and not the event in T.  
In my temporal analysis, the present adverbials describe the EAT rather than anterior or 
posterior events included in T. This is due to the inclusion temporal relation specified by the 
present tense where reference time is included in the TU. According to the semantic presentation 
given in (152 and 153) earlier, only the EAT can license this inclusion temporal reading. This 
267 
 
explains why the adverb hasaa ‘now’ in (163) describes only the EAT (the time which includes 
the evidence or the state) and not the anterior event which is described by another non-present 
adverbial, embareH ‘yesterday’, as shown under the cancellation test (163). 
 
(163) el-maHal  faatiH      hassa, bs  sami  fataHuh           embareH. 
The-store  open-DA now,  but Sami open-PERF-it  yesterday 
‘The store is open now, but Sami opened it yesterday.’  
 
 
The future adverbials, on the other hand, do not describe the EAT but can only describe T 
which is in posterior relation to EAT. In other words, despite the fact that there are two posterior 
relations in (153), TU ˂ EAT and EAT ˂ T, future adverbials can only modify T and not EAT. 
This is because, as discussed earlier, in order to express an indirect evidential reading using DAs 
in JA, the speaker is supposed to have acquired the evidence first in order for him to express the 
evidential reading and not the otherwise. Therefore, when the adverbial bukrah ‘tomorrow’ is 
used, the future adverbial modifies T and the EAT is better accounted for as coinciding with the 
TU in order to give the appropriate futurate inferential reading. As for the past adverbial 
embareH ‘yesterday’ it can describe the EAT as shown in example (162) above and T as well 
(i.e. licenses the anterior event). In other words, under the current temporal analysis past 
adverbials bear an ambiguity between specifying the EAT which includes the evidence (state) or 
T which includes the event. This is because according to the temporal relations under (152) there 
are two anterior relations: EAT ˂ TU and T ˂ EAT; therefore and due to the absence of any 
restrictions (as is the case of future adverbials where they can only modify T and not the EAT as 
discussed above) past adverbials can modify both, T and EAT. When embareH ‘yesterday’ 
licenses T, the EAT coincides with the TU. This reading violates what has been referred to in the 
literature as the ‘present perfect puzzle’ i.e. contrary to past tense sentences, present perfect 
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sentences do not allow modification with past adverbials (cf. Klein 1992). I will discuss this 
issue in more detail in chapter six. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have proposed an indirect evidential account for the semantics of DAs in 
JA. DAs correspond to the three basic features of indirect evidentiality: (a) Speaker-Dependency: 
it shows a speaker-oriented meaning, (b) type of evidence: indirect evidence (i.e. speaker did not 
witness the event; rather s/he was told about it or inferred it) and (c) speaker’s attitude towards 
the proposition (epistemic modal component): information is not attested to the speaker since 
s/he did not witness the event.  
 DAs show a distinct behavior under a habitual reading in that DAs show an evidential 
reading i.e. a habitual reading from a speaker’s perspective. The evidence comes from the fact 
that the habitual interpretation with DAs is anchored to the speaker rather than to the subject as 
in the imperfective as evident from the entailment test. Under the actuality entailment test, the 
habitual reading with DAs is anchored to the speaker and is true only in the SBW rather than the 
real world.  The contrast between the imperfective and DAs also appears in their sensitivity with 
regard to verifying instances. The imperfective usually does not require a verifying instance 
where the imperfective is acceptable even when the ‘event’ has not taken place. However, 
sentences with DAs are acceptable only when the ‘event’ is verified. Another major argument in 
support of the evidential speaker-oriented reading of DAs comes from the distinction between 
subjective and objective evidence. When objective evidence (that is known to a group of people) 
is asserted such as describing a universal fact, only the imperfective is allowed; whereas the only 
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situation in which a sentence with a DA is allowed is when subjective evidence is at issue: when 
the speaker himself has found or discovered the situation. 
 DAs have an indirect evidence requirement similar to indirect evidentials i.e. the speaker 
did not perceive the event. One piece of evidence comes from the fact that DAs are acceptable 
under a cancelation test that negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker. However, 
perfective sentences are infelicitous in these contexts. Another piece of evidence comes from the 
fact that DAs are not acceptable in the contexts where the speaker perceives the event directly. 
However, the imperfective and the perfectives are acceptable when the speaker perceives the 
event. I have also shown that evidential DAs in JA introduce a temporal contribution to the 
indirect evidence requirement: the indirect evidence is specified temporally rather than 
morphologically. In this regard, JA differs from other evidential languages where direct and 
indirect evidence is specified by separate morphemes. The indirect evidence induced by DAs is a 
result of two temporal relations:  the event is anterior to the EAT or posterior to it. The former 
corresponds to a post state reading and the latter corresponds to a futurate reading. 
As an indirect evidential, DAs trigger inferential readings: RSI and CSI inferential 
readings. In the former, there is entailment between the state (i.e. the evidence at EAT) and the 
event; therefore speaker can only target ERs in his inference and the inference about the event 
itself is blocked. In the latter however, the lack of entailment allows the inference to target the 
event. By this meaning, DAs differ from other inferential evidential systems where only a CSI 
reading is triggered; no RSI reading has been attested in these systems. The inferential reading of 
DAs stems from an epistemic modal component since DAs pattern with modals and 
propositional attitude predicates in many regards. The inferential reading is further supported by 
the fact that DAs have an irrealis reading under the actuality entailment test. 
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Furthermore, DAs pattern with inferential evidential predicates (evidential propers) such 
as shakluh ‘it looks like’ in that both forms show the core feature of indirect evidentiality: a 
speaker-oriented reading, indirect evidence and inferential interpretation. This analogous 
behavior is further evidence for the current indirect evidential analysis of DAs. 
DAs show a mirative reading and sensitivity to first person. These are one of the notable 
semantic extensions of indirect evidentiality cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald 2004). Contra to 
perfectives and imperfectives, only DAs are felicitous in the contexts where a mirative 
interpretation is expressed; also only DAs show sensitivity to first person. In addition, DAs are 
used as reported evidentials. Reported evidentials are one of the major types of indirect 
evidentiality. Reported evidentials cover the type of information acquired through hearsay or 
someone else’s report. In the contexts where the speaker acquires his knowledge through hearsay 
or someone else’s report, JA usually employs DAs to serve this purpose. JA speakers use 
perfectives sometimes to encode hearsay reports similar to DAs as well. When this happens, JA 
makes explicit reference to the speaker’s attitude towards the information s/he obtains through 
hearsay: with DAs, the speaker does not vouch for the information he was told about; the speaker 
distances himself from being responsible for the truth of the reported assertion. This modal 
reading is expected in the case of DAs since DAs induce indirect evidence where the speaker 
does not witness the event at issue. With perfectives, on the other hand, the speaker vouches for 
the truth of his assertion as he might have hard evidence based on which he is certain that the 
event at issue took place.  
I extended my indirect evidential proposal to account for the semantics of passive 
participles (PPs) in JA. I showed that PPs are indirect evidentials since they pattern with DAs in 
almost all the indirect evidential arguments. Based on this fact, I concluded that participle 
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constructions ‘active and passive participles’ are the hallmark of evidentiality in JA. This 
conclusion has its own significance not only in the literature on Arabic but for the literature of 
Semitology as well. This is due to the fact that evidentiality is a totally new topic in Semitology. 
The reason behind this fact is a long held belief that evidentiality as a separate category does not 
actually exist in Semitic languages. Contra to this belief, I have shown that participle 
morphology, exemplified by active and passive participles, is the hallmark of the evidential 
category in JA, which is a Semitic language. The fact that there exists a separate morphological 
paradigm of participles that distinguishes them from other predicates and that this morphological 
structure exhibits evidential semantics in two participle constructions, active and passive 
participles, supports my claim regarding the existence of an evidential category in JA and 
consequently in Semitology. 
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Chapter Five  
Indirect Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a compositional analysis of evidential DAs where DAs are 
analyzed as quantifiers over possible worlds, adopting Kratzer’s possible world theory (1981, 
1991). The analysis provides a unified account where the evidential, modal and temporal 
components are incorporated into the semantic denotation of DAs.  The central argument of the 
analysis is that the propositions in the scope of evidential DAs are evaluated with regard to 
multiple sets of accessible/possible worlds (i.e. speaker’s belief worlds SBW). I base my possible 
world analysis on empirical findings of some modal reading diagnostics including formal 
diagnostics of level of meaning (propositional vs illocutionary), modal subordination and 
counterfactual copular sentences.  
The significance of this chapter resides in the fact that it attempts to provide further 
typological support for the close overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality based on 
data from a Semitic language, JA. It also provides further support for the proposed evidential 
account for DAs in the previous chapter: the fact that DAs show a modal reading lends further 
support to the indirect/inferential reading of DAs. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2 I review previous approaches that 
discussed the interaction of evidentiality and epistemic modality. In section 5.3 I discuss the 
diagnostics of levels of meaning: truth-conditional vs non truth-conditional. Section 5.4 
examines whether DAs are propositional (modal) or illocutionary (non-modal) operators by 
applying the diagnostics discussed in section 5.3; it also includes the diagnostics of modal 
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subordination and counterfactual effect. In section 5.5 I lay out the theoretical framework of 
possible world semantics based on Kratzer’s (1981 and 1991). In section 5.6 I analyze evidential 
DAs as encoding a modal meaning based on the two conversational backgrounds, modal base 
and ordering source as discussed in section 5.5. I also propose a formal semantic analysis of the 
modal reading of DAs and then incorporate the temporal component into the proposed semantic 
formalization. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2 Interaction of Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality  
One of the intriguing questions in the literature of evidentiality is whether there is a 
relation between evidentiality and epistemic modality. In order to answer this question, three 
approaches have been proposed to account for this interaction.  
5.2.1 Previous Approaches 
The first approach claims that evidentiality and epistemic modality are two separate 
categories with no relation at all (de Haan 1999, Faller 2002, Aikhenvald 2004 among others). 
According to this approach, evidentiality can be expressed outside the epistemic modality 
system. Major support for this claim comes from languages where evidentials can co-occur with 
pure epistemic modals in the same clause. For example, in Western Tarahumara, the reportive 
evidential suffix -ra (1a) can be used with suffixes that indicate truth or doubt as in (1b), 
examples are described by Burgess (1984) cited in Faller (2002:84). 
 
(1)  
(a) alue  hu-ra. 
he     be-QUOT 
‘They say it is he.’ 
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(b) raha-ra-guru. 
burn-QUOT-TRUTH 
‘They say he burned it and it is probably true.’   
 
 
One of the proponents of this approach is de Haan (1999) who argues that there is no link 
between the two categories as illustrated in the following examples (de Haan 2001:208). 
 
(2)  
(a) John must be home. The light is on. 
 
(b) John is at home. The light is on. 
 
 
In (2a), the modal must is argued to be an evidential since it asserts a proposition based 
on available evidence i.e. based on the evidence (light is on) it is necessarily true that John is at 
home; therefore it is argued to be a typical evidential. However, in (2b), the same evidence is 
present (the light is on), yet no modal is used.  
The second approach claims that epistemic modals are evidentials (Westmoreland 1995, 
1998, Drubig 2001, Nuyts 2001, von Fintel and Gillies 2007). As discussed in Portner (2009), 
this view has a strong and weak version. The weak version states that epistemic modals implicate 
an evidential interpretation in their semantics; yet they are different from pure evidentials. The 
strong version, on the other hand, states that epistemic modals are pure evidentials. This 
approach bases its claims on three arguments. First, it has been argued that epistemic modals do 
not contribute to the truth condition of the assertion and therefore they are better subsumed under 
evidentials which are treated as illocutionary operators i.e. they do not contribute to the truth 
condition of the assertion.
11
 The second argument pertains to the scopal effect of epistemic 
                                                          
11
 This view has been challenged by Lyon (1977), Faller (2002), Papafragou (2006), Portner (2009) and   
    others. 
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modals. It has been argued that epistemic modals take wide scope over other truth-conditional 
operators including negation and tense and therefore they are best analyzed as evidentials which 
have the same pattern.
12
 In (3), for instance, the epistemic modal may scopes over the negation 
operator. 
(3)  John may not be at home.                     (Portner 2009:169)  
 
The final argument in favor of this approach is that epistemic modal interpretation is 
usually based on evidence which can be direct, indirect, and reportive. This is similar to typical 
evidentials in which the presence of evidence is an essential requirement to establish the 
evidential meaning. Given this fact, many authors argued that the English modal ‘must’ is an 
evidential based on the assumption that it requires indirect evidence in order for its assertion to 
be felicitous (Stone 1994 and Westmoreland 1995). Example (4) is illustrative. 
 
(4) It must be raining.  
 
In sentence (4), the assertion is acceptable only if the speaker infers that it is raining 
based on indirect evidence such as hearing the splash of water outside and not based on direct 
evidence where the speaker witnesses the event of raining. 
The third approach claims that there exists a relation between evidentiality and epistemic 
modality. Some proponents of this approach claim that evidentiality is subsumed under epistemic 
modality. Under this definition, there have been some attempts in the literature to extend the 
notion of evidentiality to cover all aspects related to epistemological assessment (Givon 1982, 
                                                          
12  See von Fintel and Gillies (2007) for counterarguments. 
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Bybee 1985, Chafe and Nichole 1986, Friedman 1986, Palmer 1986, Traugott 1989, Hopper and 
Traugott 1993, Bybee and Fleischman 1995 among others). For instance, Palmer (1986) views  
evidentiality as a major type of epistemic modality. Palmer (1986:51) describes the meaning of 
epistemic as “should apply not simply to modal systems that basically involve the notions of 
possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of commitment by 
the speaker to what he says.” This epistemic-based view thus clearly acknowledges that encoding 
the source of information (i.e. narrow sense of evidentiality) can also describe the degree of the 
speaker’s commitment towards what he says depending on the manner the speaker acquired this 
knowledge (Mushin 2001). A similar observation has been made by Givon (1982:24) who 
clearly describes evidentiality as “propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, are 
open to challenge by the hearer and thus acquire-or admit- evidentiary justification”.  Again, this 
definition subsumes evidentiality under the notion of epistemic modality (See chapter 4 section 
4.3.1 for further details). The other group of proponents of this approach argues that the two 
categories are distinct but they overlap (Izvorsk 1997, Dendale and Tasmowski 2001, 
Matthewson et al. 2007, McCready and Ogata 2007, Rullman et al. 2008 and others). In this 
dissertation, I support the line of arguments proposed in the last approach that evidentiality and 
epistemic modality are related.  
In the next sections, I provide arguments to support my claim that evidential DAs in JA 
show an epistemic modal reading.  
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5.3 Levels of Meaning: Truth-Conditional vs Non Truth-Conditional 
Since the seminal work of Searle (1969) and Searle and Vanderveken (1985), a 
distinction has been made between illocutionary (i.e. non truth-conditional) and propositional 
(truth-conditional) levels of meaning. Therefore, a linguistic structure can either contribute to the 
truth condition of the assertion and therefore belongs to the propositional level of meaning; or it 
does not contribute to the truth condition of the assertion and therefore belongs to the 
illocutionary level. The two levels of meaning stand in a hierarchical relation: illocutionary level 
operators always scope over propositional level operators. Given this fact, evidentials, as 
linguistic structures, have been examined in the literature as whether they contribute to the 
illocutionary or propositional level of meaning; the former corresponds to a non-modal analysis 
and the latter corresponds to a modal analysis (based on the fact that modals are propositional 
level operators i.e. they contribute to the truth condition of the proposition expressed, see Faller 
2002, Papafragou 2006 and others). For example, evidentials in Cusco Quechua as in Faller 
(2002), and Cheyenne as in Murray (2010) have been analyzed as illocutionary operators i.e. 
they do not contribute to the truth condition. Conversely, evidentials in languages such as 
St’át’imcets as in Matthewson et al. (2007), Japanese as in McCready and Ogata (2007), some 
evidentials in Gitsken as in Peterson (2010) and Korean as in Lee (2011) have been analyzed as 
epistemic modals i.e. propositional level operators since they contribute to the truth condition of 
the sentence.  
In order to determine the level of meaning an evidential operates at (i.e. whether an 
evidential contributes to the propositional content of the assertion as in epistemic modals or to 
the illocutionary level) some well-attested diagnostics have been proposed in the literature 
(Lyons 1977; Chierchia and McConnel-Ginet 1990; Papafragou 2000, 2006; Garret 2001; Faller 
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2002, 2003, 2007; Matthewson et al. 2007; Waldie et al. 2009; Simons et.al 2010, Lee 2011 
among others).  These tests have been classified into two parts as follows:  
 
     A. Truth Value Diagnostics: 
     (1) Known Truth Falsity 
     (2) Assent/Dissent 
     (3) Cancellability of type of evidence requirement 
 
    
 B. Scopal and Embeddability Diagnostics: 
 
     (1) Embeddability 
     (2) Scope in negative contexts 
     (3) Scope in interrogative contexts 
 
 
In order to determine whether evidential DAs in JA belong to the propositional level 
(modal analysis) or illocutionary level (non-modal analysis) operators, I adopt these attested 
diagnostics with some other related tests that I will discuss in sections 5.5 and 5.6. Before I 
proceed to the next section where I evaluate the applicability of these diagnostics to DAs, I will 
present the predications of each analysis i.e. propositional (modal) vs illocutionary (non-modal) 
analyses against the above mentioned diagnostics. This will help us understand how each of 
these analyses corresponds to each one of these diagnostics. These predictions are summarized in 
Table (1), adapted from Peterson (2010: 124). 
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Table (1): Propositional vs Illocutionary Analyses based on the Level of Meaning Diagnostics 
 
Diagnostic Yes No 
1. Felicitous if P is known to be  True or False Illocutionary Propositional 
2. Pass Assent-Dissent Test Propositional Illocutionary 
3. Evidence Type Cancellable ـــــــــــــ ـــــــــــــ 
4. Embeddable Propositional Illocutionary 
5. Scope Over Interrogatives Illocutionary Propositional 
6. Scope Over Negation ـــــــــــــ ـــــــــــــ 
 
It is worth mentioning that two of the above tests, Evidence Type Cancellable and Scope 
over negation cannot actually distinguish between the two analyses as will be discussed in 
section 5.4 since both the propositional and illocutionary analyses predicate the same patterns 
with regards to these tests (Faller 2006, Peterson 2010, Lee 2011 among others).  
 
5.4 Evidential DAs: Propositional or Illocutionary Operators  
In this section, I examine whether DAs are propositional (modal) or illocutionary (non-
modal) operators. To achieve this goal, I apply the diagnostics mentioned above. I argue that the 
results of these tests motivate a modal analysis of evidential DAs. I further support my 
arguments by comparing the results of these diagnostics of evidential DAs with English 
epistemic modals and two other types of attested evidentials in the literatures: evidentials in 
Cusco Quechua as in Faller (2002, 2006 and 2007) which have been analyzed as illocutionary 
operators and evidentials in St’át’imcets as in Matthewson et al. (2007) which have been 
analyzed as epistemic modals i.e. propositional level operators. I conclude that DAs pattern with 
English epistemic modals and evidentials in St’át’imcets, rather than evidentials in Cusco 
Quechua.  
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Before I discuss these diagnostics, some remarks on terminology are in order. The 
meaning of sentences with evidential DAs has two essential components: the evidential claim or 
evidential implication and prejacent (P) as exemplified in sentence (60 ch.4), repeated here as 
(5), which has been discussed in chapter 4 as triggering an inferential reading (See chapter 4 
section 4.4.3.4). 
(5) majdi jaai. 
Majdi come-DA 
‘Evidently, Majdi has come.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that/Based on my indirect evidence] Majdi has come.’ 
               
 
The evidential claim which corresponds to [I infer that] has two parts, the inferential part 
of the assertion and the type of the indirect evidence asserted by DAs. The other component is 
the prejacent (P) which corresponds to ‘Majdi has come’. These two components are illustrated 
in (6). 
 
(6) Intended:    [I infer that/ according to my indirect evidence]    [Majdi has come]. 
                                      Evidential Claim                                      Prejacent (P) 
 
The same logic applies to epistemically modalized utterances as in (7). The modal meaning 
of the sentence comprises two components: modal claim which corresponds to ‘it is possible 
that’ and prejacent (P) ‘it is raining’. 
(7) It might be raining. 
=  [It is possible that]  [it is raining ] 
       Modal claim         Prejacent (P)    
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5.4.1 Truth Value Diagnostics 
5.4.1.1 Known Truth/Falsity 
Epistemic modals are usually used to express a proposition that is not known to the 
speaker. In fact, that is the major function of modals: they express propositions that are possibly 
or necessarily true as in (8 and 9) respectively. 
(8) It may be raining. 
◇P: It is possible that it is raining. 
 
(9) It must be raining. 
□P: It is necessarily possible that it is raining. 
 
 
The propositions in (8 and 9) are true iff the speaker does not know whether the prejacent 
(i.e. it is raining) is true or not: epistemic modals cannot be felicitously used if the speaker 
already knows the falsity or truth of the prejacent (P). In other words, sentences (8 and 9) are 
felicitous only in the context where the speaker is inside his house, for example, with no 
knowledge at all of whether is it is raining or not outside. However, if the speaker is outside and 
he knows for sure that it is raining (he is walking under the rain) or it is not raining (he enjoys a 
sunbath with clear sky), then it is impossible for him to utter (8 and 9). This meaning is evident 
by the unacceptability of (10) where the speaker already knows that the prejacent (the embedded 
proposition of the modal i.e. raining) is false. 
 
(10) #  It may/must be raining, but it is not (raining). 
         
  This test shows that a modal analysis of evidentials predicates the same results: if 
evidentials pattern as epistemic modals then they should be infelicitous if the speaker knows the 
prejacent to be true or false. The same fact obtains for the inferential evidential k’a in 
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St’át’imcets which have been analyzed as an epistemic modal (Matthewson et al. 2007). The 
inferential evidential k’a is infelicitous in the contexts where the prejacent is known to be false or 
true by the speaker as illustrated in examples (11) where the speaker knows that the prejacent is 
false and (12) where the speaker knows that the prejacent is true (Matthewson et al. 2007: 213, 
216 ). 
(11) # wa7       k’a        kwis, t’u7 aoz    t’u7  k-wa-s                         kwis. 
IMPERF  INFER  rain   but   NEG just   DET-IMPERF-3poss  rain 
‘It may/must be raining, but it’s not raining.’ 
 
(12) # ts’um-qs-an-as          k’a        kw    s-Lemya7          kw    s-Roger;  
lick-nose-DIR-3ERG  INFER  DET  NOM-Lemya7 DET NOM-Roger   
ats’x-en-lhkan            wi7        zam’. 
see-DIR-1SG.SUBJ   EMPH  after-all 
‘Lemya7 must have kissed Roger; actually I saw it.’ 
Consultant Comment: ‘you are guessing but you are saying you saw it.’ 
 
 
In Quechua, on the other hand, the reportive evidential si is analyzed as an illocutionary 
operator i.e. a non-modal operator (Faller 2002). One piece of evidence comes from the fact that 
it does not contribute to the truth condition of the assertion as evident by their felicity under 
known/falsity test. Contra to modal analysis, in (13), the reportive evidential si is felicitously 
used even when the speaker knows that the prejacent is false; examples are taken from Faller 
(2002:160, 191). 
(13) para-sha-n-si       ichaqa  mana   creinichu. 
rain-PROG-3-si  but       not       I.believe 
‘[I heard] it is raining, but I do not believe it.’  
 
Evidential DAs presuppose that the evidence for P is indirect. This clearly implies that 
with DAs it is impossible for the speaker to know that P is true or false. The indirect evidence 
triggers an inferential reading as in (14a) below where the speaker sees a light that is on at EAT 
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and uses this evidence as a ground for his inference. The inferential meaning of (14a) is evident 
when the DA mwali3 ‘switch on(DA)’  is acceptable under the actuality entailment test (14b) as 
contrasted with the perfective in (14c) where the perfective does not survive the actuality 
entailment test suggesting that the proposition holds in the real world rather than irrealis world.  
(14)  
(a) sami mwali3            el-Daw. 
Sami switch-on-DA the-light 
‘Evidently, Sami has switched on the light.’ 
Intended: [I infer that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’ 
 
(b) sami mwali3             el-Daw,  bs   mumkin ‘aHmad elli   wala3uh. 
Sami switch-on-DA the-light, but maybe    Ahmad  who  switch-on-PERF-it 
‘Evidently, Sami has switched on the light, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’ 
 
(c) sami wala3              el-Daw, #  bs   mumkin ‘aHmad elli   wala3uh. 
Sami switch-on-DA the-light, #but maybe    Ahmad  who  switch-on-PERF-it 
‘Sami has switched on the light,# but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: ‘[I assert that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’                                       
             
    
Similar to modals and the inferential evidential k’a in St’át’imcets, the inferential reading 
of DAs is infelicitous if the speaker knows that the prejacent (i.e. it is Sami who switched on the 
light) is true. One way to test that is to embed DAs under contexts where the speaker perceived 
the event: if someone perceived the event then it follows that s/he has real world knowledge of 
this event i.e. s/he knows whether prejacent is true or not. This meaning is manifested in the 
following context (15) where the speaker saw Sami switched on the light i.e. since speaker saw 
the event of switching the light on, it follows that speaker knows that prejacent is true. The fact 
that the speaker saw Sami switch on the light yields sentence (14b), repeated here as (15a) 
unacceptable. 
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(15) Context: Speaker saw Sami when he switched on the light. 
(a) sami mwali3             el-Daw, # bs   mumkin ‘aHmad elli   wala3uh. 
Sami switch-on-DA the-light, #but maybe    Ahmad  who  switch-on-PERF-it 
‘#Evidently, Sami has switched on the light, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: #‘[I infer that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’ 
                                        
 
This observation is born out also by the fact that JA speakers intuit that in the contexts 
where the speaker perceived the event (in this case switching on the light) the perfective form of 
the verb is used rather than DAs. I asked JA speakers which sentence they use to express the 
situation where s/he saw Sami switched on the light. All agreed that they would use (16b) with 
perfective rather than (16a) with DAs. 
(16) Context: You saw Sami when he switched on the light. 
(a) # sami mwali3             el-Daw. 
Sami   switch-on-DA the-light  
‘Evidently, Sami has switched on the light.’ 
 
(b) sami  wala3                  el-Daw. 
Sami switch-on-PERF the-light  
‘Sami has switched on the light.’ 
 
The same fact obtains also when the speaker knows that the prejacent is false. This 
meaning is exemplified in (17) where the speaker saw Ahmad switched on the light i.e. since 
speaker saw the event of switching the light on, it follows that speaker knows that the prejacent 
(it is Sami who switched on the light) is false. The fact that the speaker saw Ahmad switch on the 
light yields sentence (14b), repeated here as the unacceptable sentence (17a). 
(17) Context:  Speaker saw Ahmad when he switched on the light. 
(a) sami mwali3             el-Daw, #  bs   mumkin ‘aHmad elli   wala3uh. 
Sami switch-on-DA the-light, #but  maybe    Ahmad  who  switch-on-PERF-it 
‘#Evidently, Sami has switched on the light, but maybe Ahmad did.’ 
Intended: #‘[I infer that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’   
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The infelicity of the inferential reading of DAs under this test is further supported when 
the evidential claim of DAs are contrasted with the assertive reading of perfectives. Contra to 
DAs, the perfective is felicitous when the speaker knows that the prejacent is true. This is 
exemplified in (18a and b) below where the inferential reading of DAs in (14b), repeated as 
(18a), and the assertive reading of the perfective of (14c), repeated as (18b), are used when the 
speaker knows that the prejacent is true.              
(18) Context: Speaker saw Sami when he switched on the light. 
(a) DAs = Intended:  # [I infer that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’ 
 
(b) Perfective =Intended:  [I assert that] it is Sami who switched on the light.’                                 
 
 
5.4.1.2 Assent/Dissent 
The assent/dissent test (also referred to in the literature as challengeability test) defined 
as: if an element can be questioned, doubted, rejected or (dis)agreed with, then it contributes to 
the truth conditions of the proposition expressed. Otherwise, the element does not contribute to 
the truth condition (Faller 2002:110).
13
  To illustrate the meaning of this test let us consider the 
behavior of some adverbs such as the adverb frankly which has been analyzed as illocutionary 
force operators (Faller 2002 and Ifantidou-Trouki 1993). The motivation for analyzing this 
adverb as contributing to illocutionary level of meaning rather than propositional level is that one 
cannot challenge or disagree with the meaning of this adverb as shown in (19). 
 
 
                                                          
13
 See Faller (2002, 2006) and Papafragou (2006) for discussion regarding the debate whether this test can    
   be applied to epistemic modals or not. 
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(19) A: Frankly, my opinion is that Adam has made a big mistake by not going to the  
     doctor. 
 
B: No, Not true 
=  Adam has not made a mistake by not going to the doctor (Correct Reading). 
≠ You are not being frank (Incorrect Reading).                
 
In (19), the negation uttered by speaker B targets the meaning of the sentence and not the 
meaning of the adverb frankly itself. This clearly shows that the adverb frankly cannot be 
understood as part of the propositional content of the assertion in (19A). In other words, if an 
expression scopes through a propositional level operator such negation, then this expression does 
not contribute to the truth condition of the proposition (as in example 19). On the other hand, if it 
scopes under propositional level operators then it contributes to the truth condition of the 
assertion. In (19), the adverb frankly scopes through negation and therefore is analyzed as an 
illocutionary force operator i.e. serving a speech act function rather than contributing to the truth-
condition of the proposition. 
If modals are propositional content operators, then we predict that their modal claim can 
be challenged, agreed or disagreed with. This prediction is born out in (20). In (20), which 
contains the epistemic modals must, the utterance made by the speaker B does not actually target 
the  prejacent i.e. the embedded proposition that Jo is the thief ; rather it targets the modal claim 
‘Jo must be the thief’; (example taken from Matthewson et al. 2007: 221, adapted from Faller 
2002:113). 
(20) A: Jo must be the thief. 
 
B: That is not true. There are some other plausible suspects. Jo may be entirely innocent.  
 
I reconstruct the meaning of this example in (21) below for explanation purposes. 
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(21) A: Jo must be the thief. 
     Meaning: [It is necessarily the case that]   [Jo is the thief] 
                           Modal claim (Must)                  Prejacent   
                       
B: That is not true. There are some other plausible suspects. Jo may be entirely  
     innocent.  
=  ¬
 
[It is necessarily the case that]    [Jo is the thief] 
≠      [It is necessarily the case that] ¬[Jo is the thief] 
 
 
As shown in (21), the utterance of speaker B actually challenges the modal claim of the 
proposition rather than the prejacent.
14
 This gives support to the observation that modals are 
truth-conditional operators. 
The modal analysis of evidentials would predict, as discussed above, that they would pass 
the assent/dissent test i.e. the evidential claim can be challenged. However, an illocutionary, non-
modal analysis predicts that they would fail the test i.e. the evidential claim cannot be 
challenged. The inferential evidential k’a in St’át’imcets allows the evidential or modal claim to 
be challenged as shown in (22) where the modal claim ‘John must be home’ is targeted by 
negation and not the prejacent i.e. the embedded proposition that ‘John is home’; Example is 
taken from Matthewson et al. (2007: 222). 
(22) Context: A is driving past John’s house with B and sees John’s lights are on. 
  
               A:  wa7 k’a       l-at tsitcw-s-a                       s-John;         takem  
                     be   INFER in-DET house-3poss-EXIS  NOM-John   all 
                     i              sts’ak’w-s-a          wa7      s-gwel. 
                     DET.PL  light-3poss-EXIS  IMPF  STAT-burn 
                    ‘John must be home; all his lights are on.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
  See von Fintel and Gillies (2007) for further examples on how the modal claim can be target of  
     challengeability tests.  
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               B:  aoz    kw-a-s                    wenacw; papt     wa7    lhap-en-as   
                     NEG DET-IMPF-3poss   true        always IMPF forget-DIR-3ERG  
                     kw-a-s                    lhap-en’-as                 i                sts’ak’w-s-a  
                     DET-IMPF-3poss   put.out-DIR-3ERG    DET.PL   light-3poss-EXIS  
                     lh-as                 ‘ut’qa7. 
                     when-3CONJ    go.out 
                     ‘That is not true. He always forgets to turn his lights off when goes out.’ 
                     B’s statement ≠  ‘John is not home’ 
                     B’s statement =  ‘It is not true that John must be home.’    
 
Contra to a modal analysis, the evidential claim of the reportative evidentials in Quechua 
cannot be challenged as shown in (23) where the utterance of the speaker B does not actually 
access the evidential claim that the speaker has learnt the information from someone else (as 
shown by the unacceptability of 23B); rather, the negation in B’s utterance targets the prejacent 
of the assertion i.e. the embedded proposition that Ines visited his sister. Examples are taken 
from Faller (2006:11). 
(23) A:  Ines-qa     qaynunchaw  nana-n-ta-s              watuku-sqa. 
Ines-TOP  yesterday       sister-3-ACC-REP   visit-PST.2 
P= ‘Ines visited her sister yesterday.’ 
EV= speaker was told that P. 
 
B:  Mana-n    chiqaq-chu.  # Mana-n  chay-ta       willa-rqa-sunki-chu. 
      not-BPG  true-NEG        not-BPG  this-ACC  tell-PST.1-3s2o-NEG 
     ‘That is not true. You were not told this.’                    
 
 
 The assent/dissent facts support a modal analysis of DAs in JA. This is clearly 
represented under the consequent-state inferential reading (CSI) of DAs. I have argued in chapter 
4 that JA speakers intuit that DAs are more acceptable than perfective in the contexts where the 
speaker makes inference based on a consequent-state (CS). In the following contexts (61 and 64 
ch.4 repeated here as 24 and 25 respectively), the speaker makes inference based on the available 
evidence at EAT; this evidence is regarded as CS since the speaker uses this evidence to make 
inference about a non-entailing event. JA speakers use DAs to express this meaning.  
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(24) Context: Adam and Sami see Sarah coming towards them and her eyes are red and  
                swollen. Adam tells Sami: 
 
            (a)  ‘eTala3! sarah mSayHeh. 
                   Look!    Sarah cry-DA 
                   ‘Look!  [I infer that] Sarah has cried.’  
 
 
(25) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the  
               light is on and there appears to be some luggage in the door step. Then, Adam  
               tells Sami: 
 
            (a)  majdi  jaai. 
                  Majdi come-DA 
                  ‘[I infer that] Majdi has come.’  
 
 
The inferential reading in the above contexts can also be expressed by using the epistemic 
necessity modal akeed ‘must’ as exemplified in (26-27). 
 
(26) Context: Adam and Sami see Sarah coming towards them and her eyes are red and   
                swollen. Adam tells Sami: 
 
            (a)  ‘eTala3!  Sarah akeed mSayHeh. 
                   Look!   Sarah must  cry-DA 
                   ‘Look!   Sarah must have been crying.’ 
                   Meaning: [It is necessarily possible/ must be the case] that Sarah has cried.  
 
 
 
(27) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the   
               light is on and there appears to be some luggage in the door step. Then, Adam  
               tells Sami: 
 
(a)   majdi   akeed  jaai. 
        Majdi  must   come-DA 
       ‘Majdi must have come.’ 
        Meaning: [It is necessarily possible/must be the case] that Majdi has come.  
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The fact that the epistemic modal akeed ‘must’ can replace DAs to express an inferential 
reading as shown above indicates that the inferential reading of DAs corresponds to that of the 
epistemic modal akeed ‘must’. In other words, both DAs and epistemic modal akeed ‘must’ can 
be used to express an inferential reading where the speaker uses indirect evidence (i.e. CS) at 
EAT to make inference about a certain event. Therefore and based on this fact, DAs and the 
epistemic modal akeed ‘must’ has a similar modal claim: [it must be the case that/ it is 
necessarily possible that]. This similar pattern between DAs and the epistemic necessity modal 
akeed ‘must’ especially with regard to the modal claim is crucial in capturing the inferential 
interpretation of DAs in this test. When DAs and the epistemic modal akeed ‘must’ are used 
under assent/dissent test, the evidential claim of DAs and the modal claim of the epistemic modal 
akeed ‘must’ can be challenged as in (28 and 29) adapted from Matthewson et al. (2007). 
  
(28) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the   
               light is on. 
 
Adam: majdi  jaai,           eTala3 haai  eDwaw     Daawieh. 
Majdi come-DA  look    these   light.PL  light-DA 
‘[It must be the case that] Majdi has come; all the lights are on.’ 
 
Sami:  mish sharT/SaHeeH;   majdi dayman bensa                  eD-Dwaw Daawieh 
not    necessary/true;   Majdi always IMPERF- forget  light-PL    light-DA 
lamma yeTla3                  bara. 
when   go-IMPERF-3SG outside 
‘Not necessarily true, Majdi always forgets the lights on when he goes outside.’ 
> Sami’s statement = ‘It is not true that Majdi must have come home.’ 
> Sami’s statement ≠ ‘Majdi has not come home.’ 
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(29) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the  
               light is on. 
 
Adam: majdi  akeed jaai,           eTala3 haai  eDwaw     Daawieh. 
Majdi must  come-DA,  look    these   light.PL  light-DA 
‘Majdi must have come; all the light are on.’ 
Meaning: [It must be the case] that Majdi has come.  
 
Sami:  mish sharT/SaHeeH;    majdi dayman bensa                  eD-Dwaw Daawieh  
not    necessary/true;    Majdi always IMPERF- forget  light-PL    light-DA 
lamma yeTla3                  barra. 
when   go-IMPERF-3SG outside 
‘Not necessarily true, Majdi always forgets the lights on when he goes outside.’ 
> Sami’s statement = ‘It not true that Majdi must be home.’ 
> Sami’s statement ≠ ‘Majdi has not come home.’ 
 
 
           In (28 and 29), the negation made by Sami’s utterance does not actually denies the 
prejacent i.e. Majdi has come home; rather it targets the evidential inferential claim of DAs ‘It 
must be the case that’ as shown in (28) and the modal claim of the epistemic modal ‘It must be 
that’ in (29). Also, the fact that the utterance made by Sami includes mish sharT ‘not necessarily’ 
in (28) indicates that the evidential claim of the DA in (28) has a modal claim, ‘it is necessary the 
case that’. 
 The observation that the inferential evidential claim and modal claim of DAs and 
modals can be challenged can also extend to evidential indirect predicates in JA such as the 
evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks like’ which exhibits an inferential and modal reading as 
discussed earlier. Consider the same context (30) where the evidential predicate shakluh ‘it looks 
like’ is used.   
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(30) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the  
               light is on. 
 
Adam: shakluh       majdi   jaai,           eTala3 haai  eDwaw     Daawieh. 
it looks like Majdi come-DA,  look    these   light.PL  light-DA 
‘It looks like Majdi hascome; all the light are on.’ 
Meaning: [I infer/ it must be] that Majdi has come.  
 
Sami:  mish sharT/SaHeeH;    majdi dayman bensa                  eD-Dwaw Daawieh  
not    necessary/true;    Majdi always IMPERF- forget  light-PL    light-DA 
lamma yeTla3                  barra. 
when   go-IMPERF-3SG outside 
‘Not necessarily true, Majdi always forgets the lights on when he goes outside.’ 
> Sami’s statement = ‘It not true that Majdi must be home.’ 
> Sami’s statement ≠ ‘Majdi has not come home.’ 
 
Similar to DAs and epistemic modal akeed ‘must’, the negation made by Sami’s 
utterance in (30) does not actually denies the prejacent i.e. Majdi has come home; rather it targets 
the evidential inferential claim of the evidential shakluh ‘it looks like’. The fact that DAs pattern 
with indirect evidential predicates in this test lends further support to the indirect evidential 
meaning of DAs. 
 
5.4.1.3 Cancellability of Evidence Requirement 
The type of evidence requirement (i.e. direct and indirect) is essential in evidential 
interpretation since it distinguishes between direct and indirect evidentiality. As noted by 
Izvorski (1997), the type of evidence requirement in the evidential perfect in Bulgarian is a 
presupposition and therefore is not cancellable. This prediction is also applicable to both 
analyses considered here. Both modal and illocutionary analyses predict that the evidence 
requirement is a presupposition and therefore cannot be cancelled. For instance, Faller (2006) 
observes that the reportive evidence requirement in Quechua illocutionary reportive evidentials 
293 
 
is not cancellable as shown in (31); the same fact obtains for modal evidentials in St’at’imce as 
in (32).  
(31) Ines-qa      mana-s    qaynunchaw  nana-n-ta-chu            watuku-sqa. 
Ines-TOP  not-REP  yesterday       sister-3-ACC-NEG   visit-PST.2 
P= ‘Ines didn’t visit her sister yesterday.’ 
EV: (i) speaker has reportive evidence that Ines didn’t visit her sister. 
(ii) # speaker does not have reportive evidence that Ines didn’t visit her sister.                                                                                                       
                                                                                                              (Faller 2006: 15-16) 
 
 
(32) # ts’um-qs-an-as          k’a        kw     s-Lemya7        kw    s-Roger;  
lick-nose-DIR-3ERG  INFER  DET  NOM-Lemya7 DET NOM-Roger   
ats’x-en-lhkan            wi7        zam’. 
see-DIR-1SG.SUBJ   EMPH  after-all 
‘Lemya7 must have kissed Roger; actually I saw it.’                                                                                        
                                                                                  (Matthewson et al. 2007:216)    
 
In (31), the reportive evidence requirement for the reportive evidential si in Quechua 
cannot be cancelled as shown in reading (i) and (ii). Similarly, in (32), the indirect evidence 
requirement for the inferential evidential k’a in St’át’imcets is not cancellable either. This is 
shown when the indirect evidence (i.e. event not perceived by speaker) is used in a context where 
direct evidence rather than indirect evidence is asserted. The fact that the sentence with 
inferential evidential k’a yields unacceptability in this context clearly suggests that the indirect 
evidence requirement is not cancellable. 
DAs in JA assert indirect evidence requirement as discussed earlier. The same results 
discussed above also obtain for DAs in JA i.e. the indirect evidence requirement is not 
cancellable and therefore is analyzed as presupposition. This is shown in the following context 
where the speaker perceived the event (direct evidence is asserted), yet the DA (33b) is 
infelicitous in this context and only perfective (33a) is allowed. The fact that the DA is 
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infelicitous in this context suggests that the indirect evidence requirement of evidential DAs is 
not cancellable. 
(33) Context: Majdi and Sami want to swim in the pool. Majdi goes outside to smoke a   
                cigarette; while he is smoking outside, he sees the workers filling the pool with  
                water; Majdi continues seeing them filling the pool with water. Majdi tells  
                Sami:  
  
Majdi: (a)  hayumma  3abbu                            el-burkeh mai,    bnegdar nesbaH. 
Here-they  fill-PERF.3PL.MASC  the-pool   water, can        swim 
‘Here they filled the pool with water, we can swim.’ 
 
(b)??/# hayumma  m3abbyiin el-burkeh mai,   bnegdar nesbaH. 
Here-they       fill-DA       the-pool   water, can        swim 
‘Here they have already filled the pool with water, we can swim.’ 
 
The aforementioned discussion shows that both analyses, modal vs illocutionary, predict 
the same results. In the modal analysis, the indirect evidence requirement is a presupposition and 
therefore cannot be cancellable. Similarly, in illocutionary analysis, the evidence requirement is 
an illocutionary force operator and therefore projects through negation. The two theories 
therefore converge with regard to this test. It is concluded therefore that this test does distinguish 
between the two competing analyses here and it is not useful for our purpose. 
 
5.4.2 Embeddability and Scopal Diagnostics 
5.4.2.1 Embeddability 
Another test whether evidentials contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition 
concerns embedding. The logic of this test is as follows: if the evidential can be embedded under 
conditional sentences, attitude or reporting verbs, then it is understood as contributing to the 
propositional content and therefore analyzed as modal operator not an illocutionary operator 
(Faller 2002, Matthewson et al. 2007 and others). The same logic is reformulated in Peterson 
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(2010:119): “An illocutionary operator cannot be understood as part of the propositional content 
of an embedded clause, but a modal can”. 
However, before I discuss the applicability of this test, it is crucial to our analysis here to 
examine more closely the meaning of embedding and what it entails. There are two types of 
embedding that need to be distinguished, a semantic embedding and a structural or morpho-
syntactic embedding. The difference between them is characterized by Schenner (2010), as 
reported in Peterson (2010:119) as follows: 
(34)  
(a) An expression is syntactically embedded if it occurs in a clause distinct from the root 
clause (i.e. in an adverbial, relative or complement clause). 
 
(b) An expression is semantically embedded if it is interpreted in the scope of some other 
operators. 
 
 
The difference between these two types of embedding is illustrated in sentences (35) and (36) 
below (Adapted from examples in Peterson 2010:119).  
 
(35) If you come early, we can go to the party. 
 
(36) Adam thinks that his brother, whom I met yesterday, will win the race. 
 
Sentence (35) is an example of syntactic and semantic embedding where the sentence ‘we 
can go to the party’ is syntactically embedded and is also semantically embedded since it falls 
under the scope of the conditional operator if.  Sentence (36), on the other hands, is an example 
of syntactic and not semantic embedding. That is, the relative clause ‘whom I met yesterday’ in 
(36) is not semantically embedded under the belief operator (think) i.e. it is not interpreted in the 
scope of ‘think’ even though it is  syntactically embedded under it i.e. it occurs in its 
complement clause (Peterson 2010). 
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  Epistemic modals are propositional content operators since they can be embedded under 
conditional sentences, attitude or reporting verbs. One piece of evidence comes from their 
behavior when embedded under reporting verbs. When modals are embedded under reporting 
verb, the modal claim is shifted from the speaker to the matrix subject of the reporting verb. This 
meaning is illustrated in the following sentences. 
(37) Adam might come. 
Meaning: [It is possible that]  [Adam come] 
 
(38) John said that Adam might come. 
Meaning: [It is possible that]  [Adam come]                  
 
In (37), the inference or the modal claim (i.e. it is possible that) is anchored to the 
speaker. In other words, the speaker is making the inference that Adam might come. However, in 
(38), the inference or the modal claim is not anchored to the speaker; rather it is anchored to the 
subject of the matrix verb ‘John’. That is, in (38), the anchoring of the inference shifts from the 
‘speaker’ to ‘John’ i.e. the possibility that Adam comes is viewed from the perspective of ‘John’ 
not the perspective of the ‘speaker’. This result clearly shows that epistemic modals such as the 
modal might  in (38) can be semantically embeddable since its modal claim is interpreted 
differently when it is embedded (i.e. it shifts from the speaker to the subject of matrix verb).  
A modal analysis of evidential predicts that an evidential can be embedded semantically 
under conditional, attitude and reportive verbs. In other words, if evidentials can be embedded in 
these environments, they are analyzed as contributing to the propositional content (i.e. modals) 
and hence they cannot be illocutionary operators. This prediction is true for the inferential 
evidential k’a in St’át’imcets. Matthewson et al. (2007) have found that inferential evidential k’a 
in St’át’imcets can embed under a verb of saying as in (39). 
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(39) tsut  s-Lemya7         kw     s-tup-un’-as                      k’a         s-Maria 
say  NOM-Lemya7 DET  NOM-punch-DIR-3ERG  INFER   NOM-Maria 
ta       sesq’wez-s-a. 
DET  younger.sibling-3POSS-DET 
‘Lemya7 said that Maria must have hit her younger brother.’ 
                                                                                    (Matthewson et al. 2007:230) 
 
In (39), the inferential implication of the evidential k’a is anchored only to the subject of 
the matrix verb ‘Lemya7’ rather than the speaker.
15
 This interpretation indicates that the 
evidential k’a shows semantic embedding similar to epistemic modal in (38). Conversely, 
reportive evidentials in Quechua such as the evidential si (40) can only syntactically embed 
under verbs of saying because the relevant interpretation of semantic embedding does not obtain: 
the reportive evidential implication is still anchored to the speaker (readings (i) and (ii)) and not 
to the subject of the matrix verb (i.e. Marya) in reading (iii).  
(40) Marya  ni-wa-rqa-n            Pilar-(*si)   chayamu-sqa-n-ta-s. 
Marya  say-1O-PAST1-3   Pilar            arrive-PP-3-ACC-si 
‘Marya told me that Pilar arrived.’                                                                                                                  
(i)  Speaker was told by someone else that Marya told the speaker that Pilar arrived. 
(ii) Speaker was told by Marya that Pilar arrived. 
           (iii) ≠ Marya was told that Pilar arrived.                                   (Faller 2002: 222)  
            
           
This modal analysis extends to evidential DAs in JA. This observation is obtained by the 
shiftability facts DAs show when they are embedded under verbs of saying: DAs embed 
semantically under verbs of saying such that the inferential claim is shifted from the speaker to 
the subject of the matrix clause. Consider (41) and (42). 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Similar results have been obtained for evidentials in Japanese (McCready 2010) and Tibetan (Garrett  
    2001). 
298 
 
(41) majdi    Saaf         es-sayarah. 
Majdi   park-DA  the-car        
‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car/ what Majdi has parked is the car. 
                                                                                                         
                                                                                                        (According to me)    
 
(42) hesham biguul              ennu  majdi   Saaf         es-sayarah. 
Hesham IMPERF-say  that    Majdi   park-DA  the-car        
‘Hesham says that  (evidently) Majdi has parked the car.’ 
Intended: ‘[Hesham infers that] it is Majdi who parked the car/ what Majdi has parked is 
the car.                                                                                        
                                                                                                        (According to Hesham) 
 
   I have argued earlier that sentences such as (41) above triggers inferential reading where 
the speaker uses an indirect evidence at EAT to make inference about an anterior event (see 
chapter 4, section 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.4 for detailed analysis). However, when the evidential DA in 
(41) is embedded under a verb of saying as in (42), the inferential claim of the evidential DA is 
shifted from the speaker to the subject of the matrix verb (i.e. Hesham). I support my argument 
regarding the arising shiftable interpretation in (42) by the sensitivity of DAs to first person (see 
chapter 4, section 4.4.7). In that section I argued that DAs cannot trigger inferential interpretation 
in the context of first person as in sentence (43) below due to the counterintuitive effect: speaker 
cannot infer about himself if he himself has performed the action at issue. When DA is used with 
first person, the inference is blocked due to counterintuitive effect as shown by the 
unacceptability of (43) under the actuality entailment test. 
(43) ‘ana     Saaf         es-sayarah, # bs  mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)   Safha              (mush ‘ana). 
I          park-DA  the-car,      #  but might       Ahmad  (who)  PERF-park-it (not       me) 
#‘ Evidently, I have parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did (not me).’ 
#Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is me who parked the car.’  
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    The unacceptability of (43) stems from the fact that the inference is anchored to the 
speaker i.e. the speaker cannot make inference about himself if he himself parked the car. The 
fact that DAs are sensitive to first person constitutes a good diagnostic to test whether DAs are 
semantically embeddable or not. The idea here is: if a sentence such as (43) above is embedded 
under a verb of saying and it still yields unacceptability, then this should mean that DAs are not 
embeddable because the inference did not shift from the speaker to the subject of the matrix 
verb. However, if a sentence such as (43) is embedded under a verb of saying and it yields 
acceptability, then this should mean that DAs are embeddable because the inference shifted from 
the speaker to the subject of the matrix verb. To put this differently, if (43) is embedded and the 
inference is shifted from the speaker to the subject of matrix verb, it follows that the reason for 
the unacceptability of (43) is lifted i.e. inference is no more anchored to the speaker. This 
predication is obtained for DAs as shown by the acceptability of sentence (43) when embedded 
under the verb of saying biguul ‘say’ in (44). 
(44) hesham biguul ennu  ‘ana Saaf         es-sayarah, bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)                                      
Hesham say     that    I       park-DA  the-car,       but might        Ahmad (who) 
Saf-ha             (mush ‘ana). 
park-PERF-it   (not     me)   
‘Evidently,  Hesham says that I have parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did (not me).’ 
Intended: ‘[Hesham infers that] it is me who parked the car.’  
 
The above discussion shows that DAs are embeddable similarly to modals and modal 
evidentials. It shows also that they contrast with illocutionary evidentials which violate a 
shiftability reading. I take this parallel behavior between DAs, epistemic modals and St’át’imcets 
modal evidentials to lend further support to the modal analysis of DA utterances. 
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 5.4.2.2 Scope with Respect to Interrogatives 
There is a general assumption that pragmatic operators such as speech act operators 
including questions scope over propositional content operators such as modals. This observation 
has been demonstrated by Peterson (2010: 122): “epistemic modals cannot take scope over 
illocutionary act, such as performing a request or asking a question”. Based on this fact, we 
expect a contrast in behavior between modal vs non-modal evidentials. Evidentials that are 
analyzed as modals should have narrow scope with regards to interrogatives whereas 
illocutionary evidentials can have wide scope over question operators. 
In Quechua, Faller (2002, 2006) shows that only the illocutionary analysis can account 
for the behavior of the reportive evidential si where it is used to ask a question on someone’s else 
behalf. The context in example (45) is that the researcher’s question to the mother-in-law is not 
heard, so the question was repeated by the consultant on the researcher’s behalf. 
(45) Imyana-s   ka-sha-nki. 
how-REP   be-PROG-2 
‘(She says) How are you?’ 
                                              (Faller 2006:14-15)   
 
Such uses of si require that the interrogatives are in the scope of the reportive evidential 
si. In other words, the reportive evidential has wide scope over the question as evident by the fact 
that the reportive evidential takes the speaker rather than the addressee as its anchor. Faller 
(2002, 2006) concludes based on this behavior that evidentials in Quechua are illocutionary level 
operators. 
The interpretation of epistemic modals in interrogative contexts, on the other hands, is 
anchored to the addressee rather than to the speaker. This phenomenon is known in the literature 
as ‘interrogative flip’ i.e. the change of anchoring or perspective from the speaker to the 
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addressee (Spease and Tenny 2003).  In (46b), the interpretation of the modal claim is anchored 
to the addressee rather than the speaker. This contrasts with (46a) where the interpretation of the 
modal claim is anchored to the speaker in simple declarative sentences. 
(46)  
(a) He should go to the dentist.          (Speaker-oriented, according to me) 
 
(b) Should he go to the dentist?         (Addressee-oriented, according to you)  
 
  
  
  The same fact holds true for evidentials in St’át’imcets. The evidential claim is anchored 
to addressee rather than the speaker in interrogative contexts with the reportive evidential ku7 in 
St’át’imcets (47).  
(47) swat   ku7            k-wa              táns-ts-an. 
who   REPORT   DET-IMPF   dance-CAUS-1SG.ERG 
‘Who did they say I was dancing with?’               (Matthewson et al. 2007: 232) 
 
        
The above observation is true for evidential DAs in JA. The interrogative flip reading is 
observed in the behavior of DAs in interrogative contexts under RSI and CSI readings. The DA 
msakir ‘close(DA)’ in (48a) below triggers a RSI inferential reading as evident by the fact that it 
survives the actuality entailment test in (48b and c).  The evidential claim interpretation of the 
DA is anchored to the speaker in (48a). Note here that the evidential claim includes the 
inferential implication denoted by [I infer] and the indirect evidence requirement [according to 
the indirect evidence]. However, when the same DA is used in an interrogative context, the 
evidential claim interpretation is shifted to the addressee as in (48d).  
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(48)  
(a) majdi msakir       esh-shubaak. 
Majdi close-DA  the-window 
‘Evidently, Majdi has closed the window.’ 
Intended: [I infer that] it is Majdi who closed the window/what Majdi closed is the  
window. 
 
(b) majdi msakir       esh-shubaak,  bs   mumkin 3ali elli   sakar-uh. 
Majdi close-DA  the-window,   but  maybe  Ali   who close-PERF-it  
‘Evidently, Majdi has closed the window, but  maybe Ali did.’ 
Intended: [I infer that] it is Majdi who closed the window.  
 
(c) majdi msakir       esh-shubaak, bs   huwwa mumkin sakar                 el-baab. 
Majdi close-DA  the-window, but  he         maybe     close-PERF-it  the-door 
‘Evidently, Majdi has closed the window, but maybe he closed the door.’ 
Intended: [I infer that] what Majdi has closed is the the window.  
 
(d) majdi msakir       esh-shubaak? 
Majdi close-DA  the-window 
‘Is it Majdi who has closed the window/ is it the window what Majdi closed?’ 
= [Given your evidence], is it the case that it is Majdi who closed the window. 
= [Given your evidence], is it the case that what Majdi closed is the window. 
                   
The same logic applies to the CSI reading of DAs. I have already argued that sentence 
(49a) below triggers a CSI reading (see chapter 4, section 4.4.3.5 for detailed discussion). When 
the same DA is used in interrogative context (49b), the evidential claim of DA is anchored to the 
addressee rather than to the speaker. 
 
(49) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the   
               light is on and there appears to be some luggage in the door step. Then, Adam  
               tells Sami: 
 
(a)  majdi  jaai. 
 Majdi come-DA 
 ‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has come.’ 
 = [According to my evidence] Majdi has come.  
 
(b)  majdi  jaai? 
 Majdi come-DA 
 ‘Majdi has come?’ 
 = [According to your evidence] is it the case that Majdi has come?  
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It is worth mentioning that interrogative flip has been reported with illocutionary 
evidentials too as reported in Faller (2002, 2006). In (50), the reportive evidential si triggers an 
interrogative flip reading where the evidential implication is anchored to the addressee rather 
than to the speaker. 
(50) May-manta-s  chay   run aka-n-man. 
where-ABL-REP  this man be-3-COND 
‘Where could this man be from?’                    
                                                                       (Faller 2006: 13, reported in Itier 1995: 290) 
 
 
This might suggest that the interrogative flip reading does not distinguish between the 
two analyses examined here, the modal vs illocutionary as shown in (50). However, the test cases 
are instead those presented in sentence like (45) discussed at the beginning of this section. In the 
absence of cases like the one mentioned in (45) above (where the reading is anchored to speaker 
rather than addressee in interrogatives), I conclude that the interrogative test lends further 
support to the modal analysis of evidential DAs in JA. The same conclusion has been adopted by 
Faller (2006) for the German reportive evidential sollen and Matthewson et al. (2007) for the 
modal evidentials in St’át’imcets. 
16
 
 
5.4.2.3 Scope with Respect to Negation 
The modal analysis predicts that the evidence requirement is a presupposition therefore it 
projects through negation. The same fact obtains for illocutionary analysis which predicts that 
illocutionary operators always take wide scope with respect with other propositional level 
operators such as negation. The two analyses therefore converge with regards to this test: both 
                                                          
16
  Based on data from Enrich (2001), Faller (2006) provided discussion where she motivated a modal analysis of the    
     German reportive evidential sollen. One of the arguments she provided in this regard is the absence of cases  
     where the evidential implication is anchored to the speaker rather than the addressee when  
     sollen is used in interrogatives.  
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predict that the evidential claim presented by the inferential implication and the requirement of 
evidence still obtain in negative contexts.  
Modal evidentials in St’át’imcets are reported to scope over negation (Matthewson et al. 
2007). In the following example, the inferential evidential k’a is used in negative context. The 
negation is not construed as denying the evidential claim (the inferential modal implication, and 
the requirement of indirect evidence); rather it targets the prejacent i.e. the embedded 
propositional content in the scope of the evidential.   
(51) aoz     k’a         k-wa-s                    Sylvia  ku      xílh-tal’i. 
NEG  INFER  DET-IMPF-3poss  Sylvia   DET  do(CAUS)-TOP 
= ‘It is necessarily not true Sylvia who did it.’ [Presupposition: Indirect Evidence] 
≠ ‘It is not necessarily true Sylvia who did it.’ [Presupposition: Indirect Evidence] 
≠ ‘It is not the case that I have indirect evidence that it was necessarily Sylvia who did it.’                                                                           
                                                                                
                                                                                                (Matthewson et al. 2007:218) 
 
 
Similarly, negation only scopes over the propositional content with the evidential DAs as in 
sentences (52a-c).  
(52)  
(a) majdi msakir       esh-shubaak. 
Majdi close-DA  the-window 
‘Evidently, Majdi has closed the window.’ 
Intended: [I infer that/ It must be the cast that/Given my evidence] it is Majdi who closed 
the window. 
 
(b) majdi  muu  msakir       esh-shubaak. 
Majdi  not   close-DA  the-window 
‘Evidently, Majdi has not closed the window. 
= [I infer that/ It must be the case that/Given my evidence] it is Majdi who did not close   
    the window.                                      
≠ [I do not infer that/it must not be the case that/ I do not have evidence that] it is Majdi  
    who closed the window. 
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(c) majdi  mu msakir      esh-shubaak, bs  mumkin 3ali elli   ma  sakar-uh. 
Majdi  not close-DA  the-window, but might    Ali   who not  close-PERF-it 
‘Evidently, Majdi has not closed the window, but maybe Ali has not (not Majdi).’ 
Intended: [I infer that/It must be the case that/Given my evidence] it is Majdi who did 
not close the window. 
 
(d) majdi muu    Saaf        es-sayarah. 
Majdi not     park-DA  the-car        
‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
Intended: ‘[I infer that/It must be the case that/Given my evidence] it is Majdi who did 
not parked the car. 
= [I infer that/ It must be the case that/Given my evidence] it is Majdi who did not park  
    the car.                                      
≠ [I do not infer that/it must not be the case that/ I do not have evidence that] it is Majdi  
    who parked the car.  
 
In (52a), the DA msakir ‘close(DA)’ is used in an affirmative context. The sentence 
triggers a RSI inferential reading as evident by its acceptability under the actuality entailment 
test as shown in (48b) in section 5.4.2.2. In (52b), the same DA is used in a negative context. The 
sentence (52b) triggers a RSI inferential reading as shown by its acceptability under the 
entailment test in (52c). In (52b), negation only scopes over the propositional content in the 
scope of the evidential DA. The same fact extends to (52d).  
      The same logic also applies to the CSI reading of DAs in (53). Under CSI reading, when 
DA is used in negative context the evidential claim of DA projects through negation. 
 
(53) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the  
               light is off. Then, Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) majdi  muu jaai. 
Majdi  not   come-DA 
= [I infer that/it must be the case that] Majdi has not come.’ 
= [According to my evidence] it is not the case that Majdi has come.  
≠ [I do not infer that/It must not be the case that] Majdi has come.’ 
≠ [I do not have evidence that] Majdi has come.  
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In (53), the inference in CSI is straightforwardly obtained: speaker infers that Majdi has 
not come home based on available evidence at EAT i.e. that the light is off. However, the 
inference with RSI reading is rather not straightforward sometimes. Unlike (53), the speaker in 
(52d) does not have available evidence at EAT to make his inference. In other words, the result-
state which serves as the indirect evidence based on which speaker makes his inference (i.e. car 
parked) is not available in (52d) due to negation i.e. there is no car parked.  Given this fact, the 
question that might arise here is that ‘how is the inference in (52d) obtained if there is no 
available evidence at EAT?’ I argue that the inferential reading in (52d) with negation stems 
from a presuppositional reading that accompanies DAs in negative contexts (Boneh 2005).         
Based on data from Syrian Arabic, Boneh (2005) claims that when DAs are used in negative 
contexts, only the post-state, which is asserted in TT (topic time after Klein 1994), is negated and 
not the anterior event. The fact that the anterior event is not part of the assertion time and 
therefore not negated triggers a presuppositional reading as in (54a and b); examples are taken 
from (Boneh 2005:13). 
(54)  
(a) sami muu    nayem. 
Sami NEG  sleep-PART.SG.M 
‘Sami is not/no longer asleep now  (but he did fall asleep) 
 
(b) sami muu   kaatib                      er-resaleh. 
Sami NEG write-PART.SG.M the-letter 
‘Sami is not in the post-state of having written the letter.’ 
 
(c) sami maa   katab                      er-resaleh. 
Sami NEG write-PERF.SG.M the-letter 
‘Sami did not write the letter.’ 
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In (54a) it is argued that Sami has fallen asleep at some point, but what the speaker 
asserts is that now he is not. Thus, the only part that is negated is the post-state which is included 
in TT and not the underlying eventuality itself i.e. the stage of entering into the relevant state is 
not negated. Boneh (2005) argues that this interpretation indicates that the underlying event is 
presupposed since it is not canceled under negation. The same logic obtains for (54b). Negating 
DA in this sentence does not necessarily mean that the anterior event did not take place as it is 
the case with the perfective in (54c). The difference between the DA (54b) and the perfective 
(54c) stems from the fact that in the case of the DA negation targets post-state which is included 
in TT and therefore reflects a presuppositional reading about the underlying event which is not 
included in TT i.e. an expectation on the part of the speaker that Sami was supposed to engage in 
the relevant event of writing the letter, but he hasn’t. This reading does not arise in the case of 
the perfective because the event itself is contained in TT, therefore the event is negated and a 
presuppositional reading is blocked (See Boneh (2005) for detailed discussion). 
I argue that the same results are true for DAs in JA. When DAs are used in negative 
contexts, negation triggers a presuppositional reading where the speaker assumes that the 
relevant event was supposed to take place. In (55), negating DA triggers a presuppositional 
reading where the speaker assumes that Majdi was on his way (the underlying eventuality was 
unfolding) when he (the speaker) came home. In other words, the speaker assumes that Majdi 
was supposed to come home, but in fact he has not. 
(55) lamma rawaHet                         3ala  ed-daar,   majdi  maa kaan          jaai. 
When  come-home-PERF.1SG  to   the-home, Majdi  not  be-PAST  come-home-DA 
‘When I came home, Majdi had not come yet.’   
 
 
308 
 
This presuppositional reading is what triggers the RSI with DA in (52d): the speaker 
assumes that Majdi was supposed to park the car but he has not. This presuppositional reading 
which is true in speaker’s belief world serves as the indirect evidence based on which the speaker 
makes his inference in (52d): given what should have been done in the ideal world (i.e. Majdi 
should have parked the car at EAT), I infer that it is Majdi who did not park the car.
17
 
So far, I have argued that the evidential claim with DAs projects through negation. This 
observation contrasts with the general behavior of modals because modals show wide and 
narrow scope readings under negation. However, the fact that evidential claim of DAs is 
projective does not straightforwardly undermine a modal analysis of evidential DAs. Other 
                                                          
17
 Portner (2003) argues that English present perfect triggers a presuppositional reading. He claims that perfect   
    comprises two components: a truth conditional component (temporal) and a modal pragmatic component. The  
    modal component has a presuppositional reading governed by epistemic necessity operator. This meaning is  
    characterized by the following schematic representation (Portner 2003:45): 
 
 (i)  P (P, Tense(S)) where P is the proposition expressed by S and it indicates contextual entailment and Tense (S) is 
an answer to a discourse topic T. This reading is illustrated in (ii). 
 
(ii) Suppose that the conversational background (CB) in (a) is given before the two sentences in (b and c): 
(a) CB [Eliot wrote Middlemarch; if someone smart read an author’s book, then s/he understands his/her style; Mary 
is smart]. 
(b) A: We need to get an explanation of Eliot’s style, who can we ask? 
(c) B: Mary has read Middlemarch. 
 
When the perfect is uttered, P entails that Mary can explain Eliot’s style i.e. the consequent state (Mary can explain 
Eliot’s style is an answer to the discourse topic ‘who can explain Eliot’s style’ (Portner 2003: 42-43). 
 
The same facts could also be extended to DAs: result-state of DAs triggers a presuppositional reading especially if 
we know that the resultative state with DAs is semantically asserted (iii a) contra to the perfective where the 
resultative state is pragmatically given (iiib) as shown in the cancellation test below.   
 
(iii) 
     (a)  sami faatiH el-maHal #     bs msakruh. 
           Sami open-DA the-store #but close-DA it 
           ‘Sami has opened the store but closed it.’ 
 
    (b)  sami fataH el-maHal        bs  sakruh. 
           Sami open-DA the-store but close-DA it 
           ‘Sami has opened the store but closed it.’ 
 
In other words, the fact that the resultative state is semantically asserted with DAs guarantees a presuppositional 
reading contra to the perfective where the presupposition can be blocked by the pragmatic nature of its result state. I 
leave this topic for further research. 
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propositional level operators such as the English epistemic modal must can receive only a wide 
scope reading with respect to negation. In (56), the only scopal reading of the epistemic modal 
must is the one given in (a) where the negation scopes under the modal claim; the reading where 
negation scopes over the modal claim does not arise (b), (See for example Horn 1989:259, Faller 
2006:16 among others).  
(56) Sarah must not be the burglar. 
 
(a) It is necessarily the case that Sarah is not the burglar. 
 
(b) # It is not necessarily the case that Sarah is the burglar. 
 
 
A modal analysis would therefore account for the above parallel between DAs in (52b 
and d) and (53a) and epistemic modals in (56). However, this is not necessarily the case. I have 
argued at the beginning of this section that illocutionary (non-modal) evidentials such as the 
evidentials in Quechua exhibit the same pattern i.e. they project over negation. In (57), the only 
available reading is given in (a) i.e. the speaker has evidence that the prejacent is denied; the 
reading in (b) where the evidence (evidential claim) is denied does not arise. 
 
(57) Mana-s  para-sha-n-chu. 
not-REP rain-PROG-3-POL 
p= ‘it is raining.’ 
EV= ‘Speaker has reportive evidence that it is not raining.’ 
EV≠ ‘Speaker does not have reportive evidence that it is raining.’ 
                                                                                                                     (Faller 2006: 10) 
 
 
The aforementioned discussion therefore shows that the two theories (i.e. the modal vs 
non-modal) converge with regard to this test. It is concluded therefore that this test does 
distinguish between the two competing analyses here and it is not useful for our purpose.      
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  5.4.3 Interim Summary  
The results of the diagnostics of the level of meaning so far show that DAs pattern with 
epistemic modals and modal evidentials in St’át’imcets and not with non-modal or illocutionary 
evidentials like the Quechua evidentials.  Therefore, it is concluded that a modal analysis would 
best account for the behavior of evidential DAs i.e. DAs are propositional level operators since 
they contribute to the truth condition of the proposition expressed. These results are summarized 
in Table (2) below. The results of Table (2) show that DAs pattern with propositional operators 
especially when these results are compared to those in Table (1) given earlier. These results 
pattern with the discussion in chapter 4 where I provided two pieces of evidence for the modal 
reading of DAs namely their behavior under actuality entailment effect and de-dicto reading (see 
chapter 4, sections 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.3). I provide further support to a modal analysis in the next 
two sections where I discuss the interaction of DAs and modal subordination and the behavior of 
DAs in counterfactual copular contexts. The results of the propositional vs illocutionary 
diagnostics, actuality entailment test, de-dicto reading and the discussion about the interaction of 
DAs with modal subordination and counterfactual contexts will serve as the empirical base for 
the modal account that I will provide in section 5.6.  
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Table (2) Diagnostics Results for St’át’imcets, Quechua and Evidential DAs  
Diagnostic YES NO 
1. Felicitous if P is known to be  True or False 
Illocutionary 
Quechua 
Propositional 
St’át’imcets and 
DAs 
2. Pass Assent-Dissent Test 
Propositional 
St’át’imcets and 
DAs 
Illocutionary 
Quechua 
3. Evidence Type Cancellable ــــــــــــــ ــــــــــــــ 
4. Embeddable 
Propositional 
St’át’imcets and 
DAs 
Illocutionary 
Quechua 
5. Scope Over Interrogatives 
Illocutionary 
Quechua 
Propositional 
St’át’imcets and 
DAs 
6. Scope Over Negation ــــــــــــــ ــــــــــــــ 
 
 
 
5.4.4 Modal Subordination   
Modal subordination requires an anaphora to be in the semantic scope of its antecedent 
(Roberts 1987, 1989).  In (58a), the anaphora he is used in a sentence with a realis 
quantificational meaning i.e. unmodalized sentence ‘He took the silver’. However, the 
antecedent sentence comprises a modal element which forces non-factual or modal 
quantificational interpretation as evident by the use of the modal might. The fact that the two 
sentences have different quantificational interpretations blocks the anaphoric dependency of the 
anaphora he. This observation contrasts with (58b) where the antecedent sentence and the 
anaphora sentence belong to the same quantificational force i.e. both include a modal element; 
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hence anaphoric dependency is allowed and results in the acceptability of (58b). Example is 
taken from Roberts (1989:697). 
(58)  
(a) A thiefi might break into the house. #Hei took the silver. 
 
(b) A thiefi might break into the house.  Hei would take the silver. 
 
                 
This prediction is true for evidential DAs as contrasted to perfectives. Evidential DAs are 
used in the sentences under (a) as contrasted to those under (b) where perfectives are used. Each 
antecedent sentence is then subordinated with another independent sentence with the anaphora 
and a modal element. Contra to perfectives, sentences with DAs are acceptable. Consider (59 and 
60). 
(59)  
(a)   ‘ana sheft sami mshaghil      et-tadfe’ai.  ‘eHtemal huwwa elli   shaghal-hai. 
   I       saw  Sami turn-on DA the-heating.  Maybe    he        who  turn-on -it 
   ‘Evidently/I saw Sami has turned on the heat. Maybe he is the one who turned it on.’ 
 
(b)   ‘ana sheft sami shaghal              et-tadfe’ai. # ‘eHtemal huwwa elli    shaghal-hai. 
   I      saw   Sami turn-on -PERF  the-heating.   Maybe    he         who  turn-on -it 
   ‘I saw Sami has turned on the heat. # Maybe he is the one who turned it on.’ 
 
 
(60)  
(a)   ‘ana sheft ‘aHmad m3abii el-jarakili   maai.  ‘eHtemmal huwwa elli  3abaa-hini. 
   I       saw   Ahmad fill-DA the-barrels water.  Mybe        he         who fill-PERF-them 
   ‘Evidently, Ahmad has filled the barrels with water.  Maybe Ahmad is the one who filled   
   them.’ 
 
(b)   ‘ana sheft  ‘aHmad 3aba         el-jarakili  maai.#‘eHtemmal huwwa elli  3abaa-hini. 
   I       saw   Ahmad  fill-PERF the-barrels water. Maybe       he         who fill-PERF-them 
   ‘Evidently/I saw Ahmad has filled the barrels with water. # Maybe Ahmad is the one   
   who filled them.’  
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  In (59b), the anaphora -ha attached to the verb shaghal  ‘turned on’  is used in a sentence 
with a modal quantificational force as evident by the presence of the modal mumkin ‘might’. 
However, the antecedent sentence, which has the antecedent et-tadfe’a ‘the heating’, lacks a 
modal element and has only the perfective form. The anaphoric dependency in (59b) is blocked 
as shown by the unacceptability of the utterance. The reason why (59b) is unacceptable is due to 
the difference in quantificational interpretations: the antecedent sentence has a non-modal while 
the anaphora sentence has a modal force. The contrast in quantificational force blocks the 
anaphoric dependency of the anaphora -ha and therefore yields (59b) unacceptable. Conversely, 
the fact that (59a) with the DA is acceptable clearly shows that the antecedent sentence with the 
DA has a modal interpretation otherwise the sentence should be unacceptable. In other words, 
the fact that (59a) is acceptable clearly indicates that the antecedent sentence with the DA 
belongs to the same modal quantificational force as the anaphora sentence which has a modal 
element; hence allowing the anaphora ha in the modalized sentence to refer back to its 
antecedent in the DA antecedent sentence. The same logic applies to sentences (60a and b).  
  The previous discussion demonstrates the interaction of DAs and modal subordination 
under the RSI reading of DAs. The CSI of DAs shows a parallel pattern with regard to modal 
subordination as well. In the following contexts, the speaker is making an inference abut a non-
entailing event; therefore a CSI reading is triggered. DAs are more appropriately used than 
perfectives in these contexts ((See chapter 4 section 4.4.3.5 for detailed discussion).  
 
(61) Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that the  
               light is on. Then, Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a) majdii  jaai. #        (huwwai)   jab                                     elli       hadieh. 
Majdi come-DA.  (He)          bring-PERF.3.SG.MASC  to-me  gift 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has come.  #He brought me a gift.’ 
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(b) majdii  jaai.           akeed  (huwwai)  jab                                      elli      hadieh. 
Majdi come-DA.   Must   (He)         bring-PERF.3.SG.MASC  to-me  gift 
‘[Evidently/ I infer that] Majdi has come.  He must have brought me a gift.’ 
 
 
(62)  Context: Adam and Sami see Sarah coming towards them and her eyes are red and swollen.  
                       Adam tells Sami: 
 
(a)  ‘eTala3! sarahi mSayHeh.# (hiehi)  rasabat       fii  el-‘emteHaan. 
        Look!    Sarah cry-DA.#    (she)    fail-PERF  in   the-exam 
       ‘Look!  [Evidently/ I infer that] Sarah has cried. # She failed the exam.’  
 
(b)  ‘eTala3! sarahi mSayHeh. akeed (hiehi)  rasabat       fii  el-‘emteHaan. 
        Look!    Sarah cry-DA.    Must   (she)   fail-PERF  in   the-exam 
       ‘Look!  [Evidently/ I infer that] Sarah has cried. She must have failed the exam.’  
 
 
  Given the indirect evidence (i.e. the light is on), the speaker infers that Majdi has come 
home. However, by making such inference, the speaker does not commit himself to the truth of 
the proposition in the actual world. In other words, the speaker does not assert that the prejacent 
is true, rather he hypothesizes so. This inferential meaning of the antecedent sentence with the 
DA allows anaphoric dependency as in (61b) since the anaphora sentence has a modal element 
(akeed ‘must’). The fact that the sentence is acceptable clearly means that the DA sentence has a 
similar modal quantificational interpretation; hence the acceptability of the (61b). However, such 
anaphoric dependency is blocked in (61a) due to the fact that the anaphora sentence lacks a 
modal element and therefore yielding a quantificational interpretation (realis) different from the 
modal/inferential quantification of the DA antecedent sentence; hence the unacceptability of 
(61a). The same facts obtain for (62a and b). 
  In sum, when the anaphora sentence has a modal element (modal quantification), the 
antecedent sentence with the DA allows anaphoric dependency. The fact that anaphoric 
dependency is allowed clearly suggests that the quantificational interpretation of the DA 
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sentences is of a modal nature otherwise the anaphoric relation should be blocked. I take this as 
further evidence for a modal analysis of evidential DAs. 
 
5.4.5 The Counterfactual Effect 
Counterfactuals involve situations that are remote from the actual world i.e. they make a 
statement that a given situation is hypothetical not about how it really is in the actual world.  The 
hallmark for counterfactuality is the counterfactual conditionals where the antecedent of the 
conditional does not hold in the real world but in a hypothetical world. In (63), the antecedent of 
the conditional does not hold in the actual world; the speaker implicates that Kangaroos have 
tails, (Kearns 2000: 61, after Lewis 1973). 
 
(63)    If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over. 
 
In (63), the speaker is making a hypothetical statement about kangaroos; the antecedent 
of the conditional is true only in a hypothetical world not the real world because in the real world 
kangaroos normally have tails.  
Other than counterfactual conditionals, JA sometimes uses copular sentences to implicate 
counterfactual interpretations.  However, when this happens, only DA copular is allowed and not 
the perfective copular. In the following situation, Adam is emphasizing a counterfactual effect: 
the proposition expressed by the copular sentence is not true in the real world rather it is 
counterfactual. 
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  (64) Context:  Adam has been working on a very difficult assignment for the last hour. Sami   
                          expected him to be done. Sami does not know that the assignment is  
                          hard. 
      
            Sami:  shuu!! lessa mush mxaliS?!  
                       What!! Still not     finish 
                       ‘What!! You have not finished yet?!’ 
 
            Adam:  (a)  huu      ‘ana  kaayin/baagii  subermaan! 
                               EMPH  I      was-DA            superman 
                               ‘Do you think I am a superman (to finish so fast)!!’ 
 
                        (b)# huu       ‘ana kunt/bageit   subermaan! 
                                EMPH  I     was-PERF      superman 
                               ‘Do you think I am a superman (to finish so fast)!!’ 
 
 
  In (64), Adam is making a hypothetical statement about himself which corresponds to the 
counterfactual conditional: If I were superman, I would finish it fast. The antecedent of the 
conditional does not hold in the actual world rather it is true only in a hypothetical world.     
  It is crucial to our analysis here that only DA copular verbs are allowed in these 
counterfactual contexts and not the perfective copular as evident by the acceptability of (64a) 
with the DA copular kaayin/baagii and the unacceptability of (64b) with the perfective copular 
kunt/bageit. This observation is further exemplified in the following counterfactual contexts 
where the speaker makes a statement that a given situation is hypothetical, not about how it 
really is in the actual world. Only DAs (65a and c) are allowed in these contexts and not 
perfective (65b and d). 
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    (65)  
         (A) Context: the speaker is mocking Sami by asserting the fact that he did not do anything  
                               beneficial. 
 
               (a)  shuu!! galulak                msawee     el-hawayil!! 
                     what!!  Tell-PERF-you  make-DA  the-miracle-PL  
                     ‘Do you think he has done the miracles!!’ 
 
               (b)?? shuu!! galulak                sawwa          el-hawayil!! 
                        what!!  Tell-PERF-you  make-PERF  the-miracle-PL  
                        ‘Do you think he has done the miracles!!’ 
 
       
 (B) Context: the speaker expresses his denial and surprise from Adam who thinks that Sami    
                       spends all of his time studying. 
 
              (c)  shuu!! gallak         sami  raayiH  jaai          3ala el-maktabeh 
                    what!! say-to-you  Sami go-DA  come-DA to    the-library!!    
                   ‘You think that Sami always go to the library!!’ 
 
              (d)??# shuu!! gallak         sami  raaH        ‘eja                3ala el-maktabeh 
                         what!! say-to-you  Sami go-PERF  come-PERF  to    the-library!!    
                        ‘You think that Sami always go to the library!!’ 
 
 
The counterfactual reading of the copular DA is supported by the fact that under a 
counterfactual reading, the copular DA is acceptable only with irrealis markers such as the 
conjunction marker mshaan ‘to’ and not realis markers such as lethalik/laheik  ‘that is why’. The 
contrast in meaning between these two markers is illustrated in (66a and b) where the former 
denotes irrealis reading thus the sentence is acceptable (66a), while the latter denotes realis 
reading and therefore the sentence is unacceptable (66b). 
      (66) 
           (a)  sami  rawaaH                                   3ala ed-daar     bakeer   mshaan yegra,        
                  Sami go-home-PERF.3SG.MASC  to    the-house   early    to          study-INF, 
                  bs  ma  gara. 
                  but not study-PERF 
                  ‘Sami went home early to study, but he did not study.’ 
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           (b)  sami  rawaaH                                  3ala ed-daar    bakeer   lethalik        gara,#                                      
                  Sami go-home-PERF.3SG.MASC to    the-house  early    that is why   study-PERF    
                   bs   ma   gara. 
                   but  not  study-PERF    
                  ‘Sami went home early, that is why he studied,# but he did not study.’ 
 
 
Copular DA in (64a) above is only allowed with the irrealis marker mshaan ‘to’ as in 
(67a) and not the realis marker lethalik/laheik  ‘that is why’ in (67b). 
          (67) 
                 (a)  huu      ‘ana  kaayin/baagii  subermaan mshaan ‘axaliS         bsur3a!! 
                       EMPH  I       was-DA          superman   to           finish-INF   fast 
                      ‘Do you think I am a superman to finish so fast!!’ 
 
                 (b)  huu      ‘ana  kaayin/baagii  subermaan #lethalik        xalaSt            bsur3a!! 
                       EMPH  I       was-DA           superman    that is why  finish-PERF  fast 
                      ‘Do you think I am a superman #that is why I finished so fast!!’ 
 
Note here that the realis marker can only be used under an assertive or realis reading as 
shown by the acceptability of the realis marker lethalik/laheik  ‘that is why’ with the perfective 
copular kaan in (68). 
         (68)  sami kaan ghani, lethalik       en-naas       kaanat tuTulb-uh               maSaari. 
                  Sami was  rich,   that is why the-People  were     ask-IMPERF-him money 
                 ‘Sami was rich, that is why people used to ask him for money.’ 
 
I take the counterfactual effect of DAs in these counterfactual contexts as further evidence for 
the modal reading of evidential DAs in JA. 
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5.5 Possible World Semantics: Kratzer (1981, 1991) 
Semantically, modals have been analyzed as quantifiers over possible worlds (Kripke 
1962, Lewis 1973, Kratzer 1981, 1991). The notion of possible worlds has been introduced to 
capture the meaning that the actual world might have different state of affairs. That is, there are 
infinite numbers of possible ways the actual world can be. If I say for example ‘Sami may come 
tomorrow’, I mean that there is at least one possibility in which Sami might come tomorrow. In 
possible world semantics, this meaning can be captured by saying that ‘there is at least one 
possible world that is compatible to what I know about the real world in which Sami might come 
tomorrow.’ There are also worlds in which Sami does not come tomorrow. In other words, the 
actual world might be a world in which Sami comes tomorrow or a world in which Sami does 
not i.e. there are more than one state of affair in which the actual world can be.  In possible world 
semantics, modals are analyzed as either existential quantifiers i.e. they quantify over some of 
the possible worlds such as the modal ‘might’ or universal quantifiers i.e. they quantify over all 
possible worlds such as the modal ‘must’. The fact that modals are either existential or universal 
has been referred to as ‘quantificational force’. 
According to possible world theory developed by Kratzer (1981 and 1991), modals are 
defined in terms of accessibility relations. Kratzer (1981, 1991) proposes to derive the contextual 
nature of such accessible relations by the notion of conversational backgrounds. There are two 
conversational backgrounds, the modal base and the ordering source. These two conversational 
backgrounds are discussed below.  
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5.5.1 The Modal Base 
In Kratzer’s theory, the modal base is the flavor denoted by the modal and it is either 
lexically or contextually determined. In a sentence like (69a), the modal base of the modal ‘may’ 
can be either a deontic i.e. in view of laws or epistemic i.e. in view of what is known/what the 
speaker knows. However, the modal base can also be lexically determined as in (70a and b). 
 
(69)   John may come. 
 
 (70) 
      (a)   In view of the law, John must wear a uniform.        (Deontic) 
 
      (b)   In view of what I know, John must be in London.   (Epistemic) 
 
 
In (70a), the phrase ‘in view of the law’ gives the modal ‘must’ a deontic interpretation, 
while the phrase ‘in view of what I know’ gives it an epistemic interpretation. That is, in (70a) 
there is a deontic accessible relation while in (70b) it is an epistemic accessible relation. For 
example, in (70b), the phrase ‘in view of what I know’ determines that the modal base is 
epistemic and it refers to the set of facts the speaker knows. In Kratzer’s theory, this modal base 
denotes a function f from worlds to sets of propositions: the function f of the phrase ‘in view of 
what I know’ sets the conversational background as epistemic. In possible world semantics this 
can be captured as: if the modal base is a function f assigned to the world w, then it follows that 
for any world w, f(w) is the set of propositions p which the speaker knows to be true in w.    
The accessibility relation R between two worlds (w, w') is determined as follows (adapted 
from Lee 2011):  
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(71)   
                 (a)   R (w, w') is true iff all propositions that are true in w are also true in w' 
 
                 (b)   Rf (Epis) (w, w'):  w' ∈ ∩ f(w)        
 
The accessibility relation R in (71a) means that w' is accessible from w iff all the 
propositions that are true in w are true in w' as well. Considering the f function of the modal base, 
we can use (71a) to account for the epistemic accessibility relation in (70b) as shown in (71b). 
The lexical entry in (71b) states that the accessibility relation R determined by an epistemic 
modal base f  between w and w' is true iff all propositions that are known to be true in w are true 
in w' as well. As discussed earlier, f(w) is the set of propositions p that the speaker knows to be 
true in w:  f(w)= { p1, p2, p3 …..}. In the standards of Kratzer’s possible world theory, each p is a 
set of possible worlds: w ∈ p; it follows therefore that p1 for example consists of ={wA, wB, wC}, 
p2 ={wA, wB, wC, wD}, p3 ={wA, wB}. This means that f(w) is a set of sets of worlds. Following 
Portner (2009) and for the sake of simplicity, we will intersect all propositions in this set as 
follows:  ∩ f(w) = {p1∩ p2, ∩p3…} which equals ∩ f(w) ={wA, wB, wC} ∩ {wA, wB, wC, wD} ∩ 
{wA, wB}. That is, ∩ f(w) is the set of all accessible worlds in which all the propositions of f(w) 
are true; it follows then that  ∩f(w)= {wA, wB}. In other words, {wA, wB} is the set of all 
accessible worlds in which all the propositions of f(w) are true. Put differently, {wA, wB} is the set 
of worlds w' epistemically accessible from w. We can formulate this semantics using (71) above: 
        (72)  Rf (Epis) (w, {wA, wB}):  {wA, wB}∈ ∩ f(w) 
 
 Let w' represents the set {wA, wB}, then: 
       (73)  Rf (Epis) (w, w'):  w'∈ ∩ f(w) 
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The lexical entry in (73) can represent the semantics of (70b) as follows: in all the 
possible worlds w' that are accessible from the speaker’s knowledge f(w), the proposition p ‘john 
is in London’ is true in w'. 
 
5.5.2 The Ordering Source 
The second conversational background is the ordering source g. The ordering source is a 
tool that imposes a certain ranking or ordering on the worlds in the modal base f. This means that 
the two conversational backgrounds interact: the modal base comprises worlds that represent 
certain facts known to the speaker or true in a given law or regulations; the ordering source 
imposes an ideal ordering to those worlds according to the norms, ideals, beliefs, normal course 
of events in the world.  
Formally speaking, the ordering source is a function from worlds to set of propositions 
like the modal base f. If we assume that the ordering source g is a function assigned to the world 
w, then it follows that g(w) is the set of propositions that imposes the ordering  ≤ g(w). This 
ordering relation is defined as follows in (74). 
 
        (74)   ∀ w', w'' ∈ W: w' ≤ g(w) w'' iff {p: p ∈ g(w): w''∈ p} ⊆ {p: p ∈ g(w): w' ∈ p} 
 
           The ordering relation in (74) states that for all the possible worlds (w', w'') in the set W, w' 
is better or closer to the ideal than w'' iff all the propositions that are true in w'' are also true in w'. 
Therefore, w' is more highly ranked or ranked the same as w''. To put differently, w' ≤ g(w) w'' 
means that w' satisfies all the propositions in g(w) as does w'' (i.e. they are equally ideal); or that 
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w' satisfies more propositions in g(w) than w'' i.e. w' is closer to the ideal or better than w'' (the 
propositions that are satisfied in w'' are a subset of those satisfied in w' ).  
       The interpretation of the ordering source relation is the clearest under a deontic modal 
reading as in (75). 
(75)   You must drive properly. 
 
Let us suppose that in (75) g is a deontic conversational background which comprises set 
of propositions that are true according to a certain law or regulations. Thus, these propositions 
are a set of driving regulations that any driver needs to follow if s/he wants to drive properly.
18
  
Let g(w) comprises the following propositions: p1 = you need to have a driving license,  p2 = you 
need to have insurance, p3 = you need to wear a seatbelt; g(w)= { p1, p2, p3}. The ordering source 
g ranks all possible worlds from the most ideal to the least ideal as shown in Table (3). 
Table (3) The Ordering of Possible Worlds According to the Propositions in g(w) 
     w   p1 p2 p3 
w1  1 1              1 
            w2  1 1              0 
            w3  1 0              1 
           w4  0 1              1 
           w5  1 0              0 
           w6  0 1              0 
          w7  0 0              1 
         w8  0 0              0 
                                                          
18
 Example is taken from Peterson (2010: 174, adapted from Nauze 2008). 
324 
 
According to the ordering in Table (3), the worlds in which all the propositions {p1, p2, 
p3} are true are the best worlds or the high-ranked worlds; this is exemplified in w1. The least 
ranked worlds are those in which none of the propositions {p1, p2, p3} are true as in w8. For 
instance, the ordering relation w1 ≤ g(w) w3 states that w1  is better than w3 because w1 is a world 
in which all the regulations are obeyed (i.e. p1, p2, p3 are obeyed) as contrasted to w3 in which 
only two regulations are obeyed (i.e. only  p1 and p3 are obeyed). In other words, w1 is closer to 
g(w) than w3: a world such as w1, where you have driving license, you have insurance and you 
wear seatbelt is closer to the norm or ideal g(w) than a world such as w3 where you only have a 
driving license and wear a seatbelt but not having insurance. This ordering relation is 
exemplified in (76). 
(76)   ∀ w1, w3 ∈ W: w1 ≤ g(w) w3: {p: p ∈ g(w): w3∈ p} ⊆ {p: p ∈ g(w): w1 ∈ p} 
 
The ordering relation in (76) states that w1 is better than w3 because all the propositions 
that are true in w3 (i.e. p1 and p3) are also true in w1. That is to say p1 and p3 in w3 are subset of 
the propositions  p1, p2, p3 in w1 but not the other way around. Also, some worlds in Table (3) are 
not comparable. For example, w3 and w4 cannot be ordered by g(w) because driving without a 
driving license as in w3 does not comply more to g(w) than driving without insurance as in w4. 
Given the two conversational backgrounds, modal base and ordering source, as well as 
the quantificational force of modals, the following is a semantic denotation of the modals must 
and may in English as represented in Kratzer’s possible world theory (c stands for context, O 
stands for the ordering source relation g(w) and B stands for the modal base relation f(w)).  
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        (77)  
               (a)  [must]
c,w
 = ∀w'[w'∈ Og(w)(B(w) ) → p(w') = 1] 
 
               (b)  [may]
c,w
 =  ∃w'[w'∈ Og(w)(B(w) ) ˄ p(w') = 1]          
                                                                                                  (Adapted from Peterson 2010:173)  
 
 
The denotation in (77a) represents a human necessity where p is true in all the accessible 
worlds w' from f(w) which come closest to the ideal represented by g(w). The denotation in (77b) 
represents a human possibility where p is true in some accessible worlds w' from f(w) which 
come closest to the ideal represented by g(w). 
 
5.6 Modal Analysis of Evidential DAs 
Given the empirical evidence of modal interpretation presented in section 5.4 and the 
theoretical grounding of possible world semantics in section 5.5, I analyze evidential DAs as 
encoding a modal meaning based on the two conversational backgrounds, the modal base and the 
ordering source in section 5.6.1. In section 5.6.2, I propose a formal semantic analysis of the 
modal component of DAs; I also incorporate the temporal relation in the proposed semantic 
formalization and then provide a semantic derivation. 
 
5.6.1 Possible World Semantics: Application 
The discussion in the previous section showed that Kratzer (1981, 1991) defines modal 
interpretation in terms of an accessibility relation which is determined by a modal base and an 
ordering source. In the remainder of this section, I apply these two notions to DAs in JA to 
capture their modal semantics. 
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5.6.1.1 The Modal Base 
I argue that the modal base of evidential DAs is a set of propositions p that constitutes the 
available indirect evidence which the speaker perceives at evidence acquisition time, EAT 
(Izvorski 1997). This means that modal base in evidential DA contexts is a function from world-
time pairs to set of propositions rather than a function from worlds to set of propositions as in the 
standards of Kratzer’s theory (Lee 2011 and Smirnova 2012).  In other words,  f  is the function 
that assigns to every possible world the set of propositions p which characterizes the indirect 
evidence the speaker has at EAT: f(w,EAT). Suppose that f(w,EAT) consists of the following 
propositions {p1, p2}: f(w,EAT) = {p1, p2}. In other words, f(w,EAT) is the set of propositions p1, 
p2 which constitute the indirect evidence a speaker has at EAT. In the standards of Kratzer’s 
possible world theory, each p is a set of possible worlds: w ∈ p; it follows therefore that p1 for 
example ={wA, wB, wC}, p2 ={wA, wB, wC, wD}. We will intersect all propositions in f(w,EAT) as 
follows:  ∩ f(w,EAT) = {p1∩ p2} which equals ∩ f(w,EAT)  ={wA, wB, wC} ∩ {wA, wB, wC, wD}. 
That is, ∩ f(w,EAT) is the set of all accessible worlds in which all the propositions (p1, p2) of 
f(w,EAT) are true; it follows then that  ∩ f(w,EAT)={ wA, wB, wC}. In other words, {wA, wB, wC} 
is the set of all accessible worlds in which all the propositions of  f (w,EAT) are true. 
The discussion above shows that the type of accessibility relation which holds in the 
modal base is of epistemic nature: the relation which holds between w and w' is true iff all the 
propositions that the speaker knows in w at EAT are also true in w'. Thus, the epistemic 
accessibility relation for the modal base of the evidential DAs corresponds to: ‘Given what i (the 
speaker) knows at EAT p.  
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The context given in (78) demonstrates how f (w,EAT), the modal base, of DA assigns to 
every world a set of  p that constitutes indirect evidence; the DA in (78) is used to express a 
consequent-state inferential reading, CSI. 
     (78)  Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that   
                             there appears to be some luggage in the door step and the light is on. Then,   
                             Adam tells Sami: 
 
                   (a)  majdi  jaai. 
                         Majdi come-DA 
                        ‘[I infer that] Majdi has come.’  
 
 
 The modal base f (w,EAT) of this inferential reading is given in (79). 
     (79)  
           (a)   f (w,EAT) = {p1, p2}: 
 
                  -  p1 =  Luggage is on doorstep 
 
                  - p2 =  Light is on 
 
              It follows that f (w,EAT)= {Luggage is on doorstep and light is on} 
  
 
 
           (b)  ∩ f(w,EAT) = {p1∩ p2} which equals ∩ f(w,EAT)  ={wA, wB, wC} ∩ {wA, wB, wC, wD}=      
                 {wA, wB, wC}: 
 
              - wA: Majdi has come home. 
 
              - wB: Lights of Majdi’s house are always on and his luggage has been brought before he  
                      arrived home. 
 
              - wC: Majdi rushed to the airport and he forgot to switch off lights and take his luggage. 
 
              - wD: When Majdi left to the airport, there was a power cut. Now, the power is on again,  
                       that is why the lights are on. 
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In (78), the speaker perceives indirect evidence i.e. the light is on and luggage is on the 
doorstep at EAT. Each piece of evidence corresponds to a proposition p that the speaker knows 
to be true in f (w,EAT) at EAT:  p1 = Luggage is at doorstep, and  p2 = Light is on. As discussed 
earlier, the modal base f (w,EAT) comprises the set of propositions that characterize the indirect 
evidence perceived by the speaker at EAT; it follows therefore that  f (w,EAT) = {p1, p2} which 
equals  f (w,EAT)= {luggage is on doorstep and light is on}. This meaning is captured by (79a). 
The speaker then uses this evidence at EAT to make inference given by the DA jaai ‘has 
come’. In other words, given the fact that at EAT the speaker perceives that the light is on and 
there is luggage at doorstep, he would then come up with a hypothesis about what has happened 
with respect to this evidence at EAT. This would give the speaker multiple scenarios or possible 
worlds as indicated by the set of possible worlds given under {wA, wB, wC, wD} in (79b). For 
example, considering the evidence at EAT (light is on and luggage is at doorstep), one possible 
scenario that explains what happened with respect to this evidence is that ‘someone has come 
home’ as given by wA, so on and so forth.  
One question remains here, which is ‘what is the set of accessible worlds in which all 
propositions of f (w,EAT) are true?’ in other words, what are the worlds, among those given 
under {wA, wB, wC, wD}, in which both p1 = Luggage is at doorstep, and  p2 = Light is on are true? 
The answer comes from the definition of accessibility relation given in (71a), repeated here as 
(80). 
         (80)    R (w, w') is true iff all propositions that are true in w are also true in w'. 
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That is, {wA, wB, wC, wD} are accessible from f (w,EAT) iff all propositions (p1 = Luggage 
is at doorstep, and  p2 = Light is on) that are true in f (w,EAT) are also true in each world in {wA, 
wB, wC, wD}. A closer look at (79b) reveals the fact that only worlds {wA, wB, wC} are accessible 
from f (w,EAT). That is because all the propositions p1 ( Luggage is at doorstep)  and  p2 ( Light 
is on) in the modal base f (w,EAT) are true in each world in {wA, wB, wC). However, wD is not 
among those accessible worlds because only p2 (the light is on) is true in this world and not p1 
(luggage is at doorstep). It follows then that the set of all accessible worlds in which all 
propositions of  f (w,EAT) are true is {wA, wB, wC): ∩ f(w,EAT)= {wA, wB, wC). This discussion is 
captured by the notation given in (79b).  
The same logic also applies to the modal interpretation denoted by DAs under a result-
state inferential reading, RSI. In sentence (81), the DA is used to trigger inference about ERs (the 
doer of the action, the patient/theme or the manner of the action). In (81) the speaker is making 
inference about the doer of the action i.e. who parked the car (See section 4.4.3.4 chapter 4 for 
detailed discussion). 
         (81)  majdi     Saaf          es-sayarah. 
                  Majdi     park-DA  the-car        
                 ‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
                  Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’  
 
 
In (81), the speaker perceives a car parked at EAT. He uses this evidence to make 
inference about who parked the car: He infers that it is Majdi who parked it. Let us assume that 
the speaker knows that the following propositions are true too: {Speaker knows that the car 
belongs to Majdi; he knows that Adam and Sami are his friends; he knows that Majdi allows 
only his friends to drive his car (Adam and Sami), he also knows that Ali is not his friend}. The 
modal base f (w,EAT) of this inferential reading is given in (82). 
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     (82)  
           (a)   f (w,EAT) = {p1}: 
 
                  -  p1 =  Majdi’s car is parked 
 
                  It follows that f (w,EAT)= {Majdi’s car is parked}   
 
 
           (b)  ∩ f(w,EAT) = {∩p1} which equals ∩ f(w,EAT)  ={wA, wB, wC}: 
 
              - wA: Majdi has parked the car. 
 
              - wB: Adam has parked the car. 
 
              - wC: Sami has parked the car. 
 
              - wD: Ali has parked the car. 
 
In (81), the speaker perceives indirect evidence i.e. Majdi’s car parked at EAT. This 
evidence corresponds to a proposition p that the speaker knows to be true in f (w,EAT) at EAT:  
p1 = Majdi’s car is parked. Since the modal base f (w,EAT) comprises the set of propositions that 
characterize the indirect evidence perceived by the speaker at EAT; it follows therefore that  f 
(w,EAT) = {p1} which equals  f (w,EAT)= { Majdi’s car parked}. This meaning is captured by 
(82a). 
The speaker then uses this evidence at EAT to make inference given by the DA. In other 
words, given the fact that at EAT the speaker perceives that Majdi’s car is parked, he would then 
come up with a hypothesis about who has parked the car with respect with this evidence at EAT. 
This would give the speaker multiple scenarios or possible worlds as indicated by the set of 
possible worlds given under {wA, wB, wC, wD} in (82b).  For example, one possible scenario is 
that ‘Sami has parked the car’ as given by wC. In (82), only worlds {wA, wB, wC} are accessible 
from f (w,EAT) that is because the proposition p1 ( Majdi’s car has been parked) in the modal 
base f (w,EAT) is true in each world in {wA, wB, wC):  p1 (Majdi’s car has been parked) is true in 
331 
 
wA where Majdi is the one who parked the car (since it is his car, it follows that he might have 
parked it); p1 is also true in wB and wC where Majdi’s friends, Adam and Sami, parked Majdi’s 
car respectively (since Majdi only allows his friends to drive his car and Adam and Sami are his 
friends, it follows that they might have parked his car). However, wD is not among those 
accessible worlds because p1 is not true in wD: given the fact that only Majdi’s friends can drive 
the car, Ali is ruled out because he is not a friend of Majdi. It follows then that the set of all 
accessible worlds in which all propositions of f (w,EAT) are true is {wA, wB, wC}: ∩ f(w,EAT)= 
{wA, wB, wC) as demonstrated in (82b).  
So far, I have only discussed the modal base of the evidential utterances in (78) and (81). 
However, the propositions that are asserted in (78) and (81) are true only in wA and not in wB, wC:  
the asserted proposition in (78) is true in wA where ‘Majdi has come home’ (as denoted by the 
DA jaai ‘has come’) and not in wB, wC; also, the asserted proposition in (81) is true in wA where 
‘Majdi has parked the car’ (as denoted by sentence (81) ‘majdi Saaf es-sayarah’) and not in wB 
or wC.  In other words, if {wA, wB, wC} is the set of accessible worlds in which the propositions in 
f(w,EAT) are true for sentences (78) and (81); then the question that might arise here is ‘why did 
the speaker pick out wA over wB and wC ?’. To answer this question, we need an ordering source 
that can restrict the ranking of these accessible worlds.  
 
 5.6.1.2 The Ordering Source 
Similarly to modal base, I argue that the ordering source is a function from world-time 
pairs to a set of propositions rather than a function from worlds to a set of propositions as in 
Kratzer’s theory.  I further argue that the ordering source g(w,EAT) of evidential DAs is of a 
stereotypical (ST) and doxatic (DOX) nature: gST/DOX(w,EAT) (Peterson 2010, Lee 2011 and  
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Smirnova 2012). In Kratzer’s theory, a stereotypical ordering source is a set of propositions 
which represent the normal course of events or ideals that are fixed with regards to the use of 
things in the actual world. The interpretation of modal base can also be conditioned to the 
speaker’s set of beliefs. This meaning corresponds to a doxatic ordering source. In other words, 
the doxatic ordering source imposes a restriction on the worlds in the modal base determined by 
ideals conditioned by the speaker’s belief state. The contrast between the two is given in example 
(83), (Adapted from Peterson 2010:176). 
      (83)    John must be fishing. 
 
           a- f(w)EPISTEMIC: { John’s rubber boots are missing; his truck is not in the driveway; it  
                                                is fishing season} 
 
           b- g(w) STEREOTYPICAL: { Rubber boots are used for fishing; rubber boots are not   
                                                               ideal for hunting or cherry-picking} 
 
           c- g(w) DOXATIC:{ Knowing how much John likes fishing} 
 
 
The stereotypical ordering source restricts the worlds in the modal base in (83a) by the 
set of propositions that characterize fixed ideas about how things are used in the actual world 
such as the fact that rubber boots are normally used for fishing not cherry-picking or hunting 
(83b). On the other hand, the doxatic ordering source imposes restriction on the worlds in the 
modal base depending on the speaker’s belief state such as the fact that the speaker knows that 
John likes fishing (Peterson 2010).  
I argue that with evidential DAs the speaker uses the ST and DOX ordering source to 
rank the worlds in the modal base f (w,EAT). In other words, the speaker uses all the ideals set by 
the normal course of events (ST) or those which he believes to be true in his belief state (DOX) 
at EAT to rank the accessible worlds in the modal base. Following Lee (2011), I propose that the 
ordering source for evidential DAs is gST/DOX(w,EAT).  Let us examine how the ordering source 
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ranks the worlds in the modal base in (79) and (82) given in the previous section. I will start with 
example (79). 
As discussed earlier in example (79), the set of accessible worlds  in which all 
propositions of  f (w,EAT) are true is {wA, wB, wC): ∩ f(w,EAT)= {wA, wB, wC}. However, the 
proposition that is asserted in the evidential utterance in (78a) is true only in wA. This means that 
we need the ordering source to restrict the ranking of the accessible worlds in {wA, wB, wC} more 
properly: we need a tool that picks out the best world or the most ideal world, in this case wA. 
Given the fact that the ordering source is a set of propositions, the ordering source 
gST/DOX(w,EAT) for the utterance given in (78a) is given in (84). 
 
     (84)   gST/DOX(w,EAT) = { p3, p4, p5} 
 
             -  p3 = If light is on and luggage is at doorstep, then someone has come home.  
 
            -   p4 = Lights of Majdi’s house are not always on; and he is a person who likes to  
                        keep his luggage with him everywhere he goes.  
 
            -  p5 = Majdi is usually a careful person; he does not forget to switch off lights and  
                       neither does he forget his stuff. 
 
 
The set of propositions in gST/DOX(w,EAT) imposes a ranking on the set of accessible 
worlds {wA, wB, wC) in that wA is picked out as the best world or the closest world to the ideals set 
by gST/DOX(w,EAT). That is to say, wA is the only world that is compatible with the set of 
propositions in gST/DOX(w,EAT). If we consider wB, we can see that this world is ruled out by p4. 
The same thing applies to wC which is ruled out by p5. However, all the propositions {p1, p2, p3}  
are true in wA; it follows then that wA is picked out as the most ideal world that corresponds to 
proposition set in  gST/DOX(w,EAT). To put differently, all the propositions that are true in wB and 
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wC are subset of the propositions that are true in wA. It follows then that wA is the best-ranked 
world according to the definition of ordering source given in (74) earlier, repeated here as (85). 
 
      (85)   ∀ w', w'' ∈ W: w' ≤ g(w) w'' iff {p: p ∈ g(w): w''∈ p} ⊆ {p: p ∈ g(w): w' ∈ p} 
 
         To apply on our example here: 
 
 
      (86)   ∀ wA, wB, wC ∈ f(w,EAT): wA ≤ gST/DOX(w,EAT)  wB, wC iff {p: p ∈ gST/DOX(w,EAT): wB, wC  
                  ∈ p} ⊆ {p: p ∈ gST/DOX(w,EAT): wA ∈ p} 
 
 
     According to the above discussion, it follows then that: 
 
     (87)  wA ≤ gST/DOX(w,EAT)  wB, wC 
 
 
Putting together these two pieces (the modal base and the ordering source), we can say: in 
the evidential utterance in (78a), the speaker perceives indirect evidence at EAT that is specified 
in the modal base. The speaker then thinks of hypotheses that explain the course of events with 
regard to the available evidence at EAT. These hypotheses correspond to multiple scenarios or 
possible worlds as in {wA, wB, wC} in the modal base. These worlds are then ranked by the 
speaker according to the ideals or his set of belief at EAT i.e. according to the ordering source. 
Having all these considerations together, the speaker comes up with the most ideal scenario or 
world that suits the ideals or his belief  in the ordering source at EAT, in this case the scenario 
given in wA i.e. ‘Majdi has come home’. 
The example in (81) is semantically derivable in the same fashion. As discussed earlier in 
(82), the set of accessible worlds  in which all propositions of  f (w,EAT) are true is {wA, wB, wC): 
∩ f(w,EAT)= {wA, wB, wC}. However, the proposition that is asserted in the evidential utterance 
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in (81) is true only in wA. This means that we need the ordering source to restrict the ranking of 
the accessible worlds in {wA, wB, wC} more properly: we need a tool that picks out the best world 
or the most ideal world, in this case wA. Given the fact that the ordering source is a set of 
propositions, the ordering source gST/DOX(w,EAT) for the utterance in (81) is given in (88). 
 
     (88)   gST/DOX(w,EAT) = { p2} 
 
 
             -  p2= If the car belongs to X, then X is the one who drives/parks it.              
 
gST/DOX(w,EAT) in (88) imposes a ranking on the set of accessible worlds {wA, wB, wC) in 
that wA is picked out as the best world or the closest world to the ideals set by gST/DOX(w,EAT). 
That is because according to the ordering source in (88) and given the fact that the speaker 
knows that the car belongs to Majdi as assumed earlier, it follows then that the best ranked world 
is the one given in wA i.e. Majdi has parked the car.  If we consider wB and wC, we can see that 
these worlds are ruled out by p2 in the ordering source: the car does not belong to Adam or Sami; 
therefore, wB and wC  are ruled out.    
In this context, we can say that the speaker perceives indirect evidence at EAT that is 
specified in the modal base. The speaker then thinks of hypotheses that explain the course of 
events with regards to the available evidence at EAT, in this case the one who parked the car. 
These hypotheses correspond to multiple scenarios or possible worlds as in {wA, wB, wC} in the 
modal base. These worlds are then ranked by the speaker according to the ideals or his set of 
beliefs at EAT i.e. according to the ordering source. Putting all these considerations together, the 
speaker comes up with the most ideal scenario or world that suits the ideals or his beliefs in the 
ordering source, in this case the scenario given in wA i.e. ‘Majdi has parked the car’. 
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5.6.2 Compositional Analysis 
5.6.2.1 Semantic Formalization 
In order to capture the modal interpretation of evidential DAs discussed in the previous 
sections, I propose the following semantic denotation given in (89).  
 
 (89)   [[DA]]= λp λw λEAT [w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w,EAT)) → p(w')(EAT)]] 
 
The semantic denotation in (89) states that the proposition p in the scope of the evidential 
DA is true in all the accessible worlds w' that are compatible with what the speaker knows in the 
actual world at EAT. To put this differently, p in the scope of the evidential is true in a world w' 
with respect to the modal base f (w,EAT) and the ordering source  gST/DOX(w,EAT) iff p is true in 
all the worlds w' that are epistemically accessible from w and are the closest to the ideals and 
speaker’s belief with respect to the indirect evidence at EAT. The proposed semantic notation is 
compatible with the discussion of possible world semantics laid out in the previous sections: 
according to the semantic denotation in (89), there is a set of possible worlds w' in which all the 
facts known by the speaker in the modal base (i.e. indirect evidence) are true; these worlds are 
then ranked by the ideals and speaker’s belief in the ordering source; the worlds that are ranked 
higher (closer to the ideals) are the set of worlds in which p is true.  
The proposition p in the scope of the evidential modal component in (89) varies 
depending on what inferential reading is used: under RSI (Result-state) only ERs (event 
arguments such as doer of action, theme and manner of action) are targeted by speaker’s 
inference. However, in CSI (Consequent-state) the event itself can be target of inference (see 
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section 4.4.3.4, chapter 4 for detailed discussion). The semantic denotations for this contrast 
between the two inferential readings are proposed in (90).  
       
      (90)   
           (a)  RSI:   [[DA]]= λp λw λEAT [w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w,EAT)) → p(ERs)(w')(EAT)]] 
 
           (b)  CSI:   [[DA]]= λp λw λEAT [w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w,EAT)) → p(e)(w')(EAT)]] 
 
 
The notation in (90a) asserts that under RSI the proposition p in the scope of the belief 
world includes only ERs (event arguments such as the doer of the action, the object, etc...). 
However, in (90b) the proposition p in the scope of the belief world includes the event itself 
since the event can be target of inference under CSI reading. I will provide discussion on how the 
above denotations derive semantic explanation of RSI and CSI examples in the next section. 
The modal component in (89) encodes a universal quantificational force i.e. it states that 
the p is true in all the accessible worlds w' that are compatible with what the speaker knows in 
the actual world at EAT. Note here that the quantificational force of evidential DAs in JA is not 
lexically specified as it is the case for example with English modals. In English, the modal must 
encodes a universal or strong modal force since it is used to indicate necessity interpretation. 
However, the modal might specifies a weaker or existential modal force since it is used to 
indicate possibility interpretation. Another difference lies in the fact that the modal base with 
DAs, unlike English modals, is lexically specified i.e. the modal base has an epistemic nature 
which is compatible with the evidential (knowledge of the speaker) reading.
19
  This contrasts 
with English modals where the modal base is ambiguous with a range of different interpretations: 
epistemic, deontic, dynamic, etc… One question remains that is ‘what accounts for the universal 
quantificational force of the modal reading in (89)?’ Most of the evidential systems which have 
                                                          
19
 See Izvorski (1997) for more discussion on the relation between epistemic and evidentials.  
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received formal modal analysis in the literature have proposed a universal quantificational force 
for the modal interpretation of the evidentials at issue (cf. Peterson 2010, Lee 2011, Smirnova 
2012, Matthewson et al. 2007 among others).  I follow this line of research in proposing a default 
universal modal force for the evidential DA in JA. Another motivation comes from the fact 
modal operators with non-overt modal force (modal force is not overtly expressed) such as 
attitude verbs or conditional clauses (cf. Kratzer 1986) have normally been analyzed as 
restrictors of universal force by default (Izvorski 1997). The universal quantificational force of 
evidential DAs is consistent with those non-overt modal operators since as discussed above 
modal force with DAs is not lexically specified i.e. the modal force is not overtly expressed. 
Finally, in the semantic denotation in (89), the two conversational backgrounds are 
viewed as functions of world-time pairs to sets of propositions. In other words, the temporal 
component specified by the use of EAT plays a central role in the modal interpretation of 
evidential DAs. Furthermore, and as discussed in chapter 4, the temporal relations, namely 
anterior and posterior relations, are also important in establishing the inferential/modal reading 
of evidential DAs. I will address this issue in the next section where I incorporate the temporal 
component into the formal semantic analysis of DAs proposed in (89).   
5.6.2.2 Temporal Incorporation 
 
Evidential DAs involve a temporal component in their semantics as discussed in chapter 
4. Evidential DAs in JA introduce a temporal contribution to the indirect evidence requirement: 
the indirect evidence is specified temporally rather than morphologically. The indirect evidence 
induced by DAs is a result of two temporal relations, anterior and posterior relations: the fact that 
the event is either in anterior or posterior relation to EAT guarantees that the speaker does not 
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perceive the event; in other words, the event is outside the domain of EAT (See section 4.4.2.2, 
chapter 4 for detailed discussion).  
Moreover, I have argued that the indirect evidence, which is specified by anterior and 
posterior temporal relations, is what triggers the inferential reading with DAs. The reasoning of 
this is as follows: The fact that the event is either anterior or posterior to EAT guarantees that the 
speaker does not perceive the event; rather, the speaker uses the indirect evidence (i.e. the 
evidence available at EAT) as his/her basis to make inference about the anterior or posterior 
event (See section 4.4.3. chapter 4 for detailed discussion). 
The incorporation of the EAT in the temporal presentation of DAs is crucial since it 
contributes to the evidential meaning of DAs i.e. EAT includes the indirect evidence which is 
necessary to establish the indirect evidential meaning of DAs. It also contributes to the relative 
temporal interpretation of evidential DAs as shown in chapter 4. Putting all the pieces together, 
EAT, TU, anterior and posterior relation, and relative tense, I have assumed an intentional 
analysis of temporal representation i.e. AT relation (Condoravdi 2002). An AT relation consists 
of four sentences radicals: P a property of eventuality, t an interval or reference time of 
eventuality, w the world at which the eventuality holds and e the event. The temporal relation for 
locating eventualities with respect to its reference time is solely dependent on the eventuality 
properties as specified in the lexical entries in (141 ch.4), repeated here as (91). 
 
    (91)  AT(t,w,P):   
            (a)  Eventive = ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ t]                 
            (b)  Stative = ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w)° t]          (Condoravdi 2002:70) 
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I proposed the following semantic representations to account for all the temporal readings 
of DAs, repeated here as (92) and (93). 
 
(92)  Anterior Temporal Relation: 
         (a)    EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
         (b)    EAT ˂ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
         (c)    TU ˂ EAT & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
 
 
 
(93)  Posterior Temporal Relation: 
        (a)    EAT ⊆ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
        (b)    EAT ˂ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
        (c)    TU ˂ EAT & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
 
 
The aforementioned discussion asserts the fact that temporal specification is crucial in the 
establishment of evidential (i.e. indirect evidence) and modal reading (i.e. the speaker does not 
perceive the event because the event is either anterior or posterior therefore he makes an 
inference about it). It follows therefore that the inclusion of the temporal component is essential 
for any evidential or modal analysis of DAs. To this end, I incorporate the temporal relations 
proposed in (92) and (93) into the modal denotations I proposed in (90a and b). Before I do that, 
two points are in order. First, it is worth mentioning that the semantic representations of temporal 
relations in (92) and (93) are only semantically felicitous when EAT is either at TU as shown in 
(92a and93a) or prior to EAT (92b and 93b), but not when EAT is posterior to TU (92c and 93c).  
In other words, the posterior temporal relation between EAT and TU (TU<EAT) pertains to 
contexts where the speaker makes inference about an anterior or posterior event based on the 
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assumption that he will acquire the relevant evidence in the future. Evidential DAs are not 
allowed in these contexts where the speaker makes the evidential implication first then acquires 
the evidence as shown in (94). This temporal configuration is semantically possible but 
pragmatically implausible as shown in (94). 
 
      (94)  ‘ana bukrah     raH aguul  ennuh majdi  Saaf es-sayarah,  bs mumkin 3ali elli  
               I      tomorrow will  say    that     Maji  park-DA the-car, but might   Ali who  
               Safha. 
               park-PERF-it 
               ‘[??/# Tomorrow, I will infer that] Majdi will have parked the car but maybe Ali who   
                         would have parked it.’ 
 
 
Sentence (94) is not acceptable in an inferential context where speaker makes inference 
about the event based on evidence that will be available at hand. This sentence shows that in 
order to express an indirect evidential reading using DAs in JA, the speaker is supposed to have 
acquired the evidence first in order for him to express the evidential reading and not the other 
way around. It follows, therefore, that the lexical entries given in (92c and 93c) are not 
incorporated in the modal denotation in (90a and b). 
Second, the semantic denotation in (90a) shows that under RSI only ERs (event 
arguments such as doer of action, theme and manner of action) are targeted by speaker’s 
inference. However, the semantic presentation of temporal relation in (92) and (93) includes only 
event (e) as its main argument and not ERs. Therefore, I propose the following lexical entry in 
(95) to be included in the semantic representation of temporal relations, especially anterior 
relation, to account for the ERs inference under RSI. The motivation for including (95) in 
anterior rather than posterior relation comes from the fact the RSI is compatible only with 
anterior relation rather than posterior relation as will be shown shortly.  
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        (95)  ER ∈ P (e) 
Based on this discussion, I redefine the semantic representation of the anterior temporal 
relation (92) under RSI as in (96A), while maintain the same representation under CSI (96B). 
The semantic representation of posterior temporal relation is also maintained as in (97).  
 
(96)   Anterior Temporal Relation (final): 
 
     (A) RSI: 
            (a)    EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T & ER ∈ P (e)] 
            (b)    EAT ˂ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T & ER ∈ P (e)]        
 
     (B) CSI: 
            (a)    EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
            (b)    EAT ˂ TU & T ˂ EAT & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
 
 
 
(97)  Posterior Temporal Relation (final): 
 
        (a)    EAT ⊆ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P): ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
        (b)    EAT ˂ TU & EAT ˂ T & AT(t,w,P):  ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/°  T] 
 
The representations in (96) and (97) constitute the final version of temporal relations: 
they include the lexical entry (95) needed to account for the inference under RSI as in (96A); the 
lexical entries given in (92c and 93c) are ruled out due to the pragmatic implausibility as 
discussed earlier.   
Now, I incorporate the final versions of the temporal relations given in (96) and (97) into 
the proposed modal denotation given in (90 a and b) as shown in (98 a and b); (≤  captures the 
past (EAT ˂ TU) and present (EAT ⊆TU ) relation between EAT and TU).  
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(98) 
      (a)  RSI:   
       [[DA]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT ≤ TU & T ˂ EAT & ∃e [P(w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆/° T                     
                      & ER ∈ P (e)] & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w,EAT)) → ∃ER[P (w')(ER)]]] 
 
 
    (b)  CSI: 
 
     [[DA]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT≤ TU & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w,EAT)) → (T ˂ EAT/EAT ˂ T   
                  & ∃e [P(w') (e) &  (e, w') ⊆/° T])]] 
 
   
The semantic denotations in (98a and b) provide a unified semantic account of DAs in 
JA: they comprise the modal and temporal components. The temporal component is provided by 
temporal relation between EAT and TU (present or past) and EAT and T (anterior or posterior). 
The modal component is represented by the universally-quantified conjunct which includes the 
modal base and the ordering source, (f, gST/DOX). The significance of this denotation lies in the fact 
that there exists an interaction between the modal and the temporal components and that both 
components contribute to the inferential evidential meaning of DAs under RSI and CSI. 
The semantic denotations in (98a and b) are contrastive. First, under RSI (98a), the event 
(e) is not embedded in the belief world i.e. not embedded in the universally-quantified conjunct. 
That is because, as discussed earlier in chapter 4, under RSI the event is realized in the actual 
world i.e. it cannot be target of inference.  However, under CSI (98b), the event is part of the 
belief world since it can be target of inference. Second, contra to CSI where anterior and 
posterior relations are used (i.e. T ˂ EAT and EAT ˂ T respectively), only the anterior temporal 
relation (i.e. T ˂ EAT) is used under RSI (98a). This is due to the nature of the result-state which 
is only compatible with the anterior rather than the posterior temporal relation. That is to say, my 
analysis of RSI in (98a) appeals to our world knowledge with regard to the type of evidence 
available or not in a particular temporal relation: we cannot have a result-state (which 
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characterizes the evidence in my analysis) of an event that has not occurred yet much like, in a 
similar fashion, we cannot have a direct sensory evidence of an event that has not yet occurred as 
is the case with direct evidentiality. In other words, considering the entailing relation between 
the result-state and event, result-state is an outcome of an event that has already occurred; this 
entails that for the EAT to hold a result-state, there needs to be an event that has already occurred 
prior to EAT (see chapter 4, section 4.4.3.4 for detailed discussion).   
Next, I use the proposed semantic denotations in (98a and b) to provide a semantic 
derivation of some illustrative examples. 
 
5.6.2.3 Semantic Derivation 
Sentence (81), repeated here as (99), represents RSI reading as discussed earlier. 
         (99)  majdi     Saaf          es-sayarah. 
                  Majdi     park-DA  the-car        
                 ‘Evidently, Majdi has parked the car.’ 
                  Intended: ‘[I infer that] it is Majdi who parked the car.’ 
 
 
The semantic derivation of this sentence is given below. 
 
First, this sentence comprises a temporal component: the speaker acquires the evidence 
(in this case car parked) at EAT. Let us assume that the EAT is temporally specified at TU 
(now). The speaker uses the evidence at EAT which coincides with TU to make an inference 
about an anterior event as evident by the post-state interpretation of DAs. Since the sentence 
presents RSI, it follows then that the speaker can only target ERs in his inference, in this case the 
doer of the event i.e. Majdi. This anterior temporal relation is formally captured using the 
temporal lexical entry in (96a) under RSI as follows: 
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     (100)  
             (a)  λp λw λt [AT [Park (w) (t)]] 
 
                → (b)  λp λw λt [AT [Park (w) (t)]: ∃e [Park (w) (t) &  (e,w) ⊆ T & Majdi ∈ Park (e)]] 
 
                       → (c)  λp λw λt [EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & ∃e [Park (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T & 
  
                                                   Majdi ∈ Park (e)]]                                                                              
 
The temporal semantic derivation in (100) corresponds to the semantic denotation in 
(96a) under RSI. The lexical entry in (100b) identifies the temporal structure of the event at issue 
(park) such that the event is instantiated in T and corresponds to the two variables (w) (t); this 
event also comprises the ER (i.e. Majdi). In (100c), a final temporal derivation is given where the 
two temporal relations, relation between EAT and TU and T and EAT, are specified. The former 
(EAT ⊆ TU) captures the temporal reading of the whole utterance (i.e. present) and the latter 
captures the anterior temporal relation of the proposition in the scope of the evidential operator 
i.e. T ˂ EAT.  In (101) below, the derived temporal entry in (100c) is incorporated in the modal 
denotation in (98a) which represents the final temporal and modal denotation of RSI utterances. 
 
     (101)   [[Saaf]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & ∃e [Park (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T &                                                   
                        Majdi ∈ Park (e)]] & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w, EAT)) → ∃ER[Majdi (w')(ER)]]] 
 
The lexical entry in (101) represents the final temporal and modal denotation of the RSI 
in sentence (99) above. The temporal conjunct reads as: the speaker acquires the evidence, in this 
case car parked at EAT which is temporally specified at TU (now). The evidence at EAT is a 
result of an anterior temporal relation between T (in which the event of parking is instantiated) 
and EAT. Since the sentence represents RSI, then the speaker uses the evidence at EAT to make 
an inference about ERs of the anterior event. The modal conjunct reads as: among the accessible 
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worlds w' that are compatible with what the speaker knows in the modal base f (w,EAT), those 
that are ranked higher by the ordering source gST/DOX(w,EAT) are the worlds in which ‘Majdi has 
parked the car’ is instantiated. In other words, ‘Majdi has parked the car’ is true in all the worlds 
w' that are epistemically accessible from w and are the closest to the ideals and speaker’s belief 
with respect to the indirect evidence at EAT.  
 
The same logic also extends to other RSI utterances as in (102) and (103). 
 
 
    (102)   embareH,  lageet                   majdi   Saaf          es-sayarah, bs   mumkin   ‘aHmad (elli)    
                Yesterday, find-PERF.1SG   Majdi  park-DA  the-car         but might       Ahmad  who 
                Safha. 
                PERF-park-it 
                ‘Yesterday, I found that Majdi had parked the car, but maybe Ahmad did.’            
                Intended: ‘Yesterday, [I inferred that] it was Majdi who had parked the car.’ 
                                                 
    (103)    majdi  Saaf         es-sayarah,  bs  huwwa mumkin elli   Safuh               et-treela. 
                 Majdi park-DA  the-car,        but he         maybe   what PERF-park-it  the-truck 
                 ‘Majdi has parked the car, but maybe he parked the truck.’ 
                  Intended: ‘[I infer that] what Majdi has parked is the car.’ 
 
 
The semantic denotation given in (101) can be extended to account for the semantic 
derivation of sentences (102) and (103). The only difference is that in (102), EAT is prior to TU 
i.e. the time at which the speaker collected the evidence is prior to TU and not coincides with TU 
as in (99).  Also, in (103), the speaker is making inference about another ER, in this case the car. 
Thus, the semantic denotation proposed in (98a) can formally capture the semantics of (102) and 
(103) as given in (104) and (105) respectively. 
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    (104)  [[Saaf]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT ˂ TU & T ˂ EAT & ∃e [Park (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T &                                                   
                   Majdi ∈ Park (e)]] & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w, EAT)) → ∃ER[Majdi (w')(ER)]]] 
 
    (105)  [[Saaf]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & ∃e [Park (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T &                                                   
                           Car ∈ Park (e)]] & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w, EAT)) → ∃ER[Car (w')(ER)]]] 
 
The above discussion demonstrates derivation for RSI utterances. Below, I provide 
semantic derivation for CSI utterances. Sentence (78), repeated here as (106), expresses a CSI 
reading as discussed earlier. 
       (106)  Context: Majdi is out of town. Adam and Sami approach Majdi’s house and see that   
                                there appears to be some luggage in the door step and the light is on. Then,   
                                Adam tells Sami: 
 
                   (a)  majdi  jaai. 
                         Majdi come-DA 
                        ‘[I infer that] Majdi has come.’ 
 
First, this sentence comprises a temporal component: the speaker acquires the evidence 
i.e. light is on and luggage at doorstep at EAT which is temporally specified at TU (now). The 
speaker uses the evidence at EAT to make inference about an anterior event i.e. Majdi having 
come home. Since the sentence presents CSI, it follows then that the speaker can target the event 
itself (i.e. coming home). This anterior temporal relation is formally captured using the temporal 
lexical entry in (96a) under CSI as follows: 
     (107)  
             (a)  λp λw λt [AT [Come (w) (t)]] 
 
                → (b)  λp λw λt [AT [Come (w) (t)]: ∃e [Come (w) (t) &  (e,w) ⊆ T]] 
 
                       → (c)  λp λw λt [EAT ⊆ TU & T ˂ EAT & ∃e [Come (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T]] 
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The lexical entry in (107b) identifies the temporal structure of the event at issue (come) 
such that the event is instantiated in T and corresponds to the two variables (w) (t). In (107c), a 
final temporal derivation is given where the two temporal relations (relation between EAT and 
TU and T and EAT) are specified. The former (EAT ⊆ TU) captures the temporal reading of the 
whole utterance (i.e. present) and the latter captures the anterior temporal relation of the 
proposition in the scope of the evidential operator i.e. T ˂ EAT.  In (108) below, the derived 
temporal entry in (107c) is incorporated in the modal denotation in (98b) which represents the 
final temporal and modal denotation of CSI utterances as shown in (108). 
 
  (108)   [[jaai]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT⊆ TU & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w,EAT)) → (T ˂ EAT 
   
                                                      & ∃e [Come (w') (e) &  (e, w') ⊆ T])]] 
 
The lexical entry in (108) represents the final temporal and modal denotation of the CSI 
in sentence (106a) above. The temporal conjunct reads as: the speaker acquires the evidence (i.e. 
CS: light is on and luggage at doorstep) at EAT which is temporally specified at TU (now). The 
evidence at EAT is then used by the speaker to make an inference about an anterior event: Given 
the fact that the light is on and luggage is at doorstep, the speaker infers that what causes these 
results at EAT is an anterior event, which the speaker believes to be ‘Majdi having come home’.  
The modal conjunct reads as: among the accessible worlds w' that are compatible with what the 
speaker knows in the modal base f (w,EAT), those that are ranked higher by the ordering source 
gST/DOX(w,EAT) are the worlds in which ‘Majdi has come’ is instantiated. In other words, ‘Majdi 
has come’ is true in all the worlds w' that are epistemically accessible from w and are the closest 
to the ideals and speaker’s belief with respect to the indirect evidence at EAT.  
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The same logic extends to sentence (109). The only difference is that in (109), the 
speaker makes inference about a posterior event rather than anterior event as shown by the future 
adverbial bukrah ‘tomorrow’. 
      (109)   majdi jaai            bukrah. 
                 Majdi come-DA  tomorrow 
                 ‘Majdi is coming tomorrow.’ 
                 Intended: ‘[I infer that] Majdi is coming tomorrow.’ 
 
 
The temporal derivation of this sentence is given in (110).  
 
 
     (110)  
             (a)  λp λw λt [AT [Come (w) (t)]] 
 
                → (b)  λp λw λt [AT [Come (w) (t)]: ∃e [Come (w) (t) &  (e,w) ⊆ T]] 
 
                       → (c)  λp λw λt [EAT ⊆ TU & EAT ˂ T & ∃e [Come (w) (e) &  (e,w) ⊆ T]] 
 
The semantic derivation in (110c) is then incorporated into the modal denotation in (98b) 
which represents the final temporal and modal denotation of CSI utterances. 
 
  (111)   [[jaai]]= λp λw λt λEAT [EAT⊆ TU & w: ∀w'[w'∈ ( f, gST/DOX, (w, EAT)) → (EAT ˂ T   
                                                      & ∃e [Come (w') (e) &  (e, w') ⊆ T])]] 
 
The temporal conjunct reads as: the speaker acquires evidence at EAT which is 
temporally specified at TU (now). The evidence can be any CS which the speaker believes to be 
evidence for the posterior event. The evidence at EAT is then used by the speaker to make 
inference about the posterior event. The modal conjunct reads as: among the accessible worlds w' 
that are compatible with what the speaker knows in the modal base f (w, EAT), those that are 
350 
 
ranked higher by the ordering source gST/DOX(w, EAT) are the worlds in which ‘Majdi is coming’ 
is instantiated.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the interaction of indirect evidentiality and epistemic modality in. 
It provided further typological support for the close overlap between evidentiality and epistemic 
modality based on data taken from a Semitic language, JA. It also provided further support for 
the proposed evidential account for DAs in the previous chapter: the fact that DAs show a modal 
reading lends support to the indirect/inferential reading of DAs.  
The results of the diagnostics of the level of meaning show that DAs pattern with 
epistemic modals and modal evidentials in St’át’imcets and not with non-modal or illocutionary 
evidentials like the Quechua evidentials. Further support for a modal interpretation of DAs was 
provided based on the interaction of DAs and modal subordination and the behavior of DAs in 
counterfactual copular contexts. On the basis of the empirical findings of these diagnostics, I 
conclude that a modal analysis would account for the behavior of evidential DAs i.e. DAs are 
propositional level operators since they contribute to the truth condition of the proposition 
expressed. Therefore, I analyze DAs as quantifiers over possible worlds, adopting Kratzer’s 
possible world theory (1981, 1991). The analysis provides a unified account of DAs where the 
evidential, modal and temporal components are incorporated. The modal base includes the 
indirect evidence and the ordering source ranks the accessible worlds and picks out the most 
ideal world depending on what the speaker knows at EAT with regard to the indirect evidence. 
The temporal component is also incorporated into the proposed semantic denotation of DAs 
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since it is crucial in establishing the indirect evidence requirement and consequently the 
inferential reading of DAs. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion, Implications and Further Research 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
The main goal of this dissertation was to investigate indirect evidentiality and its 
interaction with modality and temporality in JA. To this end, I have discussed the 
morphosyntactic and semantic nature of DAs as the hallmark of indirect evidentiality in JA. I 
have shown that the semantics and morphosyntax of DAs is far more complex than what had 
been envisaged in the previous literature which had mainly focused on the temporal and non-
verbal features of DAs. I proposed an indirect evidential account to capture the semantics and 
morphosyntax of DAs in JA. I explored the evidential meaning of DAs with regard to its 
interaction with temporal relations and modal contribution; and then proposed a unified semantic 
account that incorporates the two components together, the temporal and the modal components. 
Typologically, the evidential account has shown that evidentiality can be specified temporally. It 
also contributed to the literature of Semitology by providing evidence that evidentiality does 
exist as a separate category in JA, a Semitic language. 
The current study provided a comprehensive criticism of the theoretical and descriptive 
approaches of the semantics of DAs in the literature. Previous approaches of DAs in most Arabic 
dialects are mainly concerned with explaining the temporal behavior of DAs. The temporal 
problem of DAs is concerned with the varied temporal interpretations DAs license in the absence 
of an overt copula, unlike other verbless sentences, and the different aspectual reading encoded 
by DAs. I argued that all these approaches fail to account for the evidential meaning of DAs in 
JA. 
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Morphosyntactically, I investigated the mixed morphosyntactic behavior of DAs in JA. 
The intermediate behavior of DAs has been discussed under verbal and non-verbal analyses.  I 
have shown that none of these analyses can account for the morphosyntax of DAs in JA which 
exhibit both verbal and non-verbal features. 
I have provided arguments against the non-verbal analysis based on agentivity/stativity 
tests, IL vs SL predicates and morphosyntactic diagnostics including word order and interaction 
with copular verbs. I have discussed the implications of these counterarguments for the two 
major classifications of DAs which have been proposed in the literature under the non-verbal 
analysis, specifically the nominal and adjectival classifications. I showed that DAs cannot be 
classified as nominal or adjectival. 
 I have also argued that DAs cannot be accounted for by verbal analysis. The discussion 
concludes that DAs have the features [-Person, -Definiteness] which corroborate their 
morphosyntactic status as a distinct type of predication in JA that is different from verbal and 
non-verbal predicates which are characterized by [+Person, -Definiteness] and [-Person, 
+Definiteness] respectively.  Based on this fact, I showed that DAs constitute a major challenge 
to the ‘verbal vs non-verbal’ view of predication in Arabic in general and in JA in particular.  In 
this regard, I proposed an alternative view of predication in JA based on the modal vs non-modal 
distinction. I subsumed DAs under the category of ‘evidential predicates’ and supported this 
claim by the behavior of PPs in JA which exhibit a similar evidential and morphosyntactic 
behavior. 
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 I concluded that predicates in JA allow for three-way classifications: non-verbal, verbal 
and evidential predicates instead of the two-way view (verbal and non-verbal predicates). The 
three-way classification is better accounted for by a modal vs non-modal distinction instead of 
the conventional verbal and non-verbal view which only accounts for verbal and non-verbal 
predicates and which leaves the evidential predicates (DAs and PPs) unaccounted for. 
Semantically, I proposed an alternative indirect evidential account to capture the 
semantics of DAs in JA contra to the previous literature. DAs have the three basic features of 
indirect evidentiality: (a) speaker-dependency: they have a speaker-oriented meaning, (b) type of 
evidence: indirect evidence i.e. the speaker did not witness the event; rather s/he was told about it 
or inferred it and (c) speaker’s attitude towards the proposition: information is not ascribed to the 
speaker since s/he did not witness the event.  
 DAs have a habitual reading from the perspective of the speaker. The evidence comes 
from the fact that the habitual interpretation with DAs is anchored to the speaker rather than to 
the subject as evident from the entailment test. Under the actuality entailment test, the habitual 
reading with DAs is anchored to the speaker and is true only in the speaker’s belief world rather 
than in the real world. The contrast between the imperfective and DAs also appears in their 
sensitivity to verifying instances. The imperfective usually does not require a verifying instance 
where the imperfective is acceptable even when the ‘event’ has not taken place. However, 
sentences with the DAs are acceptable only when the ‘event’ is verified. Another major 
argument in support of the evidential speaker-oriented reading of DAs comes from the 
distinction between subjective and objective evidence. When objective evidence (evidence 
known to a group of people) is asserted such as describing a universal fact, only the imperfective 
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is allowed; whereas the only situation in which a sentence with a DA is allowed is when 
subjective evidence is at issue: when the speaker himself has found or discovered the situation. 
 DAs assert an indirect evidence requirement similar to indirect evidentials i.e. the speaker 
did not perceive the event. One piece of evidence comes from the fact that DAs are acceptable 
under a cancelation test that negates seeing the event on the part of the speaker. Perfective 
sentences are infelicitous in these contexts. Another piece of evidence comes from the fact that 
DAs are not acceptable in contexts where the speaker perceives the event itself. However, the 
imperfective and the perfective are acceptable when the speaker perceived the event. 
Typologically, I have shown that evidential DAs in JA introduce a temporal contribution to the 
indirect evidence requirement: the indirect evidence is specified temporally rather than 
morphologically or lexically. In this regard, JA differs from other evidential languages where 
direct and indirect evidence is specified by separate morphemes. The indirect evidence induced 
by DAs is a result of two temporal relations:  the event is anterior to the EAT (evidence 
acquisition time) or posterior to it. The former corresponds to a post-state reading and the latter 
corresponds to a futurate reading. 
 As an indirect evidential, DAs trigger inferential readings: RSI and CSI inferential 
readings. The former indicates that there is an entailment between the state (i.e. evidence) and the 
event, and therefore a speaker can only target ERs in his or her inference and the inference about 
the event itself is blocked. In the CSI inferential reading, on the other hand, the lack of entailment 
allows inference to target the event. By this meaning, DAs differ from other inferential evidential 
systems where only a CSI reading is triggered; no RSI reading has been attested in these systems. 
The inferential reading of DAs stems from an epistemic modal component DAs exhibit since they 
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pattern with modals and propositional attitude predicates. The inferential reading is further 
supported by the fact that DAs show an irrealis reading under the actuality entailment test. 
 I also analyzed how DAs pattern with other inferential evidential predicates (evidential 
proper) such as shakluh ‘it looks like’ in JA. I argued that both forms show the core features of 
indirect evidentiality: speaker-oriented reading, indirect evidence and inferential interpretation. 
This analogous behavior lends further support to the indirect evidential analysis of DAs. 
 I probed the evidential meaning of DAs further by claiming that DAs express a mirative 
reading and show sensitivity to the first person. These are one of the notable semantic features of 
indirect evidentiality cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald 2004). Unlike the perfective and the 
imperfective, only DAs are felicitous in contexts where a mirative interpretation is expressed; also 
only DAs show sensitivity to first person. In addition, DAs are used as reported evidentials. 
Reported evidentials are one of the major types of indirect evidentiality. The reported evidential 
covers the type of information acquired through hearsay or someone else’s report. In contexts 
where the speaker acquires his knowledge through hearsay or someone else’s report, JA usually 
employs DAs to communicate the lack of direct evidence. JA speakers use perfectives sometimes 
to encode hearsay reports similar to DAs. When this happens, JA makes explicit reference to the 
speaker’s attitude towards the information s/he obtains through hearsay: with DAs, the speaker 
does not vouch for the information s/he was told about; the speaker distances himself from being 
responsible for the truth of the reported assertion. This modal reading is expected in the case of 
DAs since DAs induce indirect evidence where the speaker does not witness the event at issue. 
With perfectives, on the other hand, the speaker vouches for the truth of his/her assertion as s/he 
might have hard evidence based on which s/he is certain that the event took place.  
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I extended my indirect evidential proposal to account for the semantics of passive 
participles (PPs) in JA. I showed that PPs are indirect evidentials since they pattern with DAs in 
almost all the indirect evidential arguments. Based on this fact, I concluded that active and 
passive participles are the hallmark of evidentiality in JA. This conclusion has its own 
significance not only for the literature of Arabic but for the literature of Semitology as well. This 
is due to the fact that Semiticists have long held that evidentiality as a separate category does not 
actually exist in Semitic languages. Contrary to this belief, I have shown that participle 
morphology is the hallmark of the evidential category in JA, which is a Semitic language. The 
fact that there exists a separate morphological paradigm of participles that differ from other 
predicates and that this morphological structure exhibits evidential semantics supports my claim 
regarding the existence of the evidential category in JA and consequently in Semitology. 
This study also bears on the interaction of indirect evidentiality and epistemic modality. It 
provided a formal semantic account of the modal reading of DAs based on Kratzer’s possible 
worlds theory (1981, 1991). The analysis provides a unified account of DAs where the evidential, 
modal and temporal components are incorporated. The modal analysis of evidential DAs lends 
typological support for the close overlap between evidentiality and epistemic modality. It also 
provides further support to the indirect evidential account of DAs advocated in the current work.   
The results of the diagnostics of the level of meaning show that DAs pattern with epistemic 
modals and modal evidentials and not with non-modal or illocutionary evidentials. Further support 
for the modal analysis has been provided based on the interaction of DAs and modal subordination 
and the behavior of DAs in counterfactual copular contexts. On the basis of the empirical findings 
of these diagnostics I concluded that a modal analysis would account for the behavior of evidential 
DAs i.e. DAs are propositional level operators since they contribute to the truth condition of the 
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proposition expressed. To this end, I analyzed DAs as quantifiers over possible worlds where the 
modal base includes the indirect evidence and the ordering source ranks the accessible worlds and 
then picks out the most ideal world depending on what the speaker knows at EAT. I have also 
incorporated the temporal component in the modal analysis of DAs since anterior and posterior 
temporal relations are essential to the establishment of the indirect evidence requirement and 
consequently to the inferential reading of DAs.  
6.2 Implications of the Study 
The current evidential analysis of DAs has important implications for linguistic studies of 
JA. It also provides some insights into the typological and cross-linguistic research on 
evidentiality as well. 
One significant implication is related to the temporal and aspectual system in JA. This is 
shown by introducing another temporal component, the EAT (evidence acquisition time), which 
serves to revisit the temporal and aspectual denotations of perfect and future readings in JA. In 
this regard, the perfect and future readings split into evidential vs non-evidential: the evidential 
perfect is denoted semantically by DAs where the event is anterior to the EAT; however, the 
non-evidential perfect is denoted pragmatically by the perfective form where no EAT is used. 
The same fact holds for the future reading: the evidential future is denoted by DAs where the 
time of the described eventuality is in posterior relation to the EAT; whereas the non-evidential 
future is denoted by either future particles such as raH ‘will/going to’ or by the imperfective 
where the time of the described eventuality is in a posterior relation to the TU not the EAT. I 
speculate that the same pattern applies to all other temporal and aspectual specifications in JA.  
Thus, the overall picture of temporality in JA that emerges from the new temporal dichotomy of 
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evidential vs non-evidential proves to be more complex than what most previous approaches of 
temporality in Arabic had envisaged. 
Furthermore, the current study has shown another level of interaction between 
temporality and evidential interpretation. This is manifested by the anterior and posterior 
temporal establishment of the indirect evidence requirement and the fact that evidential DAs 
trigger a relative tense reading. This type of interaction allows evidentials to be subsumed under 
the formal theory of tense, aspect and modality. The incorporation of this new evidential 
component and its interaction with all these three components (tense, aspect and modality) will 
lead to new empirical and theoretical insights into the linguistics of JA in particular and the 
dialects of Arabic in general, especially those to which the current evidential account can be 
extended. One possible theoretical insight would be the fact that the notion of evidentiality 
(indirect and direct) in JA is temporally established rather than being morphologically or 
lexically substantiated as attested cross-linguistically (Aikhenvald 2004). In other words, the 
indirect evidence requirement is established via anterior and posterior temporal relations as 
exemplified by the use of DAs. Conversely, the direct evidential interpretation (direct evidence) 
is established via an ‘overlap’ temporal relation between the reference time and the event time as 
exemplified by the use of the imperfective and the  perfective verbal forms.  
The current work has some typological and cross-linguistic implications as well.    
Typologically, Aikhenvald’s (2006) has claimed that evidentiality (the type of evidence) is 
specified cross-linguistically by two means: the first is concerned with expressing evidentiality 
by morphological closed-classes; the other is concerned with evidentiality that is specified 
through lexicalization such as adverbs and sensory verbs.  However, the fact that evidentiality in 
JA is temporally specified re-evaluates this typological claim by enforcing another means of 
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expressing evidentiality, which is the temporal means. The temporal specification lends further 
support to other evidential systems which were recently attested as temporally-specified-
evidential systems such as Korean (Lee 2011) and Bulgarian (Izvorski 1997 and Smirnova 2012) 
among others. However, while JA patterns with these languages in that the type of evidence is 
constrained in a temporal dimension, it also differs from them in that the indirect (inferential) 
evidentiality in JA is not only consequent-state based but also result-state based. I speculate that 
this two-way split in the evidence type (consequent-state vs result-state) might prove to be 
applicable to other evidential languages, especially those in which evidentiality is temporally 
specified and modally-oriented similarly to JA. 
Cross-linguistically, the evidential relative tense analysis has implications for the present 
perfect puzzle.  It has been noted that contrary to past tense, sentences with present perfect 
cannot felicitously license past-time adverbials especially those that denote a specific (definite) 
past time reference such as yesterday, last year, etc… as in (1); this phenomenon has been 
referred to in the literature as present perfect puzzle (Klein 1992 among others)
20
. 
(1) *John has left yesterday. 
Notably, the unacceptability of specific past time adverbials with present perfect 
sentences as in (1) has not been attested for all languages. Cross-linguistically, there are some 
languages where the use of past adverbials with present perfect sentences is not constrained such 
as German, Korean, Icelandic, and Italian among others.
21
 A similar observation has been made  
                                                          
20
 There have been various accounts for this phenomenon in the literature such as Klein (1992), Katz  
    (2003) and Pancheva and Stechow (2006) among others. 
  
21 See Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) and Chung (2005) for various analyses of why Italian and Korean are not  
   subject to the present perfect puzzle. 
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in Arabic as well. For instance, Brustad (2000) has noted that in several dialects of spoken 
Arabic past-time adverbials are perfectly acceptable with present perfect sentences expressed by 
DAs as in (2a and b). Mughazy (2004) has observed a similar pattern for Egyptian Arabic as well 
as in (3). The same fact also obtains for DAs in JA as in (4). I have shown in chapter 4 that past 
adverbials such as embareH ‘yesterday’ can describe the EAT and T as well i.e. it licenses the 
relevant state at EAT and the anterior event included in T. When embareH ‘yesterday’ licenses 
the EAT, T is licensed by another past adverbial. However, when it licenses T, the EAT 
coincides with TU i.e. the result-state holds at TU (present) while at the same time allowing a 
past-time adverbial, embareH ‘yesterday’.   
(2)  
(a) elyoom raani faayeq                           min s-seta. 
today    here-I-am having- woken up from the- six 
‘Look here, today I have gotten up at six.’     
                                                                    (Moroccan Arabic, Brustad (2000:180)) 
 
   
(b) elyoom  faaye’                    ‘s-saa3a  ssite. 
today     having-woken up  the hour  six 
‘Today I have gotten up at six o’clock.’                                                                                                                 
                                                                   (Lebanese Arabic, Brustad (2000:180))  
 
(3) ‘ana dilwa’ti mixalaS    er-risaala           min  sana. 
I      now       finish-DA the-dissertation from year 
‘Now I have finished the dissertation a year ago.’    
                                                                        
                                                                       (Egyptian Arabic, Mughazy (2004:7)) 
   
(4) ‘ana faatiH     el-maHal embaareH. 
I      open-DA the-store   yesterday 
‘I have opened the store yesterday.’               
                                                                       (JA) 
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 The relative evidential tense analysis tentatively accounts for the licensing of past-time 
denoting adverbials in (2-4) by the assumption that evidential relative tense includes two 
reference points, the EAT and T: the result-state holds at EAT which coincides with TU and thus 
licensing the present reading, and T is anterior to EAT and thus licensing the past adverbial. Note 
here that the present perfect interpretation can also be denoted by the perfective form of the verb 
in JA as in (5a). However, when past-time denoting adverbials are used with perfective form, the 
present perfect reading is neutralized (5b) and the sentence is acceptable only under an aorist 
reading i.e. completed event with no current relevance to the TU.   
(5)  
(a) ‘ana hassa faataHt        el-maHal. 
I      now  open-PERF the-store    
‘I have just opened the store .’  
         
(b) ‘ana faataHt        el-maHal  embaareH. 
I      open-PERF the-store   yesterday 
≠ ‘I have opened the store yesterday.’ 
= ‘I opened the store yesterday.’ 
               
  The above observation implicates that there is a two way split with regard to past adverbial 
modification under the present perfect interpretation between evidential perfect predicates such 
as DAs that allow past adverbial modification, and non-evidential perfect predicates such as 
perfectives that do not allow past adverbial modification. I assume that this distinction might 
prove to be cross-linguistically applicable. One piece of evidence comes from the observation of 
Bulgarian as noted in Izvorski (1997) where only evidential prefects allow modification by past 
adverbials (6a) as contrasted to the canonical (non-evidential) present perfect where past 
adverbial modification is precluded (6b). Examples are taken from Izvorski (1997:11). 
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(6)  
(a) Te     došli          (včera)/    (snošti). 
they  come-PE   yesterday/ last night 
‘They apparently came yesterday/last night.’ 
 
(b) Te     sa  došli                 (?? včera)/ (??snošti). 
they are come-P.PART  yesterday/ last night 
‘They have come yesterday/last night.’    
 
6.3 Further Research 
This dissertation has shown that participle constructions express an indirect evidential 
meaning which interacts with the semantic categories of temporality and modality. This evidential 
analysis is based on data from JA. Similarly to JA, most of the Arabic dialects I have reviewed 
outside the scope of this dissertation (Palestinian, Syrian, Egyptian, Moroccan, Gulf Arabic, etc…) 
include active participle constructions which denote anterior i.e. the perfect reading and the 
posterior i.e. futurate reading (See Caubet 1990 and Brustad 2000 for comprehensive 
overviews).Yet, it remains to be investigated whether the current evidential account of participles 
in JA is extendable to other Arabic dialects and whether the type of interaction between 
evidentiality and temporal and modal components found in JA is attested in these dialects as well. 
In this dissertation I focused on the semantic nature of evidentiality in JA. However, there 
is much that needs to be discussed as far as the syntactic nature of evidentiality in JA is concerned. 
Any syntactic analysis of evidential DAs in JA has many questions to consider. First, the current 
study has shown that DAs pattern with modals. However, one might speculate that the category of 
evidentiality in JA splits into modal vs non-modal evidentials as it is the case with many other 
evidential systems (c.f. Faller 2002, Peterson 2010 among others). The question that might arise 
here is how such a split maps onto the syntactic configuration of evidentials in JA. We can assume 
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that the modal evidentials map onto the IP-level since they pattern with modals and the non-modal 
evidentials onto the CP-level since they pattern with speech act operators. Yet, this proposal needs 
further investigation. Second, there is the question of whether an evidential projection exists in JA; 
and if so, what syntactic relation does this have with the fact that DAs (as proposed in the current 
study) do not belong to either verbal or non-verbal predicates. Third, what is the difference 
between the syntactic configuration of evidential sentences in JA and the non-evidential sentences? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
365 
 
Bibliography 
 
 Abney, S. P. (1987). The English Noun Phrase in its Sentential Aspect. Doctoral Dissertation,  
               Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Abusch, D. (1997). ‘Sequence of tense and temporal de re’, Linguistics and Philosophy 20(1):1-  
             50. 
 
Aikhenvald, A. Y. (2004). Evidentiality. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Aikhenvald, A.Y. and Dixon, R. M. W. (ed.). (2003). Studies in Evidentiality. Amsterdam and  
                 Philadelphia: John Benjamins.   
 
Aksu, A. and Slobin, D. I. (1982). ‘Tense, aspect and modality in the use of the Turkish  
            evidential’, Tense-aspect: Between Semantics and Pragmatics: 185-200. 
 
------------. (1986). ‘A psychological account of the development and use of  
              evidentials in Turkish’, in Chafe, W. L. and Nichols, J. (eds.), Evidentiality: The  
              Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 159-167.  
 
Al-Agarbeh, R. (2011). Finiteness in Jordanian Arabic: A Semantic and Morphosyntactic  
                Approach. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas. 
 
Alexiadou, A., Rathert, M. and von Stechow, A. (ed.). (2003). Perfect Explorations. Berlin and  
              New York: Mouton De Gruyter.  
 
Al-haisoni, E., Jarrah, M. A. and Shehadeh, M.S. (2012). ‘An investigation of evidentiality in  
               the Arabic language’, International Journal of Linguistics 4: 260-273.   
 
 
366 
 
Arche, M. J. (2006). Individuals in Time: Tense, Aspect and the Individual/Stage Distinction.  
            Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Bakir, M. (1980). Aspects of Clause Structure in Arabic. Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana  
             University. 
 
Becker, M. (2000). The Development of the Copula in Child English: The Lightness of Be.  
            Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 
 
Belazi, N. (1993). Semantics and Pragmatics of the Tunisian Tenses and Aspects. Doctoral  
           Dissertation, Cornell University. 
 
Benmamoun, E. (2000). The Feature Structure of Functional Categories: A Comparative Study  
               of Arabic Dialects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bhat, D.N.S. (1994). The Adjectival Category: Criteria for Differentiation and Identification. 
              Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Bhatt, R. (1999). Covert Modality in Non-Finite Contexts. Doctoral Dissertation, University of 
    Pennsylvania. 
 
Binnick, R. (1990). Time and the Verb. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Boeder, W. (2000). ‘Evidentiality in Georgian’, in Chafe, W. L. and Nichols, J. (eds.),    
             Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 275-328. 
 
Bolinger, D. (1967). ‘Adjectives in English: attribution and Predication’, Lingua 18: 1-34. 
 
Boneh, N. (2004). ‘Resultative (perfect) in Syrian Arabic’, in Crouzet, O., 
            Demirdache, H. Wauqier-Gravelines, S. Nantes (eds), Proceedings of JEL 2004 
           [Domaines]. University of Nantes, France 
 
367 
 
----------. (2005). Syrian Arabic Active Participles, Subject Resultatives and the Perfect. Ms. The          
                      Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
 
----------. (2010). ‘Perfect constructions in Syrian Arabic’, in Cabredo-Hofherr, Particia & Laca,   
             Brenda (eds.), Layers of Aspect, CSLI Publications, Stanford, 23-42. 
 
Brennan, V. (1993). Root and Epistemic Modal Auxiliary Verbs. Doctoral Dissertation,  
           University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
 
Brustad, K. (2000). The Syntax of Spoken Arabic: A Comparative Study of Moroccan, Egyptian,  
           Syrian, and Kuwaiti Dialects. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Burgess, Don. (1984). ‘Western Tarahumara’, in Langacker, R.W. (ed.), Studies in Uto-Aztecan  
           Grammar Vol. 4, Dallas: Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1-149.  
 
Bybee, J. L. (1985). Morphology: A Study of the Relation Between Meaning and Form.   
           John Benjamins. 
 
Bybee, J. L. and Fleischman, S. (eds). (1995). Modality in Grammar and Discourse.  
            Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Carlson, G. N. (1977). Reference to Kinds in English. Doctoral Dissertation, University of  
            Massachusetts at Amherst. 
 
Caubet, Dominique. (1991). ‘The active participle as a means to renew the aspectual system: A  
             comparative study in several dialects of Arabic’, in A. Kaye (ed.), Semitic Studies in  
             Honor of Wolf Leslau Vol.1,Wiesbaden: otto Harrassowitz, 209-224. 
 
Chafe, W. L. and Nichols, J. (ed.). (1986). Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology.  
                Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
           
368 
 
Chierchia, G. (1995). ‘Individual-level predicates as inherent generics’, The Generic Book, 125. 
 
Chierchia, G. and McConnell-Ginet, S. (1990). Meaning and Grammar. Cambridge, MIT Press.   
 
Chirikba, V. (2003). ‘Evidential category and evidential strategy in Abkhaz’, Typological Studies  
             in Language 54: 243-272. 
 
Chung, K. (2005). Space in Tense: The Interaction of Tense, Aspect, Evidentiality and Speech  
              Act in Korean. Doctoral Dissertation, Simon Fraser University. 
 
Comrie, B. (1976). Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
---------. (1985). Tense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
---------. (1987). The World’s Major Languages. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Condoravdi, C. (2002). ‘Temporal interpretation of modals’, The Construction of Meaning, 59- 
                88. 
 
Copley, B. (2009). The Semantics of the Future. New York: Routledge. 
 
Cowell, M.W. (1964). A Reference Grammar of Syrian Arabic. Washington, DC: Georgetown  
               University Press. 
 
Curnow, T.J. (2002). ‘Types of interaction between evidentials and first-person subjects’,  
                 Anthropological Linguistics, 178-196. 
 
 -------- (2003). ‘Nonvolitionality expressed through evidentials’, Studies in language, 27(1), 39- 
                59. 
 
Dahl, Östen. (1985). Tense and Aspect Systems. New York: Blackwell. 
369 
 
Davidson, D. (1967). ‘The logical form of action sentences’, Essays on Actions and Events 5:  
                 105-148. 
Davis, C., Potts, C. and Speas, M. (2007). ‘The pragmatic values of evidential sentences’, in  
           Gibson, M. and Freidman, T. (eds.), Proceedings of SALT 17, Ithaca, NY: CLC  
           Publications. 
 
Dendal, P. and Tasmowski, L. (2000). ‘Introduction: evidentiality and related notions’, Journal  
           of Pragmatics 33 (3): 339-348.  
 
de Haan, F. (1999). ‘Evidentiality and epistemic modality: Setting the boundaries’, Southwest  
                  Journal of Linguistics, 18(1): 83-101. 
 
----------. (2001). ‘The relation between modality and evidentiality’, Linguistische Berichte 9:  
               201-216. 
 
DeLancey, S. (2001). ‘The mirative and evidentiality’, Journal of Pragmatics, 33(3): 369-382. 
 
Dixon, R. M. (2003). ‘Evidentiality in Jarawara’, in Aikhenvald, A. and Dixon, D. R. (eds.),  
            Studies in Evidentiality, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 165-188.   
 
Dowty, D. R. (1986). ‘The effects of aspectual class on the temporal structure of discourse:  
            semantics or pragmatics?, Linguistics and Philosophy 9(1): 37-61. 
 
Drubig, H. B. (2001). On The Syntactic Form of Epistemic Modality. Ms., University of  
             Tübingen. 
 
Eisele, J. C. (1988). The Syntax and Semantics of Tense, Aspect, and Time Reference in Cairene  
            Arabic. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Chicago. 
 
 
 
370 
 
----------. (1990). ‘Time reference, tense, and formal aspect in Cairene Arabic’ in Mushira, Eid  
              and John, McCarthy (eds.) Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics I: Papers from the First  
              Annual Symposium on Arabic Linguistics, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins,  
              192-233.  
  
---------. (1999). Arabic Verbs in Time: Tense and Aspect in Cairene Arabic. Wiesbaden:  
                 Harrassowitz. 
 
Eksell, K. (1985). ‘On the function of the verbal active participle in northern Arabian narrative  
              texts’, ACTA ORIENTALIA 46: 7-22. 
 
El-Bakry. F. (1990). Active Participles in Colloquial Egyptian Arabic: A Functional Analysis.  
              Doctoral Dissertation, Georgetown University. 
 
El-Hassan, S. A. (1977). ‘Educated spoken Arabic in Egypt and the Levant: A critical review of  
               diglossia and related concepts’ Archivum Linguisticum Leeds 8(2): 112-132.  
 
Enҫ, M. (1996). ‘Tense and modality’, in Lappin, S. (ed.), The Handbook of Contemporary  
             Semantic Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 345-358. 
 
Faller, M. T. (2002). Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua. Doctoral  
                   Dissertation, Stanford University. 
 
-----------. (2003). ‘The evidential and validational licensing conditions for the Cusco Quechua  
                 enclitic-m’, Belgian Journal of Linguistics 16: 7-21. 
 
----------.(2006). ‘Evidentiality below and above speech act’, in Carita Paradis and Lena Egberg   
                  (eds.), Functions of Language, Special Volume.  
 
-----------. (2007). ‘The ingredients of reciprocity in Cuzco Quechua’ Journal of Semantics 24(3):  
                   255-288. 
371 
 
Fassi Fehri, A. (1993). Issues in the Structure of Arabic Clauses and Words. Dordrecht:  
                        Kluwer. 
 
Ferguson, C. A. (1959). ‘Myths about Arabic’, Georgetown Monograph Series on Language and 
               Linguistics 12: 75-82. 
 
von Fintel, K. (2001). ‘Counterfactuals in a dynamic context’, in Kenstowicz, M. (ed.), Ken   
         Hale: A Life in Language, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 123-152. 
 
 
von Fintel, K. and Iatridou. S. (2005) ‘Anatomy of a Modal’, in Gajewski, J.,  Hacquard, V.,  
          Nickel, B. and Yalcin, S. (eds.), New Work on Modality, MITWPL 51, Cambridge, MA: 
          MITWPL. 
 
von Fintel, K., & Gillies, A. S. (2007). ‘An opinionated guide to epistemic modality’, Oxford   
             Studies in Epistemology 2: 32-62. 
 
Fleischman, S. (1982). ‘The future in thought and language: Diachronic evidence from  
           Romance’, Cambridge Studies in Linguistics London, 36. 
 
Friedman, V. A. (1986). ‘Evidentiality in the Balkans: Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Albanian’, in  
           Chafe, W.L. and Nichols, J. (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology,  
            Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 168-187. 
 
Garrett, E. J. (2001). Evidentiality and Assertion in Tibetan. Doctoral Dissertation, University of  
               California, Los Angeles. 
 
Gennari, S. (2003). ‘Tense meaning and temporal interpretation’, Journal of Semantics 20: 35- 
                71. 
 
Giannakidou, A. and Mari, A. (2012). ‘Italian and Greek futures as evidential operators’, 
            To appear in Proceedings CLS 48. 
372 
 
Giorgi, A. and Pianesi, F. (1997). Tense and Aspect: From Semantics to Morphosyntax. Oxford:  
              Oxford University Press. 
 
Givón, T. (1982). ‘Evidentiality and epistemic space’, Studies in Language 4(3):23-49.  
 
----------. (1984). Syntax: An Introduction. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
 
Greenberg, Y. (2002) ‘Two types of quantificational modalized genericity and the interpretation  
              of bare plurals and indefinite singular NPs’, in B. Jackson et al. (eds.),  
       Proceedings of SALT XII, 104-123.  
  
Grimshaw, J. (1990). Argument Structure. The MIT Press. 
 
Hacquard, V. (2006). Aspects of Modality. Doctoral Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of  
               Technology. 
 
Haspelmath, M. (1993). ‘Passive participle across languages’, in Fox, B. and Hopper, P. J. (eds.),  
                Voice: Form and Function, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 151-178. 
 
Heim, I. (1982). ‘Presupposition Projection and the semantics of attitude verbs’, Journal of  
        Semantics 9: 183-221. 
 
Herweg, M. (1991). ‘Perfective and imperfective aspect and the theory of events and  
          states’, Linguistics 29(6): 969-1010. 
 
Higginbotham, J. (2000). Events and event talk: An introduction’, in Higginbotham, J., Fabio  
           Pianesi and Achille Verzi (eds.), Speaking of Events, New York: Oxford University Press.   
 
Higginbotham, J. and Ramchand, G. (1996). The Stage-Level/Individual-Level Distinction and  
           the Mapping Hypothesis. Ms., University of Oxford. 
 
373 
 
Holes, C. (2004). Modern Arabic. Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Hopper, P. J., and Traugott, E. C. (1993). Grammaticalization. Cambridge, Cambridge  
          University Press. 
  
Hoyt , F. (2007), ‘An Arabic Wackernagel clitic? The morphosyntax of negation in Palestinian  
         Arabic’, in Mughazy, M. (ed.), Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics XX, Amsterdam: John   
         Benjamins, 105-134. 
 
Ifantidou-Trouki, E. (1993). ‘Sentential adverbs and relevance’, Lingua 90(1): 69-90. 
 
Isaksson, B. (2000). ‘Expressions of evidentiality in two Semitic languages - Hebrew and   
          Arabic’, in Chafe, W.L. and Nichols, J. (eds.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of  
          Epistemology, 383-397.  
 
Izvorski, R. (1997). ‘The present perfect as an epistemic modal’, in A. Lawson and E. Cho  
             (eds.), Proceedings of SALT ,Vol. 7,  CLC Publications, 222-239. 
 
Jakobson, R. (1971). ‘Shifters verbal categories and the Russian verb’, in R. Jakobson, Selected  
            Writings, Vol II, The Hague: Mouton, 130-147.  
 
Jelinek, E. (1981). On Defining Categories; AUX and Predicate in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic.  
               Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona. 
 
---------. (2002). ‘Agreement, clitics and focus in Egyptian Arabic’, in Jamal Ouhalla and Ur  
               Shlonsky (eds.), Themes in Arabic and Hebrew syntax, London: Kluwer Academic  
               Publishers, 71-106. 
 
Johanson, L. (2003). ‘Evidentiality in Turkic’, in Aikhenvald, A. and Dixon, D. R. (eds.), Studies  
            in Evidentiality, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 273-291. 
374 
 
Johanson, L. and Utas, B. (ed.). (2000). Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian and Neighbouring                        
               Languages, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.   
Kamp, H., and Rohrer, C. (1983).‘Tense in texts’, in Bauerel, R., Schwarze, C. and Von  
          Stechow, A. (eds.), Meaning, Use and Interpretation of Language, Berlin: Mouton de  
          Gruyter, 250-269. 
 
Karawani, H. (2008). Palestinian Passive Participles. MA, Thesis, Hebrew University. 
 
Katz, G. (2003). ‘A modal account of the present perfect puzzle’, in Young, R.B and Zhou, Y.   
           (eds.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory XIII, CLC Publications: Ithaca,  
           NY, 141-161. 
 
Kaufmann, S., Condoravdi, C., and Harizanov, V. (2006). ‘Formal approaches to modality’, in   
          Frawley, W. (ed.), The Expression of Modality, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter,  
          71-106. 
 
Kearns, K. (2000). Semantics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
 
Keenan, L. (1979). ‘On surface form and logical form’, Studies in the Linguistic Sciences  
              8(2):163-203. 
 
Kinberg, N. (1992). ‘Semi-imperfectives and imperfectives: a case study of aspect and tense in  
              Arabic participial clauses’, Lingua 86(4): 301-330. 
 
Klein, W. (1992). ‘The present perfect puzzle’, Language 68(3): 525-552. 
 
----------. (1994). Time in Language. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Kozinceva, N. (2000). ‘Perfect as a means of expressing evidentiality in Modern Eastern  
               Armenian, in Johanson, L. and Utas, B. (eds.), Evidentials: Turkic, Iranian and  
               Neighbouring Languages, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 401-417.   
375 
 
Kratzer, Angelika. (1977). ‘What must and can must and can mean’, Linguistics and Philosophy  
            1: 337-355. 
 
---------. (1981). ‘The notional category of modality’, in H. J. Eikmeyer and H. Rieser (eds.),            
               Words, Worlds, and Contexts.  New Approaches in Word Semantics. Berlin: de Gruyter,              
              38-74. 
 
---------. (1988). ‘Stage-level and individual-level predicates’, in Krifka, M. (ed.), Generecity in  
            Natural Language, Tübingen: University of Tübingen, 247-284.  
 
--------. (1991). ‘Modality’, in A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich (eds.), Semantics: An   
                 International Handbook of Contemporary Research, Berlin: De Gruyter, 639-650. 
 
---------. (1995). ‘Stage-level and individual-level predicates’, in Carlson, G. and Pelletier, F.   
                (eds.), The Generic Book, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 125-175. 
 
---------. (1996). ‘Severing the external argument from the verb’, in J. Rooryck and L. Zarin 
                (eds.), Phrase Structure and the Lexicon. Dortrecht: Kluwer. 
 
---------. (1998). ‘More structural analogies between pronouns and tenses’, in D. Strolovich 
               and A. Lawson (eds.), Proceedings of SALT VIII. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications,  
               Cornell University. 
 
----------. (1986). ‘Conditionals’, CLS 1-15. 
   
Kremers, J. M. (2003). The Arabic Noun Phrase: A Minimalist Approach. Doctoral Dissertation,   
                  Utrecht: LOT.   
 
Krifka M., F. J. Pelletier, G. N. Carlson, A. ter Meulen, G. Link and G. Chierchia. (1995). 
              ‘Introduction’, in G. N. Carlson & F. J. Pelletier (eds.) The Generic Book, Chicago: The 
               University of Chicago Press. 
376 
 
Kripke, S. (1962). ‘Semantical analysis of modal logic I, normal propositional calculi’,  
                Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logic und Grundlagen der Mathematik 9:67-96. 
 
Lazard, G. (1999). ‘Mirativity, evidentiality, mediativity, or other’ Linguistic Typology 3(1): 91- 
              109. 
 
Lee, J. (2011a). ‘The Korean evidential -te: A modal analysis’, Empirical Issues in Syntax and  
                  Semantics 8: 287-311. 
 
Lee, J. (2011b). Evidentiality and its Interaction with Tense: Evidence from Korean. Doctoral  
           Dissertation, The Ohio State University. 
 
Levine, B. C. and Hovav, M. R. (1995). Unaccusativity: At the Syntax-Lexical Semantics  
               Interface. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
Lewis, D. K. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Li, C. N., Thompson, S. A. and Thompson, R. M. (1982). ‘The discourse motivation for the  
            perfect aspect: The Mandarin particle le, in Hopper, Paul (ed.), Between Semantics and  
            Pragmatics, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 19-44. 
 
Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mari, A. (2010). ‘On the evidential nature of the Italian future’, Ms. IJN  
           http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/67/85/49/PDF/Evidential_Future_Italian.pdf. 
 
Matthewson, L. (2004). ‘On the methodology of semantic fieldwork’, International Journal of  
           American Linguistics 70: 369-415. 
 
Matthewson, Lisa, Henry Davis and Hotze Rullmann. (2007). ‘Evidentials as epistemic modals:   
              Evidence from St’át’imcets’, The Linguistic Variation Yearbook 7:201-254. 
377 
 
McCready, E. (2010). ‘Evidential universals’, Evidence from Evidentials, Vancouver: University  
               of British Columbia: 105-127. 
 
McCready, E. and Ogata, N. (2007). ‘Evidentiality, modality and probability’, Linguistics and  
              Philosophy 30(2): 147-206. 
 
Mitchell, T. F. (1978).’ Educated spoken Arabic in Egypt and the Levant, with special reference  
              to participle and tense’, Journal of Linguistics 14(2): 227-58. 
 
Mitchell, T. F. and El-Hassan, S. A. (1994). Modality, Mood, and Aspect in Spoken Arabic: With  
              Special Reference to Egypt and the Levant. London and New York: Kegan Paul  
              International. 
 
Mughazy, M. (2004). Subatomic Semantics and the Active Participle in Egyptian Arabic.  
              Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 
Mushin, I. (2001). Evidentiality and epistemological stance: Narrative retelling.  
             Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Murray, S. E. (2010). Evidentiality and the Structure of Speech Acts. Doctoral Dissertation,  
            Rutgers University. 
 
Nedjalkov, V. P. (ed.). (1988). Typology of Resultative Constructions. Amsterdam: John  
             Benjamins.  
 
Nikolaeva, I. (2000). ‘The semantics of northern Ostyak evidentials’, JSFO (Journal de la  
              Société Finno-Ougrienne) 88: 131-59. 
 
Nuyts, J. (2001a). ‘Subjectivity as an evidential dimension in epistemic modal  
          expressions’, Journal of Pragmatics 33(3): 383-400. 
378 
 
Nuyts, J. (2001b). Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization. Amsterdam and  
           Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
 
Ogihara, T. (1996). Tense, Attitudes, and Scope. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Palmer, F. R. (1986). Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pancheva, R. and A. von Stechow. (2004). ‘On the present perfect puzzle ’in K. Moulton and M.  
             Wolf (eds.), Proceedings of NETS 34, GLSA: Amherst, MA, 469-484.  
 
Papafragou, A. (2000). Modality: Issues in the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface. Elsevier. 
 
-------------. (2006).’ Epistemic modality and truth conditions’, Lingua 116(10): 1688-1702. 
 
Partee, B. (1973). ‘Some structural Analogies between tenses and pronouns in English’, The   
            Journal of Philosophy 70: 601-609. 
 
----------. (1984). ‘Nominal and temporal anaphora’, Linguistics and Philosophy 7:243-286. 
 
----------. (1988). Possible worlds in model-theoretic semantics: A linguistic perspective, in  
             Allen, S. (ed.), Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts, and Sciences: Proceedings of Nobel  
            Symposium, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 93-123.  
  
Parsons. T. (1990). Events in the Semantics of English. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Perlmutter, D. (1978) ‘Impersonal Passives and the Unaccusative Hypothesis,’ in J. Jaeger et al.,  
           (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society,  
           University of California, Berkeley, 4, 157-189. 
 
Peterson, T. R. G. (2010). Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality in Gitksan at the Semantics- 
             Pragmatics Interface. Doctoral Dissertation, University of British Columbia. 
379 
 
Portner, P. (2003). ‘The (temporal) semantics and (modal) pragmatics of the  
            perfect’, Linguistics and Philosophy 26(4): 459-510. 
 
----------. (2005). What is Meaning? Fundamentals of Formal Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
----------. (2009). Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Potts, C. (2005). The Logic of Conventional Implicature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Pullum, G. K. (1988). ‘Topic…comment: citation etiquette beyond thunderdome’, Natural  
             Language and Linguistic Theory 6: 579-588. 
 
Raposa, E. and Uriagareka, J. (1995). ‘Two types of small clauses (Toward a syntax of  
      theme/rheme relations)’, Syntax and Semantics 28: 179-206. 
 
Reichenbach, H. (1947). Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Roberts, C. (1987). Modal Subordination, Anaphora, and Distributivity. New York: Garland 
 
-----------. (1989). ‘Modal subordination and pronominal anaphora in discourse’, Linguistics  
           and Philosophy, 12(6): 683-721. 
 
Rullmann, H., Matthewson, L. and Davis, H. (2008). ‘Modals as distributive indefinites’,  
             Natural Language Semantics 16:317-357. 
 
Schenner, M. (2010). ‘Evidentials in complex sentences: foundational issues and data from  
             Turkish and German’, in M. Schenner R-M. Dechaine, T. Peterson and U. Sauerland  
             (eds.), Evidence From Evidentiality, Vancouver: University of British Columbia  
             Working Papers in Linguistics. 
 
380 
 
Schlichter, A. (1986). ‘The origins and deictic nature of Wintu evidentials’,  in Chafe, W.L. and  
            Nichols, J. (eds.), Evidentiality: The linguistic Coding of Epistemology, Norwood: Ablex. 
 
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge:  
           Cambridge university press. 
  
Searle, J. R. and Vanderveken, D. (1985). Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. CUP Archive. 
  
Sener, N. (2011). Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Turkish. Doctoral Dissertation,  
             University of Connecticut.  
 
Shlonsky, U. (1997). Clause Structure and Word Order in Hebrew and Arabic: An Essay in  
           Comparative Semitic Syntax.  New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Simons, J. T, Mandy, Beaver, D. and Roberts. C. (2010). ‘What projects and why’, in Lutz, D.  
             and Li. N (eds.), Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 20, Ithaca,  
             NY: Cornell University. 
 
Smirnova, A. (2012). ‘Evidentiality in Bulgarian: Temporality, epistemic modality and  
              information source’, Journal of Semantics: 1-54. 
 
Smith, C. (1997). The Parameter of Aspect. Dordechet/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic  
              Publishers. 
 
Speas, T. and Tenny, C. (2003). ‘Configurational properties of point of view roles’ in Sscuillo,  
          Anna Maria Di (ed.), Asymmetry in Grammar, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 315-344. 
 
Speas, P. (2008). ‘On the syntax and semantics of evidentials’, Language and Linguistic  
          Compass 2(5): 940-965. 
 
381 
 
Stephenson, T. (2005). ‘Assessor sensitivity: Epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste’,  
            in  Gajewski, J.,  Hacquard, V., Nickel, B. and Yalcin, S. (eds.), New Work on Modality,  
            MIT working papers in linguistics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MITWPL, Vol. 51,179- 
            206.  
 
Stone, M. (1994). ‘The reference argument of epistemic must’, Proceedings of IWSC 1:181-   
              190. 
 
Tatevosov, S. (2001). ‘From resultatives to evidentials: Multiple uses of the perfect in Nakh- 
              Daghestanian languages’, Journal of Pragmatics 33: 443-464. 
 
Thompson, S. A. (1988). A discourse approach to the cross-linguistic category ‘adjective’, in J.  
              A. Hawkins (ed.), Explaining Language Universals, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 167-85. 
 
Traugott, E. C. (1989). ‘On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An example of  
           subjectification in semantic change’, Language: 31-55. 
 
von Stechow, A. (1995). Tense in Intentional Contexts: Two Semantic Accounts of Abusch’s  
              Theory of Tense. Ms, University of Tübingen. 
 
Verkuyle, H. (1999). ‘Tense, aspect and aspectual composition’, in Hellen, L. and  Vulchanova,  
              D. (eds.), Topics in South-Slavic Syntax and Semantics, Amsterdam: John Benjamins,  
              123-162.  
 
Waldie, R., Peterson, T., Rullmann, H., and Mackie, S. (2009). ‘Evidentials as epistemic modals  
            or speech act operators: Testing the tests’, in Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on  
            Structure and Consituency in Languages of the America (WSCLA), Vancouver:  
            University of British Columbia Working Papers in Linguistics. 
 
382 
 
Werner, T. (2006). ‘Future and non-future modal sentences’, Natural Language Semantics 14(3):  
              235-255. 
 
Westmoreland, R. (1995). ‘Epistemic must as evidential’, in Dekker, P. and Stokhof, M. (eds.),  
                   Proceedings of the 10th Amsterdam Colloquium II, ILLC, Amsterdam, 683-702. 
 
Willett, T. (1988). ‘A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticizations of evidentiality’, Studies  
            in Language 12: 51–97. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
           
 
  
    
 
  
